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 This study examines the conflicts, contradictions, and assumptions of policy-makers 
who tried to reconcile the transformation of U.S. communications policy from a theoretical 
paradigm that included public service idealism and social aspiration to a regulatory regime 
that came to be dominated by market forces pragmatism.  Although there has never been a 
universally accepted articulation of broadcasters’ obligations to the public that has remained 
consistent over time, the struggle over this contested terrain came to dominate the 
controversy over media ownership regulations during Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) Chairman Michael Powell’s tenure from 2001-2004.  Powell’s emphasis on economic 
competition as a means to serve the public interest in broadcasting did not resonate with the 
interpretive communities whose support was needed to forward his agenda.  This study 
investigates the gulf between Powell’s interpretation of the public interest and that of other 
stakeholders groups in the policy-making process. 
 The data examined for this project include several types of primary sources: official 
FCC policy memoranda and orders, statements, research reports, the text of speeches made 
by FCC commissioners, as well as transcripts of public hearings conducted throughout the 
period of study.  Additional data were gathered from Congressional hearings and testimony, 
legal documents and decisions, and research reports conducted by public service 
organizations.  Secondary sources were used to provide context.  Trade journals, academic
  iv 
journals, newspapers, other periodicals produced by interested parties are included in this 
category.   
 This study grouped policy stakeholders into relatively discrete interpretive 
communities so that the perspectives of each could be examined.  Although the FCC, 
Congress, the courts, industry groups, and the public have varying degrees of influence over 
policy decisions, each of these groups had unique perspectives that contributed to policy-
making process during the FCC’s Third Biennial Review procedures.  
 This study finds that despite the comprehensive reappraisal of communications policy 
that was ushered in after the enactment of the Telecommunication Act of 1996, the focus of 
the FCC on pragmatic market considerations did not diminish the desire of some 
stakeholders to perpetuate communications policy that includes a measure of social 
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This study examines the conflicts, contradictions, and assumptions of 
stakeholders in the policy-making process that tried to reconcile the transformation of 
U.S. communications policy from a theoretical paradigm that included public service 
idealism and democratic theory to a regulatory regime that came to be dominated by 
market forces pragmatism.  Both those who study broadcast policy and those who make it 
have been struggling to define the parameters of the public service obligations of 
broadcasters since the passage of the Radio Act of 1927 (Barnouw, 1966, 1968, 1970; 
McChesney, 1993).  Even though there has never been a universally accepted articulation 
of broadcasters’ obligations to the public that has remained consistent over time, the 
assumption that mass communication policy is an essential component of a functioning 
democracy has persisted (Avery & Stavitsky, 2003; Napoli, 2001a).  Even so, the 
definition of what actually constitutes the public’s interest has been undergoing a radical 
transformation since at least as far back as the Reagan administration (Aufderheide, 
1999; Krasnow, Longley, & Terry, 1982; McChesney, 1999, 2004b; Streeter, 1996).  As 
the shift from maintaining a robust marketplace of ideas in broadcasting gave way to the 
promotion of a competitive economic marketplace, Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) policy moved inexorably toward deregulatory policies.  By the time 
that Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, complete with its provision
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 requiring a biennial review and justification for any remaining regulatory restrictions on 
broadcast ownership policies, deregulation had become the dominant ideology by the end 
of the 20st century (Conrad, 1989; Johnson, 1998; Price & Duffy, 1997).  
This study is focused on the question of why FCC Chairman Michael Powell 
failed to enact his deregulatory agenda during his tenure despite enjoying the support of  
most of the interested stakeholders in the policy-making process (Ahrens, 2005; Labaton, 
2005).  This project makes an important contribution to our understanding of shifting 
conceptions of the public service responsibilities of broadcasters during this crucial 
transition from an analog to digital media environment that is characterized by the 
appearance of greater consumer choice, technological convergence, and ownership 
consolidation.  Although many scholars have studied the telecommunications policies 
created by the FCC, there is no comprehensive interpretation of the controversial 
decisions rendered by this agency during the Powell years. 
 
Background to the Study 
 
 When Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996 the intent was to 
update the regulations that had governed the fastest growing sector of our economy to 
allow for the growth and diffusion of new technological innovations and to better serve 
the public in the a new media environment.  However, Congress never addressed the 
contradictions inherent in the regulatory regime, nor did it reconcile those inconsistencies 
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which contained the following clause: 
The Commission shall review its rules adopted pursuant to this section and all of 
its ownership rules biennially as part of its regulatory reform review under section 
11 of the Communications Act of 1934 and shall determine whether any of such 
rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.  The 
Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in 
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the public interest.  (Telecommunications Act of 1996, §202(h), pp.111–12)  
 
 This small section of a long and complicated bill exacerbated the tension between 
differing conceptions of what constituted the public interest in broadcasting.  When FCC 
Chairman Powell attempted to further deregulate media ownership as part of the biennial 
review process in 2003, the agency was inundated by objections to the proposed rules by 
citizen groups from across the political spectrum.  The FCC received approximately 2.5 
million letters and comments from citizens and public service organizations with the vast 
majority opposed to the proposed changes (Fallows, 2003; Hickey, 2003b).  Despite the 
record number of comments filed imploring the FCC to reconsider the redefinition of the 
public service responsibilities of broadcast companies, Powell held only one public 
hearing.  Shortly thereafter, the FCC passed the new rules by a highly contentious 3-2 
vote divided along party lines.  Subsequently, Congress passed legislation that allowed 
for a more moderate relaxation of the number of stations that a media corporation could 
control nationally (Labaton, 2004).  
After the passage of the new rules, a coalition of citizen’s groups challenged the 
new regulations (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  Eventually, the Third 
District Court in Philadelphia remanded the rules back to the FCC, saying that they were 
arbitrary and capricious.  On January 28, 2005, the Justice Department announced that it 
would not petition the Supreme Court for certiorari to support an appeal for this case 
(Ahrens, 2005; Labaton, 2005). 
 
Public Interest Theory 
 The theory that broadcasters have service obligations to the public was first 
advanced during the radio conferences held in the 1920s, and then again in the Radio Act 
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of 1927 (Benjamin, 1998; Douglas, 1987; Engelman, 1996; McChesney, 1993).  This Act 
established the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) and gave it authority to regulate the 
growing broadcast industry.  The Commission was charged with allocating licenses and 
protecting the technical integrity of the electromagnetic spectrum.  Equally important was 
the provision that broadcasters were obligated to provide programming that met the 
“public interest, convenience, or necessity.”  Congress renewed the authority of the 
Commission for 1 year in 1928 and then again for the duration of the law.  In 1934, 
Congress passed the Communications Act that permanently established the FCC and kept 
most of the provisions of the Radio Act largely intact, including the public interest, 
convenience, or necessity clause.  The two acts also placed limits on the number of 
stations one entity could own in a given location.  The theoretical foundation was that 
diversity of ownership would lead to a more diverse array of programming perspectives 
that were available to the public.  Therefore, the number of outlets any one entity could 
own was limited.1
  
 Although the caps were gradually relaxed over the years, media 
ownership rules represent a classically liberal theory of the First Amendment, in that they 
were created to encourage competition as a means in which an abundant marketplace of 
ideas could function within the electromagnetic spectrum (Bunker, 2001; Pember & 
Calvert, 2008-2009).  
                                                 
1 In its 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, the FCC defined five types of diversity; 
viewpoint, outlet, program, source, and minority and female ownership. In the same 
document, the FCC described localism as a broadcaster’s obligation to be responsive to 
the needs and interests of local communities.  In describing its policy objective of 
achieving competition, the FCC stated that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
embodied the philosophy that competition is the most effective means of producing the 
marketplace results that best serve the public interest (FCC, 2003i, p. 19). 
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Deregulation 
 By the late 1970s, the media environment, as well as the political environment, 
began to shift toward deregulatory practices (Krasnow et al., 1982).  Instead of focusing 
on broadcasting and the public interest, regulators began to emphasize the technical 
aspects of regulation.  As satellite, cable, and other new delivery systems became more 
widespread, the spectrum scarcity doctrine that had provided the rationale for regulation 
of broadcasting appeared to be an anachronism.  When President Reagan came into office 
in 1980, the administration pushed aggressively for deregulation across many industries.  
In the appointment of Mark Fowler to the top post at the FCC, Reagan appointed a leader 
who believed that economic efficiency and competition in the marketplace would best 
serve the public’s interest (Fowler & Brenner, 1982).  
 In the early 1990s, most Americans were able to access a vast array of media 
services (Aufderheide, 1999; Meyerson, 1997; Price & Duffy, 1997).  Consequently, 
following the lead of the FCC, legislators reasoned that the structure of the contemporary 
media environment no longer required a regulatory regime supported by the spectrum 
scarcity rationale.  When Senator Lott introduced the Telecommunications Competition 
and Deregulation Act in 1995, he said:  
 Most telecommunications policy and regulation in America is based upon theNew 
 Deal era Communications Act of 1934.  Tight government control over spectrum-
 based services was justified on a scarcity theory.  Neither theory for big 
 government regulation holds true today, if it ever did.  (Telecommunications 
 Competition and Deregulations Act, 1995, p. 7881) 
 
 By the mid-1990s, it was assumed that the public interest, convenience, or 
necessity would best be served by allowing a competitive marketplace to dictate the 
structure of broadcasting.  This redefinition of the public interest was partially due to the 
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perceived promise of new technologies.  In his speech introducing Senate Bill 652, 
Senator Pressler said: 
 The future of America's economy and society is inextricably linked to the 
 universe of telecommunications and computer technology.  Telecommunications 
 and computer technology is a potent force for progress and freedom, more 
 powerful than Gutenberg's invention of the printing press five centuries 
ago, or Bell's telephone and Marconi's radio in the last century.  This force has 
helped us reach today's historic turning point in America. (Telecommunications 
Competition and Deregulations Act, 1995, p. 7881) 
  
 The following year, Senator Pressler presented a conference report that proposed 
a compromise to reconcile differences between the House and Senate version of the 
legislation that would become the Telecommunications Act of 1996.   
Competition, not regulation, is the best way to spur innovation and the 
development of new services.  A competitive marketplace is the most efficient 
way to lower prices and increase value for consumers.  More competitive 
American telecommunications markets will promote United States technological 
advances, domestic job and investment opportunities, national competitiveness, 
sustained economic development, and improved quality of American life more 
effectively than regulation.  (S. Rpt. No. 686, 1996, p. 42) 
  
 The 1996 rewrite of the Communications Act of 1934 was designed to create a 
regulatory environment that would knock down the old barriers between the different 
sectors of telecommunications (Aufderheide, 1999; Meyerson, 1997).  Traditional 
regulatory definitions of mass media, computing, and telephony were seen as artificial 
restraints that were no longer relevant.  Therefore, it was reasoned that the public interest 
would be served by meeting the needs of consumers who would benefit from the 
availability of new, inexpensive, information delivery systems.  When the 
Telecommunications Act finally passed, it contained provisions that further loosened the 
already eroding media ownership restrictions that had been in place. 
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 While President Clinton’s administration supported the passage of the act, there 
was increasing concern over the issue of media consolidation during the later years of 
Clinton’s presidency (Napoli, 2001a; Smith, 2003).  Clinton appointed FCC Chairman 
William Kennard supported the few existing limits on ownership, created incentives to 
encourage diversity of ownership by minority broadcasters, and attempted to create a new 
low-power noncommercial radio service designed to promote community broadcasting 
(Stavitsky, Avery, & Vanhala, 2001).  Although Kennard’s agenda to encourage public 
service broadcasting through innovation of services was supported by many members of 
the public from across the political spectrum, Congress did not support his efforts.  
Subsequently, under pressure from Congress, in 1999 the FCC voted to allow duopolies 
under limited conditions and voted to further relax limits on cross-ownership of television 
and radio stations (Cooper, 2003; McChesney, 2004b). 
 Broadcasters argued that the media ownership rules were arbitrary and capricious 
and were an impediment to doing business in an era of dwindling viewership for 
broadcast television.  Fox Broadcasting Company contended that the caps provided by 
the National Television Station Ownership Rule (35%) and the Cable/Broadcasting 
Cross-Ownership Rule were invalid (Fox v. FCC, 2002).  The District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals struck down the FCC’s ban on cross-ownership but said that a national 
ownership cap was constitutional in general.  However, the court also ordered the FCC to 
show why the cap of 35 % was not arbitrary and capricious.  In other words, the Court 
ordered the FCC to provide empirical evidence to support its claim that the existing 
ownership rules did in fact preserve diversity and the public’s interest (Cooper, 2003; 
McChesney, 2004b).
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Genesis and Justification of the Problem 
 Clearly, public dissatisfaction with the content, form, and function of broadcast 
media is nothing new.  However, given the number of objections to policy changes that 
have an enormous impact on the nature of how and where Americans receive 
information, the public outcry denouncing increased media consolidation is especially 
important.  The years between 2001-2005, the years of Powell’s tenure as Chairman of 
the FCC, represent a period of significant public backlash against policies favoring 
deregulation of the telecommunications industry as a whole.  
 When President Bush appointed Michael Powell to head the Commission in 2001, 
one of the first things he did after taking the helm was to commission 12 research studies 
designed to provide empirical data to address the very issues that were before the courts 
(Huntemann, 2004; Smith, 2003).  The White House clearly supported a deregulatory 
agenda, as did Powell.   
  When the court issued its opinion in Fox v. FCC, Powell saw it as the perfect 
opportunity to relax ownership rules (Smith, 2003).  He was quoted as saying on many 
occasions that the court had ordered the FCC to reexamine the rules based on the 
Telecommunications Act provision for biennial reviews (Hickey, 2003a).  The FCC 
solicited public comments on the issue, and the public responded in droves.  The FCC 
received more public comments from individuals and public interest groups across the 
political spectrum than it had received about any other matter in the entire history of 
broadcast regulation.  Despite evidence that the vast majority of the comments the FCC 
received were opposed to any relaxation of media ownership restrictions, Powell held 
only one public hearing on the issue in Richmond, Virginia.  
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 As Hickey (2003a) reported in the Columbia Journalism Review, “Soon, groups 
who had been only peripherally involved in the loose coalition became increasingly 
angered by Powell's intransigence” (Hickey, p. 26).  The two Democratic Commissioners 
at the FCC, Copps and Adelstein, were also outraged (Labaton, 2005).  In fact, the 
Commissioners were so opposed to Powell’s position that they held a series of unofficial 
public hearings across the country.  Record crowds turned up at all of these hearings, and 
the overwhelming consensus was opposed to further consolidation in the broadcast 
industry.  On June 2, 2003, the Commission ignored the public outcry and voted along 
party lines to relax ownership restrictions across the board.  Several weeks later, the 
Senate responded to public pressure with a compromise bill limiting the national 
ownership cap to 39%, down from the 45% cap that was passed by the FCC.  In April 
2004, the Philadelphia District Court remanded the new rules back to the FCC saying that 
the data commissioned by the FCC were grossly flawed and were therefore arbitrary and 
capricious.  Powell was widely criticized for his actions on the matter, and for months 
there were rumors of his departure.  The White House backed off of its support of Powell, 
and finally, in January of 2005, Powell announced that President Bush had accepted his 
resignation (Powell, 2005).  
Statement of the Problem 
 The purpose of this study is fourfold.  The objectives are (a) to situate the 
communications policy environment from 2001-2004 against the historical background 
of broadcast regulation in the face of growing media consolidation, (b) to analyze the 
specific policy implementation practices of the FCC during the 4-year period under 
consideration, (c) to analyze the arguments of citizen groups opposed to the 
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communications policies enacted by the FCC, and (d) to compare and contrast the public 
interest arguments generated by the FCC and citizens groups in order to provide a critical 
analysis of FCC performance, 2001-2004.  The research questions derived from this 
statement of the problem are as follows: 
1. How did the competing public interest definitions advanced by FCC Commissioners 
contribute to the formulation of broadcast ownership policy procedures and practices 
during this period? 
 
2. How did the Telecommunications Act of 1996 reframe the communications 
environment? 
 
3. To what extent did the competing interpretations extant during this time period 
contribute to the specific procedures for generating public response to proposed 
rulemaking? 
 
4. To what extent did the range of public comments contribute to subsequent policy-
making during these years? 
 
5. What are the competing values embodied in the FCC’s rulemaking, the public response 
to that policy decision, and in the Court’s response to those decisions in Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC? 
 
 
Survey of the Literature 
 
Although this study was focused primarily on the time period of Chairman 
Powell’s tenure at the helm of the FCC, it is necessary to understand the historical 
evolution of broadcast regulation in order to interpret how the definition of public service 
broadcasting has evolved.  Many historical works were consulted during the process of 
conducting this study.  Horowitz (1989) traces the origins of the public interest in 
broadcasting to the early 19th century when the nation was developing government-
sponsored infrastructure projects.  States and municipalities entered into public-private 
partnerships and began to grant charters of incorporation to private developers if they 
worked on projects that were “affected with a public interest.”  During this era, 
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corporations were granted access to public resources if they were perceived to provide a 
communal service.  As the century progressed, the classic liberal legal paradigm that 
governed our early history expanded to include a corporativst perspective. 
However, as the telegraph developed in midcentury, there were those who felt that 
the structure of the communications infrastructure should be a public resource.  The 
theory that the telegraph could provide a service that was in the public interest was 
endorsed by Samuel Morse himself.  Yet, Czitrom (1982) describes the tension between 
regulators who envisioned the utopian possibilities of the new technology and the tension 
between the more pragmatic concerns of politicians and corporations who understood the 
economic and ideological power the telegraph represented.  Additionally, Czitrom’s  
discussion of the challenges and opportunities presented by the telegraph is particularly 
insightful as it demonstrates how the potential for advancing a more participatory 
democracy through the use of technology was seen as a lost opportunity after Western 
Union gained its monopoly over the industry.   
Since most serious broadcast policy analysts agree that the concept of public 
interest broadcasting is closely related to theories of self-government, democracy, and 
freedom of the press, it is reasonable to assume that early policy-makers were influenced 
by theorists such as Zachariah Chaffee, who wrote passionately about the social interest 
contained in the First Amendment.  In 1919, the same year that Oliver Wendell Holmes 
made his famous declaration that the truth should be able to compete in a robust 
marketplace of ideas, Chaffee (1919) discussed the importance of maintaining “a social 
interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest 
course of action, but carry it out in the wisest way” (p. 985).  Thirty years later 
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Meiklejohn (1948) discussed his theory of free speech and wrote, “the unabridged 
freedom of public discussion is the rock on which this government stands” (p. 86).  While 
Dewey (1991) was not a legal theorist, his discussions of community and broadcasting 
surely influenced the intellectuals of his day.  Contemporary First Amendment scholars 
such as Sunstein (1995), Bollinger (1986), and Bunker (2001) have also written about 
how the social intent of the First Amendment can be used to inform public interest policy 
decisions in the media. 
 As wireless telegraphy and radio appeared on the scene, legislators struggled over 
how to structure the nascent broadcasting industry.  Sterling and Kittross (1990), 
Barnouw (1966), and McChesney (1993) argue that after World War I there was a 
growing sense that regulators had made a mistake when they allowed the telegraph to 
become a strictly commercial and mostly unregulated service.  Douglas’ (1987) history of 
the years between Marconi’s first demonstrations of wireless telegraphy until the radio 
conferences of the 1920s explains how an estimated 250,000 amateur radio operators 
advanced the argument that a diversity of voices in broadcasting defined, at least in part, 
the public interest.  As Engelman (1996) also demonstrates in his history of public radio 
and television in America, many educators argued that national resources such as the 
public airwaves should be employed in service to the public.  Educators, particularly 
those from the large land-grant universities, sought to extend their educational missions 
to the electronic spectrum and created distance-learning opportunities for the public. 
 McChesney’s (1993) history of the broadcast reform movement, 1927-1935, 
demonstrates that there was a highly contested struggle during those years regarding who 
would get to define the public interest in broadcasting.  The majority of Congress 
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rationalized that a commercial system of broadcasting was preferable to one dominated 
by noncommercial broadcasters because corporations had more resources and therefore 
could develop a national service.  However, a substantial minority of Congress and the 
general public favored a system that would provide for a diversity of voices, viewpoints, 
and owners across the spectrum.  
 Streeter’s (1996) critical theory of corporate liberalism is perhaps the most 
encompassing explanation for how the regulatory structure that was developed early in 
the last century came into being.  Inevitably, the contemporary structure of broadcasting 
evolved to become a system dominated by fewer and fewer multinational corporations.  
According to Streeter, broadcasting could not have developed any other way because the 
principles of corporate liberalism that were established at the beginning of the 19th 
century were already firmly established before radio appeared on the scene.  Streeter 
argues that predominant American values such as faith in professional expertise, 
functionalism, and faith in technology as an instrument for achieving social goals, made 
it predictable that corporations would end up “owning” the airwaves.  There was simply 
no way that regulators could trust amateurs, teachers, or hobbyists to preserve or promote 
the public interest.  Streeter, McChesney (1993), and Blakely (1979) make a convincing 
case that an overriding belief in the infallibility of corporate liberalism resulted in a lack 
of critical assessment of the failures of capitalism.  The public interest in broadcasting 
was not the highest priority for regulators. 
 Baughman (1981) and Armstrong (2002) examined the policy failures of the FCC 
during the period after World War II when utopian hopes for television were soaring.  
Baughman’s thesis is that since the FCC was never an independent regulatory agency but 
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was in fact dependent on Congressional and Presidential support for its power to regulate, 
it was precluded from preventing television from becoming a “vast wasteland.”  
Therefore, when the agency attempted to enforce public interest standards, it never had 
enough power on its own to face off against competing commercial and political 
interests.  This perspective conforms to Howowitz’s (1989) theory of regulatory capture.  
Armstrong’s study of localism, how it was defined, enforced, and extended, illustrates 
how ambivalent the agency itself was over the definition of public service broadcasting.  
The assumption that the public would somehow be served well if there were live, local 
programming, produced by broadcasters with roots in the communities they served, was 
given much lip service.  However, due to the FCC’s vacillating policy statements and 
sporadic attempts to enforce the standards they could define, the competing values of 
media corporations won out over even the most  broad interpretations of public interest 
broadcasting. 
 As the hopes that many had for a television service that could create a public 
forum for the exchange of ideas seemed to fade, educators stepped up to the plate and 
lobbied for a noncommercial service that could offer an alternative (Witherspoon, Kovitz, 
Avery, & Stavitsky, 2000).  After the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 passed, Avery and 
Pepper (1974) documented the problems and concerns raised by creating an institution 
that was never fully funded and never fully insulated from the vagaries of political trends.  
Many other scholars have continued to criticize the policies that resulted in a grand 
experiment that was to produce and define public interest programming on a public 
broadcasting network, one that has never been fully realized (Brown, 1971; Day, 1995; 
Engelman, 1995; Hoynes, 1994; Ledbetter, 1997b; Stavitsky, 1995). 
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 When Bagdikian first published his seminal work on media monopolies in 1983, 
he raised the issue of whether media consolidation was harmful to democracy.  Other 
critical scholars have since advanced his work (see, for example, Chester, 2005; Cooper, 
2005; Klinenberg, 2007; McChesney, 1999, 2004a, 2004b).  Aufderheide’s (1999) 
analysis of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 looks at the long-reaching economic, 
political, technological, and public service ramifications of the act.  Her assertion that 
legislators retained the public service components of broadcast regulation, even while 
they redefined its very meaning, is particularly instructive.  Meyerson (1997) and Price 
and Duffy (1997) suggest that despite all of the deregulatory rhetoric espoused by 
Congress during the process that led to the passage of the Telecommunications Act, many 
of the same regulatory divisions that existed prior to the act were retained.  Consequently, 
a less competitive marketplace exists in many discrete segments of telecommunications 
regulation.  Thus, despite regulatory reliance on competition as a means to meet the 
public interest in broadcasting, increased consolidation in media spurred on by 
deregulatory practice has decreased public service. 
Other articles published in academic and law journals show that deregulation, in 
one form or another, has weakened specific measures designed to meet the public interest 
in broadcasting (Chang & Ki, 2004; Petros, 1999; Singleton, 2003).  Convention papers 
and journal articles that discuss the specific problem of media cross-ownership policy 
during Powell’s tenure include the quantitative work of Huntemann (2004), Smith’s 
(2003) analysis of studies conducted by the FCC, Cooper’s (2003) critique of those same 
studies, and the working papers of the FCC itself (see, for example, Bush 2002). 
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This category of literature also includes essays published in law journals that 
either attempt to either support or refute the FCC’s legal and technical arguments for 
deregulating broadcasting.  Singleton’s (2003) article in Communication Law and Policy 
is representative in that he argues that when the FCC liberalized radio-television duopoly 
restrictions in the 50 largest media markets in 1999 it resulted in fewer regularly 
scheduled local news or public affairs programs in those markets.  Consequently, 
Singleton (2003) asserts that the FCC is violating its own rules.  Another article written 
by Chester (2004), director of the Center for Media Education, accuses Chairman Powell 
of being biased in favor of a market-oriented approach to media regulation and favoring 
the First Amendment rights of broadcasters over those of the public.  Pritchard (2001) 
examines the legal definition of diverse and antagonistic sources and the effects of 
reducing them on local newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership policies. 
 Many of the studies are quantitative studies that interrogate the statistical analysis 
that led the FCC to conclude that the public interest would best be served by deregulating 
broadcast ownership restrictions.  For example, Lin (2004) published his report that 
argues that “the idea of dual concept and Simpson's D, as a statistical method, are 
superior to other techniques designed to measure economic diversity” and would 
therefore be a better model for the FCC to use than the methods they are currently using 
(p.1).  Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly published a study by Petros (1999) 
that purports to show that the range of opinions to which the consumer-citizen has access 
is being limited by broadcasting media market structures on both sides of the Atlantic.  
Hakanen (2002) published a report of a study he conducted in the Journal of 
Communication Inquiry that measured programming in three selected media markets in 
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1976, 1985, and in 1997, that demonstrates that public affairs programming and other 
forms of local production have declined since 1976.  Another example of scholarship in 
this category includes Chambers’ (2003) analysis of the structural changes in small media 
markets that were a result of the relaxation of ownership restrictions in radio regulations 
after the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
 A final category of literature consulted for this study includes literature generated 
by the FCC and reports contained in the popular and trade press and newspapers.  These 
materials provide a record of the day-to-day developments that motivated the public, the 
FCC, and Congress to come to the decisions that they did during this crucial period of 
transition.  For example, there have been numerous articles that have appeared in the New 
York Times and the Washington Post (see, for example, Ahrens, 2005; Labaton, 2005).  
Several magazine articles that were particularly instructive include the histories of the 
controversies during Powell’s tenure written by Fallows (2003) in the Atlantic Monthly 
and by Hinckley (2003a, 2003b) in the Columbia Journalism Review, and an article that 
appeared in the Economist (“The politics,” 2003).  Many articles like the one written by 
Trigoboff (2003) for Broadcasting and Cable were also reviewed.  
 
Methodology 
 This study is a critical examination of historical and contemporary discourse 
surrounding media ownership regulations during a specific time period when the public 
became engaged in the process of constructing and deconstructing communications 
policy.  It is critical in the sense that it investigates, interprets, and reinterprets the 
contexts in which these events transpired, and it is critical in the sense that this study 
examines the points when the knowledge structures of various interpretive communities 
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intersect and diverge.  Further, this study critically interprets the conclusions reached by 
stakeholders in the policy-making process. 
 If  “the law is a set of lived social relations” as critical legal theorists suggest, then 
law and policy are always open to interpretation and are therefore contingent on the 
changing conditions of hegemonic and counterhegemonic forces in society (Streeter, 
1996, p. 15).  In other words, law and policy, like the culture they are situated within, are 
never static, and therefore the interpretation and application of law and policy are always 
in a state of transformation dependent on shifting values and definitions.  If the meaning 
of any regulation derives from its interpretation, the social relations that constitute 
individuals within a given interpretive community constrain and limit the ways in which 
a regulation can be criticized.  Fish (1980) first coined the term “interpretive 
communities” to describe  
not so much a group of individuals who shared a point of view, but a point of 
view or way of organizing experience that shared individuals in a sense that that 
its assumed distinctions, categories of understanding, and stipulations of 
relevance and irrelevance were the content of the consciousness of community 
members who were therefore no longer individuals, but insofar as they were 
embedded in the community’s enterprise, community property. (Fish, 1989, 
p.141) 
  
 Interpretive communities that share common assumptions about the nature of 
meaning will therefore tend to share common interpretive strategies.  Members are 
inescapably bound by “the modes of thought made available by interpretive 
communities” (Bunker, 2001, p. 70).  Zelizer (1993) applied this concept as an alternative 
way of conceptualizing the shared values of journalists, and posited that the construction 
of knowledge within interpretative communities implies certain patterns of authority, 
communication, and memory.  According to Zelizer (1993), interpretive communities 
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arise less from formal frames of professions than from informal associations that are built 
around shared interpretations.  At its core, this dissertation is a study of how separate, yet 
overlapping, interpretive communities struggled to define the meaning of the public 
interest with regard to media ownership policies.  In the case of this study, the 
stakeholders in the policy-making process assume the characteristics of interpretive 
communities.  
 Krasnow et al. (1982) named the FCC, Congress, the broadcast industry, the 
public, the courts, and the White House as the six major groups that drive the direction of 
policy decisions.  Their argument was that in order to understand how the process works, 
one has to be able to understand how the groups interact with each other.  Therefore, one 
must look at the policy-making process as a permeable system with six major actors who 
are constantly responding to outside pressures, internal interpretations, and historical 
precedent.  Since conditions outside of the system are always in a state of flux, the six 
groups are always responding, reinterpreting, and reacting to changing contingencies.  In 
other words, the regulatory process is one that is essentially an act of communication 
(Brahman, 2003).  As such, Carey’s proposition that “communication is a symbolic 
process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed” applies to 
the policy-making process as well (Carey, 1988, p.23).  Consequently, this study starts 
with the six stakeholders named by Krasnow et al. and identifies outside influences on 
the system as well as internal interactions from within the system.  
 Napoli’s (2001a) study assumed a similar approach.  He began with the 
stakeholder groups identified by Krasnow et al. (1982) and expanded his analysis to 
include seven core values that are associated with communications policy.  There are (a) 
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the First Amendment, (b) the public interest, (c) the marketplace of ideas, (d) diversity, 
(e) competition, (f) universal service, and (g) localism.  According to Napoli,  
…communications policy decisions are a product of a potential process in which 
multiple interested stakeholders, each with potentially conflicting interests and 
different influence tools available to them, attempt to affect policy outcomes.  In 
some instances, they are primarily economic, in others, they are primarily political, 
wherein in others they are motivated by a combination of factors. (p. 226) 
 
Napoli (2001a) argues that the literature is full of studies that have sought to 
evaluate broadcasting policy based on economic models.  Although he acknowledges that 
economic criteria and principles are vital components of communications policy analysis, 
these quantifiable studies, on their own, do not provide a comprehensive understanding of 
the social values that are equally important to consider in broadcasting policy.  This 
dissertation contributes to our understanding of the conflict between regulators’ 
perceptions of the public interest in broadcasting and the public’s perceptions of what the 
public interest entails, precisely since it takes into account those social values that cannot 
be counted.  In a very real sense, this particular public policy controversy, one that is 
ostensibly a contestation over the validity of relaxing media ownership restrictions, is, at 
a more basic level, a contest over conflicting social values that simply cannot be 
quantified.  Napoli’s model of the foundation principles of broadcast regulation is a 
systematic approach to analyzing the social values contained in the definition of the 
public interest in broadcasting.  Napoli argues that unless one understands how much of a 
role each of these values or principles plays in specific policy decisions, any analysis of 
those discussions will only be superficial.  
All scholars must have an interpretive framework.  This study adapts and extends 
Sillars’ (1991) model of value analysis to the model developed by Napoli (2001a).  Value 
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analysis is a form of textual analysis that allows a researcher to identify common and 
conflicting values (Armstrong, 2002; Sillars, 1991).  In this case, value analysis helps 
identify the common and conflicting values that define issues that the six major 
stakeholder groups must agree on in order to create successful public policy that will 
benefit citizens and allow the companies that serve them to remain profitable. 
 Sillars' (1991) approach begins with the assumption that all texts contain both 
explicit and implicit expressions of the values of the individual or organization that 
produced it.  Accordingly, within any given text, it is possible to identify a system of 
values.  Sillars and Gronbeck (2001) recommend a systematic approach to value analysis, 
one that has been used successfully by researchers such as Avery and Stavitsky (2003) in 
their critique of telecommunications policy-making, by Conduit and Lucaities (1993) 
who studied the changing definitions of equality over several historical periods, and by 
Armstrong (2002) who used value analysis to deconstruct the concept of localism in 
broadcast policy. 
Whether discussing legal value systems or FCC regulatory principles, it is 
important to acknowledge that the researcher must interpret texts and discourse.  Streeter 
(1987) speaks extensively of a discourse of technology that influenced regulators to 
radically revise their approach to cable television.  He explains that the discourse of 
technology created “a terrain for collective action while simultaneously obscuring 
underlying conflicts…”  (p.174).  The discourse of technology can be summarized as that 
familiar song that posits that new technologies will enable us to achieve a utopian, 
democratic communication environment once and for all.  This continuing refrain allows 
constituents from very different perspectives to be united by the supposed promise of 
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new technologies that exist in the present and in the future.  This has certainly been the 
case with the discourse surrounding media ownership policies.  While different interest 
groups or interpretive communities may not always agree on many aspects of a new 
policy proposal, they will, according to Streeter (1987), compromise accordingly if they 
are sufficiently enamored of the new technology under discussion.  While Streeter was 
using the phrase discourse of technology, to refer to the development of the cable 
television industry during the 1970s, this conception is equally relevant to subsequent 
discussions of the discourse(s) of broadcast deregulation, especially in regard to the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Powell’s reliance on the discourse of technology 
simply failed, finally, to unite the stakeholders in the debate over the public interest in 
broadcasting. 
 To summarize, this study is a critical examination of the texts produced by the 
relevant stakeholders in the contest to define the parameters of the public’s interest in 
broadcasting.  This study is also a textual analysis of the values that are part of the 
regulatory structure of broadcasting.   
Evidence and Procedures 
This study focused on the examination of broad categories of primary documents.  
Many of these data came from FCC policy statements, memoranda and orders, press 
releases, studies, transcripts of speeches given by the commissioners, and roundtable 
discussions that were conducted by the agency and accessed via the FCC’s website.  Data 
from the Congressional Record and other legislative evidence were obtained from 
LexisNexis.  This same database was used to access court decisions and other legal 
materials.  Another category of primary sources came from the websites of public interest 
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and media advocacy groups.  Transcripts of unofficial public hearings conducted by 
Commissioners Adelstein and Copps were obtained from those sources.  Historic and 
analytic treatises by scholars working in the realm of economics, cultural studies, 
political science, sociology, and policy studies were consulted for this study. 
Additionally, this investigation made use of many secondary sources published in trade 
journals, newspapers, and magazines.  These sources often provided the only daily record 
of political discourse about media ownership during this time period.   
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 The findings of this study are presented in a chronological narrative that begins 
within the 19th century when the first federal regulations were established and ends with a 
discussion of Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC in 2004.  
 Chapter 2 traces the development of the national transportation infrastructure and 
compares it to the development of the communications infrastructure.  This chapter 
explains how the broadcasting industry was structured by stakeholders in the process and 
how key decisions were influenced by outside forces.  An overview of the history of 
media regulations is provided here until the 1980s, when deregulatory practices began to 
appear on the agenda of many federal agencies. 
 Chapter 3 includes an analysis of the issues that led to passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Next, this section examines the regulatory climate 
after the restructuring of the regulatory regime that had been in place since the FCC was 
established.  It discusses the outcome of the first biennial review conducted by the FCC 
in 1998, complete with the documentation of the conflicting perspectives of individual 
commissioners, industry observers, and other interested stakeholders.  
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 Chapter 4 describes how momentum for the further deregulation of media 
ownership policies gained traction during Powell’s tenure.  This chapter describes how 
the perspectives of each commissioner influenced the policy-making process and how 
Congress, industry representatives, public interest activists, and academics helped shape 
the discourse about media ownership policies. 
 Chapter 5 focuses on public interest groups and media activists.  It documents the 
beginning of a movement opposing deregulatory practices.  It provides the background 
for understanding the dissatisfaction of those who opposed further relaxation of media 
ownership policies. 
 Chapter 6 analyzes the issues and decisions rendered by the court in the Sinclair 
v. FCC and Fox v. FCC decisions that resulted from the agency’s decisions on the 
biennial reviews.  It examines the regulatory problems that arose from these decisions 
and Powell’s assertion that the Court was forcing the FCC to abolish its media ownership 
policies.  This chapter dissects Powell’s reasoning and offers an alternative perspective 
 Chapter 7 evaluates 12 studies commissioned by the FCC to provide empirical 
evidence to support the agency’s rulings in court.  The evidence demonstrates that in 
many cases, researchers used flawed methodology and reached unsupported conclusions.  
 Chapter 8 considers the growing opposition to the policy direction taken by the 
FCC.  It identifies the issues under dispute, and it analyzes the dissenting opinions of 
stakeholders in the process. 
 Chapter 9 examines the comments of citizens and other stakeholders who showed 
up at public hearings to express their points of view on the issue. 
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 Chapter 10 discusses opposition to the FCC’s proposed policy changes.  Here, 
criticisms of the proposed changes are examined and Powell’s position is challenged.  
This chapter examines the decision. 
 Chapter 11 studies the reaction to the rule changes, and the events that led to the 
court challenge to the new regulations.  The decision of the court in Prometheus Radio 
Project v. FCC is analyzed and compared to the FCC’s Report and Order. 
 Chapter 12 summarizes and evaluates the empirical findings of the project.  It 
answers the research questions posed at the beginning of this study and provides 
recommendations for future research.  This section discusses the implications of this 






THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR MEDIA REGULATIONS 
 
 
 Americans often speak of their style of democracy as if it were a collectively 
agreed on set of objective assumptions about how the government should be run and what 
it means for us as individual citizens (Sillars & Gronbeck, 2001).  Although there are 
certain core beliefs have persisted throughout the course of our country’s history, those 
values, and how they are defined, have always been subjective and contested.  While the 
U.S. Constitution, a quintessential expression of classical liberalism, created the 
architecture for government and expressed a loosely stated set of principles that 
Americans still embrace, it did not create a blueprint for solving the problems of 
governance in the 21st century. 
This chapter demonstrates how classical liberal thought and the theory of 
democracy adapted to accommodate an industrial economy that produced large shifts in 
population patterns and technological development that would have been unthinkable at 
the beginning of the 1800s (Bruchey, 1968; Dale, 2004; Schlesinger, 1951; Wiebe, 1967).  
This chapter also provides evidence to support the proposition that by the time the issue 
of regulating broadcasting was raised, statutory law and the economic order created to 
regulate commerce had already served to establish the foundation for the structure of 
broadcasting (McChesney, 1993; Streeter, 1996).  During the period that classical liberal 
thought was expanding, revising, and reinterpreting its principle tenets, remnants of an 
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older paradigm remained and influenced the legislature that created the Federal Radio 
Commission (Hawley, 1974; Horowitz, 1989).  The paradox embodied in the first 
attempts to regulate commerce led to a Janus-like approach to the regulation of 
broadcasting that surfaced during the controversy over media ownership in 2003.  This 
chapter will trace the discursive threads that evolved during the 19th and 20th century that 
led to public and interagency discussions that attempted to define what exactly 
constituted the public interest in the 21st century.  Finally, this chapter discusses the 
emergence of interest groups that developed explanatory strategies that became the 
foundation for the formation of interpretive communities that participated in the debate 
over media ownership during the next century. 
Shifting Paradigms 
 
At the turn of the 19th century, most American’s were united by an agrarian life-
style that was supported by a classical liberal orientation that structured and organized 
legal thought, political habits, and the organization of society (Horowitz, 1989; Tedlow, 
1985).  Regardless of how one feels about overarching theories and general statements, 
certain ways of perceiving the world, and one’s place in the world, guide the way society 
is imagined and structured (Fish, 1980; Hall, 1993; Streeter, 1996; Williams, 1998).  
Individuals and organizations share values and ways of constructing the world that 
influence the development of institutions and belief systems.  For the majority of the 19th 
century, the assumption that there was a natural right to own private property, that liberty 
was perceived as an absence of restraints against individuals, and that individuals were 
rational and acted on their own self-interest, prevailed as the dominant organizing 
principles for society (Lustig, 1982; Wetlaufer, 1999).  These classical liberal values 
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were celebrated in the Constitution.  Although the contradictions inherent in elevating 
individual rights over the rights of a collective society were never resolved, most people 
believed these assumptions were self-evident.  
The natural right of an individual to own private property also coincided with the 
belief that entrepreneurship in the free market should be highly lauded (Horowitz, 1989; 
Lustig, 1982; Wetlaufer, 1999).  People subscribed to the notion that a clever individual 
producing a superior product in a competitive market would always succeed in the 
marketplace.  The classical liberal free market was, if nothing else, a so-called rational 
belief that American ingenuity would always be rewarded. 
The Age of Reason also brought forth assumptions about progress (Postman, 
1999).  The almost religious faith in science as a means to achieve a not-so-distant future 
where the ills of humanity would be cured through innovation and inventiveness, was 
also characteristic of the era that produced these habits of thought (Czitrom, 1982; 
Horowitz, 1989).  This consciousness was discernible in the jurisprudence of the legal 
formalists who assumed that the task of a jurist was to merely apply found law, or natural 
law, to conflicts between parties rationally and objectively (Wetlaufer, 1999).  
Accordingly, there emerged the belief that the law should be above political concerns as 
politics is by nature subjective, whereas the rules of law are governed by the proposition 
that its purpose is to mediate or transcend the vagaries of men. 
In the early years of the 19th century, as the migration westward progressed and 
the economy began to expand, municipalities and states began to grant charters of 
incorporation to quasi-public organizations that pledged to build roads, expand water 
projects, and develop public resources (Bruchey, 1968; Colten, 1995).  In exchange, these 
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quasi-public corporations enjoyed many privileges that unincorporated businesses did 
not.  The corporations were granted the right to raise capital through the sale of stock, 
were granted monopolies to right of ways for their projects, and were granted the right of 
eminent domain.  Additionally, these corporations were granted tax exemptions and the 
right to engage in banking operations.  
When states began to grant charters of incorporation to private entities in order to 
facilitate the growth of the nation’s infrastructure, they sanctioned the development of 
monopolies in industries that were “affected with a public interest,” a legal principle that 
preceded the concept of common carriers (Colten, 1995; Horowitz, 1989; Munn v. 
Illinois, 1876). As other commercial interests across many sectors of the economy 
demanded the right to incorporate, they created a business environment that gave rise to 
the growth of large centralized corporations whether they were affected with a public 
interest or not.  After the Civil War, industrial corporations emerged that controlled 
production and distribution channels, thus giving them enormous power over the 
development of public and private resources (Schlesinger, 1951; Tedlow, 1985; Wiebe, 
1967).  
 During this same period, jurists from the legal formalist school were expanding the 
rights of private property owners and extending those rights to corporations (Monsma, 
2006; Wetlaufer, 1999).  The dilemma for the legal formalists was how to reconcile the 
paramount rights of an individual, in an era when citizens were becoming increasingly 
dependent on corporations for their livelihood and well-being.  Since the formalists 
professed the belief that individual liberty and autonomy were vital to the foundational 
principles of the law, they had no choice but to expand the legal definition of an 
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individual to encompass the rights of individual corporations.  In essence, the 




As with the FCC during the New Deal era, the first federal regulatory agency 
arose to bring order to an industry dominated by chaos, and like the FCC, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) developed as a result of pleas for regulation by the 
industry itself (Chandler, 1968; Horowitz, 1989).  By midcentury, the contradictory 
assumptions that obscured many of the dominant features of classical liberalism were 
beginning to emerge.  The growth of the railroad industry brought many of these 
problems to the surface.  The idea that a competitive marketplace could produce an 
economically efficient environment that would benefit entrepreneurs, producers, citizens, 
and manufacturers was looked at with increasing suspicion (Schlesinger, 1951; Tedlow, 
1985; Wiebe, 1967; Zinn, 1985).  The railroad industry was an excellent example of the 
malfunctions that occurred in an unrestricted free market. 
In its early stages, small, undercapitalized companies dominated the railroad 
industry and there was fierce competition among the players (Chandler, 1968; Horowitz, 
1989; Schlesinger, 1951; Tedlow, 1985).  There were duplications of service on the most 
profitable lines and nonexistent service in rural areas.  Since the fixed costs of operation 
were so high, there was enormous pressure on individual lines to increase traffic.  As the 
industry expanded westward, the railroads entered into pool agreements and cartels to try 
to offset the costs of expansion.  However, these agreements were unenforceable and 
sometimes illegal, and many lines provided secret rebates to favored customers.  There 
was also the problem of individual owners not honoring the limits of the pool 
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arrangement, lines that classified freight illegally, and lines that neglected to contribute 
their share to the pools at all.  Clearly, the free market could not accommodate the 
problems of developing this critical component of the nation’s infrastructure unless the 
legal precedents and concomitant values of classical liberalism could be modified to 
adjust to the pragmatic limitations of capital-intensive industries.  
Despite and because of these problems, the railroads had enormous power 
(Schlesinger, 1951). A town that was not served by the railroads was essentially doomed 
to oblivion.  Since the industry was so ruthlessly competitive, it was common practice to 
give much more favorable rates to the largest customers who needed to haul their freight 
over the longest distances.  Farmers and small producers who wanted to ship their goods 
over shorter routes paid the highest rates and were sometimes frozen out altogether.  The 
Granger Laws, passed in the 1870s, were enacted as a result of discriminatory rate 
structures in the Midwest.  These laws attempted to impose state regulations on the 
railroads to eliminate these disparities.  
The railroads argued that the Granger Laws interfered with interstate commerce, 
and since they were private corporations, the courts could not interfere with their right to 
conduct business (Munn v. Illinois, 1876).  The majority opinion in Munn rejected those 
arguments and found a legal rationale for state regulation in the common law doctrine of 
“affectation with a public interest,” the rationale that was used to allow businesses to 
incorporate earlier in the century.  If a business was providing a service that was essential 
to the public, that enterprise was entitled to certain privileges by virtue of its function, 
provided the business offered equal access to its services.  Over time, the Supreme Court 
also found an expanded rationale for affirmative regulation of industry in the public 
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interest in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Horowitz, 1989; Wetlaufer, 1999).  
However, this decision required a major discursive turn to reconcile the classical liberal 
principle that granted autonomy to individuals or, in this case corporations, and required 
the law to modify the definition of the free market.  There were other reasons that the 
Munn decision was important.  First, the decision provided the trajectory that resulted in 
the first federal regulation of commerce (Chandler, 1968; Tedlow, 1985).  Second, the 
decision formed the basis for regulating common carriers and provided the basis for the 
authority to regulate in favor of the public interest.  While the public interest has been 
defined legally in many ways across numerous different regulatory agencies since then, 
the common usage of the term is what lies beneath much of the ideology that supports the 
authority to regulate commerce, particularly in the case of broadcast regulations.  
However, by elevating the rights of corporations that presumably provided a valuable 
communal service, the individual right to autonomy that had previously been one of the 
bedrocks on which American jurisprudence rested had to be modified to reflect a new 
hierarchy of values. 
 Nine years after the courts decided that railroads were common carriers, the 
Supreme Court abolished the state’s right to regulate railroads on the basis that those 
regulations were interfering with interstate commerce (Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific 
Railway Company v. Illinois, 1886).  The higher courts had been gradually expanding the 
power of the federal government to supersede state rights, and the Wabash decision 
reflected this trend (Horowitz, 1989).  The decision created the legal authority for federal 
regulation of interstate commerce.  After Wabash, there was a nearly unanimous 
consensus that Congress needed to step in to rectify the problems in the railroad industry.  
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By this point, the railroad market could at best be characterized as an oligarchy, and the 
premise that the free market required unrestrained competition to promote an equitable 
economic environment was less important than serving the public’s interest in equitable 
rate structures and access and the orderly growth of the industry. 
 When the antimonopoly and proagrarian contingent argued that legislation was 
needed to ban pooling agreements and discriminatory rate structures in the railroad 
industry, prorailroad forces argued that Congress should create an independent 
commission that would decide each case on an individual basis (Horowitz, 1989; 
Schlesinger, 1951; Tedlow, 1983).  Congress passed the Act to Regulate Interstate 
Commerce and the Interstate Commerce Commission was created in 1887. 
The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 prohibited unreasonable rates, pooling 
arrangements, rebates, and rate discrimination.  The act also gave the ICC the authority to 
investigate violations of these rules (Schlesinger, 1951; Tedlow, 1983).  The Commission 
consisted of five members who were appointed by the president to serve  
5-year staggered terms.  Only three Commissioners could come from any one political 
party, and each member had to be confirmed by Congress.  However, the charter for the 
Commission was vague, and Congress set up the ICC as a fact-finding body without 
direct regulatory authority.  The only way the Commission could enforce the rules was by 
taking a railroad company to court.  However, the courts consistently struck down 
repeated attempts by the Commission to create administrative law unless it could show a 
direct link to the Interstate Commerce Act (McCraw, 1980; Wetlaufer, 1999).  The legal 
formalists on the Court were strongly inclined to favor private common law over public 
and statutory law, and it was not until Congress added to the authority of the Commission 
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and broadened its jurisdiction in 1903 with the Mann-Elkins Act, that the ICC had any 
real enforcement power (Mann-Elkins Act, 1917).  
 In spite of the Commission’s inconsistent mandate, it did succeed in bringing a 
modicum of economic rationality to the railroad industry (Horowitz, 1989; Tedlow, 
1983).  The industry became increasingly consolidated, and by the turn of the century, six 
large corporations owned more than half of the nation’s railroad lines.  However, rates 
fell considerably and gross rate discrimination was eliminated (Schlesinger, 1951).  
Although it could be argued that consolidation had done more to revive the economic 
health of the industry than did the ICC, the precedent of establishing a federally 
mandated administrative agency to regulate national commerce that served a public 
interest was firmly established as a legitimate method of maintaining checks on corporate 
control of vital industries. 
  The new Commission thus represented a transformation in the classical liberal 
paradigm.  The acknowledgment that a classic free market approach to economic 
regulation had ill served the railroad industry, its clients, and the public was in fact a 
larger reaction to the innumerable problems that could not be rectified by allowing a 
theoretically purer form of capitalism to go unchecked.  As Congress, the courts, and the 
ICC began to clarify a new form of corporate liberalism, the rationale that had led them 
to regulate interstate commerce on the railroads did not encompass the growing 
communications industry until the turn of the century. 
The Telegraph 
 Streeter (1996) asserts that the social construction of the broadcast industry 
required the creation of property rights on the electromagnetic spectrum where it took an 
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act of collective imagination to create them from the ether.  However, in the case of 
telegraphy, individuals and corporations owned something more tangible, the wires that 
made communication possible.  The formalists could not, or would not, imagine the right 
to communicate as anything more than the right to pay for the privilege of using privately 
owned telegraph lines (Horowitz, 1989; Wetlaufer, 1999).  Given the context of the 
times, there could be no rationale offered for the federal regulation of the telegraph.  
However, as telegraphy advanced, and developing technology enabled communication 
without wires, the economic pattern that began in the railroad industry repeated itself 
(Czitrom, 1982; Engelman, 1996; Horowitz).  When Samuel Morse was granted a patent 
for his version of the telegraph after receiving government subsidies to develop his 
experimental telegraph line, many people, including Morse himself, envisioned the 
telegraph as a revolutionary communications tool that had the potential to further 
participatory democracy.  However, the courts did not embrace this discourse of 
technology—a set of assumptions about the promise of a new tool to unite the continent 
through its ability to facilitate faster communication.  Consequently, when Morse offered 
his patent to the government, the offer was declined (Barnouw, 1966).  After the 
government rejected his patent offer, Morse and his investors began to license small, 
geographically dispersed companies to develop telegraph lines (Horowitz).  By 1849, 
there were three competitive lines on the Boston to Washington and New York to Buffalo 
routes.  Aside from indirect government subsidies in the form of access to right-of-ways 
and timber, it was the demand from business that spurred the development of the 
telegraph.  Corporations embraced essential parts of Morse’s visions about the new 
technology, but they had different motivations for supporting the growth of the telegraph.  
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The telegraph enabled the growth of corporations because it lowered transaction costs 
and allowed for centralized management (Tedlow, 1985).  
 The telegraph also enabled distant companies to compete in local markets, 
increasing competition regionally, while encouraging the tendency toward the growth of 
corporate monopolies (Czitrom, 1982; Engelman, 1996; Horowitz, 1989). Additionally, 
during the period between 1845 and 1854, when telegraph lines were rapidly expanding, 
seven major commodities exchanges were founded that made it easier to capitalize the 
expansion of the lines.  By 1852, there were over 23,000 miles of telegraph wire in use.  
By 1866, Western Union controlled 75,000 miles of wire.  Unlike with the railroads, 
neither the courts nor Congress was willing to assign a common carrier status to the 
telegraph; apparently, the telegraph was not affected with a public interest. By 1909, 
when American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) acquired Western Union, reformers 
bemoaned the state of the medium.  “Behind the various political proposals for telegraph 
reform lay a sense of betrayal of the telegraph’s original promise to be the common 
carrier of public intelligence” ( p. 12).  However, by that time, experiments with wireless 
telegraphy caught the attention of the public, and the contradictions between allowing 
one or a few corporations to control the transmission of information in a supposedly free 
market economy were not resolved. 
 
Wireless and Beyond 
By the time Guglielmo Marconi and his wireless telegraphy apparatus appeared 
on the scene in America in the early 1900s, he had already convinced investors in Great 
Britain that wireless telegraphy could be used on ships to communicate in places where 
no wires could be laid (Archer 1938; Douglas, 1987).  After a series of accidents at sea, 
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Congress passed the Wireless Ship Act in 1910 (Barnouw, 1968; Sterling & Kittross, 
1990).  This legislation required all ocean-going U.S. ships with 50 passengers or more to 
carry a radio apparatus capable of reaching at least 100 miles and to have a skilled radio 
operator on board at all times.  Marconi’s company was well established to take 
advantage of the new regulation, and he had a corner on the shipping market.  However, 
by this time, the airwaves were becoming increasingly crowded with messages from 
amateur operators, and the Navy claimed that its own messages were being drowned out 
by interference.  The U.S. Navy claimed that the amateurs were endangering national 
security.  This was seen as a technological problem that needed to be addressed.  
When radio’s popularity became too dramatic to ignore, both AT&T and General 
Electric (GE) employed a defensive strategy of buying as many patents as they could to 
protect their dominance in electronic communication (Barnouw, 1968; Engelman, 1996; 
Sterling & Kittross, 1990; Streeter, 1996).  AT&T began to see radio as a possible 
competitive threat to their telephone business.  GE also began experiments to improve the 
technology.   
 When the United States entered the fighting in WWI in 1917, the Navy seized 
control of all radio stations for military use (Barnouw, 1966; Sterling & Kittross, 1990).  
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt suspended all patent claims for the 
duration of the war so that all of the major distributors of radio technology could work 
together to supply the military with vacuum tubes, transmitters, and receivers.  A massive 
effort to supply the military’s needs would require the use of all available patents.  GE 
and Westinghouse, the two major producers of light bulbs, were now enlisted to 
manufacture vacuum tubes.  By the end of the war, GE, Westinghouse, AT&T, and 
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American Marconi owned all the major patents in radio technology.  The corporations 
and the Navy, aided by civilians who had experimented with radio as amateurs, 
developed technological innovations that would fuel a radio boom.  
 When the war ended, the military argued that it should retain control of the 
airwaves, and a bill was introduced in Congress that would allow the government to 
compete with private commercial interests in the acquisition of radio stations (Engelman, 
1996; Sterling & Kittross, 1990).  The Alexander Bill allowed for a potential government 
controlled network of stations.  The amateurs and the Secretary of the Navy supported the 
bill.  There were legislators who believed that it had been a mistake to allow private 
companies to gain a monopoly over the telegraph and telephone industries, and many 
other countries decided to fund radio publicly.  Some members of Congress considered a 
monopoly in radio to be inevitable, so they felt that adopting the bill was merely 
pragmatic (Barnouw, 1966).  Opponents to the bill argued that radio should be treated as 
a natural monopoly, similar to telephony, and that the issue was not whether there would 
be a radio monopoly in the first place, but whether the government should retain control 
of it.  Still others noted the use of propaganda over the air during the war, and they were 
leery of ceding that much power to the military.  The Marconi Company and AT&T were 
opposed to the Alexander Bill and pressured Congress to kill it, which they did in 1918, 
thereby continuing the precedent of allowing commercial interests to dominate access to 
communications technology.  In mid-1919, the government lifted the ban on private radio 
stations, and when the military personnel who helped develop radio technology for the 
radio returned home, they resumed their experimentation with a vengeance. 
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 Marconi approached GE with a proposal to buy several of the high-powered 
transmitters that it manufactured for the Navy during the war and promised to continue 
purchasing transmitters in the future.  If the deal went through, Marconi would have been 
the only corporation to own the transmitters (Sterling & Kittross, 1990).  In exchange for 
the transmitters, Marconi agreed that GE would retain the exclusive right to manufacture 
them in the future.  However, in a shrewd political move, General Electric forwarded the 
details of the agreement to the Secretary of the Navy before the contract was signed.  
This set off a chain of events when the military strongly suggested that it would be 
against the national interest to allow a foreign company to obtain a complete monopoly in 
the radio industry.  Meetings were held with GE’s board of directors and all agreed that 
the deal would create an untenable situation. 
 Consequently, GE approved the formation of a new corporation, the Radio 
Corporation of America (RCA), and its articles of incorporation prohibited foreign 
citizens from becoming officers.  It also limited foreign stockholders to less than 20% of 
the company’s holdings (Barnouw, 1966).  Almost all of Marconi’s terrestrial stations 
were still in the hands of the Navy, making it unlikely that the government would return 
control to a foreign-owned corporation.  Thus, Marconi decided to sell the assets of 
American Marconi to the new corporation.  The government sanctioned the sale and 
agreed that RCA would be the chosen instrument of the government in meeting 
America’s overseas communication needs (Sterling & Kittross, 1990; Witherspoon et. al., 
2000).  After RCA absorbed the assets of American Marconi in 1919, all government- 
held land stations were transferred to the new corporation.  RCA quickly established an 
international monopoly in commercial wireless transactions (Barnouw, 1966; Sterling & 
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Kittross).  That same year, RCA entered into an agreement with AT&T and its subsidiary 
Western Electric.  In exchange for stock in RCA, AT&T and GE agreed to pool their 
competing patents.  Westinghouse, which had built an experimental broadcast station in 
Pittsburgh, joined forces with RCA as well.  GE and Westinghouse agreed to 
manufacture radio sets and supply them to RCA.  RCA would sell GE and Westinghouse 
receivers and would continue its international business.  AT&T could then sell radio 
receivers and lease its lines for radiotelephony.  The government sanctioned this 
agreement, which effectively created an environment that encouraged American 
corporate control of the airwaves.  RCA would be allowed to obtain a “natural 
monopoly” in the radio industry.  
As more stations began to broadcast regularly scheduled programs and as more 
members of the public purchased radio receivers in the early 1920s, radio became more 
popular (Douglas, 1987; Engelman, 1996; Streeter, 1996; Witherspoon et al., 2000).  
There were many public discussions about the potential of radio.  The discourse of 
technology that Morse had first applied to the telegraph gained more adherents when it 
came to radio.  Magazine articles heralded radio as a tool for uniting the nation.  There 
was a great deal of discussion about how radio could be used to advance education and 
cultivate a more participatory democracy, and many thought radio would eliminate class 
distinctions by providing universal access to information (Witherspoon et al., 2000).  
However, radio was merely a technology that permitted transmission of information 
across distances.  None of the utopian visions for how it could be used could be realized 
without the production of the content that could achieve these laudatory goals.  The 
technology itself could only transmit signals through the electromagnetic spectrum.  
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Nonetheless, the nation was captivated by broadcasting’s imagined potential 
(Barnouw, 1966; Douglas, 1987).  During this period, department stores broadcast live 
performances as a way to lure in shoppers and provide positive publicity for their stores.  
Newspapers, such as the Detroit News started broadcasting because they viewed radio as 
an electronic extension of their news-gathering operations (Barnouw; Streeter, 1996).  
Educators went on the air to publicize their schools and offer classes over the air, unions 
and socialists took to the air, and churches’ began broadcasting religious programming.  
 
The Radio Act of 1927 
  By the 1920s, there was a growing recognition that some regulation of radio 
would be necessary (Barnouw, 1966; Sterling & Kittross, 1990; Witherspoon et al., 
2000).  At this point, the U.S. economy had undergone the transformation from an 
agrarian-based system that included the classical liberal free market and all that it 
entailed to one dominated by corporations (McChesney, 1993; Streeter, 1996).  The 
social, political, and legal assumptions that provided the rationale for government policy 
during the previous century had to undergo a transformation, even if some of the 
assumptions of the earlier eras remained.  However, the political climate of the country 
had changed by the time broadcasting appeared on the nation’s consciousness 
(Schlesinger, 1951; Wiebe, 1967).  The Progressives at the turn of the century demanded 
reform in industries that had come to be dominated by monopolies.  President Theodore 
Roosevelt was associated with the trust-busting movement, and like the ICC, other 
regulatory agencies that arose during the early years of the 20th century were created to 
bring stability to industries buffeted by the extremes of a laissez-fair policy run amok.  
By creating so-called natural monopolies in the transportation and communications 
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industries, regulators protected the capital investments of corporations such as Western 
Union, AT&T, and the railroads so that development of services would proceed smoothly 
and would be available to a large proportion of the public at reasonable rates.  
Many historians and communication scholars have described the period between 
the 1880s and 1920s as a transitional period where the classically liberal way of 
imagining American government, its institutions, its economy, and the structure of 
society gave way to a new order that resulted from the fundamental restructuring of 
American life (Horowitz, 1989; Lustig, 1982; Streeter, 1996; Tedlow, 1985).  One of the 
basic characteristics of this new order was that the courts, the legislature, and industry 
leaders began to shift their orientation from a focus on the right of an individual to 
engage in commerce free from restrictions to an outlook that allowed industry to 
consolidate.  The transformation assumed that large capital investment could further 
progress for all and serve a more populous nation more efficiently in the new era.  By the 
time Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover assumed his post in 1922, his view of how 
commerce should be structured was common (Benjamin, 1998; Hawley, 1974; Sarno, 
1969).  He, like the legal formalists at the turn of the century, believed that the market 
was the best regulator.  This was in keeping with his larger vision of how society should 
be organized, and that vision profoundly affected the way that the business of 
broadcasting came to be structured.  Hoover was the quintessential corporate liberal, and 
along with other government and corporate leaders, he believed that organized 
cooperative associations between business and government could best serve society.  
Hoover [in 1921] saw himself as a protagonist of a new and superior synthesis 
between the old industrialism and the new way whereby America could benefit 
from scientific rationalization and social engineering without sacrificing the 
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energy inherent in individual effort, ‘grassroots’ involvement, and private 
industry.  (Hawley, 1969, p. 117) 
  
 In other words, Hoover believed that if scientific and corporate expertise could be 
organized properly on a voluntary basis, governmental regulations and legal coercion 
could be avoided (Hawley, 1969).  He believed that business and government could work 
together to solve their mutual problems informally by forming mutually beneficial 
interpretive communities.  The cooperative organizations that he envisioned took the 
form of trade associations.  These private organizations would serve the public.  Hoover 
believed that the expertise of corporate managers, combined with the scientific 
knowledge produced by private enterprise, would allow corporations to govern their own 
businesses according to standards that would serve the public interest.  These associations 
were to create codes of ethics and standards of practices for their members.  Hoover 
believed that political conflict could be avoided by taking an objective engineering 
approach to social problems.  Hoover believed that most political controversies could be 
abated by focusing on the technical solutions to problems that could be solved by men of 
talent, vision, and expertise. 
 Accordingly, when Hoover called the first in a series of radio conferences to 
order, he saw radio as a scientific problem that could be solved by employing technical 
expertise to create order in a chaotic environment (Barnouw, 1966; Benjamin, 1998; 
Hawley, 1974; Sarno, 1969; Streeter, 1996).  Order in the industry would provide a 
public service.  This assumption that the problem of radio was a technical one precluded 
the possibility that other dimensions of radio, most notably its educational, political, and 
cultural potential, would be given a prominent place in the discussion of how to regulate 
the spectrum (McChesney, 1993; Streeter, 1996).  The other dominant assumption of 
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Hoover’s associative vision for society was that capitalism, in the form of corporativism, 
was the only rational way to organize wealth in the 20th century.  In Hoover’s view, the 
corporations had brought order to the chaotic process of industrializing the economy, and 
an orderly society was the key to progress.  Capital invested in radio by private 
corporations needed to be protected for the public’s interest to be served.  Thus, the 
amateurs and educators who invented radio, who operated with delicious abandon and 
unstructured enthusiasm, were seen as a threat to the corporate order,  an order that was 
necessary, at least in Hoover’s estimation, to properly develop this national resource. 
Hoover held four radio conferences between 1922 and 1926 (Benjamin, 1998; 
Engelman, 1996; McChesney, 1993; Sarno, 1969).  The attendees were largely technical 
experts from RCA.  The focus was on creating an orderly structure from which 
broadcasting could be developed given the limited capacity of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.  In 1923, Hoover instituted three levels of radio broadcasting service (Sterling 
& Kittross, 1990).  Clear-channel stations had the right to broadcast at a maximum level 
of power that could reach across a wide geographical terrain, regional stations could 
broadcast their signal with lower power, and local stations could only broadcast on weak 
signals during the daylight hours.  However, Hoover’s efforts to establish a hierarchy of 
licensees was invalidated by the courts on the ground that he had exceeded his authority 
as Secretary of Commerce (United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation et al., 1926).  By 
1927, the “industry was now hopelessly out of control and begged for legislation to 
relieve the chaos that threatened to destroy this young but potentially powerful medium” 
(Witherspoon et al., 2000, p. 4). 
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Congress finally stepped in and passed the Radio Act of 1927 (Benjamin, 1998; 
Engelman, 1996; McChesney, 1993; Sarno, 1969).  The Radio Act established a 
temporary Federal Radio Commission (FRC) that had the authority that the Secretary of 
Commerce lacked (Public Law No. 632, 1927).  Like the ICC, the FRC was made up of 
five members who were appointed to serve 6-year staggered terms.  The Commissioners 
came from different geographic areas, and it was their task to allocate licenses and 
protect the integrity of the spectrum.  
 The FRC was charged with regulating broadcasting in the name of the public 
interest, convenience, or necessity (Radio Act of 1927 §3).  This provision indicates that 
legislators distinguished broadcasting from other communication technology and from 
other industrial endeavors.  Congress expressly declared that the electromagnetic 
spectrum was a publicly owned resource.  Therefore, the FRC was designated to protect 
the integrity of the spectrum but also also protect the integrity of the service provided to 
the public. 
 Despite the mandate to regulate the spectrum according to the public interest, 
convenience, or necessity, there was little discussion of what types of radio service would 
benefit the public (Engelman, 1996; McChesney, 1993).  The FRC was an expedient 
solution to a pressing problem that needed immediate resolution.  The structural 
components of the commercial model of broadcasting were not considered in the 
discussions leading up to General Order 40, the order that reorganized the broadcast 
spectrum (Radio Service Bulletin No. 137, 1928).  When the FRC was deliberating the 
matter of how to assign channels, it solicited input from the National Association of 
Broadcasters (NAB) but not groups representing educational interests or other 
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noncommercial broadcasters (Benjamin, 1998).  The public was not consulted.  After the 
first conference in 1922, participation was largely limited to industry representatives and 
engineers who were affiliated with commercial interests.  The chief engineer for AT&T 
appointed the engineers advising the FRC.  
 The FRC announced a reassignment plan in 1928  (Engelman, 1996; McChesney, 
1993).  There would be 40 clear-channel station allotments, 34 regional channels, and 30 
low-power, local stations assigned to each region (Radio Service Bulletin, No. 137, 
1928).  Licensees would be subject to renewal hearings every 3 years and many stations 
were required to share a frequency, thereby ensuring that one or both stations would not 
be able to gain the audience required to make them financially sustainable (Sterling & 
Kittross, 1978).  One hundred stations were eliminated in this manner.  According to 
McChesney (1993, 1999) when the aftermath of the Radio Act of 1927 became evident, it 
was clear to all concerned that the commercial model of broadcasting would dominate the 
ether and that this model would be unable to accommodate the goals of educators, 
community, or special interest groups.  According to Aufderheide “the unarticulated 
assumption underlying the regulation of broadcasting from its inception was that the ether 
was a virtual public culture” (1999, p. 226).  However, General Order 40 did nothing to 
advance this goal.  Instead, it successfully eliminated the problem of interference without 
considering the content of the communication that would be offered to the public.  The 
Communications Act of 1934 created a permanent FCC and gave the FCC jurisdiction 
over all aspects of the communications industry.  Aside from minor modifications, the act 
contained essentially the same provisions as the 1927 Radio Act, including the condition 
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that broadcasters held their licenses in the name of the public trust and that all 
broadcasters must abide by the public interest, convenience, or necessity.  
 
The Marketplace of Ideas 
 
Less than a year after the Radio Act of 1927 passed, the newly appointed FRC 
issued a public statement designed to clarify the public interest provision of the Radio 
Act (2 FRC Ann. Rep 166, 1928).  The Commission reiterated the importance of 
maintaining spectrum integrity but also said that it was important to provide the public 
with different types of radio service.  The Commission explicitly stated that they would 
not look favorably on duplication of programs or services in the geographic location 
when allotting licenses (Kahn, 1984), the implication being that diverse programming, 
and diverse ownership of stations, was in the public’s interest.  The Commission also said 
it was important to maintain local service, and noted that there were many more people 
who wanted to obtain broadcasting licenses than were channels available.  Accordingly, 
broadcasters that were allotted licenses had a special responsibility to serve the public 
interest.  The Commission stated: “The emphasis must be first and foremost on the 
interest, convenience, and necessity of the listening public, and not on the interest, 
convenience, and necessity of the individual broadcaster or advertiser” (Kahn, 1963, p. 
63).  Despite this statement, later that year, the FRC announced that it was allotting all 
but 3 of the 40 clear-channel, long-range frequency assignments to the two existing 
commercial networks.  Others would be assigned regionally.  
 Although the language in the Radio Act of 1927 could be traced back to earlier 
attempts to regulate the railroads in that the public interest, convenience, or necessity, the 
phrasing reflected the earlier common law concept of affection with the public interest; 
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there was no attempt to categorize broadcasters as common carriers (Benjamin, 1998; 
Sarno, 1968).  In fact, although the new plan ostensibly declared that broadcasters were 
only allowed to use portions of the electromagnetic spectrum in exchange for serving the 
public interest, this provision essentially gave broadcasters the privilege of using 
spectrum space without promising to provide public access.  The Act also gave these 
same corporations (who controlled other sectors of the communication industry) what 
amounted to a right of condemnation.  That is, corporations were allotted the most 
valuable spectrum real estate while amateurs, educators, and other special interest groups 
were pushed to the margins.  These conditions were all but certain to lead to a repetition 
of the economic patterns that plagued the telegraph, telephone, and railroad industries. 
The phrase “public interest, convenience, or necessity” was ambiguous at best, 
and Congress failed to specify its precise meaning (Aufderheide, 1999; Avery, 2007; 
Avery & Stavitsky, 2003; Streeter, 1996).  Instead, the new administrative agency would 
make its own interpretations on a case-by-case basis over the ensuing decades.  The FRC 
had to reconcile many contradictory beliefs about how the industry should be regulated 
and supported.  The hallmarks of corporate liberalism included faith in expertise and the 
liberating effects of technology.  Hoover’s vision of the associative state also expressed 
the view that creating economic efficiencies in industry would serve the greater good and 
that capital raised by privately owned or publicly owned corporations was superior to 
government restrictions and regulatory coercion.  Hoover’s faith in industry to act in its 
own self-interest, thereby serving the public interest, would soon be called into question 
during the Depression, but nonetheless, his vision was the foundation for the principles 
contained in the Radio Act of 1927. 
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However, at the same time that Hoover and Congress were busy setting up the 
regulatory regime that would govern broadcasting for the remainder of the century, much 
of the values held during the earlier era remained (Horowitz, 1989; Lustig, 1982; Streeter, 
1996).  The property rights of individuals were still sacrosanct despite the fact that 
Congress had expressly declared that the rights of broadcasters were only a temporary 
privilege granted according to how well they performed a public service.  Even though 
the FRC had declared that service to the community of license was the paramount 
definition of public service, the foundation of corporativism was designed to take 
advantage of economies of scale through the organization of business interests on a 
national and regional basis.  When Hoover endorsed the formation of RCA, he rejected 
the proposition that locally owned broadcast stations could compete in an open market to 
produce the best programming for the public.  As the Supreme Court began to expand the 
First Amendment rights of individuals, the FRC and later the FCC were intent on 
restricting the rights of individual broadcasters to control the airwaves.  As Hoover’s 
vision of the associative state gave way to the New Deal era, these conflicts went 
unresolved. 
The Progressive era spawned federal regulatory agencies that sought to protect 
small producers from large corporations, but by the time the FCC came into existence, 
the country was suffering from the effects of the Great Depression (Aufderheide, 1999, 
Horowitz, 1989).  During the New Deal era, federal regulatory agencies were required to 
encourage the economic growth and stability of the industries they controlled so the 
public could be served with increased access to dependable, affordable services.  When 
the FCC allowed broadcasters to monopolize their allotted portion of the electromagnetic 
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spectrum, they did so with the caveat that the broadcaster must operate as a public 
trustee.  Spectrum space was scarce, so those who were granted the privilege to broadcast 
had a social responsibility to the public.  As the early chaos on the airwaves gave way to 
a more stable structure, regulators turned their focus to the public interest component of 
their duties and devoted much energy over the years to the social intent of the legislation 
that created the agency.  
 
Station Ownership Limits 
  
From 1928 on, the FRC, and later the FCC, operated under the theory that the 
public interest would best be served by promoting the diversification of broadcast 
viewpoints as well as preventing undue concentrations of economic power in the 
broadcast industry (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004, p.16).  Regulators, who had 
once sanctioned RCA as the chosen instrument to dominate the new field of broadcasting, 
were now forwarding policies that promoted a competitive marketplace of ideas.  
Accordingly, the Commission sought to promote diversity and competition in 
broadcasting by limiting the number of radio stations a single party could own or acquire 
in a local market.  After the courts ratified the Commission’s ability to make public 
interest evaluations when issuing licenses, the FCC took steps to enlarge its criteria for 
measuring an applicant’s public service obligations (Great Lakes v. the Federal Radio 
Commission, 1930).  In 1938, the FCC denied an application for a new AM station from a 
candidate that already controlled an AM station in the same community (Genesee Radio 
Corp., v. FCC, 1938).  The Commission reasoned that there would be no competition 
between two commonly owned stations in the same community and that, consequently 
the situation would not encourage new applications from other potentially more diverse 
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licensees.  Therefore, in order to assure a substantial equality of service to all interests in 
a community and to assure diversification of service and advancements in quality and 
effectiveness of service, the Commission held that it would “allow commonly owned 
duplicate facilities only where it would fulfill a community need that otherwise could not 
be satisfied” (Genesee Radio Corp, 1938, p. 186).    
This was the first of a long series of regulations that would be instituted by the 
FCC with regard to broadcast ownership policies that were proposed to serve the public 
interest.  The assumption that diversity of ownership was the equivalent of diversity of 
opinion went unchallenged. 
 By 1940, 95% of all radio was network owned or affiliated (Barnouw, 1968; 
Baughman, 1981; Sterling & Kittross, 1990).  Many members of Congress and some in 
the broadcast industry believed that the FCC had not done enough to break the 
monopolistic tendencies of the networks (McChesney, 1993).  In 1941, the FCC issued its 
Report on Chain Broadcasting and announced that it would not issue a license to more 
than one station in the same area to a single network, and again regulators did not 
challenge the assumption that diversity of ownership equaled diversity of opinion.  The 
networks, which had the most to lose, were the only ones who contested this assumption 
(FCC, 1941).  The report declared that increased competition in network broadcasting 
would serve the public interest (Barnouw, 1968; Kahn, 1984; Sterling & Kittross, 1990).  
The Federal Trade Commission and the FCC, after prevailing in a protracted court battle, 
forced NBC to sell off its Blue Network, which became the American Broadcasting 
Company (NBC v. U.S., 1943). 
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 Also, in the 1940s, the FCC issued a series of rules designed to prohibit common 
ownership of stations providing the same type of broadcasting service in a single 
community (DeClerk, 2005; Emord, 1989; Kahn 1984).  This included a prohibition 
against licensees having any financial interests in any competing broadcast stations.  The 
FCC reasoned that if one station owner had an interest in promoting another station in the 
same service area, there would be a lesser likelihood of competition between the stations.  
The FCC expanded the financial interest prohibitions over the years to forbid licensees in 
the same community from forming consulting relationships, from forming time brokerage 
agreements, or from forming commonly owned advertising agencies.  These rules were 
formulated to maintain diversity of ownership in broadcast markets through competition 
and existed until 1989.  As the feasibility of operating FM stations moved forward and 
the viability of television loomed on the horizon, the FCC issued its first duopoly rule 
(Aufderheide, 1999; Horowitz, 1989; Keller, 2004; “Rules,” 1940).  The rule prohibited 
AM station owners from acquiring licenses for another FM station or another television 
station in the same market.  In 1940, the Commission also issued its first national 
multiple ownership rules and required any licensee that wished to own or operate more 
than three television stations and six FM radio stations nationwide to provide proof that 
such ownership would encourage competition.  In 1944, the FCC amended that rule to 
allow a single owner to control five television stations, six FM stations, and seven AM 
stations nationwide but by 1946, the FCC allowed a single licensee to own up to seven 
AM stations, seven FM stations, and seven television stations nationwide.  When Storer 
Broadcasting Company challenged the legitimacy of maintaining caps on national 
ownership of broadcasting facilities in 1956, the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s 
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authority to do so (United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 1956).  The multiple 
ownership rules were amended once again in 1964 to define more precisely the standard 
for determining the boundaries of overlapping service areas (Multiple Ownership Rules, 
1964).  These rules remained constant until the 1970 when the FCC expanded its 
ownership rules to accommodate changing market conditions. 
 By 1964, the FCC was concerned about the growth of consolidation in national 
broadcast markets and adopted an interim Top 50 policy (Emord, 1989; Horowitz, 1989).  
This policy required that a hearing be held if any licensee wished to obtain a second VHF 
television station in any of the top 50 markets in the nation.  The potential licensee had to 
show that there was a compelling public interest involved if the applicant wished to 
acquire a second station.  The following year, the FCC amended this policy so that no 
licensee could own more than three VHF television stations and two UHF stations in any 
of the top 50 markets in the country.  In 1968, the FCC required that anyone wishing to 
own up to four UHF stations in any of the top 50 markets could do so if the applicant 
could show that there was a compelling public interest for multiple ownership. 
During the 1970s, the FCC passed several measures designed to impede the 
growth of consolidation in the broadcast industry (Emord, 1989; Horowitz, 1989; 
Krasnow et al., 1982).  In 1970, the Commission instituted its one-to-a-market rule.  This 
regulation prohibited a licensee from owning more than one broadcast station in a 
community.  Again, the FCC reasoned that diversity in ownership of broadcasting outlets 
in a community would be equated with diversity of broadcast voices.  Therefore, this rule 
met its public interest mandate.  The following year, the Commission amended the rule to 
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allow AM/FM combinations in a single market as a means to encourage the growth of 
FM outlets. 
 In 1970, the Commission also passed regulations that restricted cross-ownership 
of broadcast properties in communities (Emord, 1989; Horowitz, 1989; Krasnow et al., 
1982).  The Commission said that it would not allow a licensee of a television station to 
purchase an interest in a cable television system, or to purchase additional television 
stations in the same community.  The Commission also prohibited networks from owning 
cable systems and did not allow telephone companies to purchase interests in cable 
systems.  These barrier-to-entry restrictions were forwarded to prevent consolidation in 
the broadcast and cable industries so a diversity of voices could be accessed by the public 
and so existing services would be protected. 
 The same justification was offered when the FCC banned newspapers from 
owning broadcast licenses in the same communities and vice versa (Emord, 1989; 
Horowitz, 1989; Krasnow et al., 1982; Levi, 2000).  This law was not retroactive, so 
existing cross-ownership relationships were grandfathered in, but the principle of 
encouraging diversity of ownership under the public interest mandate was upheld by the 
courts (Emord, 1989).  The Supreme Court held that the cross-ownership ban was a 
“reasonable means of promoting the public interest in diversified mass communications” 
(NCCB v. U.S, 1978, p. 802).  In an effort to limit the number of broadcast stations that 
any one licensee could own nationwide, the FCC instituted a policy against regional 
concentration in 1977.  The policy banned ownership of more than three broadcast 
stations in a region if the two stations were within 100 miles of the third.  
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Throughout its history, the FCC periodically attempted to regulate the content that 
broadcasters offered their audiences, most notably when it issued its report on the Public 
Service Responsibilities of Broadcast Licensees (Baughman, 1981; Friendly, 1967; Kahn, 
1968).  These attempts to require programming that was thought to encourage civic 
dialogue, or other public interests were not often successful, perhaps due to the deep 
ambivalence that many citizens and government officials felt about having regulators 
dictate what programming was good for the public.  However, regulators were able to 
obtain greater levels of support for policies that favored diversification of ownership 
because of the public’s historical aversion to the unchecked growth of corporations across 
industries.  The Commission’s long-held policy of encouraging diversity in local and 
national markets was intended to allow the public to access a full range of perspectives 
on topics of local and national interest (Armstrong, 2002).  Even though members of the 
broadcast industry did not favor the Commission’s attempts to limit the holdings of large 
media corporations, there was widespread public and political support for these policies 
throughout the 1970s.  
 
Public Participation 
 During the 1950s, there had been a series of scandals involving members of the 
FCC (Baughman, 1981; Horowitz, 1989).  The always close relationship between the 
agency and the industry it regulated led to a series of corruption charges and resignations.  
As the communication industry grew, it became more diversified, and more complicated, 
and the FCC was increasingly seen as ineffectual and bureaucratic.  The FCC’s attempts 
to define the public’s interest with regard to television programming had failed, and the 
regulatory agency was perceived of as a nuisance by the industry.  If citizens favored 
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entertainment over news and public affairs programming, and if the corporations that 
dominated the airwaves were receiving more revenue from producing entertainment than 
they were from more intellectual fare, the FCC could do nothing about it.  
 The FCC had no real power to formulate or enforce policy, and its decisions 
gained little attention in the press (Baughman, 1981).  Still, some citizens were worried 
about the effect of violence and crass commercialization in broadcasting.  By the late 
1950s, “ a critical consensus developed that television had become a social problem, had 
come to be widely shared by many of those contemplating the nation’s problems” 
(Baughman, p. 54).  Between 1958 and 1960, television was under attack.  Intellectuals 
and political leaders bemoaned television’s tendency to reflect the worst of American 
society.  There was a sense that television programming had entered a steep decline since 
the early golden years of the 1950s (Minnow, 1965; Sterling & Kittross, 1990).  Another 
concern stemmed from the negative role of advertising on television and in society at-
large.  
 During the 1960s and 1970s, many members of society questioned the legitimacy 
of institutions that were the cornerstones of civic life (Krasnow et al., 1982; Ranly, 1976; 
Sterling & Kittross, 1990).  There was a general distrust of large corporations in many 
industries.  The mass media were not immune to this type of examination, and in fact it 
was a focal point for the frustrations of citizens who were critical of the culture they 
believed the media were perpetuating (Armstrong, 1981).  Grassroots organizations 
dedicated to reforming the excesses of the media sprang up all over the country 
(Grundfest, 1976; Krasnow et al., 1982; Ranly, 1976; Rowland, 1982).  These 
organizations put pressure on commercial broadcasters to put an end to violence and the 
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amount and type of commercial advertisements on children’s programs.  They demanded 
that broadcasters remove all liquor and tobacco advertisements from television, and they 
insisted that television was contributing to harmful racial and ethnic stereotypes.  Media 
activists called for more public input into the regulatory process and they put the industry 
on notice that they intended to take advantage of all of their rights and responsibilities as 
citizens.  
 The Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ had successfully 
challenged the license renewal of a station in Jackson, Mississippi, that aired blatantly 
racist programming (Grundfest, 1976; Korn, 1991; Krasnow et al., 1982; Office of 
Communication of the United Church of Christ. v. FCC, 1966; Ranly, 1976; Rowland, 
1982).  That case established the legal right for public participation in the regulatory 
process, and for the first time citizen groups began to challenge license applications and 
renewals.  Broadcasters sometimes found that it was easier to bargain with the groups 
than to fight them outright.  Local groups were getting together and starting their own 
listener-supported community radio stations with volunteer programmers and broadcasts 
of local public affairs (Milam, 1975; Soley, 1999).  Activists demanded better 
programming for children.  In 1967, Congress passed the Public Broadcasting Act, the 
mechanism that fostered a national network of public television and radio stations.  
Beginning in 1970, cable television began offering access channels to the public, and 
many cities around the country experimented with locally produced programming 
(Engelman, 1996; Linder, 1999).  Alternative press publications began to appear and 
journals devoted to analyzing the media were founded.  During this same era, while the 
FCC was tightening its ownership restrictions and while citizens were demanding more 
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and better services from the telecommunications industry, the development of new 
communications technologies were threatening to disrupt the established order of 
America’s structure broadcasting.  
The Romance of Cable 
 Community Antenna Television (CATV) was created in the 1950s to boost the 
transmission of local broadcasting stations in rural areas that had poor reception 
(Horowitz, 1989; Streeter, 1987).  The early systems did not transmit original 
programming.  At first, local broadcasters welcomed CATV because it brought them 
more viewers.  However, when experimental cable operators began distributing 
programming that did not originate in local communities, the network affiliated stations 
started to see cable television as a threat to their dominance.  In 1962, the FCC began to 
deny cable operators the right to carry distant broadcast signals for two reasons.  First, the 
FCC reasoned that if cable system operators were allowed to carry imported broadcast 
signals into a local market it would fragment local audiences and weaken broadcasters’ 
ability to earn revenue and affect their ability to produce local programming.  The other 
concern was that if cable operators were allowed to retransmit programming originated 
elsewhere, they would enjoy an unfair competitive advantage over affiliates that had to 
pay to produce or carry the programming.  Consequently, the FCC passed a series of 
regulations designed to protect affiliate stations.  The cable industry languished for many 
years.  
 However, the fortunes of cable television began to change when media activists 
and regulators came to see cable television as a possible alternative to the offerings of the 
networks and established broadcasters.  As Streeter (1987) put it, “a discourse of new 
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technologies” became prevalent in the 1970s (p. 174).  This way of thinking about 
technology had almost religious overtones to it and provided a utopian vision of the 
promise of new communications technology.  This was nothing new, as people had 
proclaimed that a new, more democratic age of communications was upon us when other 
technologies, such as the telegraph and radio had surfaced, but in the light of such 
widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo during the more recent era, people 
embraced the “cable fable” with particular zeal.  
 Even though the Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the spectrum scarcity 
doctrine in Red Lion v. FCC during the 1970s, the prospect of cable systems with 
multichannel carrying capacities entranced groups as varied as educational broadcasters, 
minority advocates, foundations, and consumer advocates (Engelman, 1996; Red Lion v. 
U.S., 1967, Streeter, 1987).  By embracing the potential of cable as a means of 
deliverance from what many saw as inferior offerings by established broadcasters, these 
groups reasoned that the lack of spectrum space, not a lack of imagination, was 
responsible for the dearth of quality programming available on broadcast television.  
Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, since cable had a multichannel carrying 
capacity, more people would have the ability to produce programming, and that fact 
alone would provide more and better options for viewers.  Not only would viewers have 
more options with cable, but minorities and other marginalized groups would also have 
more outlets for expression.  Furthermore, if cable could achieve its potential for 
enlarging the public sphere, it could lead to a more equitable and egalitarian society.  In 
retrospect, it is easy to see that cable could never have fulfilled these lofty expectations, 
but at the time, people believed in the romance of cable.  The nation’s persistent 
60 
infatuation with new technologies would continue to be a theme echoed repeatedly by 
regulators, citizens, and academics. 
 The FCC’s Third Report and Order on Cable Television in 1972 was designed to 
cultivate the Commission’s broader goals of encouraging localism and diversity (Copple, 
1991; Engelman, 1996).  The FCC required cable systems in the top 100 markets to 
provide a minimum of 20 channels including at least 3 free public access channels for 
government, educational, and citizen use.  The FCC also required systems operators to 
lease unused channels to other entities.  This optimistic policy statement was designed to 
grease the way for a new participatory form of communication. 
 
Fowler and Friends 
 As the consumer movement came to a head during the late 1960s and 1970s, 
Congress passed legislation that created 20 of the nation’s 55 regulatory agencies 
(Horowitz, 1989).  Predictably, a slow burning backlash against regulations in general 
began to build momentum.  By the late 1970s, the economy was stagnant.  There was 
rampant inflation and a decline in productivity in many industries.  Oil and gas prices 
were at record highs.  Rates were rising for cable and telephone services and industry 
leaders saw the cost of conforming to social regulations to be excessively high.  They 
blamed regulators for their lack of productivity. 
 By the end of the 1970s, the discourse of regulation was changing (Fowler & 
Brenner, 1982; Krasnow et al. 1982; McChesney, 1999).  During the previous decade, 
regulatory reformers stressed the need for policy that would divorce administrative 
agencies from the industries that they regulated.  Consumer advocates and other left-
leaning activists perceived the roots of regulatory problems to be one of capture by the 
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industries (Horowitz, 1989).  If those agencies were forced to represent the public’s 
interest rather than those of corporations, then reform could be accomplished.  These 
activists opposed price and entry requirements in the telecommunications industry 
because they saw them as protecting the turf of huge corporations.  At the same time, 
industry leaders and government officials came to embrace regulatory reform as a goal 
that would restore economic stability to their industries.  To this interpretive community, 
those in the administration and industry, reform was equated with deregulation.  A 
deregulated marketplace would ensure that the economy could grow unfettered and that 
would serve the public interest in the end.  At the same time, free market economists 
were obtaining positions in the Ford administration and their influence was rising. 
 In 1978, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act (Public Law No. 95-504, 
1978).  The bill was passed by an overwhelming majority in both houses.  In 1980, 
Congress passed legislation to deregulate the trucking industry, and it passed laws to 
deregulate the banking industry.  President Ronald Reagan was elected, at least partially, 
because of his promise to reduce the size of the federal government, and deregulation was 
the political catchphrase of the Reagan administration 
 The political ideology of the Reagan administration stood in stark contrast to the 
philosophy of governing that was prevalent during the previous decades (Horowitz, 
1989).  The expansion of social welfare programs during the Great Society era 
promulgated the prospect of a more equitable distribution of society’s resources, but 
when the national economy floundered, the assurances of the Great Society approach to 
governance appeared to be an illusion.  The new administration vowed to shrink the size 
of the federal government and to do away with governmental regulations that inhibited 
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the growth of industry. 
 Reagan was not the only one who wanted to curb the growth of government.  
Around the world, there was a trend toward privatization of industry, and public service 
broadcasting was in decline (Avery, 1993).  When Reagan appointed Mark S. Fowler to 
head the FCC, he and his chief aide, Daniel Brenner, called for a market approach to 
broadcast regulation.  In an influential article published in the Texas Law Review, Fowler 
and Brenner (1982) argued that the primary focus of the FCC should be to protect the 
First Amendment rights of broadcasters.  In their view, the spectrum scarcity doctrine 
was not a valid rationale for continuing to uphold the public trustee model of 
broadcasting.  The previous chair of the FCC, Charles D. Ferris had encouraged the 
liberalization of barriers to entry in broadcasting and cable, and initiated efforts to bring  
such new broadcast services as direct broadcast satellites, multipoint distribution services 
and low-power television into the market.  Those actions began to disrupt the traditional 
structure of the telecommunications industry (Horowitz, 1989).  There were also more 
independent television and radio stations nationwide, and many consumers could now 
access cable television and other program content via videotape. Therefore, according to 
Fowler and Brenner, the spectrum scarcity doctrine should not apply.  According to their 
point of view, the government had no business dictating the structure and content of 
broadcasting.  Instead, the FCC needed to allow economic efficiencies to determine what 
services and programming were accessible to audiences.  Fowler and Brenner envisioned 
a day when the FCC would hold auctions for spectrum space and would collect revenue 
from the sale of station licenses.  With Fowler leading the charge at the FCC, the 
Commission systematically struck down individual content and structural regulations in 
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broadcasting (Aufderheide, 1999).   
  In 1984, the FCC raised the multiple ownership limits from 7 AM stations, seven 
FM stations, and 7 television stations to 12 of each.  It dropped the trafficking rule that 
required station owners to hold onto a license for a minimum of 3 years, and eliminated 
cross-interest rules that prohibited licensees from consulting with or entering into time 
brokerage arrangements with competing stations in the same market.  The Commission 
eliminated the regional concentration rule.  After Congress objected to the specter of 
more consolidation in broadcasting, the Commission agreed to pass a cap on the number 
of broadcast stations that a licensee could hold.  Licensees were prohibited from reaching 
more than 25% of the national audience.  
 Additionally, during the 1980s the FCC eliminated rules limiting the length of 
commercials on television programs and dropped minimum requirements for news and 
public affairs programming (Aufderheide, 1999).  Also, under Fowler’s leadership, the 
FCC rescinded rules that required station owners to keep programming logs and produce 
annual financial reports.  In 1985, the FCC issued a report that said the Fairness Doctrine, 
a policy first instituted in 1949 to ensure that programming was balanced with divergent 
viewpoints, was unwieldy and therefore restricted the diversity of voices being broadcast 
(Report on the Fairness Doctrine, 1985).  The FCC also noted that the Doctrine was 
impossible to enforce consistently.  Two years later, the FCC formally repealed it (re: 
Syracuse Peace Council, 1987).  
 In contrast, in 1984, Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act that 
among other things, imposed ownership restrictions on cable system operators (Cable 
Communications Policy Act, 1984; Carter, Dee, & Zuchman, 2000; Copple, 1991).  The 
64 
act prohibited a television licensee, or common carrier from owning a cable system in the 
same coverage area, and it prohibited TV networks from owning cable systems, although 
a network could own an interest in a cable system.  However, by the early 1990s,96 % of 
the nation had access to cable, but rates had soared, and Congress responded to consumer 
complaints with the Cable Act of 1992.  This act relaxed some of the ownership 
restrictions.  Now, network/cable cross-ownership rules allowed television networks to 
own cable systems as long as they did not exceed a national limit of 10% of the homes 
accessible by cable nationwide.  Additionally, they could not exceed a cap of 50% of 
cable homes in any given area of dominant influence. 
Summary 
 This chapter has demonstrated how the current legal regime that governs 
broadcasting was rooted in the earlier attempts to regulate the railroads.  As the classical 
liberal values of the early 19th century adjusted to accommodate an industrialized 
economy, a corporate liberal paradigm replaced faith in a theoretically purer form of the 
free market.  When the Interstate Commerce Act sanctioned consolidation within the 
railroad industry, regulators acknowledged that it was in the public’s interest to promote 
economic order and efficiency to build the nation’s infrastructure.  By the time Congress 
passed the Radio Act of 1927, legislators tried to balance the need for an orderly structure 
for the technical and economic aspects of broadcasting while maintaining a belief that 
cultivating a marketplace of ideas in broadcasting would best serve the public.  
Subsequent legislation and court rulings attempted to maintain this balance by forwarding 
policy that restricted media ownership, encouraged localism, and discouraged 
consolidation.   
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 This chapter also introduced the formation of the various stakeholder groups that 
exert an influence over policy decisions.  The first legal opinions that allowed for the 
regulation of interstate commerce and the formation of administrative agencies began 
with the recognition that certain industries were affected with a public interest.  
Therefore, the courts allowed these industries to be subjected to legal privileges and 
restrictions.  As government became more centralized, the power of Congress to shape 
the structure of emerging industries grew.  When the FCC was permanently established 
by the Federal Communications Act of 1934, it became the primary stakeholder in this 
arena.  Hoover’s vision of the associative state inspired the establishment of industry 
groups like the NAB, which also became major stakeholders in the decision-making 
process.  When the Court gave legal standing to the public in 1966, the public became an 
officially sanctioned stakeholder too.  
 This chapter also identified some of the values and assumptions that undergird 
communication policy decisions.  Congress allowed commercial interests to dominate 
broadcasting, at least partially, because of the fear that a government controlled 
communications infrastructure might restrict free speech as set forth in the First 
Amendment.  The idea that the structure of broadcasting should provide for an unfettered 
marketplace of ideas is a theme that emerged before the idea of broadcasting was a 
reality.  Various attempts to achieve diversity on the airwaves by encouraging 
competition and by mandating restrictions on ownership are documented here.  Initially, 
the corporations that were allowed to control the industry were thought to be the entities 
that were most capable of achieving nearly universal service.  The theory of localism is 
traced back to the first decisions about how to divide the spectrum.  The conflict between 
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these opposing values has never been resolved, even as they have been reinterpreted over 
time.  
By the beginning of the 1990s the communications industry was radically 
different from the environment that produced the Federal Communications Act of 1934.  
The spectrum scarcity rationale that was the foundation for regulating broadcasting was 
increasingly viewed as an anachronism that impeded the growth of a new and improved 
telecommunications infrastructure.  Once again, the discourse of new technology was 
deployed, this time to the Internet.  By the 1990s, most policy makers agreed that a major 




CONSUMER INTEREST, CORPORATE COVENIENCE,  
AND LEGISLATIVE NECESSITY 
 The 1996 Telecommunications Act was the culmination of the deregulatory trend 
that began in the 1970s (Aufderheide, 1999; Keller, 2004). The debates leading up to the 
restructuring of media policy that had been in place for decades continued over several 
sessions of Congress, and the arguments presented in many of those conferences and 
hearings are outlined in this chapter.  This chapter also suggests that whereas the old rules 
governing broadcasting had defined the public interest in terms of the needs of citizens in 
a participatory democracy to access political and cultural information, the new rules 
defined the public’s interest as a “consumer interest” as it related to inexpensive and 
reliable access to content delivery systems.  The premise that new communications 
technologies could provide an innovative and competitive market that would benefit 
consumers instead of relying on the inconsistent logic of administrative officials 
dominated these discussions and is analyzed here.  Additionally, this chapter documents 
the FCC’s first attempt to reconcile its media ownership rules with the new legislation in 




Although little testimony taken from public interest groups during the hearings 
led up to the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, other more powerful 
interests had more sway over the legislators (Aufderheide, 1999; McChesney, 1999).  
Broadcasters were extremely influential in shaping the new legislation, and they 
wholeheartedly argued in favor of deregulation when it came to the requirements for 
license renewal and the relaxation of multiple ownership rules (Telecommunications 
Competition and Deregulations Act, 1995; H. R. Rep. No. 103-225, 1993).  However, 
broadcasters were equally ferocious when arguing that they needed to retain their 
monopoly of the spectrum (Mundy, 1996, 1998).  The existing structure of regulations 
conferred a public trustee status on broadcasters in exchange for exclusive control over 
their piece of the electromagnetic spectrum, and broadcasters were loath to give up the 
privileges associated with the status quo.  They argued that broadcasting was a valuable 
public service and that the only way they could survive in the face of the onslaught from 
competition from new media delivery systems was if Congress abolished restrictions on 
multiple ownership and cross-ownership of media properties.  In exchange for the 
relaxation of ownership rules, they vowed to develop the digital capabilities of broadcast 
television and radio.  Since this would require huge capital investments on the part of 
broadcasters with no guarantee of enhanced revenue, Congress needed to protect their 
risk.  Subsequently, if Congress granted them the exclusive use of additional spectrum 
space without charge, a valuable public interest would be served.  Despite the FCC’s 
long-standing support of procompetition policies, broadcasters once again argued, as they 
had in the 1920s, that they could not survive without government-sponsored sanctions 
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that protected them from competitors.  Notwithstanding all the rhetoric in favor of 
competition and the free market that congressional representatives espoused during the 
debates leading up to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the new policy resulted in 
less competition for incumbent broadcasters, rather than more. 
 During the debates leading up to the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, radio station owners argued that their industry was in particularly dire straits and 
that the only way that they could compete in the new multichannel universe was if 
ownership restrictions on radio were relaxed (Aufderheide, 1999; Knoll, 1996).  Industry 
representatives also argued that radio advertising was in a slump, and that the only way 
that the industry could remain financially viable was to remove limits on radio 
concentration.  Congress found this argument persuasive.  The act reduced restrictions on 
national radio station ownership and relaxed local ownership restrictions so one entity 
could own approximately one half of the radio stations in any one market. 
Multisystem cable operators argued that that they too could only thrive if cross-
ownership restrictions between cable and broadcasting were abolished (Aufderheide, 
1999; Hearn, 2000; Lohr, 1996; Price & Duffy, 1997).  They cited competition from 
direct broadcast satellite services as a threat to their financial viability, and they 
maintained that price regulations should be abandoned.  The Telecommunications Act 
dropped all rate regulations on cable except for basic service, but the law required cable 
operators to carry local broadcast signals over their systems.  It also allowed telephone 
companies to compete in the video delivery market. 
In a speech before the American Women in Radio and Television, shortly after he 
was appointed to chair the FCC, Reed Hundt (1994) summarized his views on 
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broadcasting and telecommunications.  He emphasized the coming convergence of media 
and his desire to deregulate the industry in order to further competition in 
telecommunications.  He suggested that the FCC would be open to reexamining 
broadcast ownership policies. 
As a framework for competition, we have three principles: choice, opportunity, 
and fairness.  Choice means choice for consumers and suppliers.  It means you 
can go to more than one seller for telephone services or cable TV.  Fairness means 
it isn't fair for a single company to charge whatever it wants to monopolize 
consumers.  Opportunity means that competitive markets will create more 
opportunities to participate in this key part of our economy.  (Hundt, p. 2)  
 
In countless speeches, Hundt reiterated his faith that competition and deregulation 
would best serve the public interest (Hundt, 1995, 1997a, 1997b).  However, he was also 
leery of the dangers of creating an environment that was conducive to monopoly, so he 
stressed that the FCC should be proactive when it came to correcting the excesses of the 
market.   
Although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is an extremely complex piece of 
legislation, it was clearly the desire of legislators to spur the development of an 
information superhighway that would usher in a new era of technological innovation (S. 
Rpt. No. 686, 1996).  According to Congress, a competitive market unhampered by 
unnecessary regulations, without barriers to entry, would achieve these goals more 
readily than the old regulatory regime.  If some members of Congress expressed their 
concern that the act might promote “communications cannibalism,” as Representative 
Markey did, others were more concerned that the United States would be stranded on the 
side of the information highway if the telecommunications industry were not allowed to 
compete in the domestic and global marketplace. 
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The regulatory regime based on the doctrine of spectrum scarcity that had been in 
place since the passage of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was pushed aside 
during the discussion that led to the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  As 
Senator Lott put it, 
 Most telecommunications policy and regulation in America is based upon the 
New Deal era Communications Act of 1934.  Tight government control over 
spectrum-based services was justified on a scarcity theory.  Neither theory for big 
government regulation holds true today, if it ever did.  (Telecommunications 
Competition,” Cong Rec. S. 7881, 1995 p. 141)   
 
Legislators and members of the FCC argued that while the electromagnetic 
spectrum was still a limited physical entity, by the end of the 20th century, U.S. citizens 
had access to a multichannel universe (Aufderheide, 1999; Levi, 2000; Meyerson, 1997; 
Price & Duffy, 1997; “Telecommunications Competition,” Cong Rec. S. 7881, 1995).  
Cable television was now accessible by a majority of households, the number of 
broadcast stations had increased considerably since the 1970s, and consumers could 
access programming via direct broadcast satellite systems, multichannel multipoint 
distribution systems, and videocassettes.  The Internet provided Americans with even 
more access to information and other programming.  Accordingly, legislators argued that 
while the spectrum remained finite, scarcity was an outmoded principle that was no 
longer applicable to the contemporary communications environment. 
This argument, while logical on its face, neglected at least one important 
cornerstone of broadcast policy-making.  When legislators created the structure of 
broadcasting in the 1920s, they rejected proposals that would have created a 
noncommercial government-sponsored system of broadcasting (Barnouw, 1966; 
McChesney, 1993; Radio Act of 1927; Streeter, 1996).  Once Congress allowed 
72 
 
broadcasters to create an advertiser-supported, privately controlled system of 
broadcasting, they explicitly stated that this privilege came with the caveat that 
broadcasters must serve the public interest, convenience, or necessity (Federal 
Communications Act of 1934).  However, after Congress passed the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, they lost sight of the original compromise.  By the 1990s, citizens not only 
had to tolerate an advertiser-driven broadcasting system, but now, their options were also 
limited by their ability to pay for subscription-based services (McChesney, 1999).  When 
Congress left the public service responsibilities of broadcasters to the dictates of the 
market, they did not make provisions for correcting the excesses of a system based 
primarily on the interests of large multinational corporations.  
After station owners made the argument that broadcasting was an important 
public service, Congress agreed.  When broadcasters argued that providing digital signals 
would be a vast improvement for this important public service, Congress allowed 
broadcasters to increase their dominance over the spectrum so they could offer digital 
broadcasting.  Then, after broadcasters complained that the transition to digital 
broadcasting would require massive capital investments with no proven revenue- 
enhancing stream, Congress was sympathetic to their plight.  Consequently, broadcasters 
complained that they were losing viewers due to increased competition from other 
entrants in the multichannel universe, Congress decided that the only way that 
broadcasting could remain economically competitive was if station owners were allowed 
to consolidate their holdings so they could realize the economic efficiencies of large 
multiple ownership groups.  
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When Senator Pressler first presented a conference report that proposed a 
compromise to reconcile differences between the House and Senate version of the 
legislation that would become the Telecommunications Act of 1996, he stressed his belief 
that competition in the industry would benefit all stakeholders. 
Competition, not regulation, is the best way to spur innovation and the 
development of new services.  A competitive marketplace is the most efficient 
way to lower prices and increase value for consumers.  More competitive 
American telecommunications markets will promote United States technological 
advances, domestic job and investment opportunities, national competitiveness, 
sustained economic development, and improved quality of American life more 
effectively than regulation. (Telecommunications Competition and Deregulations 
Act, 1995, p. 7881) 
 
However, despite rhetoric that endorsed the principle of competition in the 
marketplace, the Telecommunications Act allowed for greater consolidation in the 
broadcasting industry (Aufderheide, 1999; McChesney, 1999).  Congress raised the cap 
on the National Television Ownership Rule to 35% of the national audience and 
eliminated national ownership restrictions for radio altogether.  Even if Congress did not 
appear to be overly concerned about the ramifications of increasing media consolidation, 
the paradox was that it had given the FCC a mandate to preserve competition.  
 
Competition as the Public Interest 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 contained a clause that required the FCC to 
review all of its media ownership rules biennially to determine whether any “such rules 
are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition” (Telecommunications 
Act, §202(h), 1996).  The Commission is also required to “repeal or modify any 
regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest.” President Clinton 
appointed William E. Kennard to chairman of the FCC in November 1997 (“Kennard 
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Biography,” n.d.).  Despite having signed the legislation that weakened media ownership 
rules in May 1996, Clinton had already gone on record as being opposed to the relaxation 
of duopoly rules by the time he appointed Kennard.  Kennard himself was a strong 
proponent of maintaining existing media ownership regulations (McConnell & Albiniak, 
1998; Mundy, 1998).  Kennard’s appointment did not please the broadcasting industry 
that was hoping that the deregulatory tide that began with the Telecommunications Act 
would be soon swing further in their direction.  Broadcasters began to pressure the FCC 
to reexamine the ownership rules.  In March 1998, the FCC adopted a Notice of Inquiry 
that solicited comments from interested parties on six rules that it was required to review, 
(a) The National Television Ownership Rule and UHF Discount, (b) The Dual Network 
Rule, (c) The Daily Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule, (d) The 
Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule, (e) The Experimental Broadcast Station Rule, 
and (f) The Local Radio Ownership Rules (FCC, 1998).  
  The commission began its first comprehensive attempt to address media 
ownership rules in 1998, although before issuing the completed report in 2000, the FCC 
relaxed the prohibition on common ownership of local television stations with 
overlapping signal contours (FCC, 1999b).  The new rule, known as the “Eight Voices 
Rule,” allowed duopolies in the same designated market area if neither station was ranked 
among the top four in the market and if after the merger, there would still be at least eight 
independently owned television stations in the market (FCC, 1999b).  In the same 
rulemaking procedure, the Commission also relaxed the one-to-a-market radio/cross-
ownership restriction and allowed radio/television duopolies under certain conditions.  A 
licensee could now control one or two television stations and up to six radio stations in a 
75 
 
market where at least 20 independent voices would remain before a merger, or one entity 
could own up to four radio stations in markets where at least 10 independent voices 
would remain after a merger or one radio station and one or two television station in a 
market regardless of how many other independent voices there were in that community.  
In the introduction to its 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review Report the 
Commission reminded readers that it had historically based its regulatory decisions on the 
principle that competition and diversity serve the public interest and that the Supreme 
Court most recently in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC (1997) validated this 
rationale  (FCC, 2000d).  Furthermore,  
Competition is an important part of the Commission's public interest mandate, 
because it promotes consumer welfare and the efficient use of resources and is a 
necessary component of diversity.  Diversity of ownership fosters diversity of 
viewpoints, and thus advances core First Amendment principles.  (FCC 2000d, p. 
5) 
 
While acknowledging that the media market had changed since the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act, a majority of the Commissioners were concerned that 
increasing consolidation across all media could undermine its goal of competition and 
diversity (FCC, 2000d; Kennard, 1999b).  Although all of the major networks were in 
favor of the repeal of national ownership limits for television, the Commission rejected 
the argument that the elimination of the caps would not affect the level of diversity and 
competition in local markets.  The Commission was not sympathetic to the network’s 
argument that the cap hindered their ability to accrue economic efficiencies, nor were 
they susceptible to the argument that group-owned stations produced more news and 
public affairs programming.  Additionally, the Commission was skeptical of the 
76 
 
networks’ argument that the national advertising market and the national market for video 
exhibition rights would remain less concentrated if the rule were eliminated.  
Instead, the Commission found the arguments of those opposed to the elimination 
of the national ownership limits to be more convincing (FCC, 2000d).  The NAB argued 
that the 1996 regulations had not been in place long enough to evaluate their effects on 
local broadcast markets.  The National Affiliated Stations Alliance (NASA) argued that 
changing the national rule would have a detrimental effect on localism by making it more 
difficult for affiliates to serve their communities.  The Center for Media Education 
(CME) and other public interest groups contended that the 1996 increase in the cap led to 
unprecedented concentration and diminished competition that could enable networks to 
exercise monopoly power in the program production market.  Additionally, these groups 
claimed that the public was receiving less news and information from fewer sources than 
ever before (FCC, 2000d).  Others commenters said that the 35% limit was not harming 
competition and was essential to protecting diversity on the airwaves.  The American 
Federation of Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) argued that group owners recycled 
news and public affairs programming from one reporter or news writer, whereas the 
public interest is better served by having different reporters and news writers in separate 
markets provide different angles and perspectives on the news. 
 By the time the FCC published its 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review Report in 
May 2000, the pattern of ownership within the industry was less stable than it had been in 
1996 (FCC, 2000d; Kennard, 1999b).  Nowhere was this more apparent than in the radio 
industry.  At the time of the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, radio was 
the least concentrated and most local of all electronic media (Aufderheide, 1999; FCC, 
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2000g).  Within a year and a half of the passage of the act, more than a quarter of all 
radio stations nationwide had been sold at least once.  In a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) issued before its second biennial review, the FCC reported that 
before the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, there were approximately 
5,100 owners of commercial radio stations nationwide, but as of November 8, 2001, there 
were only 3,880 radio station owners, a decrease of 25%.  The FCC also stated that local 
markets had seen similar consolidation.  In March 1996, a typical Arbitron metro market 
had an average of 13.5 unique owners; in March 2001, the average was 10.3, a decrease 
of 22%.  The Commission noted that “promoting diversity and competition remains the 
touchstone of its local radio ownership rules,” and it asked the public to submit 
comments addressing whether the three traditional aspects of diversity (viewpoint, outlet, 
and source) should guide its public interest considerations.  
       Additionally, a 2001 article in Broadcasting and Cable reported that the top 25 radio 
groups controlled 2,710 outlets nationwide, 24.3% of the 11,115 commercial stations 
across the country (Kerschbaumer, 2001).  Among those companies, Clear Channel 
Communications controlled the most stations nationwide with 1,202 stations.  The article 
also noted that commercial radio station revenue was up approximately 10% over 1999’s 
total, bringing in $3.5 billion dollars.  
In its 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review Report, the Commission decided to retain 
the local radio ownership rules.  In the judgment of the majority, these rules continued to 
serve the public interest.  However, the Commission was concerned that consolidation in 
local markets had led to adverse effects on local competition.  The Report cited statistics 
that showed that in 85 of the top 270 Arbitron markets, two entities already controlled 
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80% of all radio advertising revenue, and in 143 markets, two entities controlled upward 
of 70% of the revenue in a market.  This concerned the Commissioners because in their 
view radio advertising was distinct from other forms of advertising.  While CBS and 
other large group owners urged the FCC to consider all other media when evaluating the 
level of advertising revenue in local markets, the majority of the Commission insisted 
that radio advertising was irreplaceable.  According to the 1998 Biennial Regulatory 
Review Report, there was no other medium that could reach a mobile audience, no other 
medium that was as useful in reaching targeted audiences, and no other advertising 
vehicle that was as cost effective or capable of adapting so responsively to local market 
conditions.  
 The commission was less clear with regard to diversity of viewpoints in local 
markets and adopted a wait-and-see approach to local ownership rules (FCC, 2000d).  
However, the commission did note that there were hundreds fewer licensees than there 
were 4 years before.  The Commission conceded that group ownership of radio stations 
produced economies of scale that gave owners access to more resources to produce more 
public affairs and news programming.  However, the FCC was also receptive to CME’s 
argument that group owners had actually reduced coverage in this area, and that 
consolidation in the industry had reduced coverage of unprofitable demographic groups.  
However, the Commission did give one concession to group broadcasters.  They agreed 
to study whether the methodology that the Commission was using to measure the size of 
local markets was accurate. 
 When considering whether to lift the ban on the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-
Ownership Rule in local communities, the Commission once again found that the ban 
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served the public’s interest because it furthered the goal of viewpoint diversity (FCC, 
2000d).  The Commissioners argued that there was no acceptable substitute for 
newspapers or broadcast stations on a local level.  They did not feel that local access 
stations on cable systems fulfilled this responsibility, especially given that it was up to 
local municipalities to negotiate the availability of these channels when renewing 
franchise agreements.  The Commissioners reiterated the importance of maintaining 
viewpoint diversity in local markets.  “Monopolization on the means of mass 
communication in a locality assures the monopolist control of information received by 
the public and based upon which it makes elective, economic, and other choices” (FCC, 
2000d, p.48).  Additionally, the Report noted that new outlets such as DBS and MMDS 
did not typically produce local programming.  Even if new video and information 
delivery options did cover local news and public affairs, not everyone could afford to 
subscribe to these services, whereas all citizens could access local television programs or 
pay a nominal fee for a newspaper.  The Commission refuted the arguments of the few 
newspaper/television owners that were grandfathered in before 1975 when they claimed 
that the economic efficiencies they had reaped because of their exempted status allowed 
them to produce more news and public affairs programs. 
The Commission has felt that without a diversity of outlets, there would be no real 
viewpoint diversity—if all programming passed through the same filter, the 
material and views presented to the public would not be diverse.  Similarly, the 
Commission has felt that without diversity of sources, the variety of views would 
necessarily be circumscribed.  (FCC, 2000d, p. 52) 
 
With regard to competition, the Commissioners noted that the ban on  
Newspaper/Television Cross-Ownership only prohibited those combinations in local 




While the Commission acknowledged that existing combinations might have 
collected increased advertising revenues due to their exemption from the rule, there were 
no benefits that those economic efficiencies accrued to advertisers or consumers.  Since 
most of the comments received on this issue pointed out that newspaper/television 
combinations kept separate editorial staffs, the Commission was not convinced that 
allowing such arrangements would benefit group owners.  The Commission applied 
similar logic when voting to retain the Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule.  When 
the Commission first established the ban on cross-ownership between cable systems and 
television stations, regulators expressed their intent to both increase competition in the 
marketplace and to increase competition in the marketplace of ideas (FCC v. National 
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 1978). 
 In the 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review Report, the Commission voted to retain 
this rule because the members felt it was still relevant to the pursuit of competition and 
diversity.  The Commission noted that the cable industry was still highly concentrated 
and that the rule would foster diversity on a local level.  In answer to opponents of this 
rule, the Commissioners pointed out that although cable and broadcast television might 
sometime be substitutes for each other, the majority of cable system providers did not 
produce locally originated news and public affairs programs.  Even if one wished to 
allow public access channel programs into the mix, system operators had no control over 
those productions.  The Commission felt that cable/broadcast combinations would erode 
the number of independent television stations that had just begun to adapt to the 
relaxation of local television ownership restrictions recently allowed by the FCC. 
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 ABC, CBS, Paxson, and WB were the only parties to comment on the Dual 
Network Rule and they were all in favor of its repeal (FCC, 2000).  The rule permitted a 
person or entity to affiliate with a network that maintained more than one network as long 
as the network was not created through the merger of ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX, WB, or 
UPN.  The purpose of the rule was to encourage common ownership of multiple 
broadcast networks created through internal growth and new entrants to the market.  The 
rule was also designed to prevent mergers with the major existing networks unless a 
merger was created with another network formed after 1996.  The networks argued that 
they were in poor economic health because they were losing viewers to cable and satellite 
competitors.  The networks maintained that they were being discriminated against 
because mergers are allowed between broadcast networks and cable networks, but the 
rules limiting mergers among television networks still stood.  The Commission refuted 
this argument by saying that there was nothing to prevent the networks from owning 
multiple networks, and there were no restrictions on the number of stations that could 
affiliate with a network.  However, the Commission did agree to consider modifying the 
rule to allow mergers with UPN and WB and stated that it would seek comments with a 
NPRM. 
 Only one comment was filed from NAB regarding the possible repeal of the limit of 
one experimental station to a licensee (FCC, 2000d).  The Commission decided to issue a 
NPRM to allow broadcasters to operate more than one experimental station at a time 
since experimental stations had no effect on either competition or diversity.  Since these 
stations were not operated as commercial ventures and rules already existed to safeguard 
their operation, the FCC modified the rule. 
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 In a separate statement attached to the report, Kennard (2000) explained that 
although Americans did have more communication options than ever before, the majority 
of households still received most of their news and public affairs programming over 
broadcast television.  In fact, he cited statistics that said that the average American spent 
7 hours a day watching television and only spent 8 hours a month online.  Kennard 
addressed those who would argue that the substantial increase of options for consumers 
outweighed the growth of consolidation in the television and video industries.  He went 
on to state that in his opinion, more choice does not necessarily equal more competition 
in viewpoints.  Kennard said that just because there may be more pipes delivering content 
to a given household, if all pipes are owned by a single corporation all the channels in the 
world could not guarantee that the information received would come from diverse and 
antagonistic sources. 
 In his dissenting statement, Commission Harold Furchtgott-Roth (2000) 
dismissed Kennard’s argument for opposing the elimination of the National Television 
Ownership Rule by saying that the national limits had no effect on local markets.  
Furchtgott-Roth contended that by taking a wait and see approach to the rules, the 
Commission was in effect ignoring its regulatory responsibility.  He also suggested that 
past precedents should have no influence over how the Commission chose to interpret the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  
 Commissioner Michael Powell (2000) argued that the structure of the 
broadcasting market had changed so radically since the original rules were formulated 
that they were no longer applicable.  He maintained that since there were more broadcast 
networks, more broadcast stations, and more video outlets with more programming 
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options for consumers than before the Telecommunications Act was passed, therefore, 
the FCC should let the market determine the structure of broadcasting instead of 
regulating by fiat.  Powell stated that he could see no possible connection between 
national ownership limits and preserving competition and diversity on a local level.  He 
also argued that the Commission’s review did not adequately address any harm that could 
be caused by limiting the percentage of the national audience that one entity could reach.  
He said that the national ownership cap limited economies of scale for group owners and 
therefore reduced incentives for investments in broadcasting, thus limiting expansion 
opportunities for corporations.  Powell said that the caps reduced the ability of networks 
to own stations, consequently raising the costs of producing high quality, innovative 
programming.  Additionally, Powell questioned the goal of ensuring access to diverse and 
antagonist sources.  His point was that broadcasters depended on capturing the largest 
audiences and therefore it was against their best interests to alienate viewers by 
antagonizing any one group of viewers. 
 Powell (2000) also dissented from the majority’s decision to retain restrictions on 
the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule, although he was encouraged by the 
Commission’s decision to discuss if the rule could be modified in specific circumstances.  
Powell argued that the Commission’s rationale for maintaining this rule was flawed 
because it depended on the assumption that local television stations provide the bulk of 
local programming.  He stated that this technical limitation would surely change in the 
near future.  Powell said that many cable system providers already offered coverage of 
sports and other local events and would expand their coverage if there were an audience 
for them.  He also objected to maintaining the Broadcast/Cable restriction on the same 
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grounds.  Powell concurred with the majority opinion that local radio ownership rules 
should be maintained but disagreed with the decision to issue a NPRM to consider if 
consolidation in the industry had threatened local competition and diversity.  Powell 
supported efforts to redefine the geographical boundaries of local markets if the FCC 
could adopt a better tool for measuring the size of markets.  
 
The Staff Biennial Review 
 After President Bush was elected in 2000, he appointed Michael Powell to Chair 
the FCC.  However, before Kennard left office, he released a second biennial report (FCC 
2000a).  The 2000 review did not change any of the media ownership rules, but it did 
announce the Commission’s intention to issue a NPRM to solicit comments about the 
possible modification of the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule in the future 
(FCC 2000a; FCC, 2000b).  The major initiative contained in the report was an effort to 
evaluate every rule in every bureau and office, not just those explicitly covered under the 
biennial review section of the Telecommunications Act.  Therefore, the scope of the 
review process was more comprehensive than the first, and the Commissioners were 
requiring more thorough documentation from the staff.  The goal of this initiative was to 
create a more consistent methodology for future reviews and set forth a framework for 
future action.  However, before the 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Report was 
adopted, broadcasters went to court to challenge the Commission’s rulings in the 1998 
Biennial Review.  At issue was the validity of the FCC’s Cable/Broadcast Cross-
Ownership Rule, the National Television Ownership Rule, and the Local Television 
Duopoly Rule (Fox v. FCC, 2002; Sinclair v. FCC. 2002).  These two court cases, 
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combined with the change in leadership at the Commission, were the pivotal moments 
that led to Powell’s attempt to further deregulate media ownership rules.  
 
Summary 
 When legislators passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, they rejected the 
spectrum scarcity rationale that had provided the justification for the regulation of 
broadcasting since the Radio Act of 1927.  Since broadcasters no longer had a monopoly 
on the distribution of video and audio content, lawmakers reasoned that broadcasters 
should be permitted to consolidate their holdings in order to achieve the economic 
efficiencies that would allow the continued viability of the service.  Thus, legislators 
assumed that the public interest would be served with increased access to new means of 
information distribution.  As one of the primary stakeholders in the policy-making 
process, Congress elevated market force pragmatism over other core values of regulatory 
policy.  Competition became the means in which legislators assumed that localism, 
diversity, a marketplace of ideas, and the First Amendment rights of the public to receive 
information would all be achieved.  
 By statute, the FCC was required to review and adapt its media ownership policies 
biennially.  However, after the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the broadcast industry 
became less competitive and more consolidated.  FCC Chairman William Kennard did 
not subscribe to the belief that competition across all media sectors served the public 
interest in broadcasting exclusively.  Kennard believed that safeguards were necessary to 
ensure that all of the core values of broadcasting policy would be upheld.  
 The division between the Commissioners can be attributed to a larger conflict over 
the purpose of the regulatory body.  Powell represented the perspective that the proper 
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role of the FCC was to ensure the economic health of the broadcasting industry so that 
individual licensees and corporate owners could achieve a competitive position in the 
consumer and advertising market (Powell, 2000).  Only then would the industry be 
capable of serving the public interest.  The Democratic majority viewed their 
responsibilities differently.  Their vision of media was that its primary function was to 
transmit information in a democratic society.  While Furchtgott-Roth (2000) and Powell 
(2000) thought that restrictions on broadcast ownership were misguided, or as Powell 
suggested, even harmful, Kennard (2000), Ness (2000), and Tristiani (2000a), believed 
that the same restrictions would preserve a diverse and antagonistic marketplace of ideas, 
one of the primary functions of the media in a democracy.  As long as the Democrats 
maintained their majority on the Commission, the media ownership restrictions would 
remain in place, but once the membership of the Commission shifted and the Republicans 
assumed control of the White House, the balance of power would change and the conflict 
over media ownership was certain to become more intense.  
 During his years as a Commissioner, Powell repeatedly asserted that the 
deregulation of media ownership rules would promote competition and thereby benefit 
individual consumers by providing them with cheaper and more innovative services.  He 
rarely spoke of the function of media in a democracy; rather he was fond of speaking of 
the wonders of new communications technologies as if the technology was an end on to 
itself, rather than the means to achieve a more informed and participative citizenry in a 
self-governing democracy. 
 Several important events defined the agenda for the FCC in 2001, but none were 
more significant than the changes in the political make-up of the Commission, and the 
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looming threat of legal challenges to the agency’s conclusions contained in the 1998 
Biennial Regulatory Review Report.  When President Clinton appointed Commissioner 
Michael K. Powell to the FCC in November 1997, he was one of two Republican 
appointees.  By the time President Bush appointed him to head the Commission in 
January 2001, Powell would preside over a Republican majority at the FCC for the first 
time in 8 years (“Powell Biography,” 2007; Pulley, 2002).  That same year, Republicans 
controlled the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the White House, and 
broadcasters felt the political tide was turning in their favor.  Although the two cases 
broadcasters brought challenging the decisions made in the first biennial review, Fox v. 
FCC and Sinclair v. FCC, would not be decided until the beginning of the following year, 
the D.C. District Court remanded the issue of national caps on cable system operators 
back to the FCC (Time Warner v. U.S.A., 2000).  Consequently, Powell, a steadfast 
opponent of media ownership restrictions, prepared to conduct the most sweeping reform 






















ECONOMIC EMPIRICISM: THE LONE RATIONALE 
 
 
 When Michael K. Powell assumed his position as chair of the FCC, he brought with 
him a regulatory stance that was diametrically opposed to that of his predecessor’s.  
Whereas Kennard supported retaining media ownership limits, Powell was in favor of 
their elimination.  He was also determined to produce a biennial review that would not be 
rejected by the courts.  Powell had never been shy about speaking his belief that the 
invisible hand of the market was the best way to regulate media, and he had no 
compunction about expressing this belief once he assumed his position as chair.  During 
his 1st year in office, three new appointees joined the Commission, the Senate held 
hearings on media ownership regulations, and the FCC attempted to defend two 
important cases that were challenged in court after Kennard produced the 1998 Biennial 
Regulatory Review Report.  Additionally, in 2001, Powell created a Media Ownership 
Working Group (MOWG) to provide the evidence needed either to support or relax the 
six rules in question.  In November, Powell asked several prominent attorneys and 
academics to participate in a media ownership roundtable so that they could offer their 







 Powell grew up as a quintessential army brat, following his father General Collin 
Powell from post to post (“ Biography of Powell,” n.d.; Pulley, 2002).  He joined the 
Army as a junior officer after college, but during his tour of duty, Powell was injured in 
an accident that damaged his spine and fractured his pelvis.  The accident effectively 
ended his military career.  After recuperating for more than a year, he served as a policy 
advisor to Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney.  Soon after, Powell decided to pursue a 
law career and earned his JD from Georgetown University in 1993, and he clerked for the 
Chief Justice of the United States Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia.  Powell 
worked briefly for the Washington, DC law firm of O’Melveny & Myers and then took a 
job at the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice.  His duties there included 
advising the Assistant Attorney General on antitrust matters, policy development, 
criminal and civil investigations, and mergers.  Considered to be an up and coming 
conservative with a stellar pedigree backed by Senator John McCain and Representative 
Billy Tauzin, he was appointed to the FCC by President Clinton to serve on the 
Commission in November 1997. 
 Most press accounts of Powell gave him a great deal of credit for his intellectual 
abilities and his desire to reform an agency that has often been called moribund 
(Beckerman, 2003; Fallows, 2003; Pulley, 2002).  Others noted that he was personally 
engaging and affable.  Early in his administration, he was often depicted as a future 
political candidate, a possibility that he did not rule out.  However, his critics accused 
him of being remote and imperious and of closely guarding the information gathered by 
the agency (Hearn, 2002; McConnell, 2003a).  Others complained that Powell was 
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obsessed with details and determined that no rules be vacated under his watch.  All 
agreed that Powell could be both witty and sarcastic.  
 In a widely quoted speech given before the American Bar Association’s Legal 
Forum on Communication Law in Las Vegas, Powell told his audience that he had 
undergone a considerable amount of soul-searching in his quest to explicate just exactly 
what the public interest standard really meant (1998).  He studied the transcripts of the 
Congressional debates over the Radio Act of 1927 and found the discussions of the public 
interest standard to be vague and confusing.  He studied Supreme Court decisions on the 
subject, and became frustrated because both Justice Frankfurter and Harvard Law School 
Dean James Landis had concluded that vague standards administered by enlightened wise 
men were the best strategy for an administrative agency to take.  After reading the 
“scriptures” of Landis and Frankfurter, he said, 
I expected some sort of revelation, for I did not feel particularly enlightened after 
being confirmed by the Senate.  The night after I was sworn in, I waited for a visit 
from the angel of the public interest.  I waited all night.  But she did not come. And 
in fact, five months into this job, I still have had no divine awakening and no one 
has issued me my public interest crystal ball. (Powell, 1998, p. 2) 
  
 After the FCC passed rules in 2003 relaxing media ownership restrictions, 15 
women dressed in pink wings embroidered with the words “Free Speech” protested the 
ruling by dancing around in front of the glass doors of the FCC building.  They chanted 
to the beat of bongos and unfurled a scroll listing their demands.  Apparently, the angels 
of the public interest finally made their presence known (Beckerman, 2003). 
 Despite possessing a good sense of humor, Powell was deadly serious about his 
belief that the market was the best way to regulate the media (Shadid, 2001).  Just 3 
months after being elevated to his post, Powell met with telecommunications industry 
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representatives and told them that the government should rely less on the law and more 
on the market to direct the course of the industry (Powell 2001c).  According to Powell, 
the market must be the pinnacle of any government policy or philosophy, and the public 
interest would be served by letting the market do its magic.  Less than a week later, 
Powell approved the sale of 64 radio stations that had been on hold (Powell, 2001b; 
Stern, 2001).  This was a reversal of Kennard’s policy of delaying the sales out of 
concern that large broadcast companies would gain too much control over local markets.  
The sales had been pending for more than 2 years, and Powell declared that the public 
interest was not being served by inaction on the part of the agency.  The approval allowed 
Clear Channel Communications, owner of more than 1200 stations nationwide, to add an 
additional 16 stations and allowed Cumulous Media Corporation to increase its holdings 
by 21 outlets, up from 227.  
 Powell described his perspective as a regulator in an interview with Sam Donaldson 
at the NAB convention in 2001 (2001b).  Again, he espoused his faith in a free market 
and spoke passionately about the future of digital technology.  When Donaldson asked 
Powell about his views on the 35% limit for reaching national television audiences, 
Powell was quick to reply that he had not made up his mind, but he said he was skeptical 
of any prophylactic prohibitions on ownership or reach.  He explained that the FCC has 
never been able to objectively measure the effects of diversity of ownership, and that he 
was only interested in consumer’s perception of diversity, not some arbitrary limits set 
forth by his agency.  He said it was impossible to determine what the market dynamics of 
television and radio would be if the cap were lifted.  Additionally, Powell said that he 
was uncomfortable with the First Amendment implications of retaining the national 
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ownership limits.  According to Powell, the limits were a violation of a broadcaster’s 
right to speak to 65% of the American audience that the caps barred them from reaching.  
He also discussed his discomfort with the difference between First Amendment standards 
for broadcasting and the strict scrutiny tests that applied to other forms of speech.  
At another conference before telecommunications industry representatives, Powell 
summed up his regulatory philosophy. 
I think that the Commission recognizes that it has a duty and an obligation to 
reevaluate and revalidate or get rid of rules that are artificial or structural constraints 
on growth.  It has at times employed these kinds of mechanisms for the facilitation of 
competitive markets in their infancy.  But, as those conditions change and markets 
become more competitive, I think the government has a duty and an obligation to 
reevaluate whether the rule continues to serve its purpose. (2001c, p.5) 
  
 In March, the Washington, DC Court of Appeals remanded the Time Warner II 
case challenging the national ownership limit on cable system ownership back to the FCC 
for further consideration (Time Warner II. v. FCC, 2000).  The court ruled that the FCC 
had failed to provide adequate justification for imposing horizontal limits on multiple 
cable system operators.  The ruling also rejected the FCC’s contention that it had the 
authority to impose limits based on its public interest obligation to ensure that media was 
diversified both locally and nationally.  The decision rejected this reasoning and stated 
that the FCC had no statutory authority to promote diversity.  According to Powell’s 
interpretation of the ruling, the Court was ordering the FCC to provide empirical data to 
support its rulemaking procedures instead of relying on vague and qualitative notions of 
public service.  As Powell saw it, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 required the FCC 
to fully justify retaining media ownership regulations with quantifiable data or to do 




 Powell devoted the first several months of his tenure to reforming the 
organizational structure of the FCC.  In an effort to cross-pollinate the expertise of the 
agency, he shifted over 500 workers to other divisions and bureaus within the FCC (“In 
his own words,” 2002; Pulley, 2002).  Powell also created the “FCC University” as an 
attempt to update his workforce’s knowledge of new technology and economic issues.  
His goal was to streamline the agency and make it more efficient, but despite his 
deregulatory rhetoric, many industry officials complained that he was moving too slowly 
for their tastes.  However, he put off any major initiatives until the new Commissioners 
could come onboard (Labaton, 2002c).  The terms of Commissioners Susan Ness and 
Harold Furchtgott-Roth were set to expire in May, and Commissioner Gloria Tristani 
announced that she would resign before the end of the year (Tristani, 2001b).   
President Bush nominated Kathleen Abernathy to replace Furchtgott-Roth, and 
Congress confirmed her on May 31.  Abernathy was a Washington insider and a 
deregulatory-minded Republican (Carlson, 2001; Whitney, 2002).  After graduating from 
law school, Abernathy worked at the FCC for 2 years as a legal advisor to former 
Commissioners James Quello and Sherrie P. Marshall.  After leaving the FCC, she 
worked in private industry, as vice president of AirTouch Communications, as a partner 
in the Washington, DC law firm of Wilkinson, Barker, Knauer, and as vice president for 
public policy at BroadBand Communications, a lobbying position that she held at the 
time of her appointment (“Biography of Abernathy,” n.d.).  An article in Mediaweek 
reported that telecommunications lobbyists considered Abernathy to be the guaranteed 
third vote for Republican Chairman Powell (Mundy, 2001).  In an interview with 
Cableworld Abernathy spelled out her regulatory philosophy. 
94 
 
Abernathy said regulators should be like fans on the sidelines when the market is 
operating competitively (Mundy, 2001).  She said that regulators should be mediators or 
facilitators to interparty negotiations and that regulators should collect data quickly in 
order to return the situation back to market forces in a manner as timely as possible. 
Accordingly, only as a last resort should regulators act to prevent harm to consumers and 
competitors. 
 In August, Commissioner Abernathy submitted an article to The Point, The 
United States International Telecommunications Union Association’s newsletter, and 
offered her perspective on her role as a Commissioner (2001b).  Foremost, she said it was 
the responsibility of the Commission to complete its statutory mandates effectively and 
on time. Abernathy emphasized her belief that the FCC should strive to act within its 
“core competencies: as an advocate for, and as an expert regarding, commercial 
communications interests” (2001b, p.1).  She said her second principle was very 
straightforward. 
I trust functioning markets more than I trust regulation.  Domestically, to the 
extent that Congress gives the FCC discretion to act in a given context, the 
Commission should only intervene when there is clear and substantial evidence of 
market failure.  A fully functioning market is far better at disciplining wayward 
competitors than a regulator ever can or will be.  (2001b, p.1) 
 
Abernathy said that the FCC has a responsibility to respond promptly to  
requests from industry for action and to craft clear and concise regulations that are 
enforced vigorously. Abernathy’s views of her role as a Commissioner were not 
dissimilar to Powell’s. She believed that the market could best serve to regulate the 
telecommunications industry, she believed that the Commission must be strongly 
responsive to the industry, and she believed that the FCC must be proactive when 
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collecting data so that regulators could adapt quickly and efficiently to dynamic changes 
in the market.  It was not at all that surprising that telecommunications lobbyists 
considered her to be the guaranteed third vote on the Commission. There was even 
speculation that she might one day head the agency. 
 Kevin Martin was appointed by President Bush to fill the seat left vacant by 
Powell (“Biography of Martin,” n. d.).  Although Congress confirmed him, Abernathy, 
and Copps at the end of May, he was not sworn in until July 3 because of an 
administrative snafu (McConnell, 2001a). If Abernathy was a Washington insider, Martin 
had a direct line to the White House.  Before his nomination, Martin was a special 
assistant to the President on economic policy and was on the staff of the National 
Economic Council.  At the time of his appointment, his wife Catherine was Vice 
President Cheney’s chief public affairs officer (Davidson, 2003b; Murray, 2003).  From 
1997 to 1999, Martin served as a legal adviser to FCC Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-
Roth, and he served in the Office of Independent Counsel during Kenneth Starr’s 
Whitewater investigation.  Martin also worked for several years at the influential law firm 
of Wiley, Rein, & Fielding.  However, perhaps the most notable aspect of Martin’s 
resume was that he had put his career on hold in 1999 and worked for George Bush’s 
election campaign until December 2000.  During the postelection recounts, he could often 
be seen on television examining chads for the cameras (Carlson, 2001; Mundy, 2001).  
Widely considered to be President Bush’s handpicked nominee, Martin was expected to 
uphold the administration’s stance on deregulation. One friend of Martin predicted that 
he would bring a free market orientation and deregulatory mindset to the Commission, 
but he also added that Martin was very open-minded and would take each issue into 
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consideration on its merits (Alleven, 2001).  In early speeches, Martin expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule and said that the 
media environment had changed drastically since the FCC previously examined the 
regulation (2002; Shields, 2002a).  Martin stated that he thought it was inconsistent to 
count voices in any given market differently, depending on which medium the agency 
was assessing.  He expressed his view that consumers had many more video and 
information delivery systems than ever before, and he did not think that banning 
newspapers from owning broadcast properties was in the public interest.  In Martin’s 
view, this needlessly prohibited new entrants to the overall communications market.  
Martin’s area of expertise was in the telecommunications sector, and he directed most of 
his public comments to those issues in the early part of his term.  His procompetitive, 
deregulatory approach brought him in line with Powell. 
 Michael J. Copps, however, was another story altogether.  Copps was nominated 
by President Bush to fill the Democratic seat vacated by Susan Ness (“ Biography of 
Copps,” n.d.; Munroe, 2001).  After earning a PhD in history, Copps moved to 
Washington, DC in 1970 and worked for Senator Fritz Hollings (then Democratic Chair 
of the Commerce, Space, and Transportation Committee which has oversight over the 
FCC) as his administrative assistant and Chief of Staff for over a dozen years.  From 
1998 until January 2001, Copps served as Assistant Secretary of Commerce in the 
Clinton Administration and worked as deputy assistant secretary for Basic Industries 
from 1993 to 1998.  Before that, he was a director of Governmental Affairs for the 
Collins and Aikman Corporation, a major automotive supply company.  
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Copps, a Democrat, had a different view of what his responsibilities were as a 
Commissioner (Hearn, 2001; McConnell, 2001b).  Whereas Powell was still waiting for 
the angel of public interest to appear and had referred to the public interest as an “empty 
vessel” that was too ambiguous to have any influence on regulations, Copps was a 
passionate defender of his interpretation of the public interest.  In a characteristic speech 
before the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Copps denounced the 
prevalence of indecent programming on television and cable.  
Congress made protecting the public interest the foundation of the FCC’s 
responsibility.  The concept permeates the communication statutes.  Indeed, a 
quick review of the Communications Act shows that the term “public interest” 
appears 112 times.  To me, 112 times translate into “mandate.”  (2002d, p.1) 
 
Copps said that even if the public interest mandate was elusive, which 
he did not believe it was, it was the FCC’s duty to uphold it, whether it could be 
quantified or not. He told his audience that television, radio, the Internet, cable services, 
and telephone networks are among the most powerful tools in the world.  When they are 
used properly they can enlighten minds, convey powerful ideas, educate, and lay the 
foundation for economic and human development.  He said that his job as a 
Commissioner was to make sure that the best of communications technologies flourish, 
but he also said he could not do his job unless nontraditional stakeholders got involved 
with the issues.  Copps insisted that all citizens had a stake in the communications 
network and that the Commissioners needed to hear the opinions of all its citizens, not 
just the corporations who owned networks or other business interests in the industry.  
Although Copps said that the needs of media corporations were important to consider, he 
thought the public interest mandate demanded that equal attention be paid to citizens. 
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 This was a theme that he would return to time and time again.  Copps was a 
crusader for public involvement, and when the subject of media consolidation and 
ownership came up for review, Copps encouraged the public to participate in the 
decision-making process (Copps, 2002a).  He was perhaps the most publicly minded 




In July 2001 Senate Commerce Committee Chair Senator Fritz Hollings, Senator 
Bryon Dorgan, and Senator Daniel Inouye introduced a bill that would have limited the 
FCC’s ability to lift media ownership rules (“No Title,” 2001). 
The bill required the FCC to review any transactions that would create cross-
ownership conflicts at the time of the deal, rather than waiting until the license came up 
for renewal as had been the previous policy.  The bill required the FCC to report to 
Congress if it planned on making any changes in media ownership regulations, and how 
those amendments might affect the public interest. Once the FCC’s report was filed, the 
agency would not be able to make any official revisions for 18 months.  The Commerce 
Committee held a hearing on July 25 to discuss the bill and the FCC’s cross-ownership 
policies, along with the National Television Ownership Limit.  
 The senators were concerned about increasing consolidation in the industry.  
Hollings opened the hearing with a quote from Powell who said,  “I start with the 
proposition that the rules are no longer necessary and demand that the Commission 
justify their continued validity” (“No Title,” 2001, p.2).  Then, Hollings launched into a 
speech about the public interest responsibilities of broadcasters and the importance of 
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localism, diversity, and competition in the American broadcast system.  Senator John 
McCain countered Hollings’ arguments by saying that the existing limits on media 
ownership were created 30 years ago and that they were therefore anachronistic in the 
face of the current multichannel media environment.  McCain was troubled that 
corporations were barred from seeking economic efficiencies based on economies of 
scale, despite the increased competition for audiences and advertising dollars across the 
telecommunications industry.  Senator Inouye remarked that the last time he heard, all 
four networks were turning a profit.  Later in the hearing, Mel Karmizan, president and 
CEO of Viacom, testified that if the 35% cap on national television ownership were not 
lifted, the health of broadcast television would be in jeopardy.  Hollings responded with a 
quote from a CBS quality report that said the network achieved double digit revenue 
growth in primetime with increased ratings and pricing in the first quarter of 2001.  
Hollings also read from a May 28 edition of Broadcasting & Cable that reported that in 
2000, CBS enjoyed $200 million in profits, with its networked-owned stations earning 
$775 million.  Its production and syndication business earned another $450 million.  
Hollings offered his opinion that he did not see why CBS and Viacom needed relief from 
ownership caps when they were clearly earning healthy profits. 
Alan Frank, CEO of Post-Newsweek stations and chair of NASA, testified that 
maintaining existing ownership caps was the only way to preserve localism and diversity 
in media (“No Title,” 2001).  He also argued that preserving the independence of affiliate 
stations was in the public interest.  Jack Fuller, president of Tribune Publishing 
Company, argued that the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule prevented his 
company from competing efficiently in the marketplace.  He contended that having the 
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combined resources of a newspaper staff and broadcasting staff created a stronger news 
package that could offer local audiences and readers more in-depth news.  Although the 
FCC’s ownership restrictions had always been aimed at more comprehensive goals than 
the Justice Department’s antitrust regulations, Fuller claimed that antitrust regulations 
were sufficient to govern media consolidation as well.  This was a sentiment that was 
frequently endorsed by Powell (Lehmann, 2002; Powell, 2001c). 
 Gene Kimmelman, co-director of the Consumers Union, told the Committee that 
talking about the growth in the number of outlets in broadcasting was deceiving (“No 
Title,” 2001).  While the number of stations had risen over the past 30 years, he said that 
the actual number of owners had decreased considerably.  He argued that despite the 
competition from cable, the nightly network news broadcasts still drew 25 million 
viewers each night, in contrast to all other cable news shows that only garnered 3 million 
viewers combined.  He also pointed out that AOL-Time Warner controlled about a third 
of the total number of hits on the Internet and that newspapers were monopolies in 98% 
of the communities that they served.  Kimmelman said that the top four broadcast 
networks and the largest cable system providers controlled the most popular cable 
stations.  He argued that there was little competition in media, just competition in market 
segments that are adjacent to each other. Kimmelman said that any proposed changes to 
ownership rules must meet public interest goals of competition, diversity of ownership, 
and local community needs.  He added that the FCC had never done a careful analysis of 
these issues.  He pointed out that empirical research did not support the view that the 
marketplace itself, at least in the past, provided for diversity of ownership or meeting 
local needs.  Eli M. Noam, an economist with Columbia Business School, testified that 
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concentration problems were clustered locally, and if one looked at the overall history of 
concentration across all sectors of the Telecommunications industry, concentration had 
remained steady over the years. 
Although the arguments presented before the Senate Committee were not new, the 
fact that the hearing was held at all represented the misgivings that many senators had 
about the increasing pace of media consolidation.  Some senators recognized that the 
media business was unlike other businesses, in that the media transmit culture and make 
it possible for a participatory democracy to exist.  Still, all who attended the hearing 
understood clearly enough that a commercially based system of broadcasting depended 
on the ability of corporations to make a profit.  Large newspaper corporations and 
network representatives made the case that ownership limits impeded their ability to 
generate revenue and insisted that if one considered the entire array of information 
delivery systems, competitive conditions existed in the industry.  Additionally, they 
argued that their individual segments of the industry would not be able to survive if they 
were not granted the right to grow their industries through consolidation.  Furthermore, 
they maintained that combining their resources enabled them to produce better products. 
These issues certainly were not resolved during the hearing, but the senators’ concerns 
about the state of the media would not dissipate in the immediate future. 
 
The Fox/Chris-Craft Merger 
 
Less than a week after the hearing, the FCC had the opportunity to weigh in on 
some of these issues when it approved a merger between Fox Television Stations and 
Chris-Craft (FCC, 2001c; Powell, 2001a).  Fox had purchased 10 television stations from 
Chris-Craft and the transaction put Fox over the national ownership cap and also violated 
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duopoly rules in Salt Lake City, New York City, Los Angeles, and Phoenix.  
Additionally, the merger breached the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule by 
adding another television station in New York City, even though Fox had received a 
waiver in 1995 after purchasing the New York Post while also owning television station 
WNYW.  Furthermore, Section 310(b) of the Federal Communications Act prohibited a 
corporation that is more than 25% foreign-owned from holding a broadcast license unless 
the FCC determined that it would be in the public interest.  The three Republican 
Commissioners approved the merger with a conditional waiver that gave Fox up to 24 
months to come into compliance with the rules.  The order was issued with separate 
statements from Powell and Abernathy and with dissenting statements from Copps and 
Tristani (FCC, 2001b).  Clearly, this was a contentious issue among the Commissioners. 
According to Powell, the approval served the public interest.  He pointed out that 
it was only reasonable to allow Fox a temporary waiver to allow the corporation a 
reasonable amount of time to divest some of its holdings in order to come into 
compliance with the FCC’s rules (FCC, 2001b).  Powell insisted that the duopolies 
created by the merger and the cross-ownership situation in New York City would only 
cause temporary harm that would not substantially impair the public interest.  He added 
that he found it “fantastic that the minority would characterize these divesture periods as 
deviations from our rules in order to approve the transaction” (FCC, 2001b, p. 3).  
Responding to Commissioner Tristani’s assertion that the decision showed the lengths 
that the Commission would go to avoid standing in the way of media mergers, he said,  
“This sweeping assertion is not only offensive, but absurd” (FCC, 2001b, p.4) 
Although Gloria Tristani resigned from the Commission in September to run for a 
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senate seat in New Mexico, before she moved on she offered a scathing dissent from the 
Commission’s decision to grant the waiver (2001a; Saxe, 2001).  Tristani said that the 
transfer of these television station licenses violated the Federal Communications Act and 
raised serious concerns regarding the ongoing concentration in the ownership of 
television stations and other media.  Tristani objected to approving the merger based on 
promises of future compliance with the rules even though Fox offered no public interest 
showing in its application.  Although Fox Television Stations created a holding company 
to get around the foreign ownership restrictions, Tristani asserted that Fox, for all 
practical purposes, was in control of the Chris-Craft stations.  She closed her dissent by 
saying that the Fox/Chris-Craft decision 
...confirmed that the Commission would no longer give meaningful consideration 
to the public interest when considering the transfer of broadcast licenses and that 
the decision represented another unwarranted reduction in viewpoint diversity and 
the marketplace of ideas. (Tristani, 2001a, p.26) 
 
 Abernathy argued that the decision balanced the business needs of Fox while 
enforcing the FCC’s rules (2001a).  She did not feel that it was appropriate to force Fox 
to restructure its business prior to obtaining governmental approval for the deal, and she 
said that the organization of Fox’s holding company Newco was consistent with the 
cross-ownership waiver that the FCC granted Fox in 1995 when it purchased the New 
York Post.  Abernathy said that in the face of the size and scope of marketplace demands, 
the FCC had an obligation to move approvals forward quickly.  What was good for Fox 
was good for the public interest. 
 Copps took a more conciliatory tone than that of Tristani in his dissent, but he was 
equally emphatic that the ruling was opposed to the public interest.  
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In approving this transfer, the Commission is granting waivers to three different 
ownership rules.  Certain of these are long-term waivers that appear to be based 
on the anticipation that prior to the termination of the waivers, the rules may be 
relaxed so that compliance need never to occur.  Sound decisions should not be 
premised upon subjective conjecture about how future actions by the courts, 
Congress, or the Commission, may change the law or alter the rules under which 
we are instructed to operate.  (2001, p. 29) 
 
He added that the decision did not even consider how the public interest benefits  
that might accrue from the transfer could counterbalance the granting of waivers. He 
assured the other members of the Commission that he took his public service obligations 
seriously and that those responsibilities would continue to be a critical determination in 
any decision he would make on the Commission. 
 In its news release reporting the Fox/Chris-Craft merger approval, the FCC 
acknowledged that the deal put Fox in violation of several of the Commission’s own 
rules, but it also stated the terms of the waiver (FCC, 2001c).  The Commission gave Fox 
6 months to divest itself of one of the two Salt Lake City television stations and gave Fox 
12 months to comply with the 35% national ownership limit.  However, it suspended that 
order pending the outcome the final disposition of a court case challenging the rule.  The 
FCC gave Fox 24 months to get in compliance with the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-
Ownership Rule in New York City. 
 Two months later, the FCC issued an order and NPRM in the matter of cross-
ownership of broadcast stations and newspapers and of the Newspaper/Radio Cross-
Ownership Waiver Policy (FCC, 2001d).  It seemed that Copps’ speculation that granting 
a temporary waiver for the Fox/Chris-Craft merger in anticipation of future rule changes 
was prescient.  The NPRM stated that the Commission was obligated to give recognition 
to the changes in the marketplace and see to it that its rules adequately reflect the current 
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situation.  Therefore, the Commission asked for comments regarding whether changes in 
the media environment had rendered the regulations obsolete.  The deadline for 
submitting comments was December 3, and the deadline for replying to comments was 
the first week in January. 
 
Fox v. FCC Argued 
 On September 7, 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia agreed to hear Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commission (Fox v. FCC, 2002).  The case consolidated five petitions before the court 
from Fox, NBC, Viacom, and CBS, challenging the National Television Station 
Ownership Rule.  The lawsuit also included Viacom and Time Warner’s challenge to the 
Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership provisions.  The United Church of Christ (UCC), the 
NAB, the Consumer Federation of America (CFA), and NASA filed briefs in support of 
the FCC.  
 The petitioners challenged these rules based on their contention that the 
regulations violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, and the First Amendment (Fox v. FCC, 2002).  The APA states that a 
decision rendered by a regulatory agency is arbitrary and capricious if the agency fails to 
consider important aspects of the problem it seeks to solve.  The challenge was also based 
on §202(h) of the Telecommunications Act that required the FCC to review all of its 
ownership rules biennially to determine if they still upheld the public interest as a result 
of competition.  The networks argued that the FCC failed to address the issue of whether 
the 35% limit on national television ownership was still valid, and therefore the FCC had 
violated §202(h).  The networks also claimed that their First Amendment rights were 
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violated by the limits because it prevented them from reaching 65% of the potential 
viewing audience.  The networks also contended that the scarcity rationale, upheld in 
NBC v. U.S. and Red Lion v. FCC, was no longer applicable in the current media 
environment.  Furthermore, even if scarcity did exist, the networks argued that the 
National Television Station Ownership Rule did nothing to mitigate the situation. 
 Attorneys for the FCC gave three primary reasons for retaining the national limit 
(Fox v. FCC, 2002).  First, they argued that it was important to retain the rule, at least for 
the time being, until they had enough time to observe the effects the recent relaxation of 
local television ownership rules.  Following that same line of reasoning, the FCC also 
argued that it needed more time to observe the effects of the increase in the national 
ownership cap from 25% to 35%.  The agency also argued that the national limit was 
needed to preserve the power of affiliates in bargaining with the networks. Time Warner 
also challenged the Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule on the grounds that the rule 
was both arbitrary and capricious and contrary to §202(h) of the Telecommunications 
Act. Additionally, Time Warner asserted that the cable limits abridged its First 
Amendment right to speak.  Attorneys for the FCC argued that retaining the 
Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule was necessary in order to prevent cable operators 
from favoring their own stations and from discriminating against stations owned by 
others.  The Commission also argued that Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule was 
necessary to further the goal of diversity at the local level.  Accordingly, the rule 
contributed to diversity of viewpoints in local markets by preserving the voices of 




 Although it was sometimes impossible for the various interested players to find 
common ground when discussing the issue of media ownership and consolidation, the 
one thing that the industry, public interest groups, the courts, and Congress could agree 
on was the need for more reliable data from the Commission.  If Powell was determined 
to modify the FCC’s ownership rules, he would have to be able to demonstrate that the 
Commission’s decisions were not arbitrary or capricious. One way to do that was to 
provide empirical data to back up the agency’s conclusions.  In order to jump-start that 
effort, the FCC announced that it would be holding a roundtable discussion with 
researchers to discuss ownership policy on October 19. 
 
Roundtable Discussion on Media Ownership 
 
The announcement from the FCC’s Office of Plans and Policy said there would 
be two panels; the first would address ownership polices and competition with an 
emphasis on the relationship between ownership limits and market performance (FCC, 
2001e).  This session would cover the merits of issuing ex ante rules versus making 
determinations on a case-by-case basis.  The panelists were asked to comment on which 
markets they thought were most relevant to the FCC’s consideration of ownership 
policies and what the relative costs and benefits of horizontal caps, cross-ownership 
restrictions, and access regulations might be.  The second panel on diversity and localism 
was created to explore the type of diversity that ownership policies should promote, the 
extent to which outlet diversity produces source and/or viewpoint diversity, the meaning 
of localism, and whether local ownership results in locally oriented programming.  The 
meeting was scheduled for late October. 
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There were several economists on the first panel.  Stanley Besen, a vice president 
at Charles River Associates, a firm that offered economic and antitrust consulting and 
litigation to support media and telecommunications companies and other industries, was 
on the panel (Besen, 2006; FCC, 2001f).  Besen also had a solid record as a 
Telecommunications consultant for organizations such as the Brookings Institute and the 
Rand Corporation.  He was also a former economic policy analyst for the FCC, and he 
had taught at Rice, Columbia, and Georgetown Universities.  Besen was also the author 
of several books that employed economic methodology to analyze communications 
policy.  He earned his doctorate in economics from Stanford.  
 Mark Cooper, the director of research at CFA, and the president of Citizen’s 
Research, an independent consulting firm, was also on the panel (FCC, 2001f).  Cooper 
received a PhD in sociology from Yale, but his main area of expertise was in energy, 
telecommunications, and economic policy analysis.  As a consultant, Cooper had testified 
on regulatory, antitrust, consumer protection, and other public policy issues dealing with 
Internet and e-commerce, health care, energy and Telecommunications before Congress, 
federal agencies, and the courts.  Cooper too was a prolific writer, publishing numerous 
articles in law reviews and academic journals on the subject of media, antitrust 
regulations, and access to broadband technologies.  A third member of the panel was W. 
Robert Majure.  He had a doctorate in economics from MIT and extensive experience at 
the antitrust division of the Department of Justice, especially in the area of investigations 
into local marketing agreements among television stations, mergers between cable 
systems and content providers, as well as investigations into allegations of antitrust 
violations in those industries (FCC, 2001f).  
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 Bruce Owen was the fourth member of the panel, and he was the president of 
Economists Incorporated, a Washington DC consulting firm specializing in antitrust and 
regulatory issues (FCC, 2001f).  Owen held a PhD from Stanford in economics, served as 
the chief economist of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice during the 
Carter Administration, and served a member of the White House Office of 
Telecommunications Policy during the Nixon administration.  Owen also had an 
extensive publishing record including titles such as Television Economics, Economics 
and Freedom of Expression, The Political Economy of Deregulation, and The Internet 
Challenge to Television.  Two FCC staffers, James Bird and David Sappington, were 
scheduled to moderate the discussion. 
 Powell began the dialogue by announcing that he was forming a MOWG created 
to develop an empirical analytical foundation for media ownership regulations (FCC, 
2001a; FCC, 2001j).  In his introduction to the panelists he said that he often felt 
frustrated because the debates over the rules were often cursory and unsubstantiated and 
not supported by empirical evidence or a comprehensive review of past experiences. He 
told the panels that he was creating the working group to facilitate the creation of 
evidence that would leave a legacy of rigorous data analysis as opposed to the “more 
superficial, often highly politicized benchmarks [used] for that debate” (FCC, 2001j, p. 
5).  Powell said the discussion was the first step toward reaching that goal. 
 However, it is notable that of seven experts who were asked to advise the 
Commission on ownership policies, five were classically trained economists (FCC, 
2001f).  Powell’s attempt to gather empirical evidence that would support the FCC’s 
position on ownership limits was an attempt to focus almost exclusively on panelists who 
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would apply quantifiable economic methodology to their analysis.  Accordingly, the 
more “superficial political benchmark” analyses offered by disciplines outside of 
economics were relegated to the sidelines.  When Powell framed the questions addressed 
to the roundtable, he tried to exclude the possibility that negative externalities such as 
promoting civic discourse or promoting a marketplace of ideas would even be 
considered.  Powell’s attempt to frame the debate narrowly, based exclusively on classic 
economic theory, was a blind spot that would haunt him until the end of his term as he 
moved toward his goal to relax ownership restrictions at the FCC. 
David Sappington, an FCC staffer, opened the discussion by reviewing the 
general questions that were sent to the panelists in preparation for the meeting (FCC, 
2001j).  The first question asked the panelists to consider whether harms might arise in 
the absence of government intervention, other than standard antitrust intercession, in the 
marketplaces involved, and how those harms might be related to the characteristics of 
these particular industries.  The second question asked the panelists to discuss whether 
the FCC should intervene on a case-by-case basis.  
Beson’s main argument was that the FCC had failed in the past to attempt to tailor 
local ownership rules to competitive conditions in local markets (Besen, 2001; FCC, 
2001j).  He believed that the recent change in the duopoly rules that permitted entities to 
own two stations in one market in places where it would not lead to excessive 
concentration was a big improvement over the previous policy of ignoring the amount of 
competition from other independent stations in a local market.  He advocated for fewer 
blanket prohibitions and a more flexible approach to other ownership rules, such as cross-
ownership prohibitions, that would take into account the amount of competition in local 
111 
 
markets from all types of media.  Beson was adamant about the need for the FCC to 
adjust quickly to changing market conditions, and he chastised the FCC for relying 
excessively on data gathered from the industry, rather than generating its independently 
produced studies. 
 Cooper began his talk by saying that any economic discussion of the rules must be 
embedded within the legal and public policy framework that he thought ought to govern 
the area (2001; FCC, 2001j).  He pointed out that Congress and the courts had repeatedly 
concluded that the media policy in this country was based on the promotion of the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.  He also 
said that antagonism of ideas is not the same as competition between products, and 
insisted that there was clear empirical evidence to support the idea that diversity of 
ownership matters.  Cooper suggested that different media serve different needs and that 
each medium is not always substitutable for another.  He also asserted that a purely 
classical economic approach to the problem of media ownership did not address political 
economy issues.  Additionally, he said that the FCC, Congress, and the courts have 
always looked beyond mere economic efficiencies when considering consolidation in 
media, a position that is more encompassing than the Justice Department’s approach to 
antitrust cases.  He implored the Commission not to toss out the rules because they had 
failed to achieve a completely diverse marketplace in the past, but rather, the 
Commission should continue its policy of maintaining prophylactic structural rules.  
According to Cooper, these structural rules are important because those policies can 
ensure a level playing field so that unpopular voices are not denied the resources 
necessary to make civic discourse attractive.  Furthermore, he said, structural rules can 
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force the mingling of ideas so that accidental exposure is more likely.  While economics 
will determine who gets to speak and who gets heard, it is important to remember that 
economic theory should serve the broader policy goals supported by the courts and 
Congress. 
 The next speaker was W. Robert Maguire (FCC, 2001j).  Maguire said that 
antitrust actions could not always account for public interest harms that might result from 
abolishing ownership caps.  However, in the interest of trying to confine the discussion to 
the role of competition in the marketplace, he said he would assume that the public 
interest is limited to something like efficiency of markets.  Then he said he did not think 
it was meaningful to talk about the difference between the regulatory powers of the FCC 
or the antitrust analysis of the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission.  
He said that media antitrust actions taken by the Department of Justice started with a 
threshold number.  Maguire described it as a compromise hybrid version of ownership 
caps, where if a certain company exceeded the threshold level that the department had 
set, it would then be the basis for challenging a merger.  If there were no FCC ownership 
restrictions, the Department of Justice would still have to set a somewhat arbitrary ceiling 
for deciding if it was appropriate to prosecute.  Maguire said that the answer to the 
second question, whether it was appropriate to issue blanket rules versus examining each 
case as it arose, was really a political economy question.  Stating that he was no political 
economist, he argued that the FCC would have to figure out whether the trade-offs 
between the cost and benefits of a one-size-fits-all approach were tolerable in the face of 
the probability that a broad approach will inevitably produce harms.  On the other hand, a 
blanket approach would avoid consuming large amounts of resources and time that the 
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FCC would have to bear if it were to do an extensive review of each transaction that 
came down the line. He also said that it was important for the FCC to consider what the 
effects of selective enforcement of ownership caps might be on the efficacy of the 
agency’s ability to enforce other rules. 
 Owen began his talk by saying that if one wished to take an antitrust guideline 
approach to media diversity, then every relevant advertising and programming market 
over the past 20 years has become less concentrated (FCC, 2001j).  This suggested to him 
that previous ownership guidelines might not be meaningful anymore.  Then Owen said 
he wanted to talk about the purpose of competition policy within that context.  He agreed 
with Cooper that diversity is not any less a market outcome than are prices, quantities, or 
profits.  He said it was important to understand that competition is not an end in itself.  
Although experience has shown that competition generally produces more reliable 
benefits for consumers than its alternatives, it is merely a pragmatic way for society to 
allocate resources. Owen acknowledged that cross-ownership rules appear to accept the 
notion that competition is a good thing in media policy, but he said the rules implicitly 
reject the sufficiency of the antitrust approach to regulating media.  The rules reject the 
proposition that certain natural market outcomes that would not trigger antitrust review 
are acceptable in media markets.  Owen talked about the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) that is used to evaluate concentration in markets.  The scale takes the market share 
of each firm, squares it as a percentage, sums the result, and multiples it by 10,000 
(Cooper, 2003, p.114).  Under the merger guidelines of the Department of Justice, a 
market is considered to be more or less unconcentrated if the HHI number is 1000 or less. 
However, Owen speculated that the FCC could possibly conduct empirical research that 
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found that there were significant adverse effects on the price of advertising when HHI 
levels exceed 800.  The FCC would then be justified in using an HHI score of 800 as a 
safe harbor for supporting ownership regulations.  
According to Owen, merger guideline standards are generally applicable, but the 
numerical value of the scale is arbitrary (FCC, 2001j).  The guidelines are not applicable 
to any specific industry across industry sectors.  The HHI measures outcomes, not ease of 
access, or for the expression of ideas.  In Owen’s opinion, the Commission’s historical 
approach to ownership regulation was the assumption that natural market outcomes 
would produce insufficient amounts of diversity of source, content, and access.  The 
underlying principle beneath a policy that promotes diversity is the principle that the 
airwaves are a public resource that should be distributed as equitably as possible.  Owen 
said that content diversity can be subjected to economic analysis, but this methodology 
presumes that competitive market outcomes are the most optimal conditions for media, 
which ignores the underlying reasons for promoting competition to begin with.  He said 
the real question that needed to be addressed by rigorous research was if the operation of 
media markets from a political point of view requires a stricter competition standard than 
that which would be applied to other markets.  Owen said it was hard to make economic 
sense of policy objectives based on ensuring the economic success of unpopular and 
unprofitable messages.  He suggested that the FCC explore the possibility of conducting 
research to find out whether consumer benefits that result in natural levels of 
concentration are offset by the loss of diversity in concentrated markets.  He closed by 
saying that more rigorous quantifiable data were needed. 
 During the question and answer session, despite some clear differences of 
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opinion, all in attendance agreed that more rigorous studies needed to be conducted 
(FCC, 2001j). Some participants argued that the only acceptable research was 
quantifiable economic analysis, despite the fact that they all agreed that Congress had 
clearly expressed its preference for policy goals that were not easily quantifiable.  
Douglas Gomery, a participant on the next panel, said that other methods of research 
could provide evidence to support stricter guidelines than those imposed by economic 
analysis.  Gomery suggested that worldviews and research methodologies outside of 
economic departments could get at political economy outcomes, but Beson pointed out 
that recent court decisions were demanding the use of rigorous economic analysis when 
evaluating the rationales for ownership regulations.  On that note, the session was 
adjourned.   
 When the second session began, moderator Jonathan Levy from the FCC's Office 
of Plans and Policy asked the panelists to offer their opinions on what they thought the 
Commission’s goals should be with regard to diversity (FCC, 2001j).  Levy also asked 
the panelists to consider if policies promoting ownership diversity were actually an 
effective means for advancing the Commission’s goal of furthering its diversity goals and 
if the panelists could support their positions with empirical evidence.  Levy then asked 
the participants to think about localism and how that concept should be defined. 
The first panelist to speak was Gomery, a professor from the University of 
Maryland who received his PhD in communications and economics from the University 
of Wisconsin (FCC, 2001f; Gomery Vita, 2006).  Gomery’s research was focused on 
media history and economics, and his most recent book, Who Owns the Media co-written 
with Benjamin Compaine, won the Association in Education in Journalism and Mass 
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Communication’s Picard prize for best media economics book of the year.  The first thing 
Gomery said was that the reason they were all there was because of market failure that 
was being expressed in a number of ways by citizens who were upset over the negative 
externalities of the current policies.  He explained that sometimes markets do not produce 
the goals that policy-makers would like and that discussing markets exclusively in terms 
of economic efficiencies did not take into account the social and political performance of 
media institutions.  He said the concept of multiplicity of voices should be a fundamental 
criterion for measuring performance of media markets, as should the production of 
cultural quality.  Gomery also said that equality of access should be an important measure 
of market outcomes.  Gomery was in favor of retaining the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-
Ownership Rule (Gomery, 2001).  Since most newspapers operated in a monopoly 
environment, Gomery did not think it was in the best interest of local communities to 
allow newspapers to merge with local television stations.  He was also in favor of 
retaining cable ownership caps.  Gomery concluded by saying that the Commission 
needed to look at models other than those of neoclassical economics so that negative 
externalities could be considered. 
 The next person to speak was Philip M. Napoli, an assistant professor of 
communications and media management in the Graduate School of Business 
Administration at Fordham University (FCC, 2001f; Napoli Vita, 2006).  Napoli’s 
research focused on media institutions and media policy.  He wrote Foundations of 
Communications Policy: Principles and Process in the Regulation of Electronic Media 
and he earned his PhD in mass communications/telecommunications from Northwestern 
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University.  Napoli declared that he was an enthusiastic practitioner of quantitative 
methodologies in his research. 
 Napoli began by saying that it was important to understand the underlying 
rationales for promoting diversity and localism through media ownership policy before 
one could attempt to assess whether existing rules were achieving their objectives (FCC, 
2001j).  He then proceeded to break each concept down into its discrete components.  
Napoli said diversity as a policy objective emerges from the marketplace of ideas 
metaphor, advocating the “widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources” (Associated Press v. United States, 1945, p. 1424).  The social 
intent behind this policy goal is to promote informed decision-making in a well- 
functioning democracy.  This concept, he said, emphasizes the values of encouraging 
both a maximum number participants in the marketplace and the availability of a 
maximum range of viewpoints and cultural perspectives available to citizens.  He said 
that whether one looks at this concept from a purely democratic theory perspective or an 
economic theory approach, it is important to understand its underlying rationale (Napoli, 
2001b p. 2). 
 Napoli then went on to say that the concept of diversity could be broken down 
further.  Source diversity, he said, included diversity of ownership, diversity of outlets, 
and diversity of programming, as well as diversity in the workforce.  Content diversity 
includes format or program type, the demographic diversity of the audience, and the 
diversity of ideas and viewpoints available to the audience.  These components of 
diversity have traditionally been part of the Commission’s policy-making, but Napoli 
proposed that exposure diversity be added to the model (2001b).  According to Napoli, 
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this would allow for an assessment of how audience members actually respond to the 
availability of diverse content.  Napoli also believed that communications policy should 
take into account the barriers to entry for new station owners.  He told the panel about a 
study he conducted that measured the power ratio of radio stations in selected markets 
where African American and Hispanic audience demographics were available.  He found 
that many radio stations catering to minority audiences had a higher ratio of listeners to 
advertising dollars than other stations in the same market.  That meant that the minority- 
targeted stations were less stable financially and more likely to go off the air than other 
stations.  Napoli thought that the FCC should consider the potential financial handicaps 
that are inherent to serving minority audiences as a routine part of its policy assessments. 
 When Napoli began to address the issue of localism, he reminded the panel that 
localism is also a political and cultural goal that encompasses everything from localized 
control of schools and government to communications policy (FCC, 2001j).  He said that 
the FCC has long presumed that locally controlled broadcast outlets will provide 
programming that serves the needs of the community.  However, he said that there has 
not been much empirical data produced that support or undermine that supposition.  
Napoli suggested that these kinds of questions could not be addressed with traditional 
economic-based policy analyses.  As an example of the kind of research that could be 
done to address the problem, Napoli told the panel about a study he conducted that found 
that the point of origin of public affairs programming may not be as important as the fact 
that locally owned stations tended to offer more public affairs programming regardless of 
its source.  He closed by saying that if policy-makers were willing to accept that localism 
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is an important component of media policy on par with diversity, then the panel must be 
willing to accept methods and data that might not fit traditional models. 
 The final member of the panel was Joel Waldfogel, who introduced himself as an 
unrepentant economist (FCC, 2001j).  Waldfogel, a professor of business and public 
policy at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, conducted research 
focused on law and economics and industrial organization (FCC, 2001f; Waldfogel, 
2006).  His publication record included empirical studies of price advertising, media 
markets and minorities, and the operation of differentiated product markets.  He earned 
his PhD in economics from Stanford.  Waldfogel devoted most of his talk to reviewing 
some recent studies he had conducted and offered his findings up for consideration.  
Waldfogel (2001) said empirical evidence suggested that markets tend to deliver less 
satisfaction to small groups with atypical preferences (FCC, 2001j).  He said that this is 
not necessarily an inefficiency outcome, and may not be a problem at all.  He said that 
increased consolidation in media markets and a reduction in minority-owned stations 
might not be a problem in terms of economic outcomes but that the political outcomes 
that result from consolidation are important.  For example, Waldfogel said that he 
conducted a study that looked at levels of political participation for African Americans in 
communities where there were Black-targeted media outlets, and found that in those 
communities, there was a higher tendency for African Americans to vote.  Waldfogel also 
reported that in another study he had done, he found that in areas where a national 
newspaper became available, local newspaper circulation declined along with local 
political participation.  He urged the panelists to step away from attempting to measure 
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localism and diversity from an economic outcome perspective and to consider behavioral 
outcomes instead. 
 After all the panelists spoke, Levy asked the participants to tell him what kind of 
data the FCC should be looking for (FCC, 2001j).  Waldfogel suggested that Arbitron, 
Nielsen, and the Audit Bureau of Circulation might be good sources of data, but Gomery 
pointed out that those organizations were commercial research companies, and therefore 
they were not necessarily asking the questions that the FCC wanted answered.  He 
suggested, and others agreed, that the FCC should gather its own data independently.  
Napoli said that the FCC should conduct media usage surveys annually that would get at 
questions of how audiences responded to changes in their own media environment.  
However, Owen pointed out that if the FCC wanted to gather useful data they needed to 
have a clearer understanding of what the goals and objectives of the study would be.  
According to Owen, he had not yet heard a clear articulation of the questions the 
Commission wanted to answer, and any valuable research depends on a clearly defined 
hypothesis before any methodology can be applied.  However, Cooper thought that some 
of the research that Waldfogel conducted on audience behavior did get at the question of 
whether diversity of ownership matters and offered a starting point for determining 
threshold standards for enforcement.  Cooper said that even if they did not have a precise 
articulation of Congressional intent concerning upholding the public interest, there were 
rigorous ways of addressing the sociological and political questions that the FCC and the 
panelists had identified.  Beson said that the kinds of data that Waldfogel and Napoli 
were producing did not address issues of causation.  Beson said content analysis, as a 
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method, was inadequate because it depended on the evaluation of the researcher and the 
courts would not accept that as a valid research design. 
 There was much discussion about the validity of various research designs, but in 
the end the consensus was that even though there were many ways of gathering rigorous 
quantitative data outside of the parameters of traditional economic analysis, the courts 
would not accept it.  According to the panelists, courts understand merger analysis 
because it is a lot easier to predict economic outcomes.  If a researcher can show that 
prices will rise under a given set of conditions, the courts can say higher prices are a bad 
outcome.  However, if a researcher presents sociological evidence that argues in favor of 
maintaining local ownership because a citizen might be exposed to the discussion of local 
public affairs programming, no specific outcome can be measured. The upshot of the 
meeting was that content diversity and the value of localism would be almost impossible 
to quantify.  
 If Powell had been listening carefully to what the economists were saying, he 
might have realized that his own handpicked panels of experts were telling him that the 
problems he sought to address were not only economic problems, but political and social 
problems as well.  As such, Powell was asking economic researchers to measure 
outcomes that were not amenable to neoclassical economic methodology.  It may be that 
Powell’s experience in merger analysis at the Department of Justice and his experience as 
a law clerk for the same court that would pass judgment on his decisions regarding media 
ownership regulations colored his interpretation of the discussions conducted during the 
Roundtable discussion.  As a member of an interpretive community that relied on 
quantifiable economic analysis as a tool for evaluating consolidation in markets for a 
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wide range of commodities, he may not have recognized the political ramifications of 
relying exclusively on quantifiable data to address consolidation in media. 
 Nonetheless, on the same day that the Roundtable discussion was held, Powell 
issued a press release officially stating that the Commission decided to go forward with 
its Media Ownership Working Group (FCC, 2001a).  In the press release issued on the 
FCC web site, Powell said,  
Rebuilding the factual foundation of the Commission's media ownership 
regulations is one of my top priorities.  For too long, the Commission has made 
sweeping media policy decisions without a contemporaneous picture of the media 
market.  We need to rigorously examine whether current forms of media 
regulation are achieving the Commission's policy objectives, and how changes in 
regulations would affect the policy goals of competition, diversity, and localism.  
I am creating the Media Ownership Working Group to bring a sharp focus to 
these tasks.  (FCC, 2001a, p.1) 
  
 Powell appointed W. Kenneth Ferree, chief of the Cable Services Bureau; Paul 
Gallant, special advisor to the bureau chief; Cable Services Bureau; and Nandan Joshi, an 
attorney-advisor to the Office of General Counsel to lead the working group.  Jonathan 
Levy, deputy chief economist; Robert Ratcliffe, deputy chief of the Mass Media Bureau; 
David Sappington, chief economist; and Royce Dickens Sherlock, deputy chief of the 
policy division of the Cable Services Bureau, were also assigned to the group.  Powell 
said the findings of the group would be used in future media ownership proceedings. 
There was not a political economist among them.  
 
Summary  
 When Powell was appointed as a FCC Commissioner in 1997, he came to the 
agency as an outspoken proponent of a deregulatory agenda.  He clearly believed that a 
deregulated market would best serve the public interest in media ownership policy.  
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 Powell’s professional background as a law clerk on the DC Court of Appeals, a court 
that relied heavily on empirical data when reviewing administrative law, may have 
influenced Powell’s determination to provide economic data to support the loosening of 
ownership restrictions.  As the chief of staff of the Antitrust division in the Department of 
Justice, Powell was certainly well acquainted with tools such as the HHI index that 
measured concentration according to economic statistics.  Powell’s conviction that the 
public interest could be served by carefully constructing economic methodologies that 
supported his perspective on media ownership was perfectly in keeping with the 
interpretive paradigm that governed his professional life.  However, Powell’s avowed 
rejection of the political ramifications of his decisions was a blind spot that eventually 
escalated the tension between him and other stakeholders in the decision-making process. 
 Commissioner Martin was clearly supportive of President Bush’s deregulatory 
agenda, and Commissioner Abernathy, having spent the bulk of her career in the 
telecommunications industry, was firmly inline with the industry’s perspective.
 However, Tristani and Copps were oriented toward different perspectives.  As a 
long-time aide to Senator Hollings, Copps may have understood better than Powell that 
some aspects of the public interest in media ownership could not be measured by 
statistics alone.  Tristani placed more importance on the marketplace of ideas than on the 
market itself.  The conflicting values held by the Commissioners were all but certain to 
lead to more controversy as the Congressional mandate to review ownership policies 
every 2 years was implemented.  
 The court had already remanded the issue of cable limits back to the FCC, and two 
important cases challenging Kennard’s first review were looming over the 
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Commissioners.  As Congress held hearings about media concentration, it was also 
apparent that many members of the legislature were leery of allowing more concentration 
in media and their constituents were less concerned with the HHI index than they were 
about their perception that two few corporations controlled too many media outlets. 
 When Chairman Powell created the Media Ownership Roundtable, even his 
handpicked experts warned him that the public interest in media ownership issues could 
not necessarily be measured quantitatively.  Although the HHI index could provide a 
reasonable approximation of the amount of competition in discrete segments of the 
media, it was not amenable to measuring qualitative values such as diversity, localism, 
and the contribution that various forms of media made to democratic discourse.  
 Many public interest organization leaders and members of the public were 
concerned about the negative externalities that could result due to excessive 
concentration in media.  Many of these citizens and organizations had a long history of 
involvement in media reform issues, many groups formed as a result of the repercussions 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and still others would decide to commit 
themselves to media reform in the year to come.  However, all of these participants had 
one thing in common.  They were alarmed by what they saw as the detrimental effects of 







THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MOVEMENT 
 
 
During the 1990s, as Congress prepared to rewrite legislation that had governed 
broadcasting and telecommunications for half a century, there was a growing consensus 
among several key public service and philanthropic organizations that media 
consolidation was having a negative effect on the quality of mass communication in this 
country.  Some of these organizations were founded decades before the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, some of them arose as a response to it, and some of 
them were founded to create policy for new media.  However, all of these organizations 
began to coalesce around issues related to media ownership during the latter part of the 
1990s.  The organizational work laid down by these groups created the foundation for 
cohesive opposition to Powell’s plan to further modify media ownership regulations at 
the beginning of the 21st century.  This chapter discusses some of the key players and 
issues that propelled the media reform movement forward. 
Public Interest Organizations 
 
 One impetus for the creation of a grassroots backlash against media consolidation 
in 2003 began a full decade earlier with the establishment of the Telecommunications 
Policy Roundtable (TPR).  Founded in 1993 by Jeffrey Chester of the Media Education





70 public interest organizations sought to create policy for a new communications 
infrastructure that would include the Internet and other new technologies (Aufderheide, 
1999; Love, 1994). 
 That summer, TPR issued a press release that contained seven basic principles it 
said were essential to the foundation of any new telecommunications policy-making 
(“New Coalition,” 1993).  The first principle to be upheld was the right of universal 
access to affordable news, education, and government information.  According to TRP, 
this basic right was vital for the maintenance of a democratic society.  The second 
principle forwarded by TRP was that new communication networks should be designed 
in order to facilitate interactive communication between individuals, groups, and 
networks.  Additionally, any new network should be required to allow all groups and 
individuals to express themselves freely.  The fourth principle, one that would resonate in 
the coming years, proclaimed that structural diversity and competition needed to be 
protected by policy-makers because no one entity should ever control both the delivery 
conduit that enters an individual’s home and the content contained in it.  The coalition 
also submitted that a new communication infrastructure should support 
nondiscriminatory practices in the workplace and that privacy standards should be 
carefully protected and extended.  Finally, TRP declared that any new information 
infrastructure should promote democratic policy-making because every American 
deserved to be heard on issues before Congress.  
 TRP held monthly meetings in Washington DC that were attended by 50 to 70 
members (Aufderheide, 1999;  “New Coalition,” 1993).  Among them were the Media 





(CFA), Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), Common Cause (CC), and the 
Benton Foundation.  By 1994, the coalition had formed a number of committees to work 
on outreach, pending legislation, the organization of a public interest summit with the 
Clinton/Gore administration, and the development of a model for proposed   
telecommunications legislation.  One important innovation forwarded by TPR was the 
effort to use the growing popularity of e-mail and the Internet as an organizing tool.  TPR 
recognized that the Internet offered new possibilities for uniting grassroots organizations 
around a common cause.  Even though some of the Telecommunications Roundtable 
member organizations were asked to provide input to legislators as they considered the 
regulatory framework that would be eventually adopted into the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, ultimately, industry representatives had the most influence over the final version 
of the legislation (Aufderheide, 1999; McChesney, 1999).  However, the coalition created 
by TRP set a precedent for cooperation and the exchange of information among public 
interest groups concerned with media ownership issues.  TRP still meets monthly in 
Washington DC, and the Coalition for Networked Information currently hosts an open 
electronic TPR forum on its website (Coalition for Networked Information, n. d.). 
 One member that became an influential voice and important advocate for the 
retention of media ownership restrictions in 2003 was the Office of Communication of 
the United Church of Christ, Inc. (OC Inc.).  Founded in 1959 as part of the church’s 
commitment to the promotion of civil rights for communities that had been historically 
excluded from the media, this organization had long been a significant voice in 
communications policy debates (Ranly, 1976; United Church of Christ, n. d.).  In 1966, 





Mississippi, that aired blatantly racist programming.  In that landmark decision, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Washington DC Circuit forced the FCC to grant the church 
standing in the license renewal process (Krasnow et al., 1982; Office of Communication 
of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 1969).  The case established the right for citizens 
to participate in renewal hearings without having to show that they had an economic 
stake in the outcome.  After the ruling, citizens groups routinely filed petitions to deny 
broadcasters their licenses in order to force stations to meet the programming needs of 
their communities. 
 Over the years, OC Inc. was involved with many media issues, such as seeking to 
improve the quality and quantity of children’s programs (Austin, 1983; United Church of 
Christ, n. d.).  The church also worked to improve the quality of local and national public 
affairs programming and has advocated for fair rates for cable services.  In the 1990s, the 
Office created programs to promote diversity in media by supporting efforts to establish 
low-power radio stations; it campaigned for affordable access to emerging technologies 
and addressed issues of media consolidation.  OC Inc. representatives have also filed 
numerous responses to FCC calls for comments on other broadcasting issues. 
 MAP, another member of the TPR, grew out of the movement that began with the 
United Church of Christ’s litigation against the FCC in the 1960s (McChesney, 2004b; 
Media Access Project, n. d.; Ranly, 1976).  MAP is a non-profit public interest 
telecommunications law firm that represents national and locally based organizations on 
behalf of listeners’ and speakers’ interests in electronic media and telecommunications.  





attorneys appear frequently before Congress and at conferences devoted to 
communications policy issues.   
When MAP was first established, it focused primarily on issues related to the 
Fairness Doctrine and antiwar and civil rights cases (Media Access Project, n. d.).  
However, in the 1990s, MAP branched out and successfully defended “must carry” rules 
that require cable system operators to transmit local broadcast stations in their area of 
service.  MAP also served as cocounsel for the plaintiffs in the landmark Reno v. 
American Civil Liberties Union case that invalidated the Communications Decency Act 
and extended the highest level of First Amendment protection to the Internet.  By the late 
1990s, MAP was involved with the low power radio movement and was increasingly 
concerned with media consolidation (McChesney, 2004a; Yochi, 2003).  MAP also 
operates a website that provides an extensive list of resources and archival documents for 
citizens interested in these issues.  MAP eventually represented the Prometheus Radio 
Project in litigation challenging the FCC’s media ownership policies (Prometheus Radio 
Project v. FCC, 2004).  
 FAIR, another founding member of TRP, was established as a media watchdog 
group in 1986 to provide criticism of media bias and censorship, but by the mid-1990s, it 
too was becoming more active in the area of media consolidation (Fairness and Accuracy 
in Reporting, n. d.; 2006; Jones, 2002; McChesney, 2006).  The organization typically 
works with journalists, activists, and scholars to promote greater diversity in media.  
According to its website, “FAIR believes that structural reform is ultimately needed to 
break up the dominant media conglomerates and to establish independent public 





Accuracy in Reporting, n. d.).  FAIR also produces a weekly radio show called 
CounterSpin and publishes Extra, a magazine that focuses on media criticism.  FAIR has 
taken advantage of the Internet to disperse Action Alerts to its network of media activists.  
FAIR also became a forceful voice in the media reform movement (Klinenberg, 2007; 
McChesney, 2004a). 
William Benton, the founder of the advertising agency Benton & Bowles, the 
publisher of the Encyclopedia Britannica, creator of the Voice of America, and former  
U. S. senator established the Benton Foundation in 1948 (Benton, Foundation, n. d; 
Wallace, 2004).  Benton had a life-long interest in promoting the use of media for 
educational purposes and believed that electronic technology should serve the public 
interest by promoting democratic values (Fagerheim & Amato, 1998; Fratkin, 2002).  
When Benton’s son Charles took over the presidency of the Benton Foundation in the 
1970s, the foundation already had a long history of supporting public broadcasting and 
media reform.  Notably, the Benton Foundation provided the seed money and direction 
for the National Citizen’s Committee for Broadcasting, headed by former FCC 
Commissioner Nicholas Johnson during the late 1960s and 1970s, an instrumental group 
during the media reform movement of that era.  
Charles Benton served as a member of the Presidential Advisory Committee on 
Public Interest Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters during the Clinton 
administration (Benton Foundation, n. d.; Jessel, 1998).  In the mid-1990s, the foundation 
made the transition from a primarily grant-making organization, to an operating 
organization generally devoted to the field of communications.  The foundation has 





conferences on the topic of digital technologies and broadcasting.  Its website provides a 
free online news service and offers many resources for educators and media activists.  
The foundation became a critical resource for many other organizations that were 
opposed to increased media consolidation during the 1990s and beyond. 
 CC is yet another long-established organization that became a key player in the 
debate over media ownership policies, although it would not take an active role on the 
issue until 2003 (Common Cause, n. d.).  John Gardiner wanted to create an organization 
that would represent citizens’ interests in Washington and founded CC in 1970 
(McConnell, 2004; Wertheimer, 1995; Wieck, 1973).  Its mission as a nonpartisan, 
grassroots organization is to lobby Congress on pending public interest legislation, to 
educate the public about its concerns, and to organize its members to weigh in on issues.  
While Common Cause was an early member of the TPR, it had never been primarily 
devoted to media issues until its members expressed so much concern about media 
consolidation that it made media ownership its top organizing issue in 2003 (Klinenburg, 
2007; McChesney, 2004b). 
Two other consumer organizations that were initial members of TPR played key 
roles in the debate over media ownership restrictions in the 1990s and into the 2000s. CU 
was founded in 1936 to protect consumer’s rights and offer unbiased assessments of 
products and legislation affecting consumers (Consumer’s Union, n. d.; Mayer, 1989).  
Its magazine Consumer Reports, featured articles advocating for public interest in 
broadcasting going back to the 1960s (“Here,” 1962; “Truth,”1962 “What?”  1961).  In 
1972, CU founded an advocacy office in Washington DC to provide information and 





organizations and individuals to build support for stronger consumer protections.  
Advocates from this office have consistently campaigned for affordable telephone, cable, 
and Internet services for consumers and have maintained that media ownership rules 
should be sustained to ensure competition and diversity in the media.  CU also became an 
essential organizing component of grassroots opposition to the relaxation of media 
ownership regulations as the FCC moved toward its 2002 biennial review. 
 CFA was founded in 1968 as an advocacy, research, education, and service 
organization for consumers (Angevine, 1969; Consumer Federation, n. d.).  Its 
membership consists of over 300 nonprofit organizations representing in excess of 50 
million people; therefore its influence on policy-makers is considerable.  As a research 
organization, CFA publishes reports that investigate consumer issues by conducting 
surveys, focus groups, and other research.  CFA uses the information from its studies to 
conduct consumer initiatives, educational campaigns, books, brochures, news releases, 
and newsletters.  CFA also provides support to other organizations and frequently 
organizes conferences on issues of concern.  
CFA had a long history of involvement with media-related issues, and Mark 
Cooper, director of research, is the organization’s chief spokesperson on 
telecommunications (Consumer Federation, n. d.; “Groups Urge Veto,” 1995; Martinez, 
1997).  A vociferous opponent of media deregulation, Cooper was a panelist on the 
FCC’s Media Ownership Roundtable (Cooper, 2001).  Additionally, CFA operates a 
website pertaining to media ownership with a wealth of resources and studies available to 
the public.  The organization firmly opposes further relaxation of media deregulation, and 





While these established organizations and many others were filing comments with 
the FCC, speaking out to the public about media issues and testifying before policy 
makers, another group of more loosely organized activists were advocating for the 
creation of a new community based, low-power radio service. 
The Micro-Radio Movement 
  Before there was a federal agency in charge of policing the electromagnetic 
spectrum, educators and amateur pioneers operated low power radio stations all over the 
country (Barnouw, 1968; Douglas, 1987; McChesney, 1993).  However, when the 
commercial applications of the medium became apparent, regulators eliminated low 
power licenses in favor of the wider geographical coverage that full power broadcasters 
could achieve.  The bias in favor of high power commercial broadcasters led to the steady 
decline of educational institutional licenses on the AM dial.   
However, in 1947 the FCC recognized that many educational institutions did not 
have the resources to support full power stations, so it granted an experimental Class D 
license to Syracuse University (Aguilar, 1999; Stavitsky et al., 2001).  This allowed the 
station to operate with a power of 10 watts on the new FM channels reserved for 
noncommercial use, as opposed to the minimum power requirement of 250 watts for a 
standard license.  The station’s signal could be heard within a radius of 3 miles of 
campus.  The station was a success, and soon the FCC granted Class D licenses to other 
noncommercial stations.  Most were awarded to educational institutions, but some were 
operated by community groups. In some areas the new low power stations were the only 
locally based stations in the community.  Although most of these stations eventually 





D license in 1978 before eliminating the service after industry critics argued that the low 
power licenses were not an efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Although there have been many unlicensed pirate radio stations that have 
operated clandestinely in the past, a new breed of pirates emerged in the late 1980s that 
operated openly (Brand, 2004; Coopman, 1999).  Mbanna Kantako founded Black 
Liberation Radio from his apartment in the John Hay housing project in Springfield, 
Illinois in 1986 for $600.  In interviews, Kantako said that he believed his community 
was ill served by existing media in the area, so he decided to start his own station.  Black 
Liberation Radio was able to reach approximately 1,000 residents living within a mile 
and a half of Kantako’s apartment using a two-watt transmitter.  Kantako’s unique brand 
of radio soon captured the attention of his community, along with that of the legal 
authorities and other media.  Despite the FCC’s efforts to shut down the station, Kantako 
insisted that his station existed to bring his community together and empowered it in a 
way that no other commercial radio stations would.  He refused to cease and desist.  The 
FCC fined him, but he stayed on the air. The Committee for Democratic Communication, 
an arm of the National Lawyers Guild, offered to represent him in court.  However, 
Kantako was not interested in becoming a test case for micro-radio.  Nonetheless, he did 
put together a widely distributed video that demonstrated how anyone could put a low 
cost micro-radio station on the air. 
 Others began to follow Kantako’s lead, and low power, unlicensed stations began 
to multiply all over the country (Brand, 2004; Coopman, 1999; Klinenburg, 2007).  The 
movement was fueled by dissatisfaction in the quality and scope of news coverage in 





the industry.  The highly criticized coverage of the Gulf War in 1989-1990 only increased 
the sense of outrage that many micro-radio proponents felt.  Many radio activists believed 
that they could do a better job of informing their communities themselves (Coopman, 
2000a).  Low-Power FM (LPFM) represented a return to localized programming that 
addressed the needs of specific communities.  Many of these stations produced news and 
political commentary and played music featuring local bands.  Most of these stations 
were programmed by volunteers who had wide-ranging musical tastes and a desire to 
share their knowledge with the community.  Most abhorred the rigid formats of 
commercial stations and wanted to broadcast programming that was unfiltered by 
consultants and commercial restraints.  
In the early 1990s, a community activist named Stephan Dunifer began 
broadcasting his version of community radio via a low power transmitter in California 
(Brand, 2004; Coopman, 1999, 2000a; Klinenberg, 2007).  After the FCC shut down the 
station that Dunifer built with 95 other volunteers in the greater San Francisco Bay area, 
he continued to broadcast without a license, but with a portable transmitter.  In 1994, the 
government brought a case against him, saying that he had violated FCC regulations 
(U.S. v. Dunifer, 1998).  Dunifer argued that the spectrum scarcity rationale was no 
longer valid and that the FCC was abridging his First Amendment rights by denying him 
a license for a low power license.  Dunifer eventually lost his case on technical grounds, 
because he had never actually applied for a license.  However, in the meantime, other 
radio activists were reclaiming the airwaves all around the country (Markels, 2000).  
According to Coopman, (1999) the common goal of these broadcasters was to blanket the 





overwhelmed.  The goal was to force the agency to legalize the service.  During the first 
10 months of 1998 alone, the FCC shut down over 250 of these stations, and it is 
impossible to know how many more stations escaped detection (Kennard, 1998).  Despite 
pressure from the NAB to enforce the rules, the FCC was hampered by the mobility of 
micro-radio transmitters and the unconventional structure of these volunteer 
organizations.  
 As the movement grew, it became more organized, at least partly because of 
increased access to e-mail, listservs, and web sites (Coopman, 2000b).  Micro-radio 
broadcasters began to publish regular reports and newsletters on the Internet.  These sites 
kept activists and other members of the public updated on technical and engineering 
issues, legal issues, and actions pending before the FCC.  As more people learned about 
the movement, these electronic networks expanded, and more members of the public 
became advocates for the creation of a legal low power radio service. 
 On February 5, 1998, J. Roger Skinner filed a petition asking for a rulemaking 
with the FCC to consider licensing low power stations (Brand, 2004; Coopman, 1999).  
Another petition from Nicholas Leggett, Judith Leggett, and Donald Schellhardt was 
submitted on March 10 (Brand, 2004; McConnell, 1998a, 1998b; FCC, 2000h, 2000i).  
The two proposals were a bit different.  Skinner wanted the FCC to create three classes of 
low power service.  The primary service would operate between 50 to 3000 watts, 
another between 50 and one watt, and a third would be available for special events at 
between 1 and 20 watts.  In contrast, the Leggett and Schellhardt’s proposal called for 1-





 In a speech delivered to the a meeting of the NAB explaining why he supported 
the creation of a low-power service, then FCC Chair William Kennard told broadcasters 
that he thought of radio as the quintessential local medium.  He said he was worried 
about this unique characteristic of radio in the face of recent changes in the structure of 
the radio marketplace (Kennard, 1998).  Kennard said that although the radio industry 
was more profitable than it had ever been, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 had led 
to unprecedented consolidation in radio.  After assuring broadcasters that his first 
responsibility was to preserve the most efficient use of the broadcast spectrum, he said, 
I am concerned when I talk to small independent broadcasters who tell me that 
they are being squeezed out of their markets.  I am concerned when I talk to 
advertisers who tell me that large multiple owners have locked up certain 
demographics in many markets.  And I am concerned when I talk to small 
entrepreneurs, including minorities and women, who tell me of their fears that 
they will have to abandon their dreams of ever owning a broadcast station.  We 
have a tradition in this country that cherishes many voices in the broadcast 
marketplace.  It is a good tradition.  As Vice President Gore said recently “this 
isn’t just a question of diversity, it’s question of democracy.”  (Kennard, p.5) 
 
Later in the speech he told the broadcasters that the FCC was seriously 
considering the proposal to license micro-radio stations, a proposal he thought would be a 
more efficient use of the spectrum.  Kennard said that third adjacent channel spacing 
requirements were no longer necessary due to improvements in transmitting technology.2
                                                 
2 The third adjacent channel spacing requirement creates a buffer zone around allocated 
frequencies.  By eliminating it, more signals can be squeezed into existing spectrum 
space. 
  
After conducting extensive engineering field studies over 2 years, the FCC went ahead 
with its plans to create a LPFM service.  On January 27, 2000, the FCC issued a order 
that created two new low power FM services, one 10-watt, and one 100-watt (FCC, 





10-watt low power licenses would be approximately 3 1/2 miles, a 100-watt station could 
potential cover a distance of up to 10 miles.  The Report and Order said that the FCC had 
determined that the elimination of third adjacent channel restrictions would not interfere 
with existing broadcasters’ signals. 
 The Report and Order also explained why the FCC was allowing this new kind of 
broadcast license (FCC, 2000i).  They had received thousands of comments from citizens 
who wished to create a service that would serve their specific communities.  The FCC 
also wanted to create a mechanism that would provide a proving ground for new entrants 
into the industry and a service that would allow the voices of community-based schools, 
churches, and civic organizations to be heard.  The Report and Order stated that LPFM 
would be strictly noncommercial, and licenses would be restricted to community 
organizations that did not already possess a license.  The idea was to create an 
inexpensive and very localized service that would allow community organizations with 
an inexpensive way to communicate with their neighbors.  The FCC would take 
applications for LPFM in five rounds determined by which state an applicant resided in.  
According to the FCC, 
Our goals in establishing this service are to create opportunities to allow local 
groups, including schools, churches and other community-based organizations, to 
provide programming responsive to local community needs and interests....We 
believe that noncommercial licensees, which are not subject to commercial 
imperatives to maximize audience size, are more likely than commercial licensees 
to serve small local groups, such as linguistic and cultural minorities or groups 
with shared civic or shared educational interests that may now be undeserved by 
advertiser supported commercial radio and higher powered noncommercial radio 








Congress Steps In 
 Despite widespread public support for LPFM, the NAB convinced Congress to 
introduce a bill that prohibited the service (Brand, 2004; Klinenburg, 2007).  Testifying 
before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection, on February 17, 2000, NAB President Edward Fritts said LPFM would 
interfere with the spectrum space of existing broadcasters and he accused the FCC of 
abandoning its policy of preserving the most efficient use of the spectrum (Albiniak, 
2000; H.R. 3439, 2000).  Fritts also said micro-radio would drain revenue from small 
independent stations that already provided community services.  NAB said that its own 
independent field tests proved that low power broadcasting would interfere with existing 
broadcaster’s signals, and then the Fritts provided each member of Congress with a 
demonstration compact disk to prove it (FCC, 2000e). 
 Even before the FCC had issued its order authorizing low power radio, Senate Bill 
2068, a bill that would have completely annulled any FCC decision to allow low power 
radio, was also introduced in the waning days of the first session of the 106th Congress.  
A similar bill had been introduced in the House (H.R. 3439, 1999).  After returning from 
the break, before any hearings could be held, Senator McCain attached a rider to an 
important appropriations bill that mimicked the language in S. 2068 because the 
appropriation bill had a better chance of passing (S. 2518, 2000).  During the 
appropriation discussions, Senator Harkin said that the rider was a classic example of 
caving into special interests.  He admonished McCain for creating legislation behind 
closed doors, saying that the rider was a way of avoiding an open discussion of the issue.  





CU, and many religious organizations supported LPFM, including, but not limited, to the 
United Church of Christ and the U.S. Catholic Conference.  Harkin asserted that those 
organizations supported LPFM because the stations will make more programming 
available to the public and provide outlets for news and perspectives not currently 
featured on local radio stations (Stavitsky et al., 2001).  
Despite growing Congressional opposition for the new service, the FCC went 
ahead with its plans.  On March 17, 2000, it conducted its first lottery for one of five 
regional areas that could petition the agency for a low power licenses, and by September 
15, the FCC had received over 1200 applications (Brand, 2004; FCC, 2000h).  Yet, in 
September, the FCC adopted a Reconsideration Order that reinstalled the third adjacent 
channel requirements if the frequencies chosen by potential licensees were close to radio 
reading services (FCC, 2000f). 
Also in March, it was revealed that the NAB compact disk which was distributed 
to members of Congress did not portray actual interference that might be experienced due 
to low power broadcasting (Hatfield, 2000).  According to Dale Hatfield, chief engineer 
for the Office of Engineering and Technology at the FCC, and Roy Stewart, chief of the 
FCC’s Mass Media Bureau, the NAB disk was produced by artificially mixing two 
previously recorded radio signals and was not a demonstration of actual interference 
between two operational stations.  The CD furnished to Congress was recorded inside a 
studio, not from the field as the NAB had implied.  In May, the FCC issued a press 
release on its web site entitled Low Power FM Radio Service: Allegations and Facts 
(FCC, 2000e).  The document was a point-by-point refutation of the allegations that were 





issue of low power radio and had granted four extensions to the comment period because 
the NAB requested more time.  Hatfield said that it believed that the FCC engineering 
studies were legitimate, and he questioned the impartiality of the engineers that 
conducted the study for the NAB.  
Some members of Congress were incensed that the FCC was instituting a new 
class of radio licenses that would compete with existing commercial broadcasters without 
consulting them (Bateman, 2000; Labaton, 2000).  Representative Tauzin told members 
of the House that he intended to make a formal request to the Justice Department to 
investigate whether or not the FCC exceeded its authority when it sent memoranda in 
favor of LPFM to Congressional aids.  Tauzin cited a law that said that no part of the 
monies appropriated by Congress shall in the absence of express authorization be used 
directly or indirectly to pay for the personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, 
or letter printed, or written matter, or other device intended or designed to influence any 
member of the United States Congress (18 U.S.C. §1913).  
 Meanwhile, President Clinton threatened to veto any appropriations bill that 
contained the LPFM rider, and Congress decided that a compromise would be in order 
(Albiniak, 2000).  Senator Gramm introduced S. 3020, a modified version of the bill 
called The Radio Broadcasting Preservation act.  An identical bill was introduced into the 
House of Representatives.  The appropriations rider was subsequently dropped in favor of 
the Radio Preservation Act.  The Act required the FCC to do more field testing before 
issuing any low power construction permits, and prohibited the FCC from dropping the 





   As the Clinton administration was ending, FCC Chair Kennard, a Democratic 
appointee, may have been thinking about how he could leave a positive legacy at the 
regulatory agency.  He issued a press release published on the FCC website expressing 
his disappointment over the passage of The Radio Preservation Act (FCC, 2000c).  
Kennard said the House bill would cut the number of community LPFM stations by 80 % 
and added that 
 special interests trumped over community interests today.  While the NAB 
 frequently opposes new competitive services, I’m particularly disappointed that 
 National Public Radio joined with commercial interests to stifle greater diversity 
 of voices on the airwaves.  I can only wonder how an organization that excels in 
 national programming could fear competition from local programming by these 
 tiny stations operated by churches, schools, community groups and public safety 
 agencies.  (FCC, 2000c, p. 1) 
 
When Congress restored the third adjacent channel requirement, it effectively 
eliminated the eligibility of a majority of the applicants.  Although the FCC had received 
over 1,200 submissions for low power stations after the first filing windows closed, it was 
not until December 21, 2000, that the FCC determined that 255 LPFM applications were 
eligible for consideration under the third adjacent channel requirement (FCC, 2000f).  
After Powell assumed his position as chair, LPFM took a back seat to other priorities and 
it was not until the FCC was subject to an overwhelming political backlash due to its 
decisions on media ownership that Powell announced that his localism initiative in 2003 
would include discussions about low power radio.  As of July 2004, there were still more 
than 1300 applications pending (FCC, 2003a).  
 
Dissatisfaction Festers 
 Although many of the aforementioned organizations were forceful proponents for 





previously been actively opposed to media consolidation (Klinenburg, 2007; McChesney, 
2004b).  Among the thousands of applicants for LPFM licenses were the disappointed 
citizens who belonged to the civic organizations, churches, schools, and municipal 
organizations that wished to start community radio stations.  Additionally, when the 
original micro-radio NPRM issued by the FCC stated that it would disqualify any 
applicant who had previously been involved with unlicensed broadcasting, many activists 
who had worked to legalize the service felt betrayed (Coopman, 2000a).  Even though the 
court eventually overturned that prohibition, the FCC’s decision served to further alienate 
a growing number of citizens who originally created and promoted the concept.  When 
Congress limited the number of legal applicants that were eligible to broadcast a 
community-based alternative to highly consolidated, strictly formatted commercial radio, 
some felt that the concept of democratic communication was left behind.  However, one 
group of activists would not be deterred. 
 
The Prometheus Radio Project 
 During the same year that Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Pete Tridish was an activist working on issues ranging from the antiapartheid movement 
to efforts to promote a freeze on nuclear weapons (Gurwitt, 2004).  He and his friends 
were frustrated by the lack of media coverage for these issues and he thought the lack of 
exposure stemmed from corporate control of the media (Kelliher, 2003; Lotozo, 2002).  
They decided that they could do a better job of informing the public about these issues if 
they started their own radio station.  After sending away for a transmitter kit, Tridish and 





In a statement labeled Your Dial was Made for Revolution Tridish described the 
station and explained why he founded it.  
Radio Mutiny has set out to prove that in this era of corporate dominance and 
 political backlash, this era in which a large portion of our society’s culture and 
 consciousness is industrially produced by media conglomerates driven by 
 fantastic profit margins, this era in which a subservience to the cult of expertise 
 and the hegemony of professionalism makes people question their competence to 
 make any decisions for themselves or take any action outside of their specialized 
 niche in the labor market—in this era, we have set out to prove that volunteers 
 with a passion for culture and with vital, direct interest in civic affairs can make 
 better programming than the mega-corporations controlling the majority of media 
 outlets. With simple, accessible technologies, we can create a handmade sort of 
 radio that, with its directness, its immediacy, its lack of pretense, will reach out 
 from neighbor to neighbor and shake the foundations of an empire. 
 (“Prometheus,”  n.d.)  
 
Radio Mutiny was a nonprofit, all volunteer collective, and its mission was to 
provide “news, views, opinions and music not heard elsewhere on the dial” (Prometheus, 
n. d.).  Like Lorenzo Milan and other community radio pioneers before him, Tridish and 
other micro-radio broadcasters wanted to counter the homogenized, highly formatted 
product that commercial radio stations offered its listeners with a highly diverse and 
extremely localized service created by volunteers who reflected the needs and concerns 
of their communities.  Radio Mutiny considered itself to be part of a national movement 
of pirate broadcasters who operated without licenses because FCC requirements made it 
prohibitive to operate legally.  
 After 9 months on the air, the FCC served the station with a warning and finally 
seized Radio Mutiny’s equipment and shut down the station (Markels, 2000; Prometheus, 
n. d.).  However, by this time, the FCC was beginning to reconsider its stand on LPFM, 
so Tridish founded the Prometheus Radio Project to promote it.  Like Radio Mutiny, the 





and organizational support to noncommercial community groups that wish to start LPFM 
stations.  Prometheus conducts workshops, publishes manuals, and acts as a 
clearinghouse for information about low power broadcasting.  Now completely legal, 
Prometheus has organized many  “barn-raisings” that bring volunteers from all over the 
country to local communities to help build stations and teach volunteers how to run a 
radio station.  Prometheus also acts as a public advocate on other related issues such as 
media ownership, spectrum reform, and the facilitation of public participation in the FCC 
rule-making process.  By 2002, the Albert A. List Family Foundation, the Bread and 
Roses Community Fund, the Ford Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation, Soros’ Open Society Institute, and Resist Inc. had all provided funding for 
the Prometheus’ projects.  Prometheus Radio Project would become a key player in the 
fight to rescind the relaxation of media ownership restrictions instituted by the FCC in 
2003. 
 There were other signs in the late 1990s that citizens were becoming more 
dissatisfied with media consolidation.  In 1996 the Institute for Alternative Journalism, an 
advocate of independent noncorporate reporting, sponsored the Media and Democracy 
Congress in San Francisco (Ledbetter, 1997b; Pollitt, 1997).  The event was attended by 
over 700 journalists and activists who felt that mainstream media did not pay enough 
attention to issues that were not advertiser friendly, issues such as economic justice, 
racism, and poverty.  
 The following year, the institute held another conference in New York City that 
was attended by over 1,000 people (Balough, 2006; Konstantin, 1998).  The conference 





Robert McChesney, author Barbara Ehrenreich, and Amy Goodman of Democracy Now!  
Several mainstream journalists, such as Walter Isaacson, managing editor of Time, and 
New Yorker media critic Ken Auletta, spoke about the connection between Wall Street 
and media corporations.  The purpose of both conferences was to provide a forum where 
activists and journalists could meet to discuss strategies for providing more democratic 
alternatives to mainstream media coverage and to create a sense of community among the 
conference attendees. 
 The late 1990s also saw a resurgence of academic interest in public 
telecommunication and media ownership studies (Avery, 2001; McChesney, 2004b).  A 
conference held in 2001 on public broadcasting and the public interest was well attended 
by activists and professors from across the nation, and the emergence of Independent 
Media Centers following the World Trade Organization protest in Seattle in 1999 created 
momentum for a growing movement centered around the notion of media reform. 
 
Summary 
 By the time that the FCC announced the formation of the Media Ownership 
Working Group studies on October 21, 2001, the older more established media reform 
groups were gaining adherents to their cause through their web sites and other 
communications.  Newer organizations such as the Prometheus Radio Project were 
focused more narrowly on specific issues, but local groups opposed to media 
consolidation were forming all over the country.  As the movement became better 
organized, their messages began to resonate with ordinary citizens.  What was once an 
issue that was an almost exclusive concern of dedicated activists and professionally 





general public.  
 Dissatisfaction with the mainstream media’s coverage of the Gulf War, in addition 
to the shortcomings of commercial broadcasting, motivated action by established 
organizations and activists alike.  When Congress severely restricted Kennard’s efforts to 
create a new, noncommercial, local radio service, many citizen’s saw it as further proof 
that mainstream media was beholden to corporations that were more interested in the 
bottom-line than in serving the needs of a democracy.  While some public service 
organizations anticipated a new infrastructure for communications paved by new 
technology, many were also skeptical of policy-makers who seemed to capitulate to 
corporate interests when it came to the regulation of communication policy repeatedly. 
The same issues that were gaining traction with the public would also engage the 
DC Circuit Appeals Court in the upcoming year (Fox v. FCC, 2002; Sinclair v. FCC, 
2002).  By the end of the year, Powell’s effort to provide solid empirical evidence to 
sustain his effort to further relax media ownership regulations would come under intense 








POWELL PLOWS AHEAD 
 
 The new year was an eventful one for the discussion of media regulations. By 
January 2002, the FCC was preparing to issue an NPRM soliciting comments on the 
possible relaxation of several media ownership rules.  The Appellate Court in the District 
of Columbia was preparing to issue decisions in the Sinclair v. FCC (2002) and Fox v. 
FCC (2002) cases that challenged local limits on television station ownership, cross-
ownership rules, and the national caps on cable and television station ownership.  At the 
annual NAB convention in Las Vegas, Chairman Powell reiterated his intention to 
proceed with his agenda, and by the end of the year, the FCC would release its Media 
Ownership Working Group (MOWG) studies to the public. 
 
Sinclair v. FCC 
On January 14, 2002, attorneys for the Sinclair Broadcasting Group presented 
their case before the Appellate Court in the District of Columbia (Sinclair v. FCC, 2002).  
Sinclair argued that limiting common ownership of television stations in local markets to 
eight independent voices was an arbitrary and capricious decision by the FCC.  Sinclair 
also claimed that existing local marketing agreements made prior to the passage of 
theTelecommunications Act of 1996 should be grandfathered into the current rules and 





Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.  Additionally, Sinclair maintained that local 
restrictions on broadcast station ownership violated its First Amendment rights. 
 Attorneys for the FCC countered Sinclair’s arguments by insisting that the FCC’s 
eight independent voices rule was neither arbitrary nor capricious.  The agency asserted 
that the basic tenet of communication policy, that the FCC should encourage the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources, required the 
agency to limit the number of broadcasting stations that one entity could control in local 
markets (Sinclair v. FCC, 2002).  Accordingly, the Commission argued that its dual 
mission of maintaining diversity and ensuring that there was an adequate amount of 
competition in any given market was essentially an exercise of drawing a line in the sand 
until more specific empirical evidence could be found that defined an exact number of 
stations that would meet both requirements.  The position taken by the FCC in the 1998 
Biennial Regulatory Review Report, that more time was needed to ascertain whether the 
relaxation of local duopoly rules undertaken in a previous rulemaking would have a 
detrimental effect on local markets, was reiterated by agency lawyers.  In essence, the 
FCC argued that it needed more time to consider its options. 
However, when the FCC had previously considered its cross-ownership policies, 
it had counted not only broadcast stations in its assessment of how many independent 
voices there were in a market, but it had also included independently owned daily 
newspapers and cable systems as “voices” (FCC, 1999b).  In that order, the FCC 
suggested that radio and television were to some degree substitutable for each other for 
diversity purposes, and that newspaper and cable systems also contributed to the diversity 





said that public continued to rely on both radio and television for news and information, 
suggesting that the two media both contribute to the marketplace of ideas and compete in 
the same diversity market.  The Commission also found that radio and television serve as 
substitutes, at least to some degree, for diversity purposes.  Furthermore, the Commission 
concluded that newspapers and cable systems are important sources of news and 
information on issues of local concern and that they compete with radio and television, to 
some extent, as advertising outlets.  Regarding cable systems, the Commission 
acknowledged that noncommercial, educational, and government channels present local 
informational and public affairs programming to the public in some markets. 
While the FCC chose to count a wide array of media when assessing how many 
independent voices existed in a given market in its 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review 
Report, the FCC excluded all media outlets other than broadcast television in its 
enforcement of the Eight Voices Rule (FCC, 1999b).  The position of the Commission 
was that despite the changes in the media environment since the Eight Voices Rule was 
promulgated, no empirical evidence available showed that other types of media were 
easily substituted for broadcast television.  They argued that at least 20% of the 
population still did not have access to subscription services such as cable or satellite 
services, and that broadcast television had more impact on people than any other form of 
media.  Additionally, according to the FCC, a vast majority of Americans still relied 
exclusively on broadcast television for locally originated programming including news 
and sports.  However, in Sinclair, the FCC’s attorneys claimed that most subscription 





by local television stations.  The FCC also argued that broadcast television was the only 
medium that was obligated to operate under public service regulations. 
 As for Sinclair’s argument that the Eight Voices Rule violated the corporation’s 
First Amendment rights, the FCC cited NCCB v. FCC and Red Lion v. FCC where the 
courts held that the First Amendment rights of viewers are paramount to the rights of 
station owners (NCCB v. FCC, 1978; Red Lion v. FCC, 1969; Turner v. FCC, 1994).  In 
respect to Sinclair’s argument that prohibiting the grandfathering in of previously 
existing local marketing agreements constituted an illegal taking, the FCC provided 
documentation that showed that the FCC had proclaimed that the existing agreements 
would be subject to negotiation 5 years after the Telecommunications Act of 1996 went 
into effect.  It had specifically warned station owners that there would be no guarantee 
that those agreements would be honored past that period.  The court took all of these 
arguments under advisement and did not issue its ruling until April 2002. 
Fox Decided 
 On February 19, 2002, Chief Justice Douglas Ginsberg of the DC Court of 
Appeals issued the decision for the court in Fox v. FCC.  The case was a consolidated 
challenge by five petitioners to the FCC’s National Television Station Ownership Rule 
(NTSO) and the Cable/Broadcasting Cross-Ownership (CBCO) Rule (Fox v. FCC, 2002).  
The court concluded that the Commission’s decision to retain the rules was, in fact, 
arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the law.  Therefore, the court remanded the 
NTSO Rule back to the Commission for further consideration and vacated the ban on the 
CBCO Rule because it said that on remand, the Commission, in the court’s judgment, 





 The main thrust of the court’s opinion was that the FCC had failed to provide 
enough empirical evidence to support its retention of the NTSO and CBCO caps in its 
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review Report (FCC, 1999b; Fox v. FCC, 2002).  In other 
words, the rules were arbitrary and capricious according to the Administrative Procedures 
Act that compelled government agencies to provide adequate justification for 
rulemakings.  According to Ginsberg, §202(h) of the Telecommunications Act mandated 
that the Commission repeal or modify any rules that no longer upheld the public interest 
as a result of competition. His opinion stated that the FCC provided no analysis of the 
state of competition in the television industry to justify its decision to uphold the national 
ownership cap.  The opinion concluded that this oversight on the agency’s part was 
contrary to the law.  It was therefore not permissible for the FCC to adopt a wait-and-see 
approach to the problem; they were required by law to modify the rules every 2 years.  
Accordingly, the court ruled that because the FCC had failed to act in its 1998 Biennial 
Regulatory Review Report, Fox Television had suffered harm due to its inability to 
complete its purchase of the Chris-Craft that would have put them over the national 
ownership limit.  Likewise, Viacom, another petitioner in the case, had suffered 
immediate and direct harm because of the Commission’s stay in its purchase of CBS, 
which would have put Viacom’s national ownership of television stations at 41%.  
 The reasoning the court provided for overturning the CBCO Rule was similar.  
The FCC had failed to meet its burden of proof here as well (Fox v. FCC, 2002).  The 
FCC assertion that retaining the rule would prevent cable system operators from favoring 
their own stations and that the rule was necessary to promote diversity in local markets 





result of the ruling. Time Warner stated that it wished to purchase a television station in 
New York City, but it already owned a cable system there.  According to Time Warner, 
its intent was to provide a 24-hour local news channel in New York City, a significant 
public service, but was prevented from doing so by the CBCO Rule.  Time Warner also 
asserted that the CBCO hindered its ability to compete with its WB network and with 
other network-owned stations in major television markets. 
 The court asserted its jurisdiction in the matter, contrary to the FCC’s claim that 
its rules in respect to ownership were only subject to review by Congress (Fox v. FCC, 
2002; Sinclair v. FCC, 2002).  In responding to the Commission’s attorneys who argued 
that Congress had intended that the NTSO Rule remain fixed at 35%, the court’s opinion 
stated that merely quoting from the remarks of the Telecommunications Act’s sponsors 
did not show intent. 
 The court rejected the petitioners’ claim that their First Amendment rights were 
abridged by both of the rules (Fox v. FCC, 2002).  The opinion said that the Supreme 
Court had repeatedly upheld the FCC’s obligation to consider the public interest in 
maintaining diverse and antagonistic sources of information with its rules.  Nonetheless, 
the Court said it did not have the authority to overturn those precedents but hinted that the 
Supreme Court might decide to revisit the issue to reflect changes in the competitive 
broadcasting market sometime in the future.  
While the court remanded the NTSO back to the FCC for further consideration, 
the opinion was a blistering attack on the Commission for its failure to provide empirical 
evidence to support its positions (Labaton, 2002b; “Student Note,” 2002).  The opinion 





that inhibited competition as a matter of course, rather than presuming that existing rules 
could be retained unless proof was offered that they would harm competitive forces in the 
television marketplace.  The court interpreted §202(h) of the Telecommunications Act in 
a way that equated the public interest solely with competition.  While the justices 
disregarded the Commission’s contention that it had an equal responsibility to maintain 
diversity of outlets and diversity of voice in the national market, the opinion did not say 
that diversity no longer mattered under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  However, 
the opinion did say that the FCC had failed to provide justification for maintaining rules 
that promoted diversity.  Nonetheless, in a telling move, the FCC under the direction of 
Powell decided not to appeal the court’s decision to overturn the CBCO rule 
(McChesney, 2004a; Smith, 2003). 
Sinclair Decided 
Two months later, the same court in the District of Columbia handed down its 
decision in Sinclair.  Justice Roberts wrote the opinion and began by citing the court’s 
previous decision in Fox v. FCC, stating that the court had already decided that §202(h) 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 carried a presumption in favor of repealing or 
modifying media ownership rules (Fox v. FCC, 2002; Sinclair v. FCC, 2002).  Again, the 
FCC attorneys argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to review its compliance 
with the Telecommunications Act, and again, the court disagreed.  However, the court 
said “there is no unbridgeable First Amendment right comparable to the right of every 
individual to speak, write or publish” to hold a broadcast license and rejected Sinclair’s 
claim that its First Amendment rights were being abridged by the Eight Voices Rule (Red 





Fifth Amendment takings contention and its argument that local marketing agreements 
should be grandfathered in indefinitely. Noting that nothing in the Telecommunications 
Act addressed the grandfathering in of existing agreements, the court ruled in favor of the 
Commission. 
However, the court remanded the Eight Voices Rule back to the FCC for further 
consideration, and as in its decision in Fox, the opinion stated that the Commission had 
failed to provide empirical evidence to suggest that the Eight Voices Rule preserved 
competition and/or diversity in local markets (Sinclair v. FCC, 2002).  While Sinclair 
claimed that the FCC had plucked the number eight out of thin air, the court validated the 
Commission’s decision to draw a line somewhere, as long as it was not arbitrary and 
capricious.  However, because the agency failed to rationalize its decision, the Court 
stated that the rule was, in fact, arbitrary and capricious.  Additionally, when the FCC 
determined the guidelines for the number of independent media in its cross-ownership 
rules by counting various forms of media, in the case of local ownership, it had only 
counted broadcast television outlets.  The Court rejected the FCC argument that 
broadcast television was more immediate, more available, and used by more people as 
their primary source of local news and information because the agency had only provided 
one broad study that did not focus exclusively on local television.  Again, the main thrust 










In several addresses and interviews following the court’s decisions in Fox and 
Sinclair, Powell repeatedly stated that all decisions rendered by the Commission must be 
based on empirical evidence (Powell, 2002a, 2002b; Pulley, 2002).  He cited the MOWG 
studies as an example of the new initiatives the Commission was taking to gather the 
evidence necessary to support its media ownership decisions.  Often, Powell reminded his 
audiences that he thought that newspapers and radio stations, as well as other forms of 
media, should have been counted when the FCC assessed the number of independent 
voices in a given television market.  
In a panel discussion moderated by Sam Donaldson at the NAB convention in Las 
Vegas, Powell ( 2002a) told his audience that the telecommunications industry was in a 
state of transition brought on by fundamental changes in technology, public policy, and 
the marketplace. He said that the transition to digital broadcasting would benefit station 
owners if they could create programming that consumers were willing to pay for.  When 
Donaldson asked Powell what he intended to do given the decisions by the court in the 
Fox and Sinclair cases, he replied that the Commission was aggressively seeking to cull 
the deficiencies in the FCC’s media ownership policies so that they could find empirical 
evidence to support them.  He also said, “I think that the Court is increasingly saying that 
you can’t just come in here and invoke magic incantations and say ‘almighty diversity’ 
and you’re done and the rule is sustainable” (Powell,” 2002a, p. 2).  Ironically, a year 
earlier, Powell had also referred to magical powers when he said “the public interest 
works with letting the market work its magic” (Shadid, 2001, p. 2). According to what 





argument that its policies were designed to promote diversity, if they did not include all 
voices in the market.  Donaldson then asked Powell if limits on ownership were designed 
to preserve viewpoint diversity, and if the FCC decided to count all voices in the market, 
then how would he be able to defend the limits at all?  Powell replied that he did not 
think the rules were defensible.  
 A month later, when Powell was speaking to the National Cable and 
Telecommunications Association and was asked to describe some examples from 
industries he was responsible for regulating that he considered to be healthy, competitive 
industries, he said,  
I believe in competition deeply, but I believe in healthy markets.  You can get in 
heated debates about how many competitors constitute a market, how many don’t.  
So, you can have healthy market conditions and even have fairly concentrated 
markets in some instances…. (Powell, 2002c, p.3)  
 
Powell said he thought that the current media environment was fairly competitive, 
although concentrated in certain ways, and he saw nothing wrong with that. Overall, 
Powell said he would certainly ascribe it as a healthy market environment (2002c).  He 
did not believe in a one-size-fits-all approach to media regulations, and he said that the 
problem with the ownership rules was not that the values the rules represented were not 
important but that the regulatory framework was rarely contextualized for modern 
changes in the market place in the context of competitiveness.  He thought that it was 
intellectually dishonest to ignore those changes.  Powell stated that he did not have a 
problem with a lot of the rules, and although he conceded that they were rooted in 





Finally, Powell said that he disliked the idea of doing analysis based on 
“stovepipes.”  He did not think that the idea that broadcasting should live in a separate 
universe from all other forms of media was realistic anymore.  
I think then, that there is a sort of philosophical struggle, which has been slippery 
and doesn’t have a lot of precision: what do we really mean by diversity and 
viewpoint? And, I keep trying to struggle to get that down to its essence so the 
rules are really about something you can show. It can’t mean copiousness. The 
media is more voluminous and available than in any time in history.  So diverse, 
meaning plentiful, is difficult to argue….(Powell, 2002c, p.3)  
 
 The problem of how to achieve political diversity over the airwaves clearly 
presented a dilemma for Powell.  When he equated political diversity with the 
abundance of “stovepipes,” he was essentially saying that it did not matter who delivered 
the programming.  Instead, the only thing that mattered was that there was a surfeit of 
content available to suit any individual’s tastes.  He refused to acknowledge that certain 
types of programming might be more valuable in terms of achieving political diversity 
than others.  Powell’s faith in technology to cure all ills, along with his belief in the 
magic of the marketplace, precluded him from understanding that the slippery 
philosophical struggle that had informed communications policy for decades, mattered to 
some citizens as much as any empirical evidence that the FCC could provide to the 
courts.  Powell’s failure to account for the arguments of those opposed to media 
consolidation on philosophical grounds would have disastrous results in the upcoming 
struggle over media ownership rules. 
 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
 On September 12, 2002, the FCC adopted a Notice of Proposed RuleMaking 





addressed were the Local Television Multiple Ownership Rule, the Radio/Television 
Cross-Ownership Rule, the National Television Ownership Rule, and the Dual Network 
Rule.  The FCC released the NPRM to the public on September 23, and set a 90-day 
comment period following the release the MOWG studies.  The deadline for submitting 
comments was set for December 2, and reply comments were due by January 2, 2003. 
 The NPRM laid out the legal framework for the Third Biennial Ownership 
Review and documented the history of regulatory review at the Commission following 
the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  The NPRM also detailed recent 
reviews of the rules by the court (FCC, 2002e; FCC, 2002f).  The writers of the document 
took pains to describe the modern media environment in terms of the numbers of video, 
audio, cable, newspaper, and Internet outlets available to most citizens.  The Commission 
explained its policy goals as they related to diversity, competition, and localism.  In doing 
so, the report made a strong case for the abundance of media outlets in the contemporary 
media market, but the Commission also solicited reply comments from concerned 
citizens and the industry about almost every conceivable aspect of the media ownership 
rules.  Many of the questions were quite specific, others were focused more broadly, but 
repeatedly, the Commission asked that reply comments include empirical studies to back 
up claims.  The NPRM served notice that the Commission intended to conduct the most 
comprehensive review of media ownership regulations in its history.  By doing so, it was 
calling into question the entire foundation of its past policies. 
 In a concurring statement released with the NPRM, Commissioner Copps 
suggested that the review compelled the agency to undertake far ranging economic and 





2002b).  He urged Powell to commit significant resources and labor to the task, and 
suggested that the Commission hold public hearings on the issues.  Copps expressed his 
reservations that the timing and tone of the NPRM might lead people to assume that the 
foregoing review had already been predetermined.  Copps insisted it was not and asked 
citizens to comment on any issue that was of public interest even if it had not been 
specifically addressed in the NPRM.  Commissioner Martin also issued a separate 
statement approving in part and concurring in part with the notice (Martin, 2002).  Martin 
thought that the NPRM’s description of the FCC’s interpretation of §202(h) of the 
Telecommunications Act did not go far enough.  The report invited commentary on what 
standard the Commission should apply to comply with its Congressional mandate, and 
Martin asserted that the court had already clearly defined the standard: what is necessary 
to the public interest is what is essential to the public interest. 
 As previously noted, the NPRM urged the industry and other interested parties to 
submit empirical data with their comments (FCC, 2002f).  The fact that many members 
of the public who had an interest in commenting about these issues did not have the 
access or the means to conduct empirical studies could not have gone unnoticed by those 
who published the NPRM. As much as Powell would have liked to ignore or discount 
these unquantifiable issues, at this point, it remained to be seen if the public would stick 
to the parameters set by the NRPM. 
 
Summary 
 When Congress and the FCC began to gradually deregulate broadcasting and 
telecommunications during the 1980s and beyond, the courts consistently upheld 





of antagonistic sources over the rights of broadcasters to expand their holdings (NCCB v. 
FCC, 1978; Red Lion v. FCC, 1969).  The FCC generally interpreted this to mean that 
there should be rules that limited media ownership by one entity, locally, regionally, and 
nationally.  While the Commission gradually loosened some ownership requirements 
over the latter part of the 20th century, it was not until the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that the interpretation of the public interest shifted to 
favor policies that encouraged the consolidation of all sectors of the telecommunications 
industry (Aufderheide, 1999; McChesney, 1999). 
When legislators created the Telecommunications Act of 1996, they believed that 
the proliferation of new communications technologies made the old regulations obsolete 
(Aufderheide, 1999; McChesney, 1999; Price & Duffy, 1997).  While many Democrats 
under the Clinton administration had supported the general concept of deregulating the 
telecommunications industry, many also expressed reservations about deregulating 
broadcasting (S. Rpt. No. 686, 1996; Streeter, 1996).  If the act was written in order to 
spur the development of new technologies, a desire fueled by an almost religious 
obsession with the Internet and its promise, it also promoted massive consolidation in the 
telecommunications and broadcasting industries. 
 While the ability of the courts to interpret Congressional intent is often subject to 
debate, by the time the District of Columbia Court decided Fox and Sinclair it was 
obvious to most observers that the court interpreted §202(h) to mean that Congress had 
assumed that the section created a presumption that all regulations should be modified or 
eliminated if the rules impeded competition in the industry (Fallows, 2003; Hickey, 





able to enjoy the economic efficiencies available through consolidation, not necessarily 
competition between independently owned broadcasters in any given market.  This 
presumption put the burden of proof on the FCC to establish that its ownership 
regulations did not impede competition, as that was deemed to be the primary foundation 
of the new definition of the public interest (Fox v. FCC, 2002; Sinclair v. FCC, 2002). 
While the DC Circuit Court explicitly stated that preserving diversity of outlets as well as 
voices was in and of itself a worthy goal, it also stated that the FCC had failed to provide 
evidence that its numerical limitations on media ownership would further those goals.  
The court’s unwillingness to interpret Congressional intent when it passed the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 as anything other than commanding the FCC to 
eliminate regulations that restrained corporations from consolidating their holdings in the 
communications industry was consistent with the political realities of the era.  However, 
this interpretation ignored other aspects of the public interest, a phrase that was repeated 
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 over 100 times (Aufderheide, 1999; Copps, 
2002c). 
 Before the decisions in Sinclair and Fox, the DC Circuit Court had handed down 
other decisions that chastised the FCC for its lack of empirical evidence to support its 
cases.  In 2001, the same court struck down the Commission’s rules limiting the number 
of cable television systems that a company may own (Schiesel, 2002; Time Warner v. 
FCC, 2001).  The same court struck down regulations related to telephone rates and 
wireless spectrum auctions.  According to Andrew Jay Schwartzman, president of MAP, 
“ the Commission [was] getting hammered in case after case manifesting a deep 





The Bush administration clearly favored the deregulation of telecommunications, 
and Powell had repeatedly expressed his desire to eliminate many of the rules that he was 
charged with defending in court (Labaton, 2002a; Powell, 2002b).  Aside from 
independently owned broadcasters, the major players in the industry heralded the 
appointment of Powell and the subsequent decisions of the DC Circuit as new 
opportunities to expand their holdings.  The broadcast and cable industry consistently 
argued that with all the new delivery systems becoming available to the public, they were 
losing their audience and therefore should be able to buy up more broadcasting and cable 
properties.  Just as the Supreme Court interpreted the public interest in the Commission’s 
rules to include the right to access diverse media voices from a plentiful array of sources, 
the DC Circuit interpreted the public interest to be equated with industry growth during 
the Bush administration. 
 Both the Fox case and the Sinclair case were challenges to the FCC’s 1998 
Biennial Regulatory Review Report that was directed by former FCC Chairman William 
Kennard.  As previously noted, both Furchtgott-Roth and Powell have written vigorous 
dissents to the conclusions reached by the majority (FCC, 2000d).  If Powell was 
disappointed by the court’s decisions, he showed no signs of it; in fact, he had repeatedly 
taken a stance similar to the decisions in the past (Labaton, 2001).  However, the 
decisions were also a mixed blessing for Powell.  The high burden of proof that the court 
was demanding from the FCC made the task of defending rules that he did support much 
more difficult.  The DC Circuit Court of Appeals was sending a clear message that the 
FCC could no longer evoke theoretical arguments that diversity of sources and outlets 





Two weeks after issuing the NPRM, the Commission released the 12 MOWG 
studies.  Critics immediately denounced many of them for employing flawed 
methodology and inaccurate assumptions (FCC, 2002d).  When the studies were first 
released to the public, much of the underlying data on which they were based were 
considered to be proprietary, but after receiving numerous protests from the public, the 
FCC allowed academics and other interested parties to examine the data sets in 
Washington, DC by appointment.  The following chapter examines the studies and the 





THE MEDIA OWNERSHIP WORKING GROUP STUDIES 
  
 When Chairman Powell launched his initiative to provide empirical data to 
support the FCC’s media ownership regulations, he asked FCC staff members and other 
researchers to conduct 12 studies that were intended to provide empirical data to guide 
the Commission’s evaluation of the media ownership rules (FCC, 2002g).  The studies 
were also meant to provide the evidence needed to convince the courts that the FCC’s 
decision-making process was based on rational determinations.  However, the results of 
the Media Ownership Working Group (MOWG) studies were less than conclusive, and 
many critics dissected the methodology employed by the researchers and found it 
wanting.  Even as some members of the trade press declared that the studies validated 
Powell’s argument that the media ownership rules should be relaxed, a closer look at the 
data provided a much more tentative portrait of the conclusions.  This chapter examines 
the strength and weaknesses of the studies and evaluates the findings drawn from the 
data. 
 
MOWG Studies Released 
 On October 1, 2002, the FCC released the 12 MOWG studies to the public, along 
with a summary of the findings of each report (FCC, 2002g).  The press release 





policies that reflected the current media marketplace.  Additionally, the research was 
designed to impart an analytically consistent framework for the agency’s decision-
making process.  According to Powell, 
this effort is the most comprehensive look at media ownership regulation ever 
undertaken by the FCC.  As the courts have made clear, it is critical that the FCC 
has a solid factual base to support its media ownership rules.  Collectively, these 
studies represent an unprecedented data gathering effort to better understand 
market and consumer issues so that we may develop sound public policy.  (FCC, 
2002d, p.1) 
 
Amid much industry speculation that the FCC would be relaxing, if not entirely  
eliminating, many of the six ownership rules under consideration, the reports were 
released 2 weeks after the official notice of proposed rulemaking was recorded 
(Davidson, 2002; Labaton, 2002b; Sanders, 2002; Shriver, 2002).  Although some 
journalists reported that the studies supported Powell’s contention that consolidation in 
the media was rendered essentially harmless in the face of more media options for 
consumers, a close reading of the data collected is much more ambiguous. 
 According to a report in Mediaweek, the studies showed that media outlets had 
proliferated since 1980, that network-operated and newspaper-owned television stations 
did a good job of providing news, and that consolidation in the radio business had led to 
lower rates for advertisers (Shields, 2002).  The Los Angeles Times3
The studies released today reveal a deeply flawed perspective that—while 
ratifying the Chairman's view—fails to adequately assess the realities of the news 
and entertainment media marketplace.  A research agenda on this critical issue 
 reported that the 
studies offered support for Powell and large media companies that favored deregulation 
(Sanders, 2002).  However, Jeff Chester, founder of the Center for Digital Democracy, 
questioned whether the studies offered an unbiased view of the media rules. 
                                                 





should be developed and conducted outside of the FCC—not with staffers who 
must please the Chairman.  (Sanders, 2002, p. C2) 
  
 The remainder of this chapter will examine the conclusions reached by the 
researchers for each study. 
 
Study # 1 
Study #1 compared the number of media outlets and owners in 10 randomly 
selected markets in 1960, 1980, and 2000 (Roberts, Frenette, & Stevens, 2002).  The 
FCC’s summary of the report concluded that the number of radio stations, newspapers, 
cable systems, and direct broadcast satellite operators had increased by an average of 
195% since 1960 (FCC, 2002f).  The number of independent owners had increased by 
139% during that same time period.  On the surface, this finding appeared to support 
Powell’s argument that Americans had more access to more media than ever before in 
history. 
To the contrary, many critics claimed this study raised more questions than it 
answered.  For example, Roberts et al. (2002) examined the number of media outlets and 
the number of station owners in 10 selected markets.  Although these data indicated that 
there was indeed an increase in owners and outlets between 1960 and 2000, the statistics 
also showed that that the rate of increase in the number of outlets slowed substantially 
during the period 1980 and 2000 when many of the regulations regarding media 
consolidation were liberalized.  In fact, the data showed that the growth in the number of 
outlets slowed in all markets examined, except for one, during the period between 1980-
2000.  Additionally, the rate of growth in the number of owners slowed in all 10 markets 





little or no growth in ownership or outlets over the past 20 years, the authors of the study 
made no effort to determine if the lack of growth coincided with changes in regulatory 
actions. 
 In his analysis and critique of the MOWG studies, Dean Baker, co-director of the 
Center for Economic and Policy Research, suggested that it would have been useful if 
Roberts et al. (2002) had incorporated data on market shares into their research.  Baker 
(2002) asserted that when Roberts et al. merely counted the number of outlets in selected 
markets, the authors failed to provide much information about the range of choices 
available to consumers.  Furthermore, if a small number of outlets dominated the market, 
the availability of many small outlets would not be a benefit to either consumers or 
advertisers since the reach of those outlets would be limited.  Additionally, Roberts et al. 
failed to distinguish between the radio and television stations and instead counted both 
under a single category of broadcast outlets.  Although the study did provide some useful 
information, it certainly did not provide a complete media analysis of the markets 
examined. 
 
Study # 2 
David Pritchard of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee conducted the second 
study, Viewpoint Diversity in Cross-Owned Newspapers and Television Stations: A Study 
of News Coverage of the 2000 Presidential Campaign.  Pritchard’s (2002) study posed 
the question of whether there was an overall slant in coverage favoring either of the 2000 
presidential candidates that could be attributed to the common ownership of broadcasting 
stations and newspapers in the same market.  Pritchard theorized that the extremely close 





conditions for the analysis of editorial slant in election coverage.  Pritchard reasoned that 
since the FCC suspended the Personal Attack Rule and the Political Editorial Rule during 
the campaign that it was conceivable the suspension of both rules would have a liberating 
effect on the owners of cross-owned broadcast/newspaper combinations.  Therefore, 
Pritchard assumed that cross-owned outlets would be more motivated to adopt a position 
in favor of one candidate or another. 
However, several critics questioned Pritchard’s (2002) evaluation of whether the 
conditions of the study were ideal (Baker, 2002; Cooper, 2003; Smith, 2003).  In 
Pritchard’s own one-page executive summary, he reported:  
The limited number of observations in this study prevents us from drawing firm 
or sweeping conclusions about the implications of our findings.  However, for the 
markets studied, the data suggest that common ownership of a newspaper and 
television station in a community does not result in a predictable pattern of news 
coverage and commentary about important political events in commonly owned  
outlets.  (Pritchard, 2002, p. 1, italics added) 
 
Pritchard’s (2002) sample size was small; he only analyzed 10 markets in which 
cross-owned newspapers and television stations existed before the ban was instituted that 
prohibited such arrangements in 1978.  At the time of the study, there were 27 markets 
where there were cross-owned television/newspapers due to grandfathered arrangements 
or waivers from the FCC (Smith, 2003).  Moreover, Pritchard never provided a rationale 
for the cities that had been selected for the study.  Additionally, since the sample size was 
so small, it is difficult to extrapolate any meaningful generalizations to other instances of 
cross-ownership in other markets.  
According to Pritchard (2002), the two key assumptions underlying his hypothesis 
were that Governor George Bush was thought to favor the relaxation or elimination of the 





favored retaining the rule.  The second assumption was that the corporations that owned 
newspaper/broadcast combinations would also favor the elimination of the ban and that 
they would therefore endorse Bush across all of their outlets.  Pritchard does not provide 
a persuasive rationale for starting with these assumptions; he only says that they were the 
foundation for his study.  
In any case, Pritchard (2002) and his coders defined slanted coverage as any item 
about the presidential campaign from the hypothetical point of view of an interested yet 
undecided voter.  If, in the researcher’s judgment, an item made it more likely for an 
undecided voter to vote for Gore or a third-party candidate, then the item was coded as 
favorable to Gore and vice versa.  Each item was categorized as favorable or unfavorable 
if it cast the candidate in a positive light.  There was no attempt to evaluate whether an 
item was biased, nor was a determination of intent on the part of any journalist taken into 
account.  The researchers coded all available nonadvertising content about the 
presidential campaign that was carried on the early evening news broadcasts.  They 
evaluated news stories, editorials, editorial cartoons, staff-written opinion columns, 
syndicated opinion columns, guest opinion essays, letters to the editor, and freestanding 
photographs.  The coders reported a high level of intercoder reliability at 92%. 
The results showed that in 5 of the 10 newspaper/television combinations studied, 
there was a “noticeably” different slant on the campaign between newspapers and 
television stations that were commonly owned.  There was no significant difference in the 
slant between the coverage of the campaign between the newspaper and television station 
coverage of the other five combinations studied.  Pritchard (2002) concluded that this 





political events in commonly owned outlets.  Pritchard did not theorize about why some 
combinations may have rendered a similar slant on the election, but he did conclude his 
report by saying that in his judgment, cross-owned media covered the campaign in the 
same way that was typical of any other mainstream media outlet. 
While Pritchard was careful to hedge his conclusions, other academics questioned 
his methodology (Baker, 2002; Cooper, 2003; Smith, 2003).  As previously noted, it is 
impossible to determine whether or not the 10 companies selected for the study are 
representative of the 27 cross-owned newspaper and television outlets across the country.  
Eight of the 10 combinations studied were in large markets, and it is possible that 
combinations in smaller markets would have provided data contrary to Pritchard’s 
conclusion.  Another problem with his research design was the fact that Pritchard (2002) 
never attempted to compare his findings to independent media outlets.  Pritchard’s 
assertion that there was no difference in the coverage of cross-owned media with that of 
other mainstream media outlets is meaningless without a documented baseline for 
comparison. 
Another error in Pritchard’s (2002) study is that his conclusions are based on less 
than rigorous statistical analysis (Smith, 2003).  It is generally accepted in social science 
research that a p-value of at least .05 is a statistically significant difference between two 
variables (Baxter & Babbie, 2004; Creswell, 2003).  However, in several instances 
Pritchard described values of p<.17 as constituting a meaningful difference.  According 
to Smith the differences between television stations’ slant and newspapers’ slant are 
significant in only 2 cases out of 10.  Despite Pritchard’s contention that common 





coverage, in 80% of the cases he studied the slant between commonly owned news 
properties was not statistically significant.  His study should therefore be considered 
preliminary at best.  If the purpose of the study was to provide the FCC with the solid 
empirical evidence that the courts were demanding, this study was far from conclusive. 
Study # 3 
Study # 3, Consumer Substitution Among Media, was an effort by Joel Waldfogel 
of The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania to determine if the use of one 
medium by an individual affected the way an individual consumed another type of media 
(Waldfogel, 2002).  The intent of the study may have been to test Powell’s theory that an 
overall increase in different types of media-rendered FCC regulations such as the eight 
voices rule moot.  If, as Powell had previously argued, news is news, no matter how it is 
delivered to the consumer, then treating each specific medium as an entity onto itself 
would no longer be rational.  Thus, if Waldfogel’s study demonstrated that there was 
complete substitutability between and across media, the existing regulatory structure that 
assumed that each medium was distinct could be called into question.  Despite 
Waldfogel’s efforts to sustain this hypothesis, he concluded: 
The conception of each medium as entirely distinct would be unduly restrictive 
because there is evidence (here and elsewhere) that consumers substitute across 
media.  At the same time, however, substitution is not apparently so complete that 
the effects of changes in one medium are offset by changes in another to leave 
civic behavior unchanged.  It is conventional and trite to conclude a study with a 
call for more research.  Nonetheless, some of these questions will only be 
answered with additional research.  (p. 41) 
 
 For the first part of his study, Waldfogel (2002) surveyed both the availability of 
media outlets and their use over time.  He then aggregated the data in 144 designated 





Population Survey’s Computer and Internet Use Supplements, Burrelle’s Media 
Directory, and the U.S. Census in order to determine if the supply of outlets in each 
medium responded to a supply of outlets in other media.  Waldfogel examined radio 
stations, television stations, cable systems, daily newspapers, weekly newspapers, and the 
Internet.  As Waldfogel admitted, these are difficult questions to answer given the 
number of variables in each market and in the size of each market.  For example, larger 
markets tend to have more media outlets than smaller ones because bigger markets can 
support more financially viable outlets.  Waldfogel also points out that if consumers in 
one place develop an interest in a particular form of information, it could bring about a 
change in their use of multiple media.  
 Waldfogel (2002) found that there is a high level of substitutability within media 
categories.  When a new radio station appears on the dial, it is likely that it will cipher off 
a considerable share of its audience from another radio station.  Accordingly, this 
suggests that radio stations are close substitutes for each other (Berry & Waldfogel, 1999; 
Waldfogel).  Likewise, in another study, George and Waldfogel (2003) found that when 
the New York Times became available daily in a market, its readers often substituted the 
Times for a local paper.  Waldfogel concluded that the only substitutions that are 
significant at even a 10% confidence level are substitutions between access to radio 
outlets and cable use, access to radio news and Internet use, access to daily newspapers 
and cable use, and the circulation of daily newspapers and cable use (Baker, 2002; Smith, 
2002; Waldfogel).  There was no evidence of substitutability between cable and 





and Internet usage, or between any other outlets.  A ten percent level of confidence is 
quite low for an economic study (Baker, 2002). 
 For the second part of the study, Waldfogel (2002) attempted to answer the 
question of whether consumers perceive different media as substitutes for each other.  
Waldfogel examined cross-sectional data based on information on an individual’s use of 
various media; the data set was based on approximately 180,000 observations.  Again, 
Waldfogel qualified his conclusions by saying that “despite the substantial appeal of 
these data, consumption data have the drawback that individuals who use one medium 
heavily may also use others heavily” (p. 25).  Accordingly, he used a regression analysis 
that controlled for age, education, race, and gender and found there was a substitution 
between Internet and broadcast television usage.  Another regression measured the extent 
to which consumers substitute for news.  Again, the only significant measure of 
substitutability was between the Internet and broadcast television. 
 While Waldfogel’s (2002) study did provide some useful information, it also 
raised many questions.  This kind of analysis necessarily produces averages of media 
usage.  One person may view 10 hours of news programming on cable television each 
week, whereas another might view only 2.  The average amount of cable news usage 
would then be 6 hours a week, which would lead to false assumptions about viewing 
habits.  It is also possible that people who watch the evening news on television might 
then become more interested in a particular issue and would therefore seek out other 
sources of information about the subject.  In other words, some individuals might view 





Additionally, there is the question of whether or not some subgroups of the 
population might more easily substitute one medium for another.  At the time of the 
study, only 46% of the households examined had access to the Internet at home, school, 
or work (Waldfogel, 2002).  That leaves approximately 54% of households who are 
unable to substitute the Internet for other more accessible news sources.  While the 
Internet is generally offered free of charge in public libraries, it seems unlikely that a 
person without home access would substitute the Internet for other sources on a regular 
basis.  One might also wonder if people who only had access to the Internet at work and 
school would utilize those connections for news on a regular basis when they are 
engaged, or supposed to be engaged, in their primary task of working and studying.  
Although the proportion of people with home Internet connections, especially those with 
access to broadband connections, might easily substitute online information for other 
news outlets, the results of this study are far from conclusive and show that any such 
substitution is not nearly complete. 
Another issue with this study is that the research design only allowed Waldfogel 
(2002) to look at two forms of media at a time.  In the real world, most people have more 
than two choices when they decide where to get their information (Smith, 2003).  It is 
also the case that aggregate national data do not apply to local markets.  The study also 
does not address the question of how people who watch local news on television access 
local stations.  It is quite possible that people watch local news on cable or via satellite 
receivers, a possibility unaccounted for by the study.  Additionally, there is a possibility 
that people may read the local newspaper via the Internet, rather than buying a paper 





inherent in his methodology.  Waldfogel’s research simply leaves too many unanswered 
questions to form the basis for a radical change in communication policy. 
 
Study # 4 
Keith Brown and George Williams (2002) conducted the fourth working group 
study, Consolidation and Advertising Prices in Local Radio Markets.  The study was 
premised on two assumptions.  The first was that if radio stations in consolidated markets 
could charge more for their advertising, consumers would benefit because the station 
could then reduce the number of advertisements it carried.  The other assumption was 
that by specifically examining changes in radio markets since the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the researchers could then evaluate how the regulatory 
environment affected the price of advertising in local radio markets.  Brown and 
Williams (2002) found that the inflation-adjusted cost of radio advertising from 1996 
through 2001 rose by 68% (later amended to 60%) and that only 3 to 4% of that rise 
could be attributed to concentration in local markets. 
 Brown and Williams (2002) used a log of radio advertising prices, which was 
regressed against several variables.  The variables studied were the population of the 
radio market, per capita income in the radio market, the gross national product, and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that measures concentration in a market.  Brown and 
Williams recognized some of the limitations of their study.  For example, the advertising 
prices were aggregated by market, so they only reported national and regional advertising 
and did not account for local advertising time.  The statistics also did not allow for 





relationship in the community.  Brown and Williams did not attempt to control for 
differences between radio formats or play-lists or for locally originated programming 
versus national or syndicated programming.  Nonetheless, the authors concluded that 
consolidation in local radio markets only accounted for a low, single digit rise in 
advertising prices out of an overall rise of 60%.  The authors claimed that the 60% rise 
could be attributed to growth in the national economy that coincided with the rise of 
consolidation in radio. 
 This conclusion is problematic at best.  In a study that examined the price of 
advertising in real terms over the period between 1961 through 1994, Silk, Klein, and 
Berndt (2002) found that radio advertising prices had been falling over the entire period 
on an average of 1.27% annually.  Spot advertising rates fell on an average of .08% 
annually.  The overall economy grew by 202.1% during this period.  If, as the authors of 
Study 4 concluded, economic growth explained the rise in advertising rates since the 
wave of radio consolidation after 1996, economic growth does not account for the fact 
that rates fell during the time before the relaxation of ownership regulations, despite a 
202.1% rise in the Gross Domestic Product during that period.  It is also possible that 
local HHI measurements that rose by an average of 47% between 1994-2000, and the 
national HHI, which rose by 739%, account for more than the 3-4% out of 60% of the 
rise in rates for advertising in local radio markets.  One can only make an educated guess 
about this issue since the data sets used for this study were proprietary and were only 
released for review and inspection for those who signed a protective order and made prior 











Study # 5 
Mara Einstein of Queens College at City University of New York, wrote the fifth 
study, Program Diversity and the Program Selection Process on Broadcast Network 
Television (Einstein, 2002).  This report was divided into two distinct sections.  The first 
section utilized quantitative data to determine whether program diversity on network 
television had increased or decreased following the implementation of the Financial 
Syndication Rule (Fin-Syn).  The second section of the study was based on qualitative 
data, depending largely on interviews with industry executives and producers and was 
designed to illuminate the program selection process. 
The Fin-Syn Rule was enacted to prevent networks from discriminating against 
independent production houses in favor of their own in-house productions (FCC, 1993).  
The theory was that if a network owned most of its own programming, the diversity of 
programming available to viewers would decline.  In the quantitative section of her study, 
Einstein (2002) used a number of different methods to categorize different types of 
programming.  For the years 1947-1974, she used Sterling’s (1984) taxonomy.  Einstein’s 
second set of categorizations was based on three different sources.  Steiner (1963) had 
been commissioned by CBS to do a study based on how viewers watched television, and 
Einstein used his methods to categorize programming for the years between 1966-1974.  





methodology that attempted to create a diversity index to examine which types of 
programming were most likely to dominate prime time television.  Their methods were 
used by Einstein in her analysis of programming that aired from 1974-1989.  The third 
taxonomy was based on the author’s own investigation of prime time programming on 
the six major networks 1989 –2000.  Einstein then studied the diversity of programming 
before the Fin-Syn Rule, the time when the rule was in effect, and for the years after the 
rule was repealed.  She found that program diversity was at its peak in 1968-1970, the 
years before the Fin-Syn Rules went into effect.  During this time, 11 of the top-20 
program suppliers were independent production companies and the others were major 
studios.  Together they accounted for 67% of network programming.  The Fin-Syn Rule 
was relaxed in 1991, and again in 1993, and finally repealed in 1995.  Einstein found that 
the period when programming was the least diverse was when the Fin-Syn Rule was in 
effect. 
That, however, is not the end of the story.  By the 1990s, Einstein (2002) could 
not even evaluate the source of the top-20 program producers, as there were no longer 20 
individual producers to count.  In 1995, she found that 15 producers supplied 81.6% of 
network programming, and by 2002 she could only measure 10 producers, including the 
networks themselves, who supplied 87.8% of prime time network programs.  Still, 
Einstein concludes that by 2001, programming was at its highest level of diversity even 
though the industry was its highest level of concentration.  At one point in the second 
section of her study, Einstein says that despite there being a small number of shows “that 
are very low-brow, taken as a whole the prime time schedule (currently) could be 





contradicts her findings.  According to Einstein networks produce much more 
programming than ever before because of horizontal and vertical economies of scale.  
She also documents the network’s preferences for producing programming that is lower 
in cost, for example, reality shows, game shows, newsmagazines, and comedies, over 
higher cost dramas and network produced or acquired feature length movies.  Einstein 
also documents the increasing trend of the networks exacting substantial economic shares 
from the programs they do buy, or even from their own production divisions.  Clearly, the 
networks control more of their programming than ever before, and while the argument 
can be made that categorically the programs are more diverse, it is much more difficult to 
argue that the quality of programming has never been better.  None of the programmers 
or producers that she interviewed argued that we are entering into another golden age of 
television; rather programming trends discouraged most of them.  Einstein herself said 
that “ no one seems particularly pleased with the current system and several participants 
expressed concerns about the effect of the current system over program content” (p. 50).  
She quotes extensively from one television producer, Matt Williams, who expressed his 
desire to leave television and work in film instead.  He explains that since the networks 
began to lose their audience shares to cable, they have been much more reluctant to take a 
chance on new ideas in programming.  Since they are going for the lowest common 
denominator, they have become much more conservative and are reluctant to challenge 
their audiences in any way.  There may be more categories of programming offered on 
network television than in the past, but no one in this study asserted that there are more 
categories of programming worth watching.  
 





  Cunningham and Alexander’s (2002) study was an attempt to construct a 
theoretical model that predicts how broadcast media concentration affects the price and 
number of advertisements on the air and if those effects would impact both the 
opportunity costs and viewing habits of consumers.  The model is predicated on the 
assumption that advertising raises the cost of consuming nonadvertising programming, 
since the more advertisements there are on a television station, the more time a viewer 
has to spend watching television to get to the nonadvertising content.  This assumption 
implies that if there is an increased proportion of advertising, it will lead to a decrease in 
consumption of broadcasting material by a consumer. 
 Using this model, Cunningham and Alexander (2002) found that as the number of 
competitors for advertising dollars and viewers decrease, the proportion of time devoted 
to commercials increases.  This increases the opportunity costs to consumers, and the 
model predicted that the price of advertising would increase as well.  The authors then 
went on to describe a “switching-off” effect.  They speculated that if consumers respond 
to increased advertising by spending less time viewing television (or listening to radio, 
etc.), then it might be possible that the price of advertising would fall despite the overall 
increase in the number of spots.  If consumers only responded with a weaker “switching-
off” behavior, whereby viewership falls, but not enough to offset the greater amounts of 
advertisements, then the model predicts that the total amount of advertising in a 
concentrated market will still increase the proportion of advertising to nonadvertising 
content. 
In either of these scenarios, the net effect of concentration in broadcast media 





opportunity cost, or time spent with broadcast media, would have to increase because 
there would be more advertising to watch in order to get to the desired programming.  
Depending on how strongly the consumer reacts to the rising proportion of commercials, 
the price of advertising will go up as concentration goes up, even though consumption 
falls.  While the model does not specifically address how much prices will rise because of 
the difficulty of predicting specific consumer behavior, Cunningham and Alexander do 
theorize that as broadcast media concentration increases, advertising costs will also 
increase.  This study suggests that it is reasonable to assume that consolidation is good 
for media owners but bad for consumers and advertisers on this basis alone. 
Study # 7 
Four FCC staff members, Spavins, Denison, Roberts, and Frenette (2002) 
conducted Study # 7, The Measurement of Local Television News and Public Affairs 
Programs.  Ostensibly, the purpose of the study was to determine if network owned and 
operated (O&O) television stations and cross-owned newspaper/television stations 
produced higher quality news and public affairs programming than network affiliates.  
The underlying assumption was that if in fact O&Os and cross-owned stations did 
provide better quality programming, then the rationale for reducing or eliminating 
national caps on broadcast ownership could be justified.  
 Spavins et al. (2002) defined quality in news and public affairs programs in four 
ways.  They examined Nielsen ratings during one sweeps week in November 2000 for 
106 stations from 26 top-50 markets and another 24 stations from 6 DMAs in the 54-177 
range (Smith, 2003).  The second measure of quality applied to these stations was 





Television News Directors Association (RTNDA).  These awards are only granted to 
stations in the top-50 markets.  The researchers also measured how many local recipients 
received the Silver Baton of the A.I. Dupont Awards from Columbia School of 
Journalism.  Finally, Spavins et al. tallied the number of hours devoted to news and 
public affairs programs throughout the sweeps week on the stations they examined.  The 
authors restricted their study to markets with at least one O&O and at least one affiliate of 
a network.  They examined the ratings for the 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. local evening newscasts 
and reported them in unweighted averages.  As Smith points out, reporting pure numbers, 
percentage, or indices does not explain what the numbers mean or if the differences 
between stations were statistically significant 
 According to Baker (2002), greater concentration in a market provides more 
pressures on other stations to reduce expenditures on news operations in order to contain 
the cost of production.  Therefore, counting the number of hours of news and public 
affairs programming may not be a good way to measure quality or depth.  Spavins et al. 
(2002) admitted that the “categorization process invites the possibility of error,” but they 
asserted that any errors would be insignificant (p.2).  The authors themselves never 
examined any of the actual content of these programs; most of their information came 
from outside reporting agencies.  It may also be noteworthy that local news producers 
may offer more programming outputs during sweeps weeks in order to increase their 
ratings and enable them to raise the price of advertising on their evening news broadcasts.  
Additionally, Spavins et al. made no allowances for the many affiliates in local markets 
that are owned by large established media groups such as Gannett, Belo, Media General, 





produce the same type of quality news programming that O&Os do; in fact one wonders 
why the researchers expected to find any major differences in quality between these 
stations in the first place. 
 There are also several other problems associated with using Nielsen ratings to 
determine how viewers evaluate quality in local news.  First, there is the issue of 
measuring only the ratings for the 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. newscasts.  While many stations on 
the East Coast may pour most of their resources into these early evening shows, others in 
the Rocky Mountain and West Coast time zones emphasize the 10:00 p.m. local newscast 
(Smith, 2003).  This variable could conceivably skew the results.  Additionally, there is 
no way of knowing if more people watch a particular news program because of the 
programming that leads into or out of it.  The popularity of a particular newscast can also 
be dependent on other variables such as if the anchor has a pleasing appearance or 
personality of an anchor, if the station had long-term ties to its community, or if viewers 
simply habitually tune in to that particular station.  The Nielsen ratings may be a good 
way to measure a newscast’s popularity at a given point in time, but ratings do not 
measure quality programming.  It would have been more useful if the researchers had 
studied ratings using time series data (Cooper, 2003).  If they had done so, the researchers 
might have been able to determine if a station’s ratings improved or declined after 
becoming an O&O or part of a cross-owned group over time.  Additionally, many news 
operations rely on consultants who advise management how to attract and retain the 
largest audiences.  Human interest stories often attract viewers, but stories about cats 
rescued from trees might attract viewers but are surely not the type of quality news 





 As far as using awards to measure the quality of a station’s newscast, awards are 
an imperfect measure at best.  Some of the stations included in the study did not qualify 
for the RTNDA awards because they were not in the top-50 markets (Smith, 2003).  
Although the RTNDA and Dupont Awards are prestigious and well respected, like any 
other interpretive community their members develop a particular worldview or 
definitions of quality that may not be aligned with persons outside of that particular 
community (Fish, 1980; Streeter, 1996).  These types of awards can also become 
normative in that they are given to those who judge quality by the standard of what they 
think the public should want.  Smith points out that a particular company may not value 
awards.  A station that wishes to compete for these awards must allocate personnel and 
the time required to pull together their entries and provide for entry fees.  It would have 
been much more valuable for Spavins et al. (2002) to actually speak to people who watch 
the top-rated newscasts to see how they evaluate the quality of evening newscasts in their 
communities. 
 In summary, the claim of Spavin et al. (2002) that O&O stations win more awards 
than affiliated stations does not support the claim that O&Os produce higher quality news 
programs.  The authors’ findings that on average O&Os appear to produce a greater 
quantity of news and public affairs programming is also suspect, and the claim that cross-
owned affiliates win more awards and carry more news and public affairs programming 
is highly overrated.  
 
Study # 8 
The FCC commissioned a survey from Nielsen Media Research to ask consumers 





(2002) study that found that there was little evidence of media substitutability, Nielsen 
(2002) designed a computer-assisted, telephone survey to collect data.  The findings 
appear to show greater evidence of substitutability than Waldfogel’s study did.  The 
survey asked consumers directly about their usage of various media and how they might 
choose to substitute one form of media for another in order to obtain local and national 
news.  In one series of questions, the survey asked respondents that said their main source 
of news was a local daily newspaper, what they would do if that paper were no longer 
available.  Of these respondents, 66% said that they would be very likely to increase their 
use of broadcast television, 54% said they would watch more news on cable, 40% said 
they would be more likely to listen to more news on the radio, and 36% said they would 
resort to reading a local weekly newspaper.  The survey found that 57% of the 
respondents use broadcast television as their primary source for news, 23% used 
newspapers, 10% used radio, 6% used the Internet, and 4% used other sources as their 
primary source of news.  When Nielsen (2002) asked respondents what their primary 
source of local news was, 43% of the respondents said television, 31% said newspapers, 
17% said radio, and 9% said the Internet was their primary source of local news.  Only 
10% of the people surveyed who subscribed to cable said they used local cable television 
stations as their primary source of local news. 
 When people were asked if they intended to use more television, cable, daily 
newspapers, radio, weekly newspapers, magazines and the Internet in the future. The data 
clearly show that during the period of August 23-September 1 and September 3-5, 2002, 





primary source for both local and national news. The following table summarizes how 
they responded. 
The data clearly show that during the period of August 23-September 1 and 
September 1 and September 3-5 2002, large numbers of consumers were still using 
broadcast media and newspapers as their primary source for both local and national news. 
 Nonetheless, telephone surveys are limited in that the information gathered can be 
inaccurate in many ways (Tuckel & O’Neill, 2002).  Nielsen’s sample was taken from 
households that had previously filled out diaries for the February 2002 and May 2002 
measurement period and the research company did not state how the diary households 
were originally selected.  Additionally, no estimates of sampling errors were reported.  
The study did not provide an estimate of the number of households who had Internet or 
 
 
Table-Expected Changes in Usage for News 
 More Often Less Often Same Current 
Usage 
TV-broadcast 18.2 5.7 75.2 59.8 
TV-cable 21.8 8.5 68.2 52.2 
Daily newspaper 15.8 9.4 74 56.4 
Weekly newspaper 10.1 15.7 72.5 24.2 
Internet 24.7 16.4 54.5 18.8 
Magazines 5.3 24.4 67.6 6.4 







cable connections or who may or may not have had subscriptions to other forms of 
media.  In the limitations section of the study, Nielsen (2002) states that the sample is not 
a perfect probability sample because of the number of household that did not answer their 
phone or who refused to participate in the study.  There is the possibility of response 
error because despite the best efforts to train surveyors, callers can inadvertently 
influence the responses of those polled and people are sometimes unwilling or unable to 
respond to certain questions.  Additionally, many of the survey questions asked people to 
recall how they used different forms of media over the past 7 days, and it is sometimes 
difficult for people to remember the amount of time spent listening to the radio, for 
example, or which newscast they watched on any given day. 
 However, the biggest problem with this survey concerns questions about 
substitutability (Baker 2002).  Respondents were asked to predict their future behavior.  
People often report the way they wish to behave in the future, rather than how they 
actually do behave in a given time period.  The fact remains that a majority of Americans 
still use local television stations as their primary source of news, and there is no way of 
predicting how much or how little that might change in the future.  
Study # 9 
 
 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 greatly relaxed the number of radio stations 
that a single entity could own within local markets.  The act allowed a single corporation 
to own up to 8 radio stations in a local market with 45 or more stations, 7 stations in 
markets where there were 30-44 commercial stations, 6 stations in a market with 15-29 
radio stations, and 5 stations in markets with fewer than 15 stations.  The act also 





relaxation of these rules, there was a massive restructuring of radio markets with 
increased consolidation and with almost half of all stations changing hands over the next 
2 years (Aufderheide, 1999; McChesney, 1999).  
  The authors of Study # 9 examined how radio market structure affects music 
diversity (Williams, Brown, & Alexander, 2002).  This study was an attempt to 
understand whether claims that radio has become excessively homogenized across the 
country were valid.  Previous studies attempted to measure diversity in a given radio 
market by counting the number of formats available in one designated market area.  
However, Williams et al. (2002) reasoned that since many radio formats play songs that 
are common to many different format categories, a better measure of musical diversity in 
a market would be to count the number of different songs played by each radio station in 
one locality.  Williams et al. obtained listings from Radio and Records, a trade magazine, 
of the top songs played by a large sample of radio stations in March 1996 and March 
2001.  The authors found modest decreases overall in the actual number of songs on 
stations categorized under the same format by Radio and Records and slight rise in the 
amount of diversity of songs on stations listed under the same format within local 
markets.  However, Williams et al. also state that their results are tentative and that they 
can make no definitive statement regarding the relationship between concentration and 
diversity from the study. 
 There are many reasons for their tentative conclusions.  Williams et al. (2002) did 
not have access to the actual play-lists of the stations they studied; rather they relied on 
the lists of songs the stations reported to Radio and Records.  This particular magazine 





the sample stations were only taken from the top-tier markets, which may presumably 
operate in a more competitive environment than radio stations in smaller markets with 
fewer potential listeners to draw from (A. Columbo, personal communication, April 17, 
2007).  Therefore, the sample may not be a representative one.  Additionally Radio and 
Records only reports new songs, so that stations that keep the same song on their play-list 
for weeks at a time are not accounted for.  Finally, Radio and Records does not issue 
reports for stations that play older songs, so stations with formats such as Classic Rock, 
Oldies, or Classical, for example, are not counted.  
 While it might have been impractical to try to obtain the actual play-lists from a 
random sample of radio stations in a variety of markets, it would have substantially 
improved the degree of certainty about the implications of the data gathered by Williams 
et al. (2002).  Although the authors concentrated on creating a new statistical 
measurement that they call “The Distance Measure of Diversity,” there is no way of 
knowing how many of the songs reported to Radio and Records were repeated over any 
specific day part, week, or month on the same station.  All that can be ascertained is if a 
station reported adding a new song over the 2 weeks that were compared.  This study also 
failed to focus on markets that were specifically affected by the changes brought about by 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, so it is impossible to determine if the changes that 
they did measure were due to factors external to the change in regulations.  
 The Future of Music Coalition, an alliance of artists rights groups, the Media 
Access Project, and the Rockefeller Foundation commissioned the Behavior Research 
Center, a private research firm, to conduct a public opinion survey to measure consumer 





randomly selected respondents nationwide by telephone between May13 and May 20, 
2002.  The error factor for the survey was plus or minus 4.5%.  Seventy-eight percent of 
those surveyed said that they would rather hear programming with longer play-lists, e.g., 
more songs, than they heard on radio stations at the time of the survey.  Fifty-two percent 
of those surveyed said that less repetition and more new music or more local acts would 
most likely make radio more appealing (Holson, 2002).  The study also found that time 
spent listening to radio was at a 27-year low.  According to Duncan’s American Radio, 
“the %age of the U.S. population listening to the radio in any average quarter-hour has 
experienced a near 17% drop in listening over the last 13 years” (Dicola &Thomson, p.4).  
While the statistical analysis conducted by Williams et al. (2002) may have been accurate 
despite its limitations, it is clear that the people who do listen to radio perceive it to be 
less diverse and more repetitive than they had in the past.  Study 9 simply did not account 
for repetition; it counted the number of songs reported to have been added by different 




 The tenth MOWG study, On the Substitutability of Local Newspaper, Radio, and 
Television Advertising in Local Media Sales, examined whether newspaper, radio, and 
television outlets were considered substitutes for each other (Bush, 2002).  The study 
found that there was little evidence of substitutability between the examined media for 
local businesses.  Bush’s statistical analysis showed that local business people used 
different types of media to reach their targeted audiences.  These advertisers considered 





Bush (2002) gathered his data from a random sample of designated market areas 
(DMA) compiled by BIA Publication’s Master Access Database in 2001.  He also 
obtained revenue data from the National Newspaper Association of America to conduct 
his statistical analysis.  Bush states that there were limitations to the data he collected.  
For example, BIA does not report all radio revenue in designated market areas; just the 
top rated station’s revue.  The retail newspaper advertising expenditures only count a 
DMA’s share of the population over 16.  However, Bush also states that the conclusions 
reached in his report are consistent with economic theory.  
 Although he did not examine if cable television or other advertising vehicles such 
as billboards or direct mail enter into the mix when advertisers decide where to spend 
their promotional dollars, it is reasonable to assume that the three media Bush (2002) did 
examine do compete with each other for advertising dollars.  This study shows that there 
are several distinct markets operating within a given DMA, rather than one single media 
market.  Therefore, this study suggests that a diverse array of local media markets is 
beneficial for advertisers.  
 
Study # 11 
 
 Study #11, written by Williams and Roberts (2002), examined changes in the 
radio industry since the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 through March 
2002.  Its focus was primarily on trends in ownership, format, and finance in the industry.  
If Powell was looking for data to support his contention that the effects of consolidation 
due to the relaxation of ownership restrictions had little effect on diversification in the 
radio industry, he must have been disappointed by the conclusions reached in this report. 





number of radio stations on the air between March 1996 and March 2002, the number of 
radio station owners declined by 35% during that 6-year period (Williams & Roberts, 
2002).  The ownership of about 20% of the radio stations had changed hands over the  6-
year period.  The study concluded that the reason for the decline of owners was due to 
mergers between existing firms in the industry.  By March 2002, the leading radio group, 
Clear Channel Communications, owned 1200 radio stations, up from 65 stations in 1996.  
The second largest group owner, Cumulus Broadcasting Inc., held 250 stations, also up 
from 65 stations in 1996.  In March 2002 there were 50 radio station owners who held 20 
or more stations, compared to 25 in March 1996. 
 The same trend was evident in local Arbitron Metro markets (Williams & 
Roberts, 2002).  The largest firm in each metro market studied had on average 47% of the 
market’s total advertising revenue, with the top two firms controlling an average 74% of 
the revenue generated in each of the 285 markets counted by Arbitron.  Williams and 
Roberts noted that the number of radio formats available to consumers did not change 
appreciatively over the 6 years studied, but in recent years there had been a slight decline 
in the number of distinct formats offered in the largest radio markets with a slight 
increase in smaller markets. 
 The authors of Study 11 made use of various databases to compile their statistics; 
they used the BIA MasterAccess Database of radio stations and adjusted them to reflect 
sales listed as “pending,” so that only transactions that were actually completed at the 
time of the study were counted for the report.  The authors also counted stations that are 
part of local marketing agreements (LMAs) as separate stations, whereas BIA lists them 





different categories, and they assigned the approximately 25% of stations not counted by 
BMI a value of zero since these stations are usually the lowest rated stations in the 
market.  Additionally, Williams and Roberts used data compiled by Arbitron, which 
measures audiences in 285 metro markets to reflect the number of listeners reached by 
local markets.  These figures only represent about 60% of commercially licensed stations 
in the U.S., but represent a population that includes 75% of the United States population 
that is over 12 years of age. 
 Williams and Roberts’ (2002) analysis of the financial condition of publicly 
traded companies whose largest business was radio broadcasting reflected strong earnings 
in the industry although they noted that many of those companies carried heavy debt 
loads that contributed to fluctuations in stock market valuations.  Quarterly gross profit 
margins for publicly traded radio broadcasting companies were greater than gross profit 
margins measured by Standard and Poor’s 500 index in 16 out of the last 26 quarters 
measured.  Overall, radio station owners had shown very strong financial performances 
since the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  While Williams and Roberts 
studied other measurements of broadcaster’s financial performance and found that the 
debt ratio to earnings was higher in the radio industry than in other publicly traded 
companies, they also concluded that most radio owners, by all measures, performed 
better than the average company listed on the S&P 500. 
 Since 1998, Williams and Roberts (2002) found that the average number of radio 
listeners had declined by approximately 3.5% over the past 3 years, and according to 
Arbitron, radio listeners continued to turn off the dial at an average rate of 1% a year.  





were turning off their radios, the average price of radio advertising rose almost 90% from 
the rates being charged in March 1996.  During that same time, the Consumer Price Index 
only rose by 16%.  Although the authors concluded that advertising prices increased 
dramatically more than inflation since the 1996 Telecommunications Act, they 
acknowledged that although consolidation is one possible reason for the rise, they were 
not ready to make that conclusion based on the data analyzed.  However, this conclusion 
would be consistent with the findings of Cunningham and Alexander (2002) in Study #6. 
 At one point, Williams and Roberts (2002) remark that “traditionally, the 
Commission has been concerned with encouraging diversity in the ownership of 
broadcast stations so as to foster a diversity of viewpoints in the programming presented 
over the airwaves” (Williams and Roberts, p. 7).  If one were to evaluate the results of 
this study based on this criterion alone, national radio ownership policies that were 
adopted after the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 are a dismal failure.  
Although the number of commercially licensed radio stations has risen, the number of 
independent owners has declined substantially.  While the number of stations in local 
markets has also risen, the number of locally owned stations has fallen.  It may be a 
matter of debate if the number of unique radio station formats has declined over the 
period of this study, but there is no question that the number of people listening to radio 
has fallen off since the Telecommunications Act of 1996, despite the fact that revenue 
from radio advertising has increased.  Even as the top two station owners in most markets 
continue to garner an average of 74% of the revenue collected in both large and small 
markets, the rates generated for that advertising have risen astronomically.  This study 





has benefited the biggest players in the industry. 
 
Study # 12 
 For Study #12, Broadcast Television: Survivor in a Sea of Competition, Levy, 
Ford-Livene, and Levine (2002) updated a previous working paper written in 1991 that 
was a wide-ranging assessment of the broadcast television industry (Setzer & Levy, 
1991).  Levy et al. wanted to see if the predictions about the decline of broadcast 
television made in 1991 were accurate.  The authors of the 2002 report studied audience 
shares, advertising revenue, and the profitability of the television networks and individual 
stations.  Levy et al. supplemented that information with interviews with network staff, 
analysts, and advertisers.  Levy et al. concluded that despite the dire prediction in 1991 
that broadcast television was suffering from an irreversible long-term decline in audience 
and revenue share, the industry was quite healthy financially in 2002.  While the updated 
report clearly showed that broadcast television was losing its audience share to other 
forms of video distribution, its gross revenue actually increased in real terms over the 11 
years since the first report was issued.  
 While Levy et al. (2002) found that the industry itself was larger than it had been 
in 1991, with more stations and more networks on the air, broadcasters had adopted many 
strategies to cope with increasing competition from subscription-based services and other 
video outlets.  One primary reason that broadcast television had continued to be a 
profitable business is that even as audience share has fallen, the networks are still able to 
pull in a much bigger share of the audience than any other individual video channel.  On 
average, the major broadcast networks reached audiences that were over nine times the 





audience, but that audience was a national one.  If an advertiser wanted to reach a 
national audience equivalent to a broadcast network audience via cable television, the 
advertiser would have had to buy time across multiple cable networks, and still would not 
have necessarily reached an unduplicated audience.  
Additionally, broadcast television increased the number of commercials it ran 
during most day-parts.  Levy et al. (2002) reported that the big four commercial networks 
had increased hourly commercial minutes by 16.4% from 1991.  The networks had also 
increased the cost of reaching a thousand members of the audience (CPM) during prime 
time from $9.74 in 1990 to  $13.42 in 2000, an average growth rate of 3.8%.  In addition, 
the networks cut production costs by running less expensive programming such as reality 
TV shows and had cut back on offering expensive sports shows.  Since the repeal of the 
Fin-Syn Rule, broadcast networks have been able to produce more programming in-
house, therefore retaining economies of scale and future syndication rights.  Another 
network strategy that kept broadcasting profitable was the art of repurposing 
programming.  Since the big four commercial broadcast networks own cable stations, 
they often run their broadcasting programs on cable, and were able to sell advertising 
spots on the same program more than once.   
Levy et al. (2002) also found that the rate of growth for cable and other forms of 
video distribution was flattening out.  Cable systems had most likely attained a maximum 
level of penetration, and the authors of this study predicted that DBS and other newer 
technologies would also see modest rises in growth in the future.  Additionally, Levy et 
al. (2002) predicted that digital television might bring new streams of revenue to 





increase in consumer use of digital audio recorders like TIVO that allows users to fast-
forward through commercials.  However, television executives had already developed 
product placement deals that incorporate products into programming in order to offset 
this issue. 
Levy et al. (2002) predicted that broadcasters would continue to face increased 
competition from the Internet, but the relative lack of broadband connections capable of 
delivering video content quickly will keep the competition to broadcasters from the web 
down to manageable levels.  Overall, although the competition for audience share will 
continue to be fierce, the authors concluded that the television industry still provided the 
most popular and widely viewed programming available.  In their conclusion, Levy et al. 
wrote, “ the future of broadcasting will depend on its ability to continue to provide 
valuable programming on a cost-effective basis and to respond to the challenges and 
grasp the opportunities that new technology has to offer” (p. 139).  
 
Summary 
 Although Powell repeatedly stated that the MOWG studies represented the 
most comprehensive effort by the agency to provide empirical data that would support 
the FCC’s decisions on media ownership in court, the studies were in many cases based 
on flawed methodologies and unwarranted assumptions (Baker, 2002; Cooper, 2003; 
Smith, 2003).  Additionally, the researcher’s findings were less than conclusive.  When 
the FCC finally released its memorandum and order relaxing many of the ownership 
restrictions for which the studies were designed to provide supporting evidence, the 
Commission largely abandoned the MOWG studies.  Instead, Powell substituted the 





broadcasting.  The Diversity Index was a variation of the HHI test that is used to measure 
consolidation by the Department of Justice.  However, Powell did not allow the public to 
examine the new measurement tool until after the Third Biennial Review Report was 
issued.  In fact, the two Democratic members of the Commission did not have access to 
the Index until 3 weeks before the vote (McChesney, 2004a).  
 After the MOWG studies were released, public opposition to the possibility that 
the media ownership rules would be relaxed intensified.  The next 7 months would be 
marked by Congressional inquiries, one official hearing, and many off-the-record public 
input sessions culminating in the Commission’s decision to relax most of the rules under 
consideration in its Third Biennial Review that June.   
However, even if the MOWG studies had been executed flawlessly and even if 
the conclusions reached by the researchers had been unquestionably valid, the narrow 
scope of the analysis used to address the issue of media consolidation was seen as 
illegitimate by some of the stakeholders in the regulatory process.  Although regulators, 
the courts, and the industry itself had long relied on neoliberal economic data to support 
their policy decisions, many members of the general public and advocacy groups saw 
media consolidation as a social problem that impeded the political process.   
When Powell launched his initiative to provide “the most comprehensive look at 
media ownership regulation ever undertaken in the history of the FCC,” his intentions 
may have been honorable (FCC, 2002d, p.1).  However, the MOWG studies failed to 
achieve his goal.  The studies were predominantly focused on the economic ramifications 
of media policy.  When Powell directed researchers to confine themselves to this narrow 





interpretive community.  However, other communities of interest had different questions 








From the beginning of his tenure at the FCC, Chairman Michael Powell was an 
articulate spokesman for his position that the FCC was compelled by statutory 
requirements to eliminate or modify any media ownership rules that were no longer valid 
in the face of the changing character of the competitive marketplace (Fallows, 2003; 
Hickey, 2003a).  Powell was convinced that the ability of broadcasters to compete in a 
marketplace purportedly saturated with new video and information services was 
hampered by outdated media ownership rules.  He equated the public interest with the 
ability of media corporations to survive in a sea of competition.   
At least one other Commissioner construed the statutory requirements of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 differently.  Commissioner Michael Copps interpreted 
§202(h) to mean that the FCC was compelled to act in the public interest as the 
conditions of the competitive marketplace changed due to the transformative effects of 
the Telecommunications Act (FCC, 2002a; Hearn, 2001; McConnell, 2001b).  Copps 
focused on the public interest aspects of the clause and repeatedly stated that the public 
was ill served by the increased consolidation in media that had occurred since the 1996 
act passed.  Although Copps was quick to acknowledge that the court was demanding 
that the FCC provide empirical evidence to back up the claim that certain regulations 





believed that the public should decide what was in its own best interest (Copps, 2002a).  
Copps too was an articulate representative for his position.  As he began to press his point 
in the public arena, tension between himself and the chairman began to strain their 
relationship. 
 
Copps Alarmed and Disappointed 
 
Before Jonathon Adelstein was finally confirmed to the FCC in December 2002, 
Commissioner Copps was the lone voice of opposition to media concentration on the 
Commission (Labaton, 2002d; McConnell, 2001; Mundy, 2003a; Sanders, 2002).  Copps 
consistently expressed his concerns about increasing media consolidation and 
emphasized his position that relaxing regulations would be especially harmful in the 
arena of local news and public affairs programming.  In mid-2002, Copps asked 
Chairman Powell to hold public hearings before making any determination about the 
media ownership rules (FCC, 2003b; “FCC Commish,” 2002; McConnell, 2002a).  He 
urged his fellow commissioners not to act too quickly and said that once the decision was 
made to deregulate the rules further, the FCC would never be able to revert to its previous 
regulatory regime.  Copps insisted that the decision to allow more concentration in media 
ownership was a momentous one, one that should not be made without consulting the 
American people. 
 Copps believed that public hearings would provide important evidence to support 
any decision made by the FCC  (Copps, 2002a, 2002c, 2003e).  He suggested that the 
FCC hold hearings in small, medium, and midsize markets where existing cross-
ownership arrangements had been grandfathered in to determine the effects on the 





interested parties including minority broadcasters, creative artists, consumer groups, and 
unions.  
 However, when union representatives urged Kenneth Ferree, the chief of the task 
force at the FCC studying ownership rules, to hold public hearings, he rejected the idea.  
He said that field hearings would only be an exercise in foot stomping (Labaton, 2002c; 
McConnell, 2002a).  Copps disagreed and threatened to hold his own unofficial hearings 
beginning in New York and Los Angeles in early January.  At first, Powell declined to 
accept Copps’ invitation to hold field hearings, with or without the FCC, and said he 
needed to focus on developing the economic rationale for the rules demanded by the 
courts (Shields, 2002b).  Although Powell and Ferree were not amenable to Copps’ pleas, 
the other commissioners were.  Despite the fact that only a few newspapers and broadcast 
outlets were providing coverage of the issue, Copps was getting a fair amount of press in 
trade publications (Layton & Cirillo, 2003).  As the pressure on Powell to hold hearings 
intensified, he finally relented and announced that the FCC would hold a single public 
hearing in Richmond, Virginia, sometime in February (FCC, 2003h; Halonen, 2002; 
McConnell, 2002b). 
 Copps immediately issued a press release stating that the Richmond hearing 
would be a good step forward (FCC, 2002a).  However, Copps also said that he thought 
more than one hearing should be held. 
 We need to have other hearings in diverse venues to flesh out the record needed 
 for this single most important decision the Commission will make next year.  That 
 means listening not just to one community, but giving Mid-Western and West 
 Coast Americans, for example, access to the FCC.  I understand budget 
 constraints but on an issue of this profound importance, we just have to find a way 
 to hear from more folks outside the Capital Beltway.  I am looking for that way 
 and I am determined to find it.  (FCC, 2002a, p.1) 





          An editorial in Broadcasting & Cable declared that Powell chose Richmond as the 
location for the hearing because the FCC was under severe financial restraints (“Onward 
to Richmond,” 2002).  Richmond’s proximity to the capital would save money because 
participants from the FCC could drive to Virginia, therefore avoiding the costs of airline 
tickets and hotel rooms.  The editorial went on to question the need for the Richmond 
hearings or any other hearings at all. 
Does Copps really think that people in the provinces think much about media 
consolidation?  At best, what you will get in any given town are local fronts for 
the Washington lobbyists and groups that spend their lives grappling with the 
issues.  In Richmond, you probably would be able to stir up a better discussion on 
McClellan's Peninsula Campaign of 1862 than you will on the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  (“Onward to Richmond,” 2002, p.50) 
 
Other trade journals echoed the sentiment that most citizens did not care about  
FCC regulations and that even if field hearings were scheduled, no one would show up 
(Halonen, 2002; McConnell, 2002b).  This would prove to be a gross miscalculation. 
 As previously noted, the FCC decided to extend the comment period for the 2002 
Biennial Review until January 2, 2003, with reply comments due by February 3 (FCC, 
2002c).  In the meantime, the issue of media consolidation was gaining traction in the 
Senate and among the public. 
Competition Issues in the Telecommunications Industry 
 On January 14, 2003, all five Commissioners were called before the Senate 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee presumably to testify about the state 
of competition in the telecommunications industry (Competition Issues in the 
Telecommunications Industry, 2003).  The Commissioners issued written statements 





such as broadband services, universal service, and preserving competition at the local 
level for telecommunication services.  Powell did not address media ownership issues in 
his statement, nor did Martin.  However, Commissioner Abernathy suggested that the 
FCC move forward to update outmoded regulations in media ownership saying that she 
believed that regulatory restraint was necessary to preserve competition and innovation in 
the telecommunications sector.  Abernathy said it was her duty as Commissioner to do 
away with legacy regulations that impeded the growth of the industry.  In her statement, 
she said that given recent court decisions, the FCC had no other choice but to provide the 
industry with distinct guidelines that would help them grow their businesses.  
Commissioners Adelstein and Copps both stressed their commitment to universal service 
and preserving local autonomy in the telecommunications industry.  Furthermore, both 
Commissioners stressed the importance of gathering public input on the matter of media 
ownership rules. 
 Senator Ernest Hollings, the chairman of the committee, began the meeting by 
assailing Powell for a comment that he had made that asserted that the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 was an experiment (Competition Issues in the   
Telecommunications Industry, 2003).  Hollings then launched into what he a called a 
history lesson, one that detailed the legislative intent behind the bill and the history of 
communications regulations in America.  Senator McCain then asserted that the 
telecommunications industry had been in crisis for some time, and he wanted to know 
why his constituent’s cable bills kept going up.  McCain accused Powell of blaming 
Congress for the FCC’s failure to defend its rules in court, and he made it abundantly 





Senators Allen, Burns, and Brownback spoke about the deployment of broadband and 
wireless services and Brownback scolded Powell for indecency on television.  Powell 
replied that the FCC did not receive very many complaints about indecency, so he had 
focused on other issues. 
The tone of the Committee hearing did not improve by the time Senator Wyden 
made his opening statement (Competition Issues in the Telecommunications Industry, 
2003).  He launched into a monologue about how the FCC was allowing big media to get 
bigger, and he demanded to know what Powell’s intentions were on the media ownership 
regulations.  From then on, most of the hearing was devoted to the issue of consolidation 
in media, and none of the senators expressed anything remotely akin to satisfaction with 
the replies given by Powell. 
 Senator Byron Dorgan related his opinion that concentration in the radio industry 
had harmed consumers; he provided statistics from his home state of North Dakota to 
support his claim (Competition Issues in the Telecommunications Industry, 2003).  
Dorgan said that in his state, the four largest cities had 31 commercial radio stations.  One 
company owned 13 of them, including all 6 commercial stations in one city.  He said the 
national statistics were even more ominous.  Senator Hutchinson warned the Commission 
to carefully weigh the potential adverse effects of relaxing ownership caps and stressed 
the importance of maintaining independent voices both locally and nationally.  Senator 
Boxer stated that competition in media and telecommunication was crucial for 
consumers.  She said that more media mergers were not healthy for the greatest 
democracy in the world.  Hutchinson did not want to see a situation where a few 





The Commissioners did their best to address the committee’s concerns and 
Powell, Martin, and Abernathy tried to redirect the committee’s focus back to 
telecommunication issues (Competition Issues in the Telecommunications Industry, 
2003).  Adelstein expressed his concern that deployment of broadband and wireless 
services were rolling out too slowly in rural America.  He wanted to ensure that every 
American had access to, and a choice between, telecommunications services of all forms.  
Commissioner Copps spoke about the public interest and responsible deregulation based 
on the best possible evidence.  However, he also added that the FCC needed to hold 
public field hearings on media ownership regulations in order to create a national 
dialogue on this all-important issue. 
After Copps spoke for the record, there was a return to the topic of competition in 
the telecommunications industry (Competition Issues in the Telecommunications 
Industry, 2003).  Many Senators wanted to know how the Commission would negotiate 
with local regulators, how they would attempt to get rates down for consumers, and how 
they would encourage new entrants into various sectors.  Then McCain returned to his 
earlier query about the price of cable and how those rates had risen faster than inflation.  
McCain grilled Powell on the DBS and DSL asking why those technologies were not 
competitive with cable.  Powell replied that there were new subscribers to those services 
each day, and that this was producing positive effects in the marketplace.  McCain 
continued to express his skepticism and asked the Commissioners what had become of 
the highly touted convergence that he had heard about.  No matter how the 
Commissioners responded, McCain remained unsatisfied with their answers.  After the 





returned to his earlier question about violence and indecency over the air.  Copps said 
that he did not think it was a coincidence that as the industry became more consolidated, 
there was a rising incidence of violence and indecency on television.  That remark 
triggered another round of debate over the deregulation of media ownership rules and the 
Senators were off and running. 
Senator Wyden expressed the opinion that the communications world  was 
controlled by five companies: Disney, News Corp. Viacom, Clear Channel, and AOL 
Time Warner.  Therefore, it did not make sense for the Commissioners to relax rules 
further so that one of those companies could take over everything in town (Competition 
Issues in the Telecommunications Industry, 2003).  He specifically asked Powell to 
explain where he stood on this issue.  Powell said the Justice Department would not allow 
one company to take over all outlets in a market no matter what the FCC decided.  Powell 
was skeptical of what he said were melodramatic scenarios being drawn in the press, and 
he declared that he would not take a position on the rules until the ongoing review was 
completed.  Powell then reminded the committee, many who were there when the details 
of the Telecommunications Act were first hammered out, that they were the ones who 
required the FCC to review the rules biennially.  Powell also pointed out that the last time 
the agency had tried to defend the rules as they stood, the court threw them out saying 
that they were arbitrary and capricious and did not pass Constitutional muster.  He then 
stated that some of the rules in question were over 40 years old and needed to be brought 
in line with the contemporary media landscape. 
Still, the Senators insisted on badgering the chairman and the other 





of voices, local news, entertainment, and competition, Dorgan reacted with cynicism and 
asked Powell if he was talking about more voices or talking about more voices by one 
ventriloquist (Competition Issues in the Telecommunication Industry, 2003; Mulkern, 
2003).  Wyden wanted to know if Powell thought it was okay by him that Clear Channel 
owned over 1200 radio stations.  He wanted each Commissioner to answer that question 
for the record.  Dorgan then gave a lengthy speech on the importance of localism and 
diversity and said further deregulation of the media was a train wreck waiting to happen.  
The discussion continued with each committee member expressing his or her reluctance 
to endorse further deregulation.  Senator Olympia Snowe agreed with Copps that there 
should be a series of field hearings across the country.  She added that she had heard that 
many citizens had questioned the validity of the MOWG studies and asked Powell to 
address this criticism.  Powell said he would not fix on a particular study and try to 
defend it, he was not the author of the studies after all, but he did say that more 
concentration did not necessarily preclude diversity of programming.  He stated that 
media companies with existing cross-owned properties in one market were able to deliver 
a better news product in many cases. 
If there was any consensus that came out of this Senate Committee hearing, it was 
that the senators were warning the Commissioners to be very cautious about amending 
any of the media ownership rules as a result of their review.  The scheduled purpose of 
the Committee meeting had been to discuss the state of competition in the 
telecommunications sector, but it had evolved to include the discussion of media 
ownership limits.  Every Senator on the committee expressed concerns that the FCC 





potential ramifications of deregulation on a local and national basis.  While all the 
Senators claimed to be watching out for their constituents, the degree to which they were 
willing to publicly criticize big media was remarkable given that they all depended on 
those same companies for favorable coverage during election cycles.  Despite Powell’s 
insistence that any new rules would protect the diversity of voices, local news, 
entertainment, and competition, once again Snowe urged Powell to hold more public 
hearings. 
 
The Columbia Forum 
 The day after the senate hearing, Columbia University’s Kernochan Center for 
Law, Media and the Arts held a forum on media ownership in New York City and asked 
the Commissioners to attend (“Columbia Law School,” 2003).  In addition to Powell, 
Copps, Adelstein, and Martin, the participants included representatives from unions, 
media executives, musicians, and independent producers.  There were five panel 
discussions on the schedule.  The first was a discussion of legal issues surrounding media 
ownership regulations.  Other panels were to address news and civic discourse, 
entertainment, community voices, and business concerns.  
 The first panel began sedately enough with Powell reading his opening statement.  
It was largely a familiar restatement of his previous claims (Powell, 2003c).  He said that 
the courts had forced the FCC to justify its media ownership rules and no matter what the 
outcome of the FCC’s deliberative process was, there would be new rules set forth at the 
end of the biennial review process.  He also said that the FCC was working hard to make 
sure that the broadcast ownership rules were not completely swept away by the hands of 





and competition was in the public interest and that “ we can achieve these goals—and the 
courts will agree with us —if we do it in the right way” (Powell, p.2).  
The right way, according to Powell, was to dispense with “sound bites” and 
emotional declarations and provide the solid empirical evidence that the courts were 
demanding (“Columbia Media,” 2003; Powell, 2003c).  He urged the audience to look at 
the FCC’s MOWG studies and submit comments on them while there was still time.  If 
the comments were filed correctly, Powell said, the FCC’s media regulations would no 
longer be based on personal anecdotes or personal bias, and thus the rules protecting 
diversity and localism would be defensible in court.  The audience listened politely 
(“Columbia Media”). 
Then Copps stepped up to the podium (“Columbia Media,” 2003; Copps, 2003b).  
With a dramatic flair, he began by saying that the forum may well be the most important 
meeting in America taking place today.  Copps spoke about his concern that further 
consolidation in media could drastically alter the media landscape for future generations.  
He expressed his trepidation that the FCC was rushing forward with new rules without 
the kind of debate and analysis that the issue deserved, and he suggested that the state of 
consolidation in radio offered a model of what could happen if ownership restrictions 
were relaxed in other sectors of the communications industry.  According to Copps, radio 
in most markets was dominated by oligopolies.  He detailed complaints by media 
watchers who said that there was far less coverage of news and public affairs 
programming on radio than there had been before the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 
Then Copps pointed to some charts he had prepared for the forum (“Columbia 





numbers of television and radio stations, cable networks, newspapers, magazines, book 
publishers, music, concert promoters, and web sites.  The second chart showed that the 
same corporations that owned the television networks and cable providers owned 90% of 
the top 50 cable channels.  He said only 5 of the top-rated cable stations were 
independently owned.  The third chart showed the audience that the Internet was showing 
signs of concentration as well.  According to Nielsen, the aforementioned companies also 
controlled the top 20 Internet news sites.  Then Copps told his audience that although the 
comments of business executives from the industry were important to take under 
consideration, in his opinion every citizen in the country had a stake in these issues.  
While Copps congratulated Powell for deciding to schedule an official hearing on the 
issue in Richmond, he said that by keeping the hearing so close to the beltway, it would 
ensure that most of the attendees would be lawyers and the sorts of folks who read the 
Federal Register.  
 Copps also described the tenor of the Senate hearing the day before, where both 
Republican and Democratic senators expressed their concerns about media consolidation 
(Competition Issues in the Telecommunications Industry, 2003).  Copps said the FCC and 
media needed to do a better job of reaching out to average citizens who are the people 
who will be most affected by any changes in media ownership rules.  He thanked the 
organizers of the forum, but also said that the onus for public discussions of these 
important issues should not be left up to private organizations; rather the FCC should be 
required to organize more events like this one. 
 Commissioner Martin spoke next about his belief that although concentration in 





cited statistics from Nielsen that showed that the average cable household was able to 
receive 102 channels and that cable penetration had increased as well.  Martin gave 
Copps credit for raising the question of whether the rise in coarse television programming 
could be the result of consolidation, but he insisted that newspaper owners should be 
allowed to own television stations in the same markets.  He also suggested that some of 
the consolidation in radio might be due to the Commission’s definition of markets. 
 Despite Powell’s plea for the audience to stick to the facts, the crowd of network 
executives, consumer advocates, producers, academics, and others responded with strong 
opinions about media consolidation (Brady, 2003; Gatlin, 2003).  Richard Masur, an 
actor and former president of the Screen Actors Guild, asked "What possible objective 
metrics can we give you about diversity, other than opinion?”  (Gatlin, 2003, p. 27).  
However, Ellen Agress, senior vice president of the Fox Entertainment Group, said that 
the TV stations owned by the four networks provide substantially more local news than 
stations that are not owned by the networks.  Juan Gonzales, president of the National 
Association of Hispanic Journalists, referred to a study that showed 92% of all U.S. news 
sources on newscasts in 2001 were White, and less than 1% were Latinos.  David 
Poltrack, executive vice president of research and planning for CBS, said he estimated 
that only two of the four major networks made a profit on their prime time schedules 
during the 2001-2002 season.  However, Jon Mandel, president and CEO of MediaCom, 
a media buying and planning agency, took exception with that remark.  Mandel claimed 
that the networks dropped the percentage of net advertising revenue that they spent on 
programming by 26%, according to information that they submitted for an FCC report.  





same period.  Mandel claimed that advertisers and consumers were hurt by increased 
consolidation in the industry.  Consumers suffer, according to Mandel, because the 
networks have decreased the amount of programming with affordable advertising rates so 
they get poorer programming and steeper prices at the retail level. 
 As the discussion became more heated, television producers expressed their 
opinion that the relaxation of the Fin-Syn Rules had frozen them out of prime time 
programming, resulting in fewer scripted programs and more reality shows that debased 
the quality of network offerings (“Columbia Media,” 2003).  Network executives 
countered that programs like Survivor were not inexpensive, and if the networks were not 
allowed to maximize economic efficiencies of scale, free television would become extinct 
and more and more programs would only be offered on a pay-per-view basis.  
 One member of the audience, Monroe Litman, 72, of Manhattan created a ruckus 
when he decried the lack of coverage of the ownership debate in mainstream media 
outlets (“Columbia’s Forum,” 2003).  Even though the forum was broadcast over the 
Internet, on WBAI, and other Pacifica affiliated stations and even though Bill Moyers 
had a camera crew from PBS’ NOW at the forum, none of the major networks chose to 
cover the hearing.  There was widespread agreement among antideregulatory participants, 
who were largely responsible for organizing the event that the public needed to be more 
informed about the debate. 
 Harry Jessel, editor-in-chief of Broadcasting & Cable, who was asked to 
moderate a panel discussion for the forum, wrote a column about his experience for the 
trade journal (2003).  Jessel, who clearly stated that he saw no harm in allowing further 





just how passionate media activists were about these issues.  He said it is one thing to 
read formal comments submitted by unions and consumer groups, but it was quite 
another to hear how committed they were to their positions in person.  He said that 
although the forum had been vociferous, it was what democracy sounded like.  Jessell 
acknowledged that Broadcasting & Cable had printed an editorial a few weeks earlier 
that asserted that folk wisdom was overrated and that holding more hearings would not 
produce any more information than was already known.  However, he conceded that if 
the Columbia debate was representative of how people actually feel about media 
consolidation, the Commissioners needed to get out there and listen.  He also urged 
broadcasters to do a better job of covering the issues so people outside of the industry 
could understand what was at stake.  Indeed, it appeared that Jessel was not the only one 
who had underestimated the unswerving commitment to existing ownership policies that 
many people held.  Powell left the forum after making his opening remarks and missed an 
opportunity to understand, as Jessel wrote, how people felt about the issue. 
 The following week Powell (2003e) wrote an editorial for USA Today on the task 
his Commission was facing. He started his piece with an analogy from Dragnet, a 
popular television show in the 1960s.  He quoted the character Sgt. Joe Friday, who was 
famous for saying, “just the facts ma’am” and said,  
 Unfortunately, many have turned this critically important policy debate into a 
 political one, substituting personal ideology and opinion for the facts.  If we are to 
 craft responsible media policy for the 21st century, everyone involved in this 
 debate must set aside the rhetoric, put the public interest before political interest 
 and focus on "just the facts."  (Powell, 2003e, p. A11) 
  
 Powell’s piece went on to describe a media environment full of abundance and 





decisions that required the Commission to set legally sustainable limits on media 
ownership.  The points that Powell made were not unfamiliar to those who had been 
following the debate, but to those members of the public who may not have even known 
that a controversy existed, Powell’s appeal must have seemed eminently reasonable.  
After all, who would not sympathize with a public servant who based his arguments on 
facts and reason instead of rhetoric and politics?  The problem with Powell’s argument, 
however, is that he failed to understand that media ownership was in itself a political 
issue, one that inspired soaring rhetoric and visions of a more participatory democracy.  
The state of the media environment in the 21st century was about the perception of how 
that environment may affect ordinary citizens; it was not about numbers or economic 
efficiencies.  This was not about merely stating the facts ma’am; it was about the 
interpretation of what those facts meant. 
 
Senate Radio Hearing 
Despite Powell’s avowed promise to stick to the facts and avoid political rhetoric 
on the subject of media consolidation, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation had no such compunction when it held a hearing on radio consolidation at 
the end of January (Media Ownership, 2003).  The hearing began with an opening 
statement by Senator Feingold, who described how much radio had affected his life.  He 
spoke about the power of music to inform, inspire, and connect a community to each 
other.  He told the Committee how Bob Dylan’s songs about the civil rights movement 
had motivated a generation to work for social justice.  Feingold discussed the anti-
competitive practices of Clear Channel Communications and his sons’ complaints that 





1996 had driven small mom and pop radio owners out of business.  He spoke out against 
local radio stations being operated remotely and wondered how residents would get 
emergency information if a disaster occurred in their community.  Feingold bemoaned 
the lack of local news and community affairs programming on the radio.  He spoke of the 
unethical practice of pay-per-play, and how concert tickets had risen over 60% since the 
passage of the Telecommunications Act.  He told the committee that the first Black 
American Mayor Harold Washington of Chicago would never have been elected if local 
radio stations had not raised public awareness for his campaign.  He wondered if 
remotely programmed radio stations would even be interested in community issues if 
their programmers resided thousands of miles away from the communities where their 
stations were licensed.  Feingold said he was surprised to hear how powerfully his 
constituents felt about the issue.  He was eloquent, anecdotal, and articulate, and he urged 
his fellow committee members to cosponsor a bill that he was proposing that would 
prevent large radio companies from cross-leveraging their radio and concert businesses.  
Powell would have been horrified had he been at the meeting. 
 Senator Hollings treated the committee to a comprehensive history of broadcast 
regulations from their inception (Media Ownership, 2003).  He declared that no one who 
had been present when the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was debated could have 
foreseen the amount of consolidation in radio that took place after its passage.  He also 
said that beyond the impact of consolidation, there were troubling allegations that Clear 
Channel with its 1,211 radio stations, 135 concert venues, and 700,000 billboards had 
engaged in anticompetitive practices that harmed independent promoters, musicians, and 





gains due to consolidation. He said:  
Radio consolidation has contributed to a 34 % decline in the number of owners, a 
90 % rise in the cost of advertising rates, a rise in indecent broadcasts, and the 
replacement of local news and community programming with remote “voice 
tracking” and syndicated hollering that ill-serves the public interest.  If ever there 
were a cautionary tale, this is it.  (Media Ownership, 2003, p. 18).   
 
 Senator Berman from California also expressed his extreme displeasure with Clear 
Channel Communications and recited a litany of allegations about the company (Media 
Ownership, 2003).  Berman then went on a tirade against the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) who he said had ignored his and his constituents’ complaints about the company.  
He said he had repeatedly failed to get the DOJ interested in the issue and claimed, when 
told that the Bush administration had little interest in pursuing antitrust complaints, he 
had just refused to believe it.  Therefore, he was urging Congress and the FCC to 
investigate the complaints that have been made about Clear Channel many times, by 
many different people, who worked in various segments of the industry. 
 The only committee member who did not attack Clear Channel outright in his 
opening statement was committee chairman Senator John McCain (Media Ownership, 
2003).  He admitted that the radio industry had become consolidated and that the large 
number of stations owned by Clear Channel was potentially troubling, but he said he was 
looking forward to hearing what Lowry Mays had to say.  McCain reiterated his oft-
stated position that he was inclined to favor market-based solutions to the problem.  
Nonetheless, he said he was disturbed by some of the allegations he was hearing against 
Clear Channel. 
 By the time Lowry Mays, CEO and president of Clear Channel Communications 





stations engaged in anticompetitive practices and said that that all of his employees are 
required to sign statements that say they will not accept payola.  Mays said that 
deregulation and economics of scale allowed his company to reinvest profits and expand 
his company’s offerings.  Therefore, consumers had benefited because his company had 
eliminated redundant formats and created new ones in many markets.  Mays said the 
industry was healthier than it had been previous to deregulation, and that he would never 
jeopardize his core radio business by refusing to support musicians who used other 
promoters.  Mays claimed that Clear Channel would not be successful if local managers 
and employees of his radio stations did not serve the needs and interests of their 
communities. 
 President and CEO of the NAB, Edward Fritts, reiterated Mays’ claim that radio 
was financially more stable than ever before (Media Ownership, 2003).  Fritts said that 
10 years ago, before the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 60% of the 
radio stations on the air were losing money and some were forced off the air.  He said 
that radio was the most local and least consolidated of all media, and that radio remains 
the “ultimate local community medium” (Media Ownership,p. 7).  Fritts said that if 
broadcasters were not allowed to own more radio stations that enabled them to benefit 
from economic efficiencies, the radio industry would be an economic failure. 
 Although Don Henley, singer-songwriter and representative of the Recording 
Artists Coalition, did not dispute that the radio industry was more profitable now than it 
had been, he accused Clear Channel of using its size to squeeze out competitors and to 
coerce promotional deals with performing artists to benefit the company (Media 





stations in Mexico in order to avoid FCC ownership regulations, that the company had 
made deals that skirted around the rules against payola, and that it had strong-armed 
artists into performing for Clear Channel Productions.  Henley even claimed that some 
performers were forced to pay independent promoters to get their music on Clear 
Channel’s stations.  He said that artists were often required to make unpaid appearances 
on Clear Channel stations to promote their concerts in exchange for airtime (Davidson, 
2003a; Martin, 2003).  Henley asserted that consolidation in radio was preventing new 
artists from getting airplay, and that comparing radio to other media was misleading.  He 
said, “the airwaves belong to the public, just like the national forests belong to the 
public” (Lee, 2003, January 31, p. 8). 
 Robert Short, president of Short Broadcasting and a representative of independent 
radio stations, said he was forced to sell his urban-oriented station in Syracuse because he 
could not match Clear Channel’s advertising rates. He also said that Clear Channel was 
using unethical methods to force smaller stations to sell out to the company, and Short 
asserted that if Clear could own every radio station in the country, they would (Davidson, 
2003a). 
 Jenny Toomey, herself a musician and executive director of the Future of Music 
Coalition, said that according to a study her organization had conducted, while it might 
be true that Clear Channel only owned about 10% of all radio stations nationwide, if one 
examined radio market by market, the radio industry tends to look like an oligarchy 
(Decola & Thomson, 2002; Media Ownership, 2003).  Toomey said that four or fewer 
companies control at least 70% of market share in nearly all local markets (Lee, 2003).  





According to an article in the New York Times, Clear Channel took in about 20% of all 
advertising revenue and attracted about 25% of all listeners nationwide, which is 
equivalent to around one third of the nation’s total population (Lee, 2003).  Lee also 
reported that Clear Channel had become worried about all the negative attention it was 
receiving.  Consequently, according to Lee in November 2002, Clear Channel opened a 
lobbying office in Washington, DC staffed by a former aid to Rep. John Dingell, the 
ranking minority member of the House Commerce Committee. 
 Four days before the hearing, on January 28, Senator DeWine, a Republican from 
Ohio, and Senator Kohl, a Democrat from Wisconsin, who were both serving on the 
Senate Anti-Trust Subcommittee, sent a letter to the FCC imploring Powell to maintain 
the public interest in broadcasting by protecting diversity on the airwaves (Halonen, 
2003a).  The Senators asked the Commissioners to carefully weigh any potential harm to 
consumers’ need to access differing views on news and public affairs programming.  The 
letter also said that any significant relaxation of media ownership rules would lead to 
further media consolidation.  According to Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center 
for Digital Democracy, the letter represented the strongest expression yet that “there is 
real concern that [FCC Chairman] Michael Powell is going too far” (Halonen, p.3). 
 
Summary 
 As a former chief of staff to Senator Fritz Hollings for over a dozen years, 
Commissioner Copps may have been more oriented toward public opinion than were 
other career staffers and colleagues at the FCC.  He certainly demonstrated a clear grasp 
of the political problems that might occur if the public, a stakeholder in the policy-





therefore, had not necessarily established a long history of dealing primarily with 
industry representatives and economic and legal analysts that revolved through the 
offices of the FCC. 
 By all accounts, the Senate was also clearly concerned about mounting opposition 
to further deregulation of the media.  The message they were hearing from their 
constituents was that the public was concerned about media consolidation.  This was a 
political problem, not an economic one.  Although many in Congress had heard 
complaints about the various failures of the media before, now they were hearing much 
more specific complaints about problems that were deemed to be a result of consolidation 
in the industry.  While Feingold’s opening statement to the Committee investigating 
media ownership in radio was emotional and full of political rhetoric, it reflected 
widespread public sentiment that something had gone terribly wrong in the radio 
industry.  Although the allegations against Clear Channel’s business practices were 
specific to that company, citizens were clearly concerned about the perceived lack of 
localism in radio.  If Hollings was correct when he said that the state of radio was a 
cautionary tale for what was to come if the FCC allowed further consolidation across the 
media, the political pressure on Powell was bound to increase.   
Chapter 9 explores the growing opposition by the public to the possibility of relaxed 
media ownership rules that was confirmed by the only officially sanctioned public 





THE PUBLIC WEIGHS IN 
 
  
 Despite Michael Powell’s reluctance to hold a field hearing to engage the public in 
a discussion of media ownership policy, he finally capitulated to political pressure and 
scheduled one hearing in Richmond, Virginia (FCC, 200h).  All of the Commissioners 
attended the hearing and made introductory statements followed by panel discussions 
centered on preapproved topics (FCC, 2003g).  After each discussion, there were brief 
question and answer sessions when the audience was allowed to participate.  The 
speakers chosen for the panels were predictable, and the arguments presented could not 
have been particularly enlightening to the Commissioners or the experts on the panels.  
However, if Powell had listened carefully to what the audience had to say, he might have 
been able to anticipate the firestorm that awaited him in the upcoming months. 
 
Richmond 
 As a major snowstorm swept through Washington, DC on February 27, 195 people 
made their way to the Richmond, Virginia, Convention Center to attend the only 
officially sanctioned hearing held to discuss the prospective changes in media ownership 
regulations.  According to the Washington Post,  
One hundred and nineteen of them [attendees] were white men in suits; many of 





scheduled to address the audience, 13 had traveled to Richmond from Washington 
DC. (Fisher, 2003, p. C.1).   
  
 Chairman Powell began by telling the audience that to date, the FCC had received 
upward of 15,000 comments from the public on media ownership regulations.  He noted 
the technological innovations that allowed for public participation via the Internet in the 
rulemaking process (FCC, 2003h).  He said that the written comments along with the 
public input at the hearing would supplement what he called one of the most exhaustive 
records in modern FCC history.  Powell repeated his earlier assertion that Congress and 
the courts were forcing the Commission to revise its existing regulations.  He also said 
that the FCC had no other choice but to proceed methodically in order to provide 
evidence that the courts would accept. 
 Commissioner Abernathy spoke next and reiterated Powell’s argument that the 
courts were demanding that the FCC provide justification for retaining its regulations  
(FCC, 2003h).  She spoke about the tremendous changes in the marketplace and the 
increased number of choices that allowed consumers to access a diverse array of 
programming.  However, Abernathy also said that increased consolidation in media was a 
concern to her, and that it was her job as a Commissioner to look at the effects of 
consolidation on diversity and competition.  Therefore, it was her duty to examine 
whether current restrictions were outdated.  She thanked the attendees for their 
commitment to working with the FCC to ensure that the Commissioners were making 
well-informed and reasoned decisions. 
 Then Copps stepped up to the podium (FCC, 2003h).  He too echoed his previous 
statements and said that the decisions that the FCC would be making over the next few 





extremely high.  He said he had two goals for the hearing.  One was to receive input from 
local and state residents who lived and worked outside of the beltway, and the second 
goal was to help raise awareness about the issues discussed. 
 Copps clearly expressed his reservations about the possibility of increasing 
consolidation in media.  He warned that what had happened with radio since the passage 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was a good predictor of what could happen if 
other media ownership rules were relaxed.  Copps reminded the audience that media 
watchers such as Robert McChesney, the Consumer’s Union, and the Media Access 
Project were arguing that concentration had led to far less coverage of local news and 
public affairs programming and that radio now existed to advertise products rather than to 
provide Americans with the best and most original programming.  Copps then called the 
audience’s attention to a host of potential problems that the FCC studies had not 
considered and asked the attendees to comment on as many of these questions as 
possible.  Copps said it was essential that the agency hear from nontraditional 
stakeholders.  He closed his remarks by noting the death of Fred Rogers and held him and 
his program, Mr. Roger’s Neighborhood, up as an example of someone who used the 
media to serve the public interest. 
 Martin spoke next and agreed that diversity and competition in media were key 
components in a democracy (FCC, 2003h).  He discussed the court’s mandate to 
reexamine media ownership rules and stated that the changes in the media landscape 
must be factored into any decision the FCC might make.  He also suggested that cross-
ownership rules that forbade newspapers from buying a broadcast station in the same 





combinations in a single market. 
 Although Adelstein had only served on the Commission for 3 months, he 
apparently had no qualms about expressing his opinions.  In his opening statement, he 
began by thanking Copps for his efforts to take the discussion of media ownership policy 
outside of the beltway (FCC, 2003h).  Like Copps, Adelstein stressed that the decisions 
the Commission would be making in the upcoming months were of critical importance to 
all of the public.  Adelstein told those assembled about the Senate Commerce Committee 
hearing that was scheduled to discuss telecommunications policy but instead had quickly 
turned into a heated debate over media ownership regulations.  Adelstein assured the 
audience that the senators at that meeting were very concerned about these issues, and he 
asserted his conviction that the media market is not like other markets for other products.  
For example, it was not as if the FCC was determined to regulate the price of candy, but 
rather, the Commission was charged with promoting the public interest.  Adelstein quoted 
from the Supreme Court decision in Red Lion (1969), "It is the right of the public to 
receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences 
which is crucial here.  That right may not constitutionally be abridged by Congress or by the 
FCC " (FCC, 2003h, p. 32; Red Lion v. FCC, 1969).   
 According to Adelstein, it was important to keep the Supreme Court’s mandate in 
mind, and he said that the decision in Red Lion in 1969 was just as relevant as ever.  
Adelstein praised Powell’s initiative to provide empirical data with the MOWG studies but 
also offered his opinion that the kinds of questions that the FCC was seeking to answer at 
this hearing were not amenable to mathematical proofs or purely quantitative analysis.  He 





pointed to consolidation in radio as an example of past decisions that most people did not 
favor.  Before he finished his remarks, he paraphrased one comment that he heard during the 
Columbia Hearing.  He said that someone told him that the FCC was rushing to make 
monumental decisions in a time frame that was shorter than the NBA Basketball season and 
that more time needed to be allotted for the process. 
 
The Panelists 
 After Adelstein’s comments, Thomas Krattenmaker, the moderator of the 
discussions, gave a brief history of the rules under consideration by the Commission and 
summarized the recent court decisions that were propelling the inquiry (FCC, 2003h).  
Krattenmaker, a former professor and former dean of the Law School at the College of 
William and Mary, was also the former director of research at the FCC.  At the time of 
the hearing, Krattenmaker was a senior counsel in the Washington, DC law firm of 
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky, and Popeo where he specialized in communications 
transactions and antitrust cases (“Krattenmaker Biography,” n.d.).  While eminently 
qualified to summarize broadcast ownership rules and the key issues under discussion, 
Krattenmaker was also a quintessential Washington insider whose job it was to facilitate 
business transactions for media corporations.  
 After Krattenmaker’s summary, he reminded the panelists and the audience that 
each of the speakers would have 5 minutes to make their statements (FCC, 2003h).  
Members of the audience were invited to write down their questions, and Krattenmaker 
would forward them to each speaker after the panelists made their opening remarks.  
After the discussion, the microphone would be open for comments from the audience on 






 The first panel, convened to discuss diversity issues, began with a statement by 
Brent Bozell III, president and founder of the Parents Television Council, a conservative 
organization that tracked the media (“Bozell Biography,” n.d.).  Bozell described the 
angst he felt as a Libertarian who was advocating for more government regulation.  He 
said that his organization represented over 750,000 members who were  
disgusted, revolted, fed up, horrified, I don't know how else to underscore this, by 
the raw sewage of the ultra violence, the graphic sex, the raunchy language that is 
flooding into their living rooms day and night through the television screen and 
poisoning the minds of an entire generation of youngsters whose parents' concerns 
are dismissed by an industry that admonishes them instead to stand guard over the 
TV sets, perhaps with a baseball bat to keep impressionable children away.  (FCC, 
2003h, p. 51) 
  
 Bozell said the Commission was not serving the public interest and that 
consolidation in media had led to the decline in the quality of television programming. 
Robert Corn-Revere, a communications law specialist at the Washington, DC law firm of 
Hogan & Hartson was the next panelist to speak (“Corn-Revere Biography,” n.d.).  He 
had previously acted as a legal advisor to James Quello, a controversial FCC 
Commissioner from 1974 to 1997.  The gist of Corn-Revere’s remarks was that blaming 
consolidation in media for the problem of insipid content was a red herring  
(FCC, 2003h).  He reminded the audience that the Commission had to be mindful of 
broadcaster’s First Amendment rights and that the FCC should not be in the business of 
regulating programming content.  
 Jay Ireland, president of NBC Television Stations, spent the bulk of his time 
arguing that broadcast television was at a considerable competitive disadvantage in a 





Internet as an example of the diverse array of information that was now accessible to all.  
Ireland explained that not only was broadcast television losing its audience share, but it 
was also facing skyrocketing production costs.  Ireland claimed that most industries did 
not get in trouble with regulators until they reached a 40% share of a market, yet the 
networks were penalized when they reached a 3% share during primetime.  He said that 
in the top-50 markets, national chains owned most of the stations and were no more local 
than the networks.  Ireland also claimed that when affiliates substituted local 
programming for network programming, they were not offering original locally produced 
shows but were instead recycling programs provided by syndicaters.  Then Ireland 
launched into a passionate defense of diversity on television, noting that NBC had 
recently purchased Telemundo, a Spanish language network that it wanted to extend to 
more markets.  However, FCC ownership caps prohibited his network from doing so.  
Ireland also said that it was in the network’s best interest to offer diverse arrays of 
viewpoints, and offered Law and Order, a conservative-leaning show, and the West Wing, 
a liberal-leaning show, as examples of the varied viewpoints offered by a single network.  
 Alfred Liggins, chief executive officer and president of Radio One, said he was there 
to inform the Commission about how consolidation in radio had affected minority 
ownership (FCC, 2003h).  He related the story of his own company, the only minority-
owned station in Richmond, to various changes in regulatory policy.  In 1978, Liggins said 
there was only one minority-owned television station and 68 minority-owned radio stations 
in the country before the FCC instituted its tax certification policy.  By 1995, when the 
policy was dropped, and comparative hearings ended, there were 35 minority owned 





Liggins made a point of noting that there had been a significant decrease in minority-owned 
stations since 1996 and said that although deregulation had enabled his company to grow, 
policy changes may have hurt other minority-owned companies that offered unique services 
to their communities. 
Liggins recounted many community services his company provided in different 
markets and described how Radio One offered unique programming targeted to the African 
Americans served by his stations  (FCC, 2003h).  Liggins said his mother started the 
company in 1980 with one AM station that she was able to purchase because of the FCC’s 
distress sell policies that were in effect at the time.  Her goal was to serve the unique needs 
of the African American community.  By 2003, the company had grown to 65 stations, with 
60 formats targeted to African Americans in 22 different markets.  Liggins said that the 
success of his company was due to taking it public and taking advantage of Clear Channel’s 
commitment to divest a number of stations acquired from its AM-FM acquisitions to 
minority-owned companies.  He said this was an example of how deregulation actually 
created more diversity, rather than less.  
Victoria Riskin represented the Writer’s Guild of America (West) and began by 
reeling off a number of statistics that showed that independent producers were not being 
served by consolidation in the industry (FCC, 2003h; Slocum, 2003).  She said the Guild 
members had less of an opportunity to present their shows on network or cable stations since 
the Fin-Syn Rules were relaxed.  Since the networks owned many cable stations, they aired 
programming produced by their own companies on both.  Riskin offered evidence provided 
by an independent Wall Street analyst that said that in December 2002, five media 





current situation stifled the diversity of voices on the airwaves.  She strongly suggested that 
the FCC consider how further consolidation could affect diversity even more profoundly. 
Andrew Schwartzman, founder of the Media Access Project, began his talk by 
stating that he thought the FCC should retain all of its media ownership rules, except that it 
should eliminate the UHF discount (FCC, 2003h).  Schwartzman then chastised Powell for 
agreeing to hold only this one public hearing.  He said that in order to really obtain a 
diversity of public opinion, more hearings needed to be held with far fewer familiar faces 
than those who had simply driven over to Richmond from their offices in Washington, DC.  
He went on to tell the audience how he had debated these very same issues with many of the 
panelists on numerous other occasions in the capital, and that it was not very useful to have 
the same people state the same viewpoints that were available to the Commission at home.4
Schwartzman praised the public service records of many of the broadcasters on 
the panels.  However, he pointed out that the regulations under discussion were in place 
to police the practices of the worst broadcasters, not the best (FCC, 2003h).  He said 
media ownership rules were established to serve the entire public, not just those who 
were attractive demographically.  Schwartzman also offered his opinion that the word 
empirical meant verifiable, and it was not a concept that was exclusively defined by 
 
Indeed the roster for the panels read like a virtual who’s who of media attorneys, media 
activists, industry representatives, and economic analysts from the nation’s capital (Fisher, 
2003; Shields, 2003b).  While there was a sample of local representatives in attendance, 
even those participants were directly or indirectly tied to the industry.  They were, as Copps 
had put it, the usual suspects. 
                                                 






statistical analysis.  He suggested that Powell’s directive to stick to empirical facts 
exclusively   meant that the FCC was discounting other types of verifiable evidence.  
Furthermore, he said that Powell’s reading of the court’s decision was a cramped 
interpretation, and the court never said that only statistics count.  Schwartzman also 
reminded the Commission that they had asked for alternatives for measuring competition 
and diversity and that his organization, together with other public service groups, had 
asserted that a weighted version of the HHI index would provide more accurate 
assessments of any given market. 
 The last speaker on the first panel was Wendy Thompson of ZGS Broadcast 
Holdings, a small Hispanic broadcaster (FCC, 2003h).  She urged the Commissioners to 
vote against further deregulation in media because increasing consolidation was decreasing 
the amount of minority ownership of media properties and thus decreasing diversity.  Her 
company operated low-power television stations, and she urged the Commissioners to allow 
stations like hers to increase their power so they could serve larger geographical areas. 
 With the conclusion of Thompson’s speech, Krattenmaker declared that although 
they were out of time, he would still ask the Commissioners if they had any questions for the 
panelists (FCC, 2003h).  Adelstein asked Ireland about his statement that the Internet 
increased the options available to consumers.  The Commissioner offered an example of 
someone who was seeking a local weather report and suggested that it was highly unlikely 
that an individual would go to the National Weather Service’s web site to find out if it was 
going to rain that day.  Adelstein said that the majority of Americans rely on local television 
and radio stations to serve as gatekeepers for the information they need.  He asked if the 





that people still seek out gatekeepers to provide them with professional news analysis?  
Furthermore, Adelstein asked Ireland if he felt that the Internet was an effective substitute 
for programming that people got from other sources.  Ireland replied that the most important 
point was that people now had more choices on the Internet. 
 Schwartzman jumped in and said that the Internet has yet to become a significant 
source for original local content about news and information (FCC, 2003h).  He said that 
most of the information content on the Internet was recycled from local broadcast and 
newspapers that had leveraged their incumbent status.  He said the FCC’s own studies 
showed that the Internet is not an effective substitute for other sources of local news. 
 Powell then addressed Bozell’s statements and said that the problem with trying to 
regulate programming content was that it often came down to criticizing programming that 
the vast majority of the audience preferred to watch (FCC, 2003h).  Powell said that even if 
the FCC or the Parent’s Television Council preferred that people view certain types of 
programming over other genres, the fact remained that the “sludge” Bozell complained 
about was the sludge that most people preferred to watch.  Bozell conceded that that might 
be the case, but also submitted that when there were only a handful of corporations 
controlling two thirds of the access to programming out there, then the corporations were the 
ones that decided what the public wants. 
Copps followed up the comment by asking Bozell how someone who stands for less 
governmental interference in people’s lives could advocate for taking action against 
indecent and violent programming and why his organization was arguing against 
deregulation (FCC, 2003h).  Bozell said simply that in his entire professional career he had 





passionately about the state of the media and believed that increasing consolidation was 
responsible for producing content that was harmful to children.  He asked the FCC to take 
an aggressive stance to stem the tide.  Copps volunteered his assessment of the discussion 
and said that the issue of indecency might be an outside—the—beltway issue that concerns 
thousand of Americans.  Bozell replied that very few of his 750,000 members even knew of 
the Commission’s proposed rule changes, but all of them cared deeply about violence and 
indecency on the public’s airwaves. 
 Powell then asked Risken about programming content, and she said that the race for 
ratings and the bottom line has kept quality programs off the air (FCC, 2003h).  Abernathy 
offered her opinion that there were many wholesome alternatives offered on cable 
television.  She reinforced what Powell said about trashy programming and agreed with him 
that most people chose to watch programming that Bozell found distasteful.  Schwartzman 
said that the problem with this type of reasoning is that the market will always take care of 
the majority, but it is the job of the FCC to offer corrections if the market fails to provide 
quality children’s programming, for example.  The discussion went back and forth between 
Schwartzman and Abernathy for some time, and then Martin asked Corn-Revere if he saw 
any connection between consolidation and indecent programming.  Corn-Revere said he did 
not see a connection.  For another 10 minutes, the panelists discussed whether the Sopranos 
was a creative, quality program or just another example of violent and indecent 
entertainment.  There was no consensus reached.  
While each of the panelists may have had unique perspectives to offer the audience, 
none of the panelists was unfamiliar with these perspectives.  All agreed that diversity was 





panelists learned anything from the discussion that they had not heard before; they were 
talking to each other as they had many times in the past. 
 The first panel was representative of the discourse presented by the second and third 
panels (FCC, 2003h; James, 2003; Shields, 2003b).  Overall, the big media representatives 
discussed how wonderful their companies were and how much they offered to the 
communities they served.  The smaller broadcasters bemoaned the state of the industry and 
were opposed to any further deregulation that would jeopardize their own ventures.  They 
too, espoused the value of localism, diversity, and competition.  The union representatives 
claimed that their members were being hurt by consolidation, the musicians said 
consolidation in radio was harming them, and the Newspaper Association of America said 
that it could no longer operate competitively without being allowed to purchase 
broadcasting properties in their communities.  However, Frank Blethen, publisher of the 
Seattle Times, was vehemently opposed to the abolishment of the cross-ownership rules 
because he felt that each community should be served by a diverse array of media voices.  
Still, the remaining discussions came down to the big guys against the little guys and thus 
were fairly predictable, if not educational, for the audience (Fisher, 2003). 
 By far the most interesting part of the hearing came when the audience was allowed 
to speak (FCC, 2003h).  Because the panels had run over the time limit, Krattenmaker 
reduced public comment time to 2 minutes per person.  The total time allotted for public 
comments at this field hearing only amounted to about 1 hour versus 4 for the panelists.  









The Audience Interprets the Rules 
 After the first panel, an unidentified participant stepped up to the microphone and 
said he was offended when the president of NBC said his network could do local 
programming (FCC, 2003h).  He said that his low-power radio station offered truly 
localized coverage of his community and urged the Commission to push for the licensing of 
more stations like his.  This person also said that media ownership would not be such a big 
problem if there were more local media to own.  Dee Dee Hallick, an independent producer 
and media activist, offered her opinion that people who produced independently financed 
documentaries were effectively frozen out of the television and cable market unless their 
name happened to be Ken Burns.  Hallick said that consolidation forced diverse viewpoints 
off the air, and that this was a great loss for democracy.  Several other commenters also 
related incidents when they were not able to get their work on the air.  One student from 
Virginia Tech, representing the Virginia Citizen’s Consumer Council, said that her 
organization had been trying to obtain coverage in local media about the restructuring of 
Virginia’s electricity markets but had been told that the issue was too complicated for 
citizens to understand.  Kerkus said that further relaxation of media ownership rules would 
make it far too easy for a small number of corporations to control the public discourse. 
 Several radio and television broadcasters who owned AM or low-power television 
stations said that because of consolidation, they could not expand their reach in local 
markets (FCC, 2003h). Arthur Mobley said that although he wanted to broadcast local 
sports, he could not obtain a license to broadcast after dark when most of the games were 
played.  Nathan Long, an educator at Virginia Union University, an historically African 





the media is not to entertain us but to give us what we need to know.  He said further 
consolidation would only bring about less diversity and fewer options concerning news and 
opinions. 
 Another educator, John Richmond, a principal at a local school, said that the only 
reason he was able to attend the hearing was because his school was closed due to the 
snowstorm (FCC, 2003h).  He implored the Commission to hold more hearings in the 
evenings or on weekends so working folk could attend.  This sentiment was repeated several 
times over the course of the hearing.  Principal Richmond was concerned about 
consolidation in the radio industry.  He said that despite the claims of Clear Channel and 
others, more formats do not lead to more diversity and, in his opinion, all the stations played 
the same songs regardless of their advertised format.  He said that the news he received on 
his local television stations was formulaic and virtually identical on each station.  Richmond 
suggested that the FCC allow more low-power radio stations to go on the air so people could 
hear diverse coverage of local news and a more diverse array of music. 
 Jenny Crummiller, from the Antiwar Video Fund, recounted her difficulties getting a 
30-second antiwar video spot to run on Comcast, the only cable provider in Washington, DC 
(FCC, 2003h).  Her group had a contract to air an advertisement three times on the evening 
of the President’s State of the Union address.  At the last minute, Comcast refused to run it.  
According to Crummiller, Comcast said the spot was unsubstantiated, but she described it as 
a 30-second montage of citizens speaking out against the war.  Crummiller said the decision 
to pull the spot was arbitrary.  A few minutes later Dan Preston, also from the Antiwar 
Video Fund, updated the story.  He said that ultimately NBC and ABC also refused to air the 





the political advertisement.  Preston argued that this type of censorship was insidious 
because the public never gets an opportunity to find out about what it is missing.  According 
to Preston, a local Comcast channel produced a news segment about his group, but when the 
station’s management learned that Comcast’s corporate headquarters had refused to air the 
spot, the local station dropped the story.  Preston said one of the reporters at the local station 
confided that the reason why the story was dropped was because the reporter did not want to 
lose his job.  Although NPR, PBS, Canadian, French, and Arabic Television, plus a few 
small local papers, picked up the story, none of the media properties owned by 
conglomerates reported on it.  Preston said that consolidation in the media was suppressing 
the diversity of voices, which he said was especially important now, given the debate over 
the war.  
 Later in an afternoon session of public input, Glen Best from the Sierra Club also 
said that his organization had been unable to get proenvironmental messages on the radio in 
Detroit and in Idaho (FCC, 2003h).  Clear Channel in Idaho and Viacom in Detroit rejected 
the advertisements.  He asked the Commissioners how the marketplace of ideas was 
supposed to thrive in an environment where fewer and fewer corporations controlled access 
to the public’s airwaves. 
 Katie Ewell said that she was there because the Commissioners had asked ordinary 
citizens to come to the hearing to offer their views (FCC, 2003h).  Ewell, who lived and 
worked in Richmond, said she just happened to catch an article about deregulation in the 
local paper and took it upon herself to research the subject.  Ewell said that she had no idea 
that the FCC was in the process of making a decision on media ownership regulations until 





after she did some research, she wrote a letter-to-the editor of the Times Dispatch, but it was 
not printed.  Then she addressed Powell and said: 
Chairman Powell, I know that you wanted us to bring evidence and I'm just an 
individual and I want to ask what can we do as individuals or concerned citizens to 
help you guys fight the courts, to gather the evidence that you need to support our 
views?  I could do a telephone survey or you know, would you like me to document 
all my media intake for a month?  What can the public do to help you guys, because 
apparently you don't have enough time to get all the studies done together?  I'm just 
trying to ask for help so that we can help you guys.  (FCC, 2003h, p. 238) 
 
Deborah Rannell expressed similar sentiments.  She said she was a former teacher  
who did not know the issue of media ownership even existed before 2 weeks ago.  Rannell 
said she was essentially clueless, but she came to the hearing to learn about the issue (FCC, 
2003h).  Rannell said her biggest fear as a mainstream conservative after listening to the 
panel discussions was that she was alarmed that if the regulations were relaxed further she 
would not be able to hear opposing viewpoints.  Rannell said this was important to her for 
two reasons.  First, she said if she was not exposed to other views she might not have the 
chance to reconsider the views that she did hold, and second, if she did not hear opposing 
viewpoints she could never be certain that the perspective she held was correct.  Rannell 
closed her remarks by saying that the Commissioners were the stewards for her voice and 
she hoped that they made the right decision. 
 Anthony Mazza, who drove down from Philadelphia, remarked that he had heard 6 
hours of testimony, with 20 minutes of public comment before lunch, 20 minutes after 
lunch, and now they were in the midst of another 20 minute public comment period (FCC, 
2003h).  He said that the format of the meeting was not a very good way of inviting the 
public into the process.  He said that he heard testimony from representatives of Fox, Clear 





comment from a single member of the public at the hearing that was in favor of more 
consolidation.  In fact, Mazza said he was wondering where all the representatives from the 
communities served by these corporations were.  He said even the tobacco companies can 
trot out local citizens to say that they support smoking, but he had not heard from a single 
person who was not directly tied to the media industry say that they were in favor of media 
consolidation. 
 Several representatives from local unions spoke about the need for localism because 
their members had no other voice in national media (FCC, 2003h).  Other participants spoke 
in favor of low-power FM as a hedge against further consolidation of local media.  One 
volunteer from the Prometheus Radio Group reminded the audience that there are at least 42 
different families of languages spoken in America, and 247 different ethnicities, and that the 
media should serve all of them.  A few speakers derided Powell’s comments about keeping 
emotion and politics out of the discussion, and Silver Persinger said although the 
marketplace of ideas might be an economic metaphor, it is also essential to political speech, 
which he claimed would be harmed by further consolidation in media. 
 Laura K. Smith, a doctorial candidate from the University of Texas at Austin, 
questioned the validity of the MOWG studies (FCC, 2003h).  Smith said the studies lacked 
theoretical foundations basic social science protocols and were missing data and quality 
control mechanisms. Smith then went on relate her experience as a reporter for a television 
station that purchased another station in Jacksonville, Florida.  Smith said the new owners 
fired most of the reporters at the second station but kept the entire sales staff.  In essence, 
she said, the new station owners began to simulcast one news program on both stations.  





lifted, large station owners would go to regional newscasts that would further debilitate the 
concept of localism. 
 Other comments reiterated the same points; however the consensus was that the 
FCC should not move to relax media ownership rules further (FCC, 2003h).  Many of the 
people who traveled to Richmond that day also were suspicious of the lack of coverage of 
ownership issues in the mainstream media.  
After the hearing, Powell declared that there was no need for further input from the 
public given that the FCC had also already received some 15,000 comments on its website.  
When Copps suggested that the FCC was moving too quickly to modify its regulations, 
Powell said, “ I just think the suggestion that this issue hasn’t been explored and fully laid 
out and worked over is really naïve.  I can go out and try to win the court of public opinion.  
But when it comes back from the court that matters, we’ve done nothing” (Shields, 2003b, 
p.3).  Powell also suggested that he had not heard anything new at the hearing. 
 
Summary 
If anyone was being naïve, it was Powell.  Although he and his staff and his 
fellow Commissioners may not have heard anything new from the panelists at the 
hearing, the people who attended the event and the people who were just learning about 
these issues, were hearing new information.  While there may have been a limited 
proportion of the public that had the interest or expertise to fully evaluate the 
ramifications of FCC regulations, the vast majority of this key stakeholder group was 
affected by the media everyday, and several dozen cared enough about the issue to show 
up for a hearing in the middle of a snowstorm.  As participants in the policy-making 





than were the expert panelists in Richmond.  Instead, the citizens who attended the 
hearing were more interested in how media ownership policy would affect them as 
citizens.  Powell seemed to have forgotten that the Commission was charged with 
protecting the public’s interest in addition to its obligation to meet the statutory 
requirements of Congress and the evidentiary demands of the courts.  His tendency to 
discount the perspectives of the public as a relevant stakeholder group in the policy-
making process may have obscured his judgment. 
Additionally, the Internet was proving itself to be an effective tool for 
communicating opposition to media consolidation among a wide segment of the public 
that may not have had anything else in common.  As interest in the issue heated up in 
early 2003, many organizations began to archive and distribute information on the topic 
(Chester, 2007; Klinenberg, 2007; McChesney, 2004a, 2004b).  
After the Richmond hearing, a reporter asked Copps if he thought the meeting had 
been successful.  His response was that he felt bolstered by the comments he heard (Shields, 
2003b).  The fact that he had persuaded Powell to hold the hearing in the first place was a 
feat in itself.  Additionally, Copps said he was heartened that so many members of the 
public had come to the hearing to express themselves; this indicated to him that it was 
possible to get a national dialogue going on the subject of deregulation.  Clearly people who 
had heard about the Commission’s deliberations cared about these issues, a fact that was 
born out by a new poll from Pew Research that concluded that as more people learned about  






CONFLICTING COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST 
 
After the Richmond hearing, Commissioner Michael Copps proceeded with his 
plan to hold public input sessions across the country (FCC, 2003d).  Media activists and 
other public service organizations were also ramping up their efforts to inform the public 
about the potential changes in the media ownership regulations (Chester, 2007; 
Klinenberg, 2007; McChesney, 2004a).  Although there had been very little coverage of 
the issue in the mainstream media prior to the Richmond hearing, a Pew Research study 
published in February 2003 indicated that the more people heard about the FCC’s 
proposal to relax media ownership policies, the less they liked the idea (Layton, 2003; 
Rosenstiel, Chinni, & Avila, 2003).  Even as antideregulatory forces began to win more 
support from the press, the public, and key Congressional representatives, Chairman 
Michael Powell refused to postpone the deadline again for public comments, saying that 
people had plenty of time to consider the issue and action had to be taken eventually 
(Powell, 2003a).  However, despite the lack of publicity in the mainstream press, by June 
the FCC had received 500,000 comments from citizens and other interested parties and 
over 5,000 phone calls, more feedback than the agency had ever received on any issue 







Copps Hits the Road 
Before the Richmond field hearing, Copps announced his intentions to schedule 
other hearings across the country, with or without his fellow Commissioners (FCC, 
2003d).  He wanted to hear how people who lived outside the Beltway felt about the 
potential relaxation of media ownership rules.  Copps considered feedback from ordinary 
citizens to be an essential component of his decision-making process, even if his 
Republican colleagues did not share his concerns (FCC, 2003e).  Seeking additional 
citizen involvement after extending the comment period once, in conjunction with the 
Richmond hearing, may have seemed like a superfluous move to the other 
Commissioners.  Powell, in fact, had said as much (Klinenberg, 2007; McChesney, 
2004a).  However, between March and June, Copps or Adelstein, or both, would attend a 
dozen public hearings to discuss the proposed changes.  
The first hearing took place in Seattle at the University of Washington (FCC, 
2003c; Johnson, 2003; Scott, 2003).  Several hundred people attended, some coming 
from as far away as the California bay area.  Three panels of experts, including local 
representatives from the recording industry, broadcast affiliates, and labor organizers and 
journalists convened to discuss the impact of media consolidation on news, 
entertainment, and local programming.  Copps began the meeting by informing the crowd 
and the panelists that a recent survey found that less than three fourths of all Americans 
knew that the media ownership rules were under review.  Even though the FCC would 
not be paying for any more field hearings, according to Copps, it was better to have the 
discussions take place on a shoestring budget than not at all.  





was sometimes boisterous (Johnson, 2003; Scott, 2003).  A number of broadcasters made 
the case for doing away with the media ownership rules altogether.  For example, Dave 
Lougee, an executive for the Belo Group that owned two Seattle television stations, said 
that having both stations in one market allowed him to cut overhead and devote more 
time to local news.  He also said that if his stations were not offering a quality product, 
the audience for both stations would not be as large and as loyal as they were.  Lougee 
claimed that due to increased competition among various media outlets, some small 
towns were in danger of losing their only local stations unless they were permitted to 
merge with larger corporations.  Becky Brenner, a program director for two country 
music stations owned by Infinity, said that listeners were better served by large radio 
station groups that could offer several formats in a single market.  Brenner said that her 
company featured acts like Shania Twain, the Dixie Chicks, and Faith Hill on a variety of 
formats, which proved their diverse appeal.  Brenner’s remarks were met by some of the 
aforementioned boisterousness.  One local music promoter asserted that more formats do 
not necessarily equal more diversity.  Other broadcasters argued that their stations 
provided excellent community coverage.  Even when owned by a distant corporation, 
their staffs were local, and no one from headquarters decided what not to cover or which 
stories should run.  However, Ben Tucker, president of the Seattle-based Fisher 
Broadcasting Company, said that he opposed relaxing national ownership caps because it 
would decrease the amount of autonomy network affiliates had.  Additionally, Alan 
Bushong, director of a community television station in Salem, Oregon, said that in his 
small town there were only three AM radio stations, no FMs, and no network television.  





diversity that Salem residents currently enjoyed. 
One of the most prominent members of the local media on the panel was Frank 
Blethen, publisher of the Seattle Times (Johnson, 2003; Scott, 2003).  He was vehemently 
opposed to any further relaxation of rules that would allow cross-ownership arrangements 
within any given market.  Although he said cross-ownership would make sense 
economically for his own newspaper, it would not make sense from a public service 
perspective.  
Of the 50 or so members of the audience who were allowed to comment on the 
issues under discussion, not one of them spoke in favor of further consolidation in the 
media.  One audience member, Alan Stavitsky, associate dean of the University of 
Oregon's School of Journalism and Communication, said that many of the companies that 
bought radio stations after 1996 cut newsroom staff as a way to quickly boost profits 
(Johnson, 2003; Scott, 2003).  He claimed that some of those stations relied on news 
programming produced elsewhere.  David Meinert, a local music promoter, said that the 
Telecommunications Act had led to greater homogenization on the radio, which made it 
harder for local bands to get airplay, and consequently made it nearly impossible for new 
bands to receive national exposure.  The Seattle City Council and the Seattle Educational 
Association also weighed in with their opposition to further consolidation, saying in a 
prepared statement that media consolidation had failed to deliver newscasts that covered 
local issues in depth.   
 On March 31, Duke University Law School sponsored a field hearing that both 
Copps and Adelstein attended (FCC, 2003k; Lewis, 2003).  They invited local media 





competition, and diversity.  The public was also encouraged to attend the sessions.  
Congressman Richard Burr-R, vice-president of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee, which has jurisdiction over the FCC, and Congressman David Price-D, made 
it clear that they were strongly supportive of localism.  Both representatives voiced their 
concerns about the possibility of more deregulatory moves by the FCC.  Before the 
meeting, Burr issued a press release that went on at some length about the issue (Burr, 
2003). 
Burr insisted that as an author of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, “it was 
not our intent to establish a higher standard for retaining a rule than was required for 
adopting it” (Burr, 2003, p. 3).  He also identified himself as a free market conservative 
who felt that retaining the current media ownership restrictions was the only way 
residents of North Carolina could ensure that their own local values were upheld.  Burr 
decried what he called a “moral failure” at the national network level, citing programs 
such as Who Wants to be a Millionaire?  Who Wants to Marry a Millionaire and Who 
Wants to Marry my Mom?  He said that if large national companies were allowed to 
consolidate further, local station owners would not have the option of preempting 
network programming that might be offensive to their own communities.  Although Burr 
clearly stated that he was opposed to government censorship, he said that he supported 
the current system whereby local citizens could work with local broadcasters to provide 
programming that was responsive to their communities.  Burr also took a swipe at the 
Public Broadcasting Service, saying that it was trying to “nationalize” programming and 
preempt local public broadcaster’s decisions.  He accused the Corporation for Public 





Approximately 150 people turned out at Duke to hear what Copps, Adelstein, and 
local broadcasters had to say and to join the discussion (Cox, 2003; Lewis, 2003).  About 
two dozen members of the public made comments after the panels ended, and again, not 
one of them was in favor of more regulation.  Additionally, of 11 local broadcasters and 
musicians who sat on the panels, only 2 spoke out in favor of further deregulation.  
Michael Ward, president and general manager of WNCN, an NBC affiliate, said that the 
current rules cannot govern station content or conduct and therefore do not allow stations 
be more responsive to their viewers.  He said that only a corporation with a large amount 
of financial resources could offer better community service.  Barry Farber, general 
counsel of Sinclair Broadcast Group, agreed that stations should be able to pool their 
resources in order to provide more information in different formats.  Orage Quarles III, 
publisher of the News and Observer in Raleigh, North Carolina, spoke out in favor of 
relaxing the newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban because the nature of the media 
landscape had changed tremendously over the past 20 years.  Therefore, the FCC needed 
to make sure that newspaper owners could operate on a level playing field with 
broadcasters. 
However, the vast majority of both panelists and members of the public agreed 
that further deregulation would be a negative development for their communities and for 
the nation (Cox, 2003; Lewis, 2003).  Jim Goodmon of Capital Broadcasting, Jim 
Heavner of Vilcom, and Don Curtis of Curtis Media Group, all local broadcasters, argued 
that deregulation had already eroded the concept of localism.  Heavner said that 
deregulation was a “disaster for the public interest” (Lewis, p. C1).  William Sutton, past 





Herald-Sun (Durham, North Carolina) said that 98% of radio stations had news 
operations in 1982; however by 2003, that number had dropped down to 67%.  Sutton 
blamed consolidation for the loss of news operations on radio as well of the loss of jobs 
for Black journalists (Lewis).  Tift Merritt, a local singer-musician, said that despite her 
appearances with Willie Nelson and on the Country Music Television, she could not get 
airplay on local stations.  Others brought up the danger of consolidation in light of a story 
that appeared in the New York Times in March that reported a chemical spill in Minot, 
North Dakota that injured over a hundred residents (Klinenberg, 2007; Lee, 2003).  When 
emergency responders tried to call their local radio stations to provide an alert, there was 
no one actually on location because the stations were running syndicated programming.  
Another audience member brought up the Dixie Chicks incident when singer Natalie 
Maines told a London audience that she was ashamed to come from the same state as 
President Bush.  Subsequently, Clear Channel banned the Dixie Chicks from their play-
lists.  Mike Elkin said that news stories represented the ban as a grassroots effort when in 
reality, the management of the corporation actually instigated it.  Adelstein urged the 
crowd to keep writing Congress and thanked everyone for their time. 
Several other hearings were held between March and June, and Copps or 
Adelstein, or both, attended the majority of them (Fallows, 2003; Klinenberg, 2007; 
McChesney, 2004a).  Some, like the hearings in Chicago and Duke University, were only 
attended by approximately 100 people, whereas others, such as those in Seattle, Los 
Angeles, and San Francisco were standing room only affairs (Chester, 2007; 
McChesney).  All told, there were hearings in the aforementioned locations as well as in 





ordinary citizens, as well as professionals in the creative fields, including small 
broadcasters and local representatives, were taking the time to show up at hearings to 
express their opposition to further consolidation in media.  This was an extraordinary turn 
of events given that FCC policy was generally considered an archaic stronghold of 
faceless policy wonks and cloistered academics (Halonen, 2002).   
Repeatedly, panelists and citizens complained that the quality of radio was 
adversely affected by the relaxation of ownership rules that had been permitted after the 
passage of the Telecommunications Act.  Broadcast employees and union representatives 
complained that consolidation resulted in lost jobs and less local news.  Musicians and 
listeners complained that tight corporate play-lists excluded new artists and restricted 
airplay for local acts, which created homogenized programming across media markets 
and throughout the nation.  Hearing attendees insisted that there was less coverage of 
public affairs than there was before the act.  Small station owners complained that 
corporations that consolidated their holdings were able to offer more favorable 
advertising rates across several stations in one market. Consequently, small stations were 
being squeezed out of the market.  The consensus reached by those who attended these 
hearings was that radio was indeed the “canary in the coalmine,” and if television, cable, 
and newspapers were allowed to follow suit, it would be disastrous for communications 
policy and the marketplace of ideas.  
Commissioner Copps continued to speak out ceaselessly in favor of public 
involvement, and it was apparent that citizens were listening.  They were also willing to 
take action.  Meanwhile, other organizations began to encourage their members to make 






 Toward the end of 2002, Robert McChesney, John Nichols, and Josh Silver 
formed an organization named Free Press to increase public participation in media policy 
(Free Press, n.d.).  Originally, they conceived it as a project of the Media Education 
Foundation to educate the public about the debate over media ownership. By the 
following August, Free Press was a fully incorporated nonpartisan, nonprofit 
organization.  Almost immediately, Free Press was instrumental in the distribution of 
information over the Internet that supported maintaining existing media ownership 
regulations (Chester, 2007; Free Press, n.d.; Klinenberg, 2007).  One of the 
organization’s first projects was to design a website that functioned as a repository of 
information about media policy and activists groups around the country.  The 
organization also delivered daily newsletters updating readers on media issues, and they 
provided information about other groups working to reform media.  The goal of the 
organization was to educate, organize, and advocate for media reform.  In 2003, it played 
a major role in organizing activists and in uniting them on common ground.  By February 
2003, the coalition that Free Press helped coordinate was gaining strength. 
While many other organizations that had traditionally been concerned with media 
matters were instrumental in building public opposition to the relaxation of media 
ownership rules, other groups not primarily focused on media matters were hearing from 
their members on the issue.  In  2003, Common Cause made media consolidation its central 
organizing issue for the year, and it invested $250,000 in an advertising campaign opposing 
further consolidation in media (Kirkpatrick, 2003; McChesney, 2004a).  By the end of 





one of the fastest growing political action committees in the country.  It joined the chorus 
opposing media consolidation as well (Cochran, 2003; “MoveOn,” n.d.).  With only seven 
staff members and no physical office, MoveOn.org had amassed a mailing list of 1.8 
million.  When MoveOn.org launched its campaign opposing the proposed new rules on the 
urging of its members, it was able to significantly influence the public discourse by raising 
funds and promoting the cause over the Internet.  By the end of May, MoveOn.org alone 
had collected 170,000 signatures on a petition to the FCC asking the agency to retain its 
current ownership rules (Ahrens, 2003a). 
During the spring of 2003, another somewhat unlikely organization jumped on the 
antideregulatory bandwagon.  The National Rifle Association (NRA) urged its members to 
send postcards expressing their dissatisfaction with media consolidation to members of 
Congress and the FCC (Beckerman, 2003; McChesney, 2004a).  Approximately 300,000 
NRA members responded to the call.  Just as the more liberal end of the anticonsolidation 
activist spectrum feared that media moguls with a conservative slant could 
disproportionately influence the public because of its large media presence, the NRA feared 
that corporate media was biased against its own cause.  The United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops was also opposed to any changes in media ownership rules.  Francis J. 
Maniscalo, director of communications of the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, said that his organization was concerned about the loss of localism and 
broadcaster’s responsiveness to their communities of license.  Maniscalo explained that his 
organization understood that U.S. media were a foundational block on which modern culture 
was moored.  He feared that if more consolidation were permitted, there would be less 





Maniscalo expressed his view that when any group became marginalized in the media, there 
was a risk that they would then be viewed as a less important segment of society than were 
those that were featured more prominently.  Other conservative groups also joined the 
coalition.  As previously mentioned, the Parents Television Council and like-minded groups, 
such as the Family Research Council, opposed media consolidation because of television’s 
unremitting vulgarity which they blamed on the corporate quest to satisfy their stockholders 
(Klinenberg, 2007; Safire, 2003a).  
 Most professional journalism associations were opposed to any further loosening of 
media restrictions (Fallows, 2003; Holland, 2003; Johnson, 2003; McChesney, 2004a).  The 
National Association of Black Journalists and the National Association of Hispanic 
Journalists opposed relaxing ownership rules.  The International Federation of Journalists, 
The Newspaper Guild, The American Federation of Television and Radio Artists and the 
Hollywood unions all opposed the proposed changes.  The Columbia Journalism Review, 
among other trade magazines, featured stories by working journalists who were also 
opposed to deregulation (Beckerman, 2003; Hickey, 2003a). 
 William Safire, the man who coined the phrase “nattering nabobs of negativism” for 
a speech given by Vice President Spiro Agnew during the Nixon Administration, had 
become one of the most influential conservative editorialists for the New York Times, the 
most widely read newspaper in the world.  Safire was unequivocally opposed to any 
relaxation of media ownership rules (Safire, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 
2003f, 2003g).  He wrote several editorials in 2003 disparaging, in no uncertain terms, 
Powell’s arguments for relaxing the rules.  In one January column, Safire explained why he, 





for, to expand their holdings.  He quoted Powell who said that “the market is my religion” 
and went on to write that “conservative economic religion is founded on the rock of 
competition, which—since Teddy Roosevelt’s day—has protected small businesses and 
consumers against predatory pricing leading to market monopolization” (Safire, 2003a, 
p. A19).  Safire said that media consolidation forced those seeking to air political 
advertisements to depend on the networks with their unmatchable costs per thousands of 
viewers, and he asserted that the highly touted competition that emerged from new 
technologies was an illusion.  Safire told his readers that the same few companies that 
dominated broadcasting also dominated cable programming and the leading Internet sites.  
Safire pointed to radio as an example of the dangers of deregulation and said that the state of 
the radio industry showed that media mergers have narrowed the range of information and 
entertainment available to people of all ideologies. 
 Safire kept writing about media consolidation on the op-ed page of the New York 
Times.  At the end of May, just before the FCC vote on the new rules, he decried the secrecy 
that dominated the process and accused the FCC of abdicating its responsibility to uphold 
the public interest.  According to Safire, although we have more channels for 
communication, we have fewer real choices today because the ownership of those channels 
is shrinking.  
That’s why I march somewhat uncomfortably along side CodePink Women for 
Peace and the National Rifle Association, between liberal Olympia Snowe and 
conservative Ted Stevens under the banner of “localism, competition and diversity 
of views.’  That’s why too, we resent the conflicted refusal of most networks, 
stations, and their putative purchasers to report fully and in primetime on their 
owners’ power grabs scheduled for June 2.” (2003d, p. A19) 
Barry Diller was the keynote speaker at the April convention of the NAB in Las Vegas, 





ownership rules (Bloom, 2003; Orol & Lauria, 2003).  Diller, the chair of USA Interactive 
and the former head of the Fox Network, said he was opposed to any rules that could 
potentially increase the financial reach of the networks.  He said it was a mistake to 
eliminate the Fin-Syn Rules and pointed out that 10 years ago, there were 16 new 
independently produced programs being broadcast on the networks during primetime, and 
by 2002 there was only 1.  “The barrier is so high that the ability of new entrants to go 
into the market has been eliminated.  The possibility of a new Fox Network today is 
nonexistent” (Bloom, 2003, p.18).  He was also opposed to the relaxation of the national 
cap on ownership.  Diller argued that broadcasters have the unique responsibility of 
upholding the public interest, and he clearly stated that he did not believe that more 
consolidation was in the public’s interest.  A few weeks later, Diller told Bill Moyers on 
NOW that a handful of companies, an oligarchy, controlled most everything both 
vertically and horizontally that one can see on a television screen (Moyers, 2003).  A 
week before the FCC vote on the ownership rules, Diller appeared on Nightline with 
Commissioner Adelstein to express their views on the proposed new rules, although 
Powell backed out of his commitment to appear at the last minute (Lieberman, 2003). 
In early February, after being demoted from his position at AOL-Time/Warner, Ted 
Turner resigned from the company that he helped found (Jonsson, 2003).  According to 
Jeff Chester, Turner recognized that big media mergers had a destructive effect on the 
quality of news and entertainment programming, and he later said that he could never 
have started CNN in the current media market (2007).  In an editorial published a few 
days before the FCC was to decide on the new rules, Turner wrote that large media 





said,  “when you lose small businesses, you lose big ideas” (2003, p. A23).  Turner wrote 
that big media companies were in the business of making money for their shareholders, 
but if the FCC did not protect the public interest, it would not be served.  The larger the 
company, the more unwilling its executives are to take risks.  According to Turner, fewer 
media owners amounted to less diversity and less of a chance for democracy to flourish. 
As opposition to the proposed rule changes mounted, the press increased its 
coverage of the issue.  However, Bill Moyers, host of NOW, had been covering the debate 
over media consolidation since early in 2002.  During 2003, when the debate became more 
heated, Moyers ran 8 segments on media consolidation, sometimes devoting the entire hour 
length of his show to examining the arguments in favor of and opposed to media 
consolidation.  Additionally, Moyers presented his own views on the subject in his Bill 
Moyers’ Journal segment and interviewed Commissioner Copps, Barry Diller, Robert 
McChesney, John Nichols, and Chuck Lewis from the Center for Public Integrity.  NOW 
frequently ran investigative reports on the proposed rule changes during this time period, 
and supplemental information about the subject was posted to NOW’s website.  
 In April, a majority of the Senate Commerce Committee sent Powell a letter asking 
him to delay the vote, and House Republicans led by Billy Tauzin sent a letter to Powell 
urging him not to delay the vote (Alpert, 2003; Pelofsky, 2003).  In early May, both the 
House and Senate held hearings on the topic.  Legislators in both houses introduced bills to 
require the FCC to retain the 35% cap on national ownership limits.  Cards and letters from 
individuals and those affiliated with public service organizations flooded the FCC’s website 
and mailboxes (Beckerman, 2003; Mulkern, 2003).  At this point, neither Congress nor the 





the FCC staff, although some of the provisions were leaked to the press.  The vote would go 
forward on June 2, despite the objections of Copps, Adelstein, and a half a million citizens 
that sent letters to the FCC.  CongressDaily reported that a majority of Senate Commerce 
Committee members including Olympia Snow R-ME; Byron Dorgan, D-ND; Earnest 
Hollings D-SC; Trent Lott R-MS; and John Jay Rockefeller D-WV again sent Powell a 
letter urging him to delay the vote so that the public could have more time to review the 
proposed changes.  “Openness in this process is the best way to proceed to ensure that 
Congress and the public support the agency’s decision” (“ Lawmakers Decry,” 2003, p. 11).  
Still, Powell refused to extend the deadline.  Meanwhile, the press reported, and Powell 
confirmed, that a new Diversity Index would be employed by the Commission to determine 
if a media merger would be allowable in most markets.  
 
The Diversity Index 
 Electronic Media first reported in March that Powell, in conjunction with Media 
Bureau Chief Kenneth Ferree, was in the process of creating a so-called diversity index that 
would rely on mathematical formulas to guide the agency in its determination of whether or 
not to allow media mergers in different markets (Davidson, 2003c; Halonen, 2003b; Hearn, 
2003a).  According to Powell, the index was based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
used by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to determine if there was enough competition 
between businesses in a product market.  Theoretically, such a model would provide an 
objective analytic tool for the Commission that would stand up to court challenges.  
Instead of basing their evaluations on the number of specific media outlets in a given 
market, the new formula would assign each medium a numerical value, and the level of 





index required the FCC to take a census of all media outlets in every market.  The index, 
therefore, could conceivably allow more mergers than the previous rules would (“FCC: 
Chair Backs Index,” 2003; Wigfield, 2003).  However, the assignment of numerical values 
would still be a subjective process, as Ferree reluctantly allowed.  Someone still had to rate 
how much value translators importing signals were figured into the mix, let alone if a 
weekly shopper circulated in a small town would be counted. 
 Powell and Ferree emphasized that the Diversity Index (DI) was still a work in 
progress and that they did not expect to deliver the draft Report and Order to the 
Commissioners until May 12 (Hearn, 2003a).  Industry analysts and lobbyists were skeptical 
of the plan at best.  The newspaper industry was concerned that such a formulation would 
result in a complicated market-by-market analysis that would slow deals and invite lawsuits 
(Wigfield, 2003).  Legg Mason media analyst Blair Levin, a former FCC chief of staff, told 
his clients that the DI would likely be softened.  As he understood it,  “ FCC lawyers have 
concluded that if the agency relies too heavily on the diversity index, it would need to seek 
public comment on such a market measuring device” (Hearn, p. 36). 
 Fellow Commissioner Kevin Martin also expressed reservations about imposing the 
index at the NAB convention.  “ I guess I would say it this way: I am concerned about a 
complicated mathematical formula as a new rule....I think the rules in the end should be 
simple” (Hearn, 2003a, p. 36).  Powell insisted that the Court was requiring the Commission 
to provide stronger empirical evidence to support ownership restrictions.  He added that 
industry lawyers might want to bone up on their knowledge of integers, constants, and 
variables.  However, Powell promised that the DI would not be a Rube Goldberg 





sophisticated and its mythology grows as the proceeding continues....I don’t think there is 
anything that sophisticated or complex around the idea” (Hearn, p. 36).  At the same 
convention Abernathy and Adelstein offered their opinions that a DI  might give the rules an 
across-the-board consistency and ability to provide case-by-case analysis on media mergers.  
However, Copps remained adamant that the FCC had not had enough time to answer key 
questions about the potential effects of relaxing media ownership rules.  He did not think the 
Commission had time to gather all of the needed data, although at another panel discussion, 
Ferree insisted that the agency would not delay the vote (Albiniak, 2003).  At this point, no 
one except FCC staff members had actually seen the fabled index. 
 A few weeks after the existence of a DI was made public, Mara Einstein, the author 
of MOWG Study #5: Program Diversity and the Program Selection Process on Broadcast 
Network Television, wrote an editorial for Broadcasting and Cable that denounced the 
FCC’s efforts to rely on purely quantitative methodology to determine diversity (Einstein, 
2003).  Einstein said that even though quantitative studies have value, and her own study 
was grounded in them, she stressed that the FCC needed to place these kinds of studies in 
context.  She said that her own research suggested that consolidation does not necessarily 
lead to a decrease in the diversity of entertainment programming; however, it did not say 
anything about the news.  Einstein also argued that her study was designed to open the 
discussion about the underlying assumptions in FCC policy-making process, specifically the 
assumption that diversity is a worthy goal.  She said that the FCC had never fully defined 
the term diversity and that her study was an attempt to provide a basis for a succinct 






 Furthermore, she said: 
With all due respect to the FCC, quantitative measures should not be seen as the 
be all and end all in determining whether to ease the media-ownership rules. 
Much of the statistical information in front of the commission is provided by the 
industry, a decidedly biased group.  While my work is not biased (though I have 
been accused otherwise), I implore the commission to examine it within its 
appropriate context.  It is meant as a work that blames advertising for many of our 
current woes, not as a means to put even more power into the hands of a select 
few.  I would like to see this research used as it was meant to be used: As a means 
to stimulate wider discussion on media ownership, media diversity and the 
underlying economics that guide media content.  The FCC says it will decide by 
June 2.  That's simply too soon, given the lack of broad public debate. With the 
$70 billion giveaway that was the 1996 Telecom Act, it is time for the networks to 
give back.  (Einstein, 2003, p. 50) 
According to Broadcasting and Cable, the most contentious issue over the rules was 
the lifting of the national ownership cap (Albiniak, 2003).  Networks wanted to raise or 
eliminate the 35% limit; however, station affiliates wanted the rule to remain in place as a 
check on network power.  Predictions about the outcome of the vote varied widely.  Levin 
predicted that the FCC would loosen TV duopoly rules and raise the national cap.  
Communications attorney Wade Hargrove predicted that local markets for radio stations 
would be redefined.  However, the only consensus about these issues that arose, was that no 
matter what the FCC decided to do on June 2, there would be no one who was completely 
satisfied. 
 
The Fur Flies 
 During the Senate hearings held in early May, Copps and Adelstein expressed their 
frustration with their lack of access to information on the media ownership review.  
Although Powell claimed that each Commissioner had been consulted equally, Copps told 
the senators, “We don’t know what we’re going to be working on.  It’s like a state secret” 





findings on media ownership public, but Powell refused to do so (FCC, 2003b; FCC, 
2003e).  By law, he was required to give a draft copy of the staff report to the entire 
Commission 3 weeks in advance of any decision, and Powell stuck to the letter of the law.  
All five Commissioners received a copy of the 258-page Report and Order on May 12.  
Copps immediately requested a 1-month extension on the decision so that he could study the 
findings, but Powell insisted that it was imperative to proceed in a timely fashion because 
the court had already disqualified some key ownership rules (Shields & Bachman, 2003).  
According to the Atlantic Monthly, White House political strategist Karl Rove met with 
Powell in May to urge him to wrap up the proceedings as quickly as possible (Fallows, 
2003).  As some of the FCC’s staff findings leaked to the press over the next few weeks, the 
conflict over media consolidation intensified.  Finally, the press was covering the issue 
extensively, and as more people heard about the new rules, the more likely they were to 
oppose them (Layton, 2003; “Strong Opposition Emerges,” 2003). 
At a luncheon sponsored by the Media Institute in Washington, DC,  
Adelstein accused the majority of “McDonaldizing” the media, and he predicted that 
supersizing the media would bring on widespread consumer heartburn (2003a, p.6).  
Adelstein was just warming up when he said, “once we place our order...we’ll all have to 
digest what comes our way.  And the public may be about to experience a giant Maalox 
moment”  (p. 9).  Adelstein accused Powell of drafting an extremist proposal that would 
lead to a tsunami of mergers, and he told his audience that they could expect a public 
backlash if the proposed rules were approved on June 2.  According to a report in Daily 
Variety, many of the members of the audience, most of whom stood to benefit from 





Looms,” 2003).  Ex-FCC Chairman Richard Wiley disagreed with Adelstein.  He said that 
cross-ownership limits between a TV station and newspaper in the same market frequently 
results in more local news coverage, not less, and he expressed his view that more growth in 
the industry was needed.  Wiley stressed that broadcasters now had to compete with many 
other delivery systems, and, therefore, relaxing the rules could level the playing field. 
A week before the Commission vote, Copps and Adelstein hosted a public meeting 
for more than two dozen organizations including socially conservative groups such as the 
Parents TV Council and the Family Research Council (Gentile, 2003).  There were also 
representatives from the Catholic Conference of Bishops and the United Church of Christ in 
attendance, as well as minority journalism groups, telecommunication union representatives, 
consumers, and network-affiliated broadcasters (Enrich, 2003).  The discussion took place 
amidst a backdrop of mail baskets containing 250,000 postcards from NRA members, and a 
petition signed by approximately 150,000 individuals from the general public (Ho, 2003b; 
Linder, 2003).  During the meeting, the presidents of the National Association of Black 
Journalists (NABJ) and the National Association of Hispanic Journalists (NAHJ) were 
particularly outspoken about the damage that increased media consolidation could inflict on 
minority groups.  Both groups urged the FCC to postpone the vote so it could study the 
effects that any changes in the rules would have on communities of color.  Responding to a 
report issued by the Center for Public Integrity that documented the number of trips and 
junkets taken by Commissioners, Gonzales, president of NAHJ, said that Chairman Powell 
had taken 44 trips mostly paid for by the telecommunications and broadcast industries.  
According to Gonzales, this left the public with the perception that only powerful media 





be relegated to the sidelines.  By this time, the FCC had received hundreds of thousands of 
e-mails and postcards protesting any changes in the media ownership rules; however Powell 
asserted, “You don’t govern by just polls and surveys.  We have to exercise difficult 
judgments and abide by the law.  If  all of our rulemaking was a case of put them out and 
take a referendum, things would be a lot easier” (Ahrens, 2003a, p.3). 
 On the weekend before Monday’s decision, small groups of protesters marched in 
several cities across the nation (Campbell, 2003; Gentile, 2003).  In Los Angeles, about 60 
people organized by CodePink picketed a local Clear Channel station with signs that read, 
“No Choice, No Voice: Reclaim Our Airwaves.”  In Pittsburgh, about a dozen people 
protested outside of another Clear Channel station, and in New York, about 150 people 
picketed WWPR, yet another Clear Channel station.  However, Clear Channel was not the 
only target of protesters that weekend.  A  $250,000 advertising campaign paid for by 
Common Cause, MoveOn.org, and Free Press ran spots in the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, and Daily Variety and on the Fox News Channel in New York (Fallows, 
2003; Kirkpatrick, 2003).  The ads featured Rupert Murdock with a banner over his face that 
read, “ This Man wants to Control News in America.  The FCC wants to help him.” 
Apparently, Murdock had become the poster boy for media consolidation (Fallows).  
 
Out With the Old, In With the New 
 On Monday June 3, 2003, a line of activists, reporters, and paid placeholders stood 
on line outside of the FCC Building in Washington, DC to watch the FCC’s long-scheduled 
vote on media ownership (Fallows, 2003).  At 10:00 A. M., Powell struck his gavel and 
called the meeting to order.  The staff presented the Commissioners with a report that 





changes (Powell, 2003d).  Copps and Adelstein spoke twice as long as Powell did, and both 
emphasized their dissenting opinions (Adelstein, 2003b; Copps, 2003a, 2003d).  Martin 
spoke next and said there were strong arguments on both sides of the issue, but in the end, 
he gave his vote to the majority (2003b).  Powell then took the official vote, and the biggest 
change in the history of media ownership policy was approved.  Security guards had to 
hustle a small group of protesters from CodePink out of the room.  Dick Gregory and Jesse 
Jackson gave interviews to the press outside of the building where dozens of protesters had 
congregated waving placards with the Rupert Murdock’s image on them. The Senate 
Commerce Committee summoned the Commissioners to its chambers for a meeting to take 
place 2 days later. 
 The Report and Order that the Commission voted for on June 2, 2003, modified, 
repealed, and revised existing media ownership rules (FCC, 2003i).  The majority voted to 
approve raising the National Television Ownership Rule to 45%, up from 35%, and to 
maintain its 50% discount on UHF stations.  They voted to retain the Dual Television 
Network Rule.  Additionally, the Commission voted to repeal both the 
Television/Newspaper and Radio/Television Cross-Ownership prohibitions and replace 
them with a single set of Cross Media Limits that were also applied to the Multiple 
Television Ownership Rule and the Local Radio Ownership Rule.  
 
National Television Ownership Limits 
The Report and Order was voluminous and convoluted.  The justification for raising 
the national cap on ownership was rooted in the court’s decision in Fox Television Inc. v. 
FCC (2002).  The gist of this argument was familiar terrain.  According to the report, the 





encouraged tremendous innovation in the communications industry.  The report said that the 
increase in the national limit from 25% to 35% had created opportunities for the public to 
access new options such as local all-news channels, and new program formats were now 
available via DBS, cable television, broadcasting, and the Internet.  Additionally, the 
transition to digital television represented a critical evolutionary step in broadcast television.  
This development could best be exploited if there were more group owners that had the 
wherewithal to explore innovative uses for the spectrum.  Since the networks have different 
economic incentives to use the spectrum, i.e., higher programming production costs than 
local television stations, the networks might want to use digital spectrum space in different 
ways than its local affiliates.  The report concluded that the networks and other large station 
owners needed more incentives so they could gain the economic efficiencies that would be 
required for them to consummate their goals.  The report also concluded that raising the cap 
to 45% would not appreciably harm affiliated television stations any more so than had the 
35% limit. 
The report declared that the National Television Ownership Rule did not appear to 
be relevant to the goal of promoting diversity “because people gather news and information 
from sources available in their local market and that the relevant geographic market for view 
point sources is national, not local” (FCC, 2003i, p. 209).  Therefore, there was no 
compelling evidence to suggest that raising the national ownership cap would affect 
diversity.  However, the report found that some cap on national ownership was necessary to 
promote localism, and it was determined that 45% was a reasonable number.  Since national 
audiences for network programming were eroding due to the reach of new video delivery 





audiences.  If networks could not reach large audiences, their revenue would fall, and the 
public would have access to less quality programming and the possibility that free over-the-
air television would disappear from the media landscape.  
 
Dual Network Rule 
The Commission voted to uphold the Dual Network Rule that prohibited ABC, 
NBC, CBS, or FOX from merging with each other (FCC, 2003i).  This rule only applied to 
those network broadcasting operations.  There were no restrictions placed on mergers with 
cable networks, or any other group owners.  The Commission reasoned that this rule was 
necessary to protect the national advertising market, and it was necessary to retain the 
balance of power with the networks and their affiliates.  Therefore, according to the report, 
localism would be protected.  However, this logic was in direct contrast to the decision to 
raise the national ownership limit.  When voting to expand the national limit on ownership, 
the FCC said a 45% cap would not affect that balance of power between the networks and 
their local affiliates.  However, in this section of the Report and Order, the Commission 
found that the Dual Network Rule did, in fact, protect the public interest in terms of 
competition and localism.  The Commission also asserted that diversity of viewpoint was 
irrelevant to the discussion of this rule.  
 
Local Television Multiple Ownership Rule 
 In the introductory section on the Local Television Multiple Ownership Rule, the 
FCC maintained that the existing local television rule was based on the flawed assumption 
that only local television stations contribute to viewpoint diversity in local markets (FCC, 





media available in the market when determining if the rules were necessary to promote the 
public interest.  It was also necessary to reevaluate the way the FCC determined the 
boundaries of local markets to make them more accurate.  After issuing a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking after the previous biennial review, the FCC determined that the old 
method of configuring a designated market area (DMA), based on how far a broadcaster’s 
signal carried, was inadequate.  The Commission changed its methodology to conform to 
A.C. Neilsen’s method of measuring markets based on geographic locations, rather than by 
measuring signal contours.  The Commission rationalized that since a DMA is the market in 
which a digital audio provider competes, a geographical measurement would be more 
appropriate.  The FCC grandfathered in existing stations that did not conform to the new 
method of measuring markets.  Since only 70% of the country fell into A.C. Neilsen’s DMA 
listings, the Commission stated that the new measurement system would have to be applied 
to the remainder of the country after further study. 
 The Report and Order concluded that the current Local Television Multiple 
Ownership Rule could not be justified under §202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.  Therefore, it modified the rule to permit an entity in markets with 17 stations or less 
to own up to two television stations in one market.  Additionally, if a market consisted of 18 
or more television stations, one entity could own three stations.  There was one caveat 
though; the Commission prohibited combinations where one of the stations rated among the 
top-four in a market.  That meant that there could be no combinations allowed in markets 
with five or fewer stations.  However, if one owner acquired a second or third station in a 





station if the market subsequently declined below the level consistent with the outlet cap or 
if more than one station subsequently became a top-four ranked station in the market.  
 The rationale for revising the Eight Voices Rule was based on the agency’s 
interpretation of the Sinclair case (2002).  After remanding the issue back to the FCC, the 
Court noted that the Eight Voices Rule was inconsistent with the FCC’s own definition of 
voices in its Radio/Television Cross-Ownership regulations.  In that ruling, the FCC 
determined that newspapers and cable stations counted as voices; therefore the court 
suggested that the agency reconcile this inconsistency and perhaps place a numerical limit 
on these rules.  Consequently, the Commission concluded that the Eight Voices Rule could 
not be justified under §202(h) unless all available media in a given market were counted.  
 The FCC supported this argument by asserting that the Eight Voices Rule actually 
prohibited firms from realizing economic efficiencies in mid-to-small-size markets and 
therefore prevented potential combinations from better serving the public with better quality 
programming (FCC, 2003i).  The agency reasoned that there were three different markets 
served by local markets.  The first and most important consideration should be the Delivered 
Video Programming (DVP) market because this is the element of the local marketplace that 
most affects consumers.  Although the Report acknowledged that most consumers would 
not substitute video watching for reading books or magazines, it insisted that there was still 
a bountiful array of video entertainment options for the consumer to choose from if it 
counted all video delivery systems in a locality.  Therefore, allowing more consolidation in 
local markets would not harm competition in the DVP because the number of households 
that subscribed to cable kept increasing.  If the price was too high for consumers, it should 





decreased, over time, this indicated that the public was not suffering from a lack of 
competitive pricing.  As a result, the Commission concluded that cable and television are 
good substitutes for each other and that the competition between them was adequate to 
support relaxation in local television ownership rules. 
 On the topic of local advertising markets, the FCC defended the relaxed rules by 
asserting that local television broadcasters would not unilaterally increase advertising prices 
because of increased market power (FCC, 2003i).  This was a failed assumption because 
broadcasters adjusted their rates if they knew that an advertiser had a good substitute for 
television commercials.  Television station owners sold spots based on individual needs 
rather than by setting prices across the board, according to the comments made by Belo and 
Sinclair; thus, the agency rejected the findings of Brown and Williams’ (2002) study, 
Consolidation and Advertising Prices in Local Radio Markets.  The report also disputed 
claims that local video production markets might be harmed by further mergers; instead the 
Commission concluded that there were more markets available for sellers via new video 
delivery systems than there were when the rule was first promulgated.   
 In one paragraph, the Commission stated that the adoption of The Multiple 
Television Local Ownership Rule was not predicated on the promotion of localism (FCC, 
2003i).  According to the report, the FCC relaxed the duopoly rule in 1999 on the 
assumption that it would lead to increased economic efficiencies and that commonly owned 
stations were more likely to produce more local news.  The Commission found that there 
was no danger that more mergers in local markets would reduce local control of content, 
contrary to the assertions made by the AFL-CIO and AFTRA.  Although the FCC rejected 





 The FCC was not worried about any effects on viewpoint or programming diversity 
that could result from relaxing this rule (FCC, 2003i).  The Commission again stated that the 
modifications to the Multiple Local Television Rule would increase diversity rather than 
harming it by increasing competition among video delivery systems.  It explained the 
threshold for calculating diversity in local markets was based on the HHI index used by the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to determine if a merger is 
acceptable.  When a market for a given product is deemed moderately concentrated, it will 
obtain a score of 1800 on the index.  The FCC decided to lower its own threshold to 1000 
because of competitive pressure from cable television and because the market for television 
programming is always in flux depending on which new show is most popular to the public 
at any given time.  The Commission added that since the number of licenses that a 
corporation controls is a measure of its capacity to control programming, that limit would 
also prevent undue concentration. 
 
Local Radio Ownership Rule 
 The FCC concluded that numerical limits on radio station ownership in local 
markets were necessary to the Commission’s obligation to serve the public interest (FCC, 
2003i).  However, the agency decided that the current configuration of markets based on 
signal reach was flawed and thus did not promote competition.  The old rule did not account 
for noncommercial radio stations, so the FCC revised the new rule to include them.  
 In order to determine if the number of stations in a local market could meet the  
§202(h) test, the Commission decided it would be appropriate to break down local radio 
service into three product definitions: radio advertising, radio listening, and radio program 





agency relied on data used in MOWG Study #10: On the Substitutability of Local 
Newspaper, Radio, and Television Advertising in Local Business Sales and MOWG Study 
#5: Program Diversity and the Program Selection Process on Broadcast Network Television 
to determine that advertisers do not consider radio stations, newspapers, and television 
stations to be good substitutes for each other (Brown & Williams; 2002; Einstein, 2002).  
Although both MOWG studies were based on national data, not local, for the purposes of 
examining the radio advertising market, the FCC concluded that radio should be considered 
to be a separate market from other local advertising media.  This finding was also consistent 
with previous rulings made by the DOJ (see United States v. Clear Channel 
Communications, Civil Action No.: 1:00CV02063, 2001). 
 The FCC considered the radio listening market to be the most important component 
of its analysis because of the impact it had on consumers (FCC, 2003i ).  The FCC also 
decided that the radio listening market should be separate from other local media markets 
because again the Commission found that there are no good substitutes for radio listeners in 
nonaudio media.  In response to comments that suggested that this category should include 
other audio media such as Internet streaming stations and satellite radio, the Commission 
rejected that reasoning saying that not all radio listeners had access to the Internet and that 
the combined total of satellite radio listeners was only 600,000 nationally.  Additionally, 
they reasoned that radio is the least expensive and most portable medium available, so it 
should be considered a category unto itself.  The Commission likewise concluded that the 
radio production market was also unique and that in order to preserve competition, they 





 The Commission decided that the old definition of a market was inconsistent with 
industry standards, so they adopted Arbitron’s methodology of counting radio stations 
within a geographic area rather than by using the signal contour overlap methodology that 
the FCC had previously relied on (FCC, 2003i).  According to the Report, this change 
conformed to antitrust regulations and protected markets from being overwhelmed by 
stations whose signals reached farther than smaller stations.  Although the Commission 
conceded that geographic markets might be less accurate than its previous methodology, 
they argued that radio stations serve people, not land.  Consequently, they reasoned that 
when there is an accepted commercial definition of markets, the FCC should use it.  The 
new rule stated that if an Arbitron market changed, a station owner must wait 2 years before 
the FCC would consider altering its status.  This afforded protection for markets that were 
expanding or shrinking.  Another reason why the Commission decided to adopt the Arbitron 
standard was because the agency relied on BIA’s Media Access Pro-Database software, and 
that program used Arbitron data.  
 In its analysis of the numerical limits on local radio station ownership, the FCC 
concluded that if the current standard met the §202(h) test, because the three-tiered approach 
to regulating local markets, if amended to include noncommercial stations, guaranteed that 
there would be at least five relatively equal competitors in each market.  Furthermore, since 
the barriers to entry in local markets were high, given that virtually all spectrum space is 
licensed, radio broadcasting is a closed entry market.  This, according to the Report and 
Order, effectively limits the market power of station owners.  
However, the Commission went on to say that they realized that not all stations are 





reach much larger audiences than others.  The Report cited MOWG Study #11: Radio 
Industry Review 2002; Trends in Ownership, Format and Finance, that found that the top 50 
metro markets have an average of 19.9 radio station owners and the next 50 metros have an 
average of 11.4 owners.  The remaining metros have an average of 6.7 owners (Williams & 
Roberts, 2002).  While the top 50 metros had an average of 19.9 owners, the top station 
group in those markets received on average 35.2% of the revenue, and the top four groups 
receive 86.1% combined.  The top four groups also dominated audience share.  The Future 
of Music Coalition, and Bear Stern presented similar findings in their own  studies (DiCola 
& Thomson, 2002; Miller, Ensley, &Young, 2003).  This, said the FCC, showed that the 
numerical limits on local radio station ownership were not particularly onerous.  Despite the 
fact that the rule allowed one station group to own up to half the radio stations in small 
markets, the FCC considered this to be acceptable because it protected the financial viability 
of stations in small markets.   
 The Commission also concluded that localism is protected by the current limitations 
because local stations are responsive to the needs of their community of license.  The FCC 
asserted that concerns about large station groups are really concerns over national ownership 
levels, not localism.  Therefore, they need not address the issue when deciding whether to 
retain local radio ownership.  When discussing viewpoint diversity, the Commission  
said that media other than radio can play an important role in the dissemination of local 
news and information.  However, the Commission conceded that viewpoint diversity is 
important in local radio markets because it is easier to reach specific demographic audiences 
with radio than with other forms of mass media.  Because radio is more affordable than 





particularly for women, small business owners, and minorities.  This conclusion was 
reached despite the Commission’s earlier assertion that radio remains a closed entry market.  
 When addressing claims from organizations that argued that program diversity 
should be the predominant goal for the agency, it said that a recent study by Berry and 
Waldfogel (2001) showed that reductions in the numbers of owners in a radio market led to 
an increase in formats.  However, MOWG Study #11 showed that since the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act, the number of formats across radio markets remained flat.  The 
Commission ascribed the discrepancies between the two studies to the use of different 
databases.  Nonetheless, the Commission said no definitive evidence suggested a causal link 
between increased concentration in radio markets and a decrease in the number of formats 
offered in a market.  
 
Cross-Media Limits 
 The Commission’s 2002 Biennial Review Report devoted pages and pages of 
analysis to support its view that it was not necessary to retain its ban on 
Newspaper/Broadcast and Radio/Television Cross-Ownership rules pursuant to §202(h) of 
the Telecommunications Act (FCC, 2003i).  The Commission boldly declared that neither 
the current nationwide ban on newspapers and broadcast outlets in the same market nor the 
cross service restrictions on the ownership of Television/Radio combinations promoted 
competition.  The Report stated that the 27-year-old ban was intended to promote 
competition, but the ends sought no longer justified the means used to attain that goal.  
Therefore, the agency determined that modifying the rules to include a single set of cross-
media limits would be more precise and afford greater protection for media owner’s First 





 The FCC’s rationale for this decision began with a review of the rules it was 
modifying (FCC, 2003i).  According to the FCC, the current ban on Newspaper/Broadcast 
Cross-Ownership allowed no such combinations in markets where a broadcast station’s 
signal contour overlapped with a newspaper’s city of publication.  One of the flaws of this 
rule, according to the Report, was that while the regulation was intended to promote media 
competition and to protect diversity, it did not take into account the size of a market, the 
number of media outlets, the number of newspapers, nor the number of other media interests 
that serve each individual market.  Hence, the Commission found that the rules did not 
promote localism either. 
 In reaching this conclusion, the Commission first defined the relevant geographic 
and product markets for each medium.  Since the primary economic market that each 
medium competes in is the advertising market, it was the primary focus of the analysis.  The 
Commission expressed its concern that broadcasters could not compete for advertising 
dollars if they were not permitted to achieve greater economic efficiencies through mergers.  
If broadcasters could not compete for advertising dollars with other media, free over-the-air 
broadcasting might not remain viable in the future.  Since MOWG Study #10: On the 
Substitutability of Local Newspaper, Radio, and Television Advertising in Local Business 
Sales established that most advertisers do not ordinarily substitute television, radio, or 
newspaper spots for each other, the Commission declared that each medium should be a 
distinct market (Bush, 2002).  In other words, radio did not compete for advertising dollars 
with other media; it competed for those dollars among other radio stations in the market.  
The concept of each medium constituting a separate advertising market was buttressed by 





Commission reasoned that when one firm acquires another different type of medium in the 
same market, it is not a horizontal merger and cannot adversely affect competition in 
another discrete product market. 
 There were 21 existing cross-ownership arrangements before the Commission 
passed the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule in 1978 (FCC, 2003i).  These 
combinations were granted waivers that were grandfathered into the rule.  The FCC 
examined the markets that contained grandfathered combinations and determined that 
advertising rates were consistent with those in smaller markets that did not contain any 
cross-owned properties.  In fact, the Commission asserted that some of the grandfathered 
markets were more competitive than others because of the synergies and cost reductions that 
the combinations were able to obtain.  While the FCC received comments suggesting that 
some firms with existing cross-owned properties promoted cross media buys, the 
Commission stated that it was not charged with protecting advertising markets to begin 
with.  Although it was not the FCC’s responsibility to police advertising markets, advertisers 
were not without remedy.  Both the DOJ and the FTC addressed these problems, as did 
federal and state statues.  Furthermore, the agency acknowledged that if some advertisers 
were harmed by the relaxation of the ban, the harm would be greatest only if one entity 
owned all of the newspapers and all of the broadcasting properties in a market.  Moreover, 
since the FCC retained some constraints on local television and local radio stations, they 
expected that a healthy level of competition would remain in place. 
 The FCC explained that newspapers and television stations promoted two entirely 
different products.  Broadcasters provide breaking news and live reports, whereas 





judgment, a firm that accrues newspaper/broadcast combinations cannot affect competition 
in any relevant market. 
 The Report then went on to address localism and cross-owned media (FCC, 2003i).    
The FCC said that the record indicated that the Newspaper/Television Cross-Ownership ban 
was not necessary to promote local news and public affairs programming.  In fact, the 
Commission found that the ban actually inhibited localism by forbidding owners to 
capitalize on economic efficiencies obtained through mergers with other media in a market.  
The Report and Order cited MOWG Study #7: The Measurement of Local Television News 
and Public Affairs Programs that suggested a direct correlation between combinations and 
the amount of local news they provided and that such combinations were more successful in 
providing quality reporting than other single medium (Spavins et al., 2002).  This finding 
also cited a paper submitted by the Project in Excellence in Journalism, Does Ownership 
Matter in Local Television News?  that concluded that combined ownership outlets were 
more than twice as likely to receive accolades than others were (2003). 
 The FCC addressed comments by those who asserted that some producers carry a 
noticeable editorial viewpoint across their properties, and the FCC insisted that this was 
hardly an indictment against those owners.  According to the FCC, certain ideas gain 
traction in the marketplace of ideas, and it is not up to the agency to intervene.  “Nor is it 
troubling that media properties may allow their news and editorial positions to be driven by 
‘the bottom-line’” (FCC, 2003i, p.142).  The Commissioners proceeded to explain that the 
need and desire to produce revenue and profit from media is a time-honored tradition. 
Additionally, the FCC determined that a blanket ban on cross-ownership in all 





Since there had been tremendous growth in the number, breadth, and scope of entertainment 
and information media over the past 27 years, the ban no longer made sense in light of new 
competition from other media.  Besides, enormous benefits could be accrued if companies 
were encouraged to achieve the efficiencies and synergies that would permit them to 
enhance the quality and viability of their products.  The FCC cited evidence that the average 
grandfathered newspaper/television combination led their markets in early day-parts and 
delivered 43% more audience share than the second ranked station in the market (FCC, 
2003i; Miller et al. 2003).  This study also found that grandfathered combinations created 
new information outlets on the Internet and over cable. 
 When addressing diversity, the FCC made the claim that the ban on cross-owned 
newspapers and television station may actually be harming it (FCC, 2003i).  According to 
this line of reasoning, the synergies and efficiencies that a cross-owned property might be 
able to achieve could actually lead to increases in the number of newspapers and television 
stations in a market.  Since newspapers and television stations have suffered from declines 
in reader and viewership in recent years, relaxing the ban would have a positive effect on 
diversity.  Additionally, the FCC must fashion its rules based on the strength of media 
outlets because maximizing the number of independent voices does not further diversity if 
the market cannot support multiple outlets. 
 Quoting from data collected by Pritchard (2002) in MOWG Study #2: Viewpoint 
Diversity in Cross-Owned Newspapers and Television Stations: A Study of News Coverage 
of the 2000 Presidential Campaign, the Commission said that there is evidence to believe 
that individual outlets in group-owned properties do not speak with a monolithic voice.  





anecdotal evidence to suggest widespread bias.  The Report stated that the FCC would have 
to have a high degree of confidence that a uniform bias existed in cross-owned properties to 
consider this a factor in its rule-making.  In fact, the FCC said it had evidence that indicated 
that competing outlets abound in all markets.  For example, television, radio, both 
commercial and noncommercial, and cable and nationally distributed satellite programming, 
have all expanded to provide original programming.  Additionally, MOWG Study #3: 
Consumer Substitution Among Media, showed that 72% of U.S. citizens are now online and 
say that they generally consider the Internet as a news substitute for television and 
newspapers (Waldfogel, 2002). 
 Likewise, the FCC dispatched the Radio/Television Cross-Ownership Rule.  As with 
the Newspaper/Television Cross-Ownership ban, the FCC rationalized that radio and 
television comprise two discreet markets, and, therefore, they cannot compete with each 
other.  The Commission agreed that fostering the diversity of voices is a worthy goal; 
however they did not believe this rule accomplished that end.  Instead, they decided to adopt 
cross-media limits that relied on a diversity index to measure the number of voices in a 
market. 
 
Diversity Index and Market Concentration 
After reiterating the necessity of relying on empirical evidence so the courts would 
uphold its rules, the FCC announced that it had created a mathematical formula based on the 
HHI used by the DOJ to determine if a given market for a product was overly concentrated 
(FCC, 2003i).  The HHI created a numerical score that measured market concentration.  A 
market’s HHI score is the sum of a market share squared.  The higher the number, the more 





of 1000; a market with 5 equal size competitors receives a score of 2000 (Cooper, 2003; 
Prometheus Radio Group v. FCC, 2004).  The FCC rationalized this approach because it 
said that they did not expect every outlet to be diverse since the local news product is 
delivered via multiple media.  Accordingly, the relevant issue was whether a consumer in 
each market had a range of choices.  While admitting that the DI was not perfect because it 
was based on aggregated national data rather than information that was gathered locally, the 
Commissioners said that the new index would provide them with a baseline summary that 
would be used to determine which areas are at risk of losing viewpoint diversity. 
The data used to construct the index were based on MOWG Study #8: Consumer 
Survey on Media Usage, a study that purported to measure consumers’ use of media when 
seeking out local news and information (Nielsen, 2002).  Based on this study, the FCC 
concluded that the relevant outlets that needed to be included in the DI were radio, 
television, daily and weekly newspapers, and the Internet.  According to MOWG Study #8, 
the aforementioned media were the ones that consumers relied on most heavily to access 
local news. 
 The next step taken to determine the DI was to calculate an ownership share of each 
medium (FCC, 2003i).  The FCC chose sample markets, counted the number of outlets in 
each one, and then assigned them an equal market share.  Next, each ownership share was 
given a relative weight by media type.  Consequently, broadcast television received a 33.8% 
weight, radio was assigned 24.9%, daily newspapers received 20.2 %, weeklies, 8.6%, and 
the Internet weighed in at 10.2%.  However, in markets with cross-owned shares, the 





then squared all of the weighted ownership shares, and their sum equaled the market’s total 
DI share. 
 After calculating the DI, the Commission then turned its attention to how these 
scores would change depending on the size of each market.  In markets with five or more 
television stations, the average DI was 911.5
 
  If a newspaper and television combination 
existed in that same market, the score increased to 1134.  The Commission considered other 
hypotheticals for combinations in similar size markets.  They calculated the DI based on the 
following scenarios: (a) If one television station and all the radio stations that were allowed 
to be commonly owned under the local radio rule were owned by a single entity; (b) if one 
newspaper and all of the radio stations allowed under local radio ownership rule were 
owned by a single entity; (c) if one newspaper, one television station, and half of the radio 
stations that were allowed were owned by a single entity; (d) if two television stations were 
owned by a single entity; (e) if one newspaper and two television stations were owned by a 
single entity; and (f) if one newspaper, two television stations, and all of the radio stations 
were owned by one entity.  After concluding that all of the above consolidation scenarios 
would lead to unacceptable increases in the DI score for the smaller markets, the FCC 
prohibited newspaper/television and newspaper/radio combinations in those markets.  In 
midsize markets with between four and eight television stations, the only unacceptable 
combinations were those that involved a newspaper and television duopoly, so all others 
were permitted.  In large size markets with nine or more television stations, the Commission 
did not impose any limits on cross-media ownership. 
                                                 






 Despite considerable input from individuals, public service organizations, and media 
professionals who urged the Commission to retain the current media ownership regulations, 
the FCC voted 3-2 to relax or eliminate most of them.  The overriding rationale for these 
decisions was that due to increasing media delivery options, the Commission had a 
responsibility to protect competition between all types of media outlets, not just within 
discrete segments of radio, television, and newspaper markets.  Powell, Abernathy, and 
Martin believed that the marginal limits they adopted would increase competition among all 
media outlets by allowing mergers between media group owners who could then assume 
increased efficiencies of scale.  The majority felt that media owners would then pass on their 
savings to consumers in the form of improved and expanded products that would benefit 
consumers and increase diversity.  If the theoretical foundations of their determinations were 
correct, then consumers could look forward to a wider array of viewpoint diversity even if 
the notion of outlet diversity was largely discarded.  
However, the 2002 Biennial Report and Order was littered with inconsistencies and 
flawed assumptions.  A considerable amount of the content of the report was devoted to 
detailing the FCC’s policy goals.  According to the agency, diversity, competition, localism, 
and regulatory certainty were the primary objectives that informed the decision-making 
process.  Although this may have been the case, many of the modifications to media 
ownership rules were clearly designed to protect the economic interests of the industry it 
governed.  
The National Cap on ownership was increased to 45% of the national audience from 





channels.  The FCC decided that viewpoint diversity is not relevant to national markets, 
because diversity is only applicable to local markets.  Yet, when the decision was made to 
loosen local television ownership restrictions, the agency decided that it was a flawed 
assumption to presume that only local television contributed to diversity.  Accordingly, the 
FCC concluded that cable contributed to diversity in local markets, this despite the fact that 
most of the programming that is distributed by cable systems is produced for a national 
market.  Then, almost as an aside, Report and Order stated that the local television 
ownership rules were established to promote economic efficiencies, not localism.  
According to the Commission, radio is a closed entry market.  The Commission also 
determined that there are no viable substitutes for radio; therefore it did not consider other 
media when assessing the diversity of local radio markets.  Although the Commission 
reached the conclusion that a closed entry market provides a check on the market power of 
group owned properties, it still insisted that radio offered an excellent opportunity for new 
entrants in the market, particularly small business owners, women, and minorities.  When 
addressing whether or not local radio stations provide local news and information to their 
communities of license, the FCC declared that licensees are responsive to the needs of the 
community, this, despite assertions to the contrary that the public made repeatedly.  
When the Commission decided to increase the limits for cross-owned media, it 
decided to count all media in determining whether a market is sufficiently competitive, 
diverse, and local.  The FCC then devised the Diversity Index, based on national data, to 
apply to local markets.  The index assigned somewhat arbitrary weights to each medium in 
order to come up with a mathematical formula that could be applied consistently to each 





shoppers and large metropolitan dailies; college radio stations were accorded the same 
weight as 50,000 watt clear channels stations, and stations broadcasting community athletic 
events were given the same weight as were network-affiliated stations. 
Although the Commission took pains to establish that its ultimate goal was to 
provide a media environment that supported localism, competition, and diversity, its 
decision to achieve this end by allowing group owners to achieve economic efficiencies in 
local and national markets was immediately contested.  The industry was disappointed that 
more ownership restrictions were not lifted.  According to the FCC’s own studies, a 
majority of the population still relied on broadcast television and newspapers for most of 
their local, regional, and national news.  The perception among a significant portion of the 
public was that fewer owners meant fewer voices would be able to access the marketplace of 
ideas.  In the days and weeks following the release of the Report and Order, the Commission 
























 Shortly before the Commission voted on the 2002 Biennial Review Order (the 
Order) in June 2003, more than 150 members of Congress from both parties asked the 
FCC to postpone the vote until they conducted more studies (Labaton, 2003a).  Two days 
after the FCC voted to relax its media ownership rules, the Senate Commerce Committee 
summoned the Commissioners to a hearing to explain the rationale for their votes (“FCC 
Oversight,” 2003; Ho, 2003c).  Subsequently, throughout the summer, Congress 
instigated a series of complicated maneuvers intended to reverse or modify the 
Commission’s decision to raise the cap on national television ownership (Ahrens, 2003b; 
Crabtree, 2003a; Davidson, 2003f).  As soon as the Order was published in the Federal 
Record, activists filed lawsuits challenging the new rules in several jurisdictions.  The 
cases were consolidated, and the lawsuit proceeded on to the U.S Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit Court in Philadelphia.  Meanwhile the public asserted its opposition to 
the new rules by writing editorials, by writing letters and e-mails, and by phoning the 
FCC and their representatives in Congress (Blevins & Brown, 2006; McChesney, 2004a).  
In September, the court issued a stay prohibiting the FCC from implementing the new 
regulations pending review (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  On June 24, 





arbitrary and capricious and remanded it back to the agency.  Six months later, Powell 
submitted a letter of resignation to President Bush (Powell, 2005). 
 
Heated Reactions 
  Before the Commission voted in June, many trade publications and major 
newspapers predicted that no matter what the FCC decided, no one would be completely 
satisfied with the outcome (Ahrens, 2003a; Davidson, 2003d; Hearn, 2003a).  The 
pundits were correct.  Even Powell told the New York Times that lawsuits were inevitable 
(Labaton, 2003a).  Criticism came from all stakeholders in the debate.  Presidential 
candidate John Kerry and his running mate John Edwards condemned the FCC’s vote 
(Dreazen, 2003a; Labaton, 2003b).  In fact, all of the Democratic presidential candidates 
expressed their opposition to the new rules.  The Wall Street Journal reported that 
Democratic opposition to the vote was part of a larger strategy to depict the Bush 
administration as being too close to business interests and too lax in moderating corporate 
excess.  According to Mark Mellman, a Democratic pollster and strategist, the FCC vote 
was part of a pattern of the Bush administration caring more about the interests of big 
business than about ordinary citizens.  Mellman predicted that Democratic candidates 
would exploit the consolidation vote as part of a larger agenda.  Kerry announced that he 
would introduce a Resolution of Disapproval6
                                                 
6 A resolution of disapproval allowed a simple majority to override an administrative 
agency ruling. 
 in the Senate to reverse the new 
regulations (Anselmo, 2003a; Johnson, 2003).  Edwards said that he would co-sponsor a 
bill already introduced by Senators Ernest Hollings and Ted Stevens that would reinstate 





cap was a "massive giveaway of public resources to a few privileged insiders," and it was 
"bad for free expression, bad for American democracy, and particularly bad for the 
forgotten corners of rural America" (Dreazen, 2003a, p. A4).  
  House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi issued a press release stating that she was 
very disappointed in the FCC’s ruling (Pelosi, 2003).  She accused the Republican 
majority of recklessly loosening rules that were put in place to serve the public interest.  
House Democratic Caucus Committee Chairman Bob Menendez issued his own 
statement saying that the FCC’s vote showed no regard for the public’s opposition to 
deregulation in media.  He accused the press of ignoring the issue even after a dozen 
House members organized a press conference to discuss their opposition to the proposed 
rules before the vote.  
Not a single network camera, radio or mainstream print outlet showed [up], we 
were faced with the grim reality of what a future with further consolidation may 
look like.  When media conglomerates lobby for change, but refuse to air debate, 
then corporate decision-making has infiltrated the newsroom.  (Menendez, 2003, 
p.1) 
  
  Senators Trent Lott-R, Earnest Hollings-D, and Bryon Dorgan-D called a news 
conference to criticize the Commission (Dreazen, 2003a; Labaton, 2003c).  They 
declared that opposition to the FCC’s decision was not a partisan issue.  However Billy 
Tauzin-R, chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, applauded the FCC, 
although he said the FCC should have gone even further to deregulate broadcasting. 
  Mark Mays, president and chief operating officer of Clear Channel 
Communications, issued a statement saying that his company was deeply disappointed 
with the Commission’s vote to “re-regulate” radio (“Clear Channel Criticizes,” 2003).  





60% of the radio industry was operating in the red.  Before the act, radio stations were 
cutting news budgets and laying off staff, but after the legislation, radio station owners 
began to innovate and find new ways to serve their listeners and grow their businesses.  
Mays said that the FCC Order suggested that the agency had succumbed to political 
pressure at the expense of the public interest when it revised market contours that failed 
to lift ownership caps in radio completely.  Although Mays insisted that Clear Channel 
would continue to strive to provide the best entertainment, local news, and information 
for its listeners, he implied that the Commission’s vote would seriously hamper his 
company’s efforts. 
 Trade publications reported that Congress seemed unlikely to roll back the new 
rules despite the outcry from senators, because Senator McCain and Representative 
Tauzin controlled key Congressional committees and both were opposed to any rewrites 
of the rules (Crabtree, 2003a; Halonen, 2003c; McConnell, 2003b).  However, most 
observers agreed that the Federal Appeals Court in Washington, DC would be deluged 
with lawsuits as soon as the FCC had time to review petitions asking it to reconsider the 
rules.  Broadcasting & Cable reported that Clear Channel was expected to challenge the 
radio ownership rules, and small stations and affiliates were expected to sue over the new 
45% cap on national ownership.  Consumer groups were likely to exploit inconsistencies 
in the ruling in court.  Despite predictions that no bill to reversing the FCC rules would 
make it through Congress, the growing backlash against the agency was of concern to 
media lobbyists (McConnell, 2003b; Shields, 2003c).  John Sturm, president and chief 
operating officer of the Newspaper Association of America, said that his organization 






Just 2 days after the FCC voted to relax its media ownership rules, Senator 
McCain, chair of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, asked the 
Commissioners to justify their votes to the full committee (FCC Oversight, 2003; Ho, 
2003c).  Powell began his testimony by reminding the senators that the FCC did not 
always have the luxury of abiding by public opinion (Powell, 2003b).  He said the 
Commission was bound to comply with the rules laid down by Congress and the courts, 
whether its regulations were popular or not.  He repeatedly said that the rule changes 
were moderate and twice pointed out that any single network owned less than 3% of the 
nation’s television stations.  He denied that he was promoting gratuitous deregulation, 
and stressed that the FCC was compelled to continue the process of deregulation that 
began with the 1996 Telecommunications Act.  Powell insisted that the modifications to 
the ownership rules were carefully considered so that they would meet the agency’s 
public interest goals of diversity, localism, and competition.  He said that when the FCC 
considered the “explosion” of new media outlets, it was striking a careful balance 
between the public interest and corporations’ ability to compete in the marketplace. 
In a prepared statement, Commissioner Abernathy supported Powell and 
suggested that Congress should consider increasing the time allotted for regulatory 
review (Abernathy, 2003).  She pointed out that the Commission was already 5 months 
behind schedule and that it was difficult to adhere to a 2-year schedule of review.  
Abernathy reiterated Powell’s argument that the courts had struck down every broadcast 
ownership rule that they had appraised since the Telecommunications Act.  She said that 





also claimed that the Commission had a duty to protect the First Amendment rights of 
broadcasters, and therefore, it had to tailor its rules to conform to the competitive realities 
of the current marketplace.  In reply to allegations that the FCC rushed to judgment on 
the new rules, Abernathy told the committee that the FCC had initiated a review of the 
Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule in 2001.  Other studies of the rules were 
initiated in 1996 and 1998.  Therefore, the FCC had between 18 months and 7 years to 
study these issues.  She repeated Powell’s claim that the defining characteristic of the 
2002 Biennial Review Order was balance.  Abernathy told the senators that it should go 
without saying that none of the Commissioners wanted to see media concentrated in the 
hands of few but that reasonable minds differ on where the lines should be drawn.  
 Commissioner Copps began his statement to the committee with an expression of 
dissent from the majority.   
I strongly dissented to this decision.  I dissented on grounds of substance.  I 
dissented on grounds of process.  I dissented because I believe the Commission’s 
actions empower America’s new Media Elite with unacceptable levels of 
influence over the ideas and information upon which our society and our 
democracy so heavily depend.  (2003c, p. 1)  
 
 Copps (2003c) told the senators that he believed that the Commission came to a 
fork in the road.  One path led to a reaffirmation of America’s commitment to local 
control of media, diversity, and the importance of competition.  The other path, according 
to Copps, led to a handful of corporate giants controlling media content.  He said that the 
FCC should have looked to the law before deciding which path to take.  The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, according to Copps, indicated that Congress felt it was 
necessary to put limits on how many media outlets an entity could control.  The Supreme 





of voices, rather than to tolerate the monopolization of the marketplace of ideas.  When 
the radio industry became unforeseeably consolidated after limits on ownership were 
lifted, the FCC should have used that experience to guide its decisions about other 
segments of the broadcast industry.  Finally, Copps said that the FCC should have 
listened to the American people when the agency received close to three quarters of a 
million comments from citizens who were 99.9% opposed to lifting ownership 
restrictions.  Copps said that the FCC’s decision to allow radical deregulation would 
allow media giants to exert a massive influence over communities: “I see centralization, 
not localism; I see uniformity, not diversity; I see monopoly and oligopoly, not 
competition” (p. 3).  Then Copps elaborated on his earlier remark that the decision-
making process was flawed.  He told the committee that the process was dominated by a 
classic inside-the-beltway mentality.  Instead of keeping the proceeding transparent and 
reaching out to the public and other interested parties, the Commission refused to disclose 
the new rules before voting on them.  After offering a lengthy critique of the majority’s 
rationale for liberalizing the rules, he ended his statement by reading the senators a note 
that he had received: 
Dear Commissioner:  I understand you’re messing around with the people’s 
airwaves. I don’t think I like what you’re doing.  I know I don’t like the way 
you’re doing it.  I’m a citizen and I expect to be told what your plans are before 
you do it.  Get a grip.  Straighten out your priorities.  Thank you.  (Copps, 2003c, 
p. 8) 
  
 When it was his turn to speak, Commissioner Martin began by thanking the 
senators for giving him an opportunity to answer any questions they might have (Martin, 
2003c).  He praised the hard work and vision of Chairman Powell and said he was 






 Commissioner Adelstein (2003c) began his statement by noting that June 2 had 
been a sad day for democracy.  He predicted that media companies would go on buying 
sprees and would therefore accumulate debt and become even more beholden to bottom 
line issues than they already were.  He foresaw a media environment that contained more 
sensationalism, more crassness, more violence, and less coverage for serious news and 
local events.  He derided the assumption that allowing more cross-ownership in media 
holdings would increase levels of public interest programming.  Adelstein informed the 
Committee that a national study found that combined television coverage of all political 
campaigns in 2000 was about 74 seconds per night.  This figure included all time spent 
covering all election campaigns, local, statewide, and national.  It excluded political 
advertising.  He concluded his statement by acknowledging that the courts and Congress 
required the FCC to review the media ownership rules every 2 years.  However, he was 
 After a long explanation of the difficulties involved in assessing the issues, 
Martin quoted from §202(h) of the Telecommunications Act and reminded the committee 
that the FCC has a legal mandate to determine whether the rules are still necessary in 
today’s marketplace.  Martin said that the DC Circuit Court had placed a demanding 
burden on the Commission to repeal or modify the ownership rules.  He quoted from Fox 
v. FCC (2002) saying that the Commission may retain a rule only if it reasonably 
determines that the rule is necessary in the public interest.  In Martin’s opinion, the new 
rules were necessary.  He then went on to talk about the abundance of media available in 
today’s marketplace and the importance of protecting localism, diversity, and competition 
in the face of changed circumstances.  
                                                 





of the opinion that the agency should have required a market-by-market, case-by-case 
approach that would ensure that each merger served the public interest. 
 After the Commissioners spoke, the Committee members peppered them with 
questions and criticism (Davidson, 2003e; FCC Oversight, 2003; Ho, 2003c; Labaton, 
2003c).  Powell twice defended the new rules as “modest proposals”; however the 
Senators were not very sympathetic to his claim.  Although Chairman McCain was 
widely acknowledged to be in favor of deregulation, he noted that the business of media 
ownership was too important to be dealt with categorically.  He told the Commission that 
he would insert language into an upcoming bill to clarify that the FCC had the authority 
to strengthen ownership rules as well as to loosen them (S. 1046, 2003).  McCain also 
said that the Committee would consider extending the period between compulsorily 
reviews.  Senator Hollings, who had already introduced a bill cosponsored by Senator 
Stevens to rescind the National Television Ownership Rule, was an even harsher critic.  
Hollings, the Committee’s ranking Democrat, said Powell was engaged in spin and fraud.  
Hollings accused the agency of becoming an instrument of corporate greed.  Senator Kay 
Bailey Hutchinson said that lifting the Television/Newspaper Cross-Ownership Rule was 
an alarming development.  Senator Olympia Snowe said that the new regulations paved 
the way for further consolidation and concentration into the hands of a few.  She noted 
that the court declared that the FCC had to have a rational basis for determining what is 
in the public interest.  She doubted that the FCC could determine the public interest 
without involving the public (Kirkland & Stuck, 2003; Shields, 2003c).  Senator Barbara 
Boxer told the Commissioners that it was their job to represent the people, not special 





Television/Newspaper Cross-Ownership Rule.  Senator George Allen disagreed with the 
other committee members and said that the new rules reflected the current marketplace.  
As the meeting ended, McCain scheduled a vote on S. 1046 that would reverse the FCC’s 
2002 Biennial Review Order and rescind the National Television Ownership Rule 
(Anselmo, 2003; Preservation of Localism, 2003; S. Rprt. No. 108-141, 2003).  Nine 
Senators from the Committee cosponsored the bill, including four Republicans.   
 
Committee Consensus 
 On June 19, the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee 
forwarded S. 1046 out of committee (Ahrens, 2003b; Geewax, 2003; S. 2046, 2003; S. 
Rpt. No. 108-141, 2003).  The bill contained provisions that would roll back the National 
Television Ownership Rule to the previous limit of 35% and force television group 
owners to divest of some of their stations if they were over the line.  The bill had 
bipartisan support and passed with a voice vote.  According to Hollings, the vote was a 
repudiation of the FCC’s disastrous ruling.  The bill permitted radio station owners who 
were already over the limit to keep all of their existing stations, and it would have 
allowed state regulators to recommend waivers to the amendment if it was necessary to 
keep a station from going off the air.  Additionally, the bill required the FCC to hold at 
least five public hearings before contemplating any future ownership changes. Also 
language in the bill clarified the FCC’s authority to strengthen, as well as to relax, media 
ownership rules. 
 Although this was a partial victory for those who were opposed to the FCC’s June 
2 action, there was considerable doubt over whether the bill would be successful when it 





“Media-Rule Thrill Ride,” 2003; Shales, 2003).  Although there were similar bills 
making their way through the House of Representatives, Representative Billy Tauzin 
vowed to block the bills from reaching the floor of the House.  Additionally, C.W. Bill 
Young, a Republican Representative from Florida who chaired the Appropriations 
Committee, said he would strongly resist any attempt to attach a rider overturning the 
FCC vote as apart as a larger spending bill.  However, Representative John Dingle, a 
Democrat from Michigan, was the ranking member of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee and he strongly supported a bill to amend the FCC rules.  Moreover, most 
observers gave the bill slim to no chance of passing in the Senate.  Nonetheless, both of 
the Democratic members of the FCC were encouraged by the Commerce Committee’s 
vote.  Copps declared that they had momentum on their side and that the decision would 
awake a sleeping giant.  Adelstein said that the other Commissioners should see the 
writing on the wall and reverse their ruling.  
 
The Sleeping Giant Awakes 
 While Congress was considering its options, lobbyists from all sides of the issue 
descended on both Houses (Chester, 2007; Klinenberg, 2007; McChesney, 2004a).  A 
wide range of public activist groups such as CU, CFA, FreePress, MoveOn.org, the 
Parent’s Television Council, the Christian Coalition, NOW, and labor unions pressed 
Congress to block the new rules from taking effect.  Not only did these groups lobby 
Congress, but they also created extensive web sites to inform the public about media 
consolidation.  There were letter-writing campaigns, petition drives, and urgent e-mails 
asking citizens to call their representatives.  On a single afternoon, House members 





opposition to the new rules overwhelmed members of Congress when they traveled back 
to their districts.  Additionally, the National Association of Broadcasters, with 1,100 
independently owned television stations and 6,000 radio station members, initially 
supported the roll back on the national cap. 
 On the other side of the debate, the networks were urging Congress to let the 
FCC’s vote on the National Television Ownership Rule stand (Schatz, 2003).  However, 
when the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee passed Senate Bill 
1046, which included provisions to retain cross-ownership limits and the National 
Television Ownership Rule, NAB withdrew its support for the measure due to pressure 
from its other members (Anselmo, 2003b).  The National Association of Newspapers, 
The Tribune Company, Hearst/Argyle, and the Belo Corporation stepped up their own 
lobbying efforts and urged the committee to drop the cross-ownership amendments to the 
bill.  
 Meanwhile, from June through November, both chambers of Congress were 
introducing bills, blocking bills, passing resolutions, and generally trying to respond to 
increased pressure from the public.  By the end of July, the FCC received an additional 
1.25 million letters opposing the new rules (Anselmo, 2003d).  In May, Richard Burr-R 
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce had introduced a bill called the 
Preservation of Localism, Diversity in Programming, and Competition in Broadcast 
Service Act of 2003 (H.R. 2052, 2003).  The bill would have reinstated the 35% National 
Television Ownership limit, but Tauzin refused to let it out of committee, this despite the 
fact that the bill had 192 co-sponsors, including 147 Democrats and 45 Republicans (H.R. 





Appropriations Committee attached a rider to a funding bill for the Commerce, Justice, 
and State departments (H.R. 2799, 2003).  It passed out of committee by a vote of 40-25.  
However, by the time the bill reached the full floor, it was amended so its provisions 
would only be in effect for 1 year.  The vote passed by a margin of 400-12.  
Subsequently, the White House announced that President Bush would veto the bill, and 
the President even appeared on Fox Television with Powell telling the audience what a 
good job Powell had done with the new rules. 
 This development left the senate to consider its own version of a similar bill 
(Davidson, 2003f; “FCC Media Ownership,” 2003).  On September 4, the Senate 
Appropriations Committee amended an omnibus-spending bill that would have 
effectively blocked media ownership changes indefinitely.  The bill contained many other 
controversial provisions and did not pass.  On September 16, the full Senate passed a 
Resolution of Disapproval by a vote of 55-40.  The resolution condemned the FCC’s 
Order and would have reversed the new rules if it passed in the House.  However, the 
prospects for that appeared unlikely (Crabtree, 2003b; Mundy, 2003b).  By this point, 
both the Senate and the House were scrambling to find some consensus so that any 
version of a bill would pass.  Tauzin was still trying to block any legislation from 
reaching the floor in the House.  Then, on November 5, members of the House sent 
Majority Leader Dennis Hastert a letter imploring him to let the full House consider its 
own Resolution of Disapproval.  On November 24, in a last minute deal, the White House 
and Senate Republicans reached a compromise that would limit national ownership to 
39%.  That compromise drew the line precisely at the limit that would allow Viacom and 





spending bill in the House, and it passed on December 8.  It was ratified in the Senate on 
January 23, 2004 (Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 2673, §629, 2004).  The rider 
also contained a provision that gave group owners 2 years to divest of some of their 
holdings if they were over the limit and changed the biennial review requirement of the 
Telecommunication Act to a quadrennial review.  President Bush did not veto the bill and 
it became law.  While all of this maneuvering was taking place in Congress, activists 
were not standing still; they sought a remedy from the courts and filed petitions in several 
jurisdictions to reverse the Order. 
 
Prometheus Radio Project and the Media Access Project 
 On August 13, Andrew Schwartzman of MAP, in conjunction with the 
Prometheus Radio Project, the Media Alliance, and the National Council of Churches of 
Christ (Citizen Petitioners) filed suit against the FCC in three different jurisdictions 
(Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  The petitioners argued that the deregulatory 
provisions contained in the 2002 Biennial Review Order did not conform to the FCC’s 
statutory mandates, and that the rulemaking process violated the Administrative 
Procedures Act.  Although the DC Circuit Court was usually the venue for appeals to 
FCC decisions, it was also widely acknowledged to be in favor of deregulatory decisions 
(McConnell, 2003b; Yang, 2003).  Schwartzman’s strategy of filing suit in three different 
venues was precluded on the assumption that all three appeals would be consolidated and 
moved to a more favorable circuit (Bischoff, 2003; “Ownership Re,” 2003; “The 
Politics,” 2003).  However, NASA, representing affiliates of NBC, CBS, and Capitol 
Broadcasting, filed suit in Washington, DC arguing that the National Television 





(Network Petitioners) also appealed the decision, although those companies thought the 
new rules were too restrictive.  Fox Entertainment Group and the Sinclair Broadcast 
Group filed a petition in Wahington, DC to overturn the National Television Ownership 
Limit altogether.  After the Judicial Panel on Multijurisdictional Litigation reviewed all 
of the petitions, it did indeed consolidate the three Prometheus petitions and the other 
challenges into one case.  The Third District Court in Philadelphia was chosen to hear the 
case after a lottery was held.  Then the Network Petitioners filed a motion to transfer the 
case back to the DC Circuit. 
 Prometheus et al. subsequently filed a counter motion (Prometheus Radio Project 
v. FCC, 2004).  First, they argued that the Network Petitioner’s motion asserting that the 
DC Court was the only appropriate venue for hearing the case was invalid.  The Network 
Petitioners then declared that the Prometheus v. FCC (2004) case was closely related to 
Fox Television Stations v. FCC (2002) and Sinclair Broadcast Group v. FCC (2002).  
Therefore, the DC Court had the necessary expertise to decide the case.  In answer to the 
question of expertise, the Citizen Petitioners responded by saying that if Congress wanted 
to give the DC Circuit additional jurisdiction over the FCC rulemaking process, it would 
have done so.  Additionally, the Citizen Petitioners contended that the Fox case stemmed 
from the 1998 Biennial Review, not the 2002 Order that was currently under scrutiny.  
The Sinclair (2002) case had its roots in an FCC rule that was adopted in 1999, but not 
completed until 2001.  According to the Citizen Petitioners, this distinguished the cases 
from the preceding at hand.  The Network Petitioners also accused MAP of forum 






 On the same day the court ruled on the motion to transfer, the Citizen Petitioners 
filed a motion asking the court in Philadelphia to issue a stay that would prevent the 
FCC’s rules from taking effect before the case could be decided (Prometheus Radio 
Project v. FCC, 2004).  Prometheus argued that there was a significant possibility that the 
Senate might overturn all or parts of the 2002 Order.  Accordingly, not only did these 
circumstances increase the likelihood that Prometheus might succeed in the litigation, but 
it also magnified the likelihood that the Prometheus would incur irreparable harm absent 
a stay.  The precedent that defined the criteria for issuing a stay was Virginia Petroleum 
Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC (1958).  The test for an issuance of a stay asks four questions.  Has 
the petitioner made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on merits of the appeal?  
Has the petitioner shown that there will be irreparable harm to the petitioner in the 
absence of a stay?  In the absence of a stay, will others be harmed? Where lies the public 
interest? 
  The Network Petitioners also argued that it would be inconvenient for their 
attorneys to travel to Philadelphia from Washington, DC.  Then, the Citizen Petitioners 
countered by pointing out that Philadelphia was only an hour and a half commute by 
train, probably less than the commute the attorneys made from their homes to their 
offices.  
 On September 3, after hearing 4 hours of oral arguments from Prometheus Radio 
Project and the FCC, Fox Entertainment Group, Fox Television Stations, NBC, 
Telemundo, and Viacom, the Court granted the Prometheus Radio Project’s request for a 
                                                 
8 As noted in proceeding chapters, citizens have legal standing in matters before the FCC, 
and the Prometheus Radio Project had a long history of being involved with issues related 
to media reform (Caruso, 2003; Lazaroff, 2003; Office of Communication of the United 





stay (Dreazen, 2003b; Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  The Per Curium 
opinion applied Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC (1958) and determined that 
there was a considerable risk of harm to the Citizen Petitioners if the rules were permitted 
to take effect.  Those harms, including the possibility of more mergers occurring before 
the Court could decide the case, were considerable.  In contrast, the court could see no 
harm likely to be incurred by the Network Petitioners if the status quo was maintained 
until the case was decided.  
While it is difficult to predict the likelihood of success on the merits at this stage 
of the proceedings, these harms could outweigh the effect of a stay.  Given the 
magnitude of this matter and the public's interest in reaching the proper 
resolution, a stay is warranted pending thorough and efficient judicial review. 
(Prometheus v. FCC, 2003, Stay Order, p.3) 
 
 The reaction to the court-ordered stay was swift and furious.  The FCC said in a 
statement that it will "continue to vigorously defend them [the new rules] and looks 
forward to a decision by the Court on the merits " (Dreazen, 2003b, p. A3).  MAP issued 
a statement that was cautiously optimistic and thanked all who had collaborated with 
them.  The press release also acknowledged that this was hardly the end of the fight 
MAP, 2003).  Gene Kimmelman told the Washington Post that "this is a surprise to 
everybody, nobody expected we'd get a stay" (Ahrens, 2003c, p. 3A). 
  Others in the industry expressed surprise as well.  One trade journal began its 
report on the decision with this lead; “ If Michael Powell is wearing a neck-brace to work 
this week, everyone will know the cause of his injury: political whiplash” (Hearn, 2003c, 
p. 3).  Levin, an analyst for Legg Mason, told reporters that the rules were on hold 
anyway until Congress finished its review, but the stay increased the level of uncertainty.  





court would lift the stay (Mundy, 2003b).  Therefore, during that 1 week in September, 
Chairman Powell suffered two serious setbacks to his broad agenda to deregulate media.  
One day after the court issued its stay, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a 
spending bill that would roll back the national cap on television ownership to 39% 
(Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 2673, 2004).  Laura Behrens, a media analyst at 
Gartner/G2, said that Powell miscalculated a sea change in public opinion.  It was her 
impression that Congress wanted to keep the current rules intact.  One week later, Powell 
and the networks were dealt another blow. 
 
Philly Court Retains the Case 
 On September 15, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia denied the 
Network Petitioners’ joint motion to transfer the case to Washington, DC (Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  The court concluded that the issues in Prometheus (2004) 
were not closely related enough to warrant transfer to the DC Circuit.  The judges said 
that the 2002 Order was an omnibus biennial review of media ownership rules compelled 
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, not by Fox and Sinclair (Prometheus Radio 
Project v. FCC, 2003).  The justices also asserted that the Third Circuit Court was no less 
qualified than any other appellate court to determine whether the FCC appropriately 
considered the public interest in its decision-making process.  Levin declared that this 
was a significant setback for the networks.  Broadcasting & Cable reported that keeping 
the case out of Washington, DC did not necessarily ensure a favorable deregulation 
decision (Hearn, 2003b; McConnell, 2003b).  No matter what happened in Congress, no 
mergers could go forward until the Court reached its decision.  Even though the court 





spring.  Schwartzman insisted that it was highly speculative to think that his strategy to 
keep the case out of Washington, DC would pay off in the end.  Others predicted that the 
case would inevitably end up in Washington one way or another, through appeals to the 
Supreme Court, through remands to the FCC, or through new legislation working its way 
through Congress.  The networks did not issue any comment immediately after the denial 
to transfer the case. 
 In September, Powell gave a telephone interview to the New York Times 
(Labaton, 2003e).  He told the reporter that he was thinking about retiring from his post 
but had not reached any firm conclusion about whether he would stay, and if so, for how 
long.  The author described him as being “alternately frustrated, assertive and resigned” 
as he acknowledged the political skills of his opponents (Labaton, p. C1).  Powell said 
that he had been misrepresented by his adversaries and said that there had been a political 
lopsidedness about the debate over media ownership.  He said that the people opposed to 
him were part of a highly vocal community: “On the other side, if you are in a fraternity 
watching TV and drinking beer and happy, what are you going to do about the debate?  
You are not [going to do anything].  I think the public is more upset with the media than 
they are with the rules”  (Labaton, p. C1). 
The problem with Powell’s reasoning was that most citizens did not belong to a  
fraternity, and many, over a million, were upset about the rules.  Powell had badly 
miscalculated the political nature of his job as he had tried to stay above the fray.  Powell 
acknowledged that as a matter of principle, he deliberately avoided doing any political 
groundwork before advancing the new rules.  Powell said he thought of his role as more 





beltway.  By mid-September, he had lost a number of his senior advisors including his 
chief of staff Kevin Ferree.  Some ex-FCC employees said that they left because Powell 
ignored their political advice and never gave them authority to strike potential deals that 
could have avoided some of the FCC’s subsequent problems. 
 While Powell brooded about his future, the court in Philadelphia accepted 
motions and proceeded with its the case.  The Network Petitioners requested that the 
Court sit en banc and rehear its motion to move the case back to Washington, DC.  The 
Court denied this motion on October 1.  After the first of the year, the court issued an 
Oral Argument Order.  The arguments were scheduled for February 11 and the Citizen 
Petitioners9 and the Deregulation Petitioners10 were both allotted 45 minutes for their 
arguments (Prometheus Radio Project, 2004).  The FCC was given 90 minutes to make 
its case, and the MMTC11
 After President Bush signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act that rolled back 
 group had 15 minutes before the Court.   
                                                 
9 The Citizen Petitioners included the following parties: Prometheus Radio Project, 
Media Alliance, National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States, Fairness 
and Accuracy in Reporting, Center for Digital Democracy, Consumers Union and 
Consumer Federation of America, Capital Broadcasting Corp., and Network Affiliated 
Station Alliance. 
10 The Deregulatory Petitioners included the following parties: Fox Entertainment Group, 
Inc., Fox Television Stations Inc., National Broadcasting Company Inc., Telemundo 
Communications Group Inc., and Viacom Inc., Paxson Communications Corp., Univision 
Communications Inc, Tribune Company, and Media General Inc. 
11 The MMTC group included the following parties: The American Hispanic Owned 
Radio Association, Civil Rights Forum on Communications Policy, League of United 
Latin American Citizens, Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, Minority Media and Telecommunications Council, National Asian American 
Telecommunications Association, National Association of Latino Independent Producers, 
National Coalition of Hispanic Organizations, National Council of La Raza, National 
Hispanic Media Coalition, National Indian Telecommunications Institute, National Urban 
League, Native American Public Telecommunications, Inc., PRLDEF-Institute 
for Puerto Rican Policy, UNITY: Journalists of Color, Inc., and Women’s Institute for 





the National Television Station Ownership Limit to 39%, the Philadelphia court asked the 
petitioners to comment on the legislation in the form of a letter brief (“Office of the 
Clerk,” 2004).  The citizen petitioners filed a brief that conceded that the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act might make the appeal of the national cap moot (Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, H.R. 2673, 2004; Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004; 
Schwartzman, Leanza, Campbell, Bachtell, & Henein, 2004).  However, they also argued 
that the Consolidated Appropriations Act did not address the issue of whether the UHF 
discount of 50% was appropriate.  Additionally, they argued that the definition of 
national audience reach in the statute was unclear because it relied on the UHF discount 
and proprietary information from Nielsen’s DMA’s.  Capital Broadcasting Company Inc. 
submitted a letter brief addressing the same issues.  They asserted that the legislation did 
not mention the UHF discount at all, and, therefore, it was still subject to review based on 
whether or not the rule was arbitrary and capricious.  NASA argued that the issue of the 
National Television Ownership Rule was moot but suggested that the Court hold the 
matter in abeyance pending further orders from the Congress. 
The Network Petitioners also claimed that the issue was moot in light of the new 
legislation.  They argued that Congress knew that audience reach was calculated 
including the UHF discount.  Therefore, the networks argued that the issue was moot or 
should be held under abeyance.  Paxson Communications/Univision contended that the 
issue of the legitimacy of the UHF discount was not under the court’s jurisdiction 
because neither the Citizen Petitioners nor the interveners mentioned it in their opening 
briefs.  Therefore, they too insisted that the issue was moot.  The FCC told the court that 





and suggested that it was not necessary to hear oral arguments on the issue. 
 
Oral Arguments 
 On February 11, the court heard oral arguments in Prometheus Radio Project v. 
FCC (2004) before Chief Justice Anthony Scirica and Justices Julio Fuentes and Thomas 
Ambro.  Although the oral arguments were set to last for 4 hours, the hearing actually 
lasted over more than 8 hours (Labaton, 2004; McConnell, 2004a).  The citizen 
petitioners12
                                                 
12 Andrew Schwartzman, CEO and President of MAP; Angela Campbell, of 
Georgetown’s Institute of Public Representation, on behalf of Media Alliance; and Glenn 
Manishin, of the law firm Kelley, Drye & Warren, on behalf of Consumer Federation of 
America; and Consumers’ Union, represented the Citizen Petitioners. 
 were given 2 1/2 hours to make their presentations and answer questions 
from the panel (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  The main thrust of 
Prometheus’ argument was that the FCC had made competition a higher priority than 
diversity, which was misguided.  More specifically, the citizen petitioners argued that the 
FCC failed to consider lowering the UHF discount.  Although the FCC claimed that no 
one from the public argued against the discount, Schwartzman was able to prove 
otherwise.  The Citizen Petitioners also disagreed with the FCC’s interpretation of 
§202(h) of the Telecommunications Act, and said that there was nothing in the language 
that forced the agency to deregulate ownership rules.  The presumption that this section 
of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 required the agency to deregulate was a false 
assumption. “What the FCC has done is place the burden on the proponents of the rule to 
demonstrate why a rule is necessary," Schwartzman said.  "This is not a correct reading 
of the law, and in fact demonstrates that the Commission has had its thumb on the 





Additionally, the Citizen Petitioners claimed that the theoretical structure that 
rationalized the new rules was erroneous and therefore led to a flawed analysis 
(Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  They gave an example from the FCC 
Diversity Index that concluded that the Duchess County Community College television 
station was 50% more valuable in terms of audience reach than was the New York Times.  
The Duchess County station was also weighed equally with the ABC affiliate station in 
New York City.  Moreover, the citizen petitioners said it was completely without 
foundation to give equal weight to the Internet as a source of significant original local 
news.  Furthermore, the FCC also counted television stations that did not offer local news 
in the Diversity Index, which was inconsistent with its own stated goal of preserving 
localism.  
Richard Wiley, the ex-FCC chairman who represented the Newspaper Association 
of America and three other broadcasters, argued that the court should question the 
relevancy of Red Lion (1969), the Supreme Court case that upheld the Spectrum Scarcity 
Doctrine and ruled that the public interest in broadcasting was paramount to a 
broadcaster’s First Amendment rights (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  Wiley 
also questioned the authority of NCCB v. FCC (1969), the case that upheld the 
constitutional validity of the FCC’s ban on owning a television station and a newspaper 
in the same market.  He said that those rules no longer made any sense in the current 
media environment (Labaton, 2004; “ MAP Report,” 2004).  Miguel A. Estrada, a lawyer 
representing Clear Channel and the networks, argued that § 202(h) required the 
Commission either to set aside older restrictions or to deregulate them over time.  Estrada 





programming—should be regarded as secondary to competition when determining how 
many radio stations any one corporation can own in a market.  Estrada also argued that 
when the FCC cannot decide between diversity and competition, ties should go in favor 
of deregulation.   
John Rogovin, chief counsel for the FCC, defended the Commission's efforts, 
saying they reflected a well-thought-out balance between the financial interests of media 
companies, which favor consolidation, and the public good of having newspapers and 
broadcast companies compete with each other for viewers, readers, and listeners 
(Labaton, 2004).  Judge Ambro asked the attorneys for the FCC to explain why the DI 
produced inconsistencies such as the Duchess Country Community College’s television 
station rating being higher than the New York Times on the scale.  ''I understand you tried 
to draw lines, but in some cases, what is not allowed turns out to be better than what is 
allowed,'' Judge Ambro said to Jacob Lewis, a Commission lawyer (Labaton, p.  C1).  
Lewis tried to diminish the significance of the DI, saying that it was only one of a number 
of tools used in market analysis.  “The Commission should not be faulted for trying to 
impose greater analytical rigor rather than simply waving their hands'' (Labaton, C14).  
Ambro asked the FCC attorneys how they justified the UHF discount in light of satellite 
and cable permits that allow formerly fuzzy stations to be seen clearly.  The Consumers 
Federation of America contended that the FCC’s analysis artificially raised the diversity 
number up to a point that justified the Commissioner’s preconceived notions.  
Schwartzman also argued that the polling data gathered by Nielsen asked the wrong 





justices were concerned with the accuracy of the index.  Ambro also questioned why the 
Diversity Index was based on hypothetical examples instead of real-world market data.  
The panel questioned Estrada about his assertion that one broadcaster could 
provide as much diversity as several and quoted from a brief submitted by the United 
Church of Christ that reported that even through the number of radio stations had 
increased, the number of station owners had declined.  The justices also questioned 
Estrada’s claim that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 required the FCC to deregulate 
rules and gradually phase all of them out entirely and that the act limited the FCC 
authority to impose tougher regulations on his clients. 
By the time the hearing ended, it was clear that the court was concerned about the 
validity of the Diversity Index, but they gave little indication of how they would 
ultimately vote.  While the trade journals speculated, activists continued to pressure for 
reform, and the industry was stuck in a holding pattern. 
 
The Court’s Opinion 
 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (2004) was decided by a three-to-one vote, 
with Judge Anthony Scirica dissenting.  Justice Ambro wrote the majority opinion that 
extended the temporary stay of the FCC’s new ownership rules pending further review.  
The court affirmed that the Commission had the Constitutional authority to regulate 
media ownership and rejected Deregulatory Petitioners’ claim that §202(h) provided rigid 
limits on how the FCC could interpret the public interest.  Specifically, the court ruled 
that the Commission did not sufficiently justify its numerical limits for local television 





Justice Scirica dissented from the majority because he did not believe that the 
court should be substituting its own policy judgments for that of the Commission 
(Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  He acknowledged that the agency’s 
reasoning was not perfect; however, he wanted to give the FCC some leeway until the 
next review so they could rectify any mistakes over time without having to resort to a 
court remand.  Ambrose and Fuentes responded to his objections by noting them and 
explaining that they had no policy views except to ensure that the Commission act with 
reason.  In a footnote to the opinion, the majority clarified their position with this 
statement,   “The bottom line: the Commission gets another chance to justify its actions.  
Once that occurs, and the case returns to us, we may yet close the loop of agreement with 
our colleague” (Prometheus Radio Project, v. FCC, 2004, p.15). 
 The decision in this case was lengthy, and the justices’ reasoning was detailed 
(Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  It began with a general review of the issues 
and the arguments filed by the principal parties and the interveners.13
                                                 
13 The Citizen Petitioners included the aforementioned parties along with The Office of 
Communication of the United Church of Christ as an intervener.  The Deregulatory 
Petitioners included the afore mentioned parties joined by Clear Channel 
Communications Inc.; Emmis Communications Corporation; Sinclair Broadcast Group; 
and interveners Belo Corporation; Gannett Corporation; Morris Communications 
Company; Milkcreek Broadcasting LLC; and Nassau Broadcasting Holdings. 
  First, the court 
addressed the Citizen Petitioners’ claim that the deregulatory position of the FCC 
disregarded the statutory mandates of the Telecommunication Act of 1996 and certain 
provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (Public L.  No 104-104, 1946).  The 
court accepted the agency’s stated goal that it was in the public interest to protect 
competition, localism, and diversity.  However, it ruled that the public record did not 





Deregulatory Petitioners’ claim that the Order violated the U.S. Constitution and ruled 
that the words “repeal or modify” in §202(h) did not mean that the FCC's only option was 
to repeal the rules.  Rather, the Commission had to be able to justify its decisions 
according to reasoned analysis.  The court then addressed each rule individually. 
 Due to the legislation passed by Congress in January restricting the National 
Television Ownership Limit to 39% of the national audience reach, the court decided that 
the challenge to the cap was moot.  The FCC agreed in a letter brief that it would abide 
by statutory mandates from Congress.  According to the court, the issue of the 50% UHF 
discount was also moot.  The discount had been in effect since 1985, and the jurists 
assumed that legislators understood that the definition of the national audience reach 
included the allowance.  The court did not agree with the Citizen Petitioners’ argument 
that the UHF discount was mistakenly included in the bill. 
 Next, the court turned its attention to the cross-ownership rules and restated the 
record (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  The Commission determined that the 
rule prohibiting Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership was no longer necessary in the 
public interest for three reasons.  First, the ban was no longer necessary to promote 
competition because advertisers did not view newspapers and television to be good 
substitutes for each other.  Second, the Commission claimed that the ban harmed localism 
by prohibiting firms in the same market from creating economic efficiencies through 
mergers.  Third, there was not enough evidence to conclude that common ownership 
influences viewpoint diversity. 
 In order to support the claim that the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership ban 





Local Television News and Public Affairs Programs (Spavins et al., 2002).  This study, 
however flawed, showed that existing cross-owned properties carried 50% more local 
news and information than other television stations in a market.  The FCC asserted that 
those same stations were the most highly rated in a market and that cross-owned stations 
garnered more awards than others did.  The court agreed that consumer and critical 
approval indicated that there was evidence that cross-owned stations can promote 
localism and that a complete ban on these mergers was not necessary. 
 However, the citizen petitioners argued that MOWG Study #7 was inaccurate 
because it measured all markets, including those with cross-owned local properties within 
a market, together with those controlled by distant corporations.  The Citizen Petitioners 
also claimed that the FCC relied on anecdotal evidence to draw their conclusions.  
Nonetheless, the Court found this aspect of the FCC’s argument to be persuasive and 
explained that the Commission had only used anecdotal evidence to illustrate one of its 
points.  On the issue of whether the FCC’s point that there was not enough evidence to 
determine if commonly owned properties speak with one monolithic voice, the citizen 
petitioners were highly critical of MOWG Study #3: Consumer Substitutability Among 
Media (Waldfogel, 2003).  While the court noted the methodological problems of the 
study, it acknowledged that sources other than broadcasting do contribute to viewpoint 
diversity, but only to a limited extent.  The court found that the FCC weighed cable 
television and the Internet too heavily in its determination of cross-media limits.   
 The deregulatory petitioners argued for the repeal of the Newspaper/Broadcast 
Cross-Ownership Rule in its entirety and said that they would not accept any limits at all 





Fifth Amendment rights.  They also asked the court to reconsider the spectrum scarcity 
rationale, saying that it was no longer relevant in the current media environment.  The 
court disagreed on all counts, and it decided that limits on cross-ownership were not only 
Constitutional, but retaining some limits on cross-ownership was necessary to protect the 
public interest.  Besides, the court did not have the power to overturn the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Turner v. FCC (1994), the case that had most recently upheld the 
spectrum scarcity principle.  Pointing out that physical spectrum space was no less 
limited because there are supplemental ways of delivering information, the court declined 
to accept this argument. 
 Instead, the court applied the rational basis standard from NCCB v. FCC (1978), 
saying that limiting common ownership is a reasonable way of promoting the public 
interest in mass media.  In NCCB v. FCC, (1978) the court ruled that cross-ownership 
restrictions do not violate the First Amendment.  The judges agreed with the conclusion 
of the Commission that a ban is necessary in some instances; nevertheless, the court 
decided that the Commission had not provided reasoned analysis to support the Cross-
Media Limits that it chose. 
 According to the FCC, it chose to construct its limits as narrowly as possible so it 
could avoid needless overregulation of markets with ample viewpoint diversity 
(Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  Consequently, it focused on identifying 
markets that were at risk for becoming overconcentrated.  That being said, the court 
found that the FCC’s Cross-Media Limits employed several irrational assumptions and 
inconsistencies.  The biggest problem was with the DI.  The justices did not have an issue 





connect it to local markets and when they weighed the Internet too heavily on the scale.  
Additionally, according to the court, the FCC irrationally assigned outlets of the same 
media type equal market shares, and, therefore, inconsistently derived its Cross-Media 
Limits from the Index. 
 The Citizen Petitioners argued that when the FCC decided to include the Internet 
as a local media source when measuring the diversity of a market, it gave too much 
weight to the Internet at the expense of discounting the importance of daily newspapers 
and local television stations (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  On the other 
hand, the Deregulatory Petitioners claimed that the FCC understated diversity of 
viewpoint when it did not include cable television as a source of local news.  The court 
ruled that the decision to discount cable television while including the Internet was 
irrational.  
 The judges explained that the FCC’s decision to discount cable television was 
sound because cable was not usually a source of original local content (Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  The Commission chose to ignore the section in MOWG 
Study #8 that asked respondents where they get their local news because there were 
indications that people were confused about the question (Nielsen, 2002).  It appeared 
that respondents were watching their local stations delivered by cable and, therefore, said 
that they accessed local news on cable.  The survey’s accuracy on this question was also 
doubtful because Nielsen had provided data that showed that locally originated cable 
channels, when available, were the least watched stations overall.  
 The Commission included the Internet in its calculations because MOWG Study 





but the survey failed to identify any websites (Nielsen, 2002; Prometheus Radio Project 
v. FCC, 2004).  The court pointed out that there is a crucial difference between websites 
that offer independent sources of local news, and those that are merely republishing news 
from local television and newspapers.  According to the court, aggregator websites are 
not independent voices and should not have been counted as such.  Additionally, the FCC 
cited The Drudge Report and Salon.com as examples of websites that added to the 
diversity of viewpoints, but those sites are directed toward national audiences, not local 
ones.  Contrary to the Commission’s claim that there is a vast universe of information 
available on the Internet, the court said that the Commission should have distinguished 
between local independent websites and national ones.  The judges also explained “the 
media” functions, at least in part, to deliver local news and public affairs programming. 
Search engines that deliver content such as local restaurant or concert venues have a 
different function.  Likewise, many websites function as aggregators or distillers of 
information, but they are not “media outlets” (Prometheus v. FCC, 2004, p. 65).  Neither 
are local government websites or commercially driven sites.  The judges reasoned that if 
the Commission included those types of sources as media outlets, then they would have 
to include telephone books too.  The court was also skeptical of the FCC’s claim that the 
Internet is available everywhere, when data provided to the Court that 30% of the U.S. 
population did not have access to Internet connections.  The judges said that this 
argument was irrelevant anyway.  On remand, the court suggested that the agency either 
exclude the Internet or find a better rationale for including it in light of their decision not 





 Next, the court ruled that the Commission did not justify its assumption that all 
outlets in a media type received the same market shares as all other media outlets in the 
category (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  This assumption was inconsistent 
with the overall approach to the DI taken by the FCC and made unrealistic assumptions 
about a media outlet’s relative contribution to viewpoint diversity in a market.  It was 
also inconsistent with the decision to assign relative weights to different types of media 
themselves.  The Order made a point of saying that there is no reason to believe that all 
media are of equal importance.  However, the fact that the Commission chose to assign 
media outlets of the same type equal weight negated the proffered rationale for using the 
HHI to account for losses of viewpoint diversity through mergers.  Furthermore, the 
Commission assigned equal market shares to outlets that did not provide local news.  
Additionally, there is no dispute that the assignment of equal market shares 
generates absurd results.... A Diversity Index that requires us to accept that a 
community college television station makes a greater contribution to viewpoint 
diversity than a conglomerate that includes the third-largest newspaper in 
America also requires us to abandon both logic and reality.  (Prometheus v. FCC, 
2004, p. 68) 
 
The justices then questioned why the FCC did not use actual market data to assign  
market shares, especially given that it used such data to assign weights to general media 
types.  The court said simply that the FCC needed to undergird its predictive judgments 
with evidence in order to survive arbitrary and capricious review.  The FCC claimed that 
if they used market data to assign market shares, they would have to evaluate content.  
According to the Commission, making judgments about content would violate the First 
Amendment and create other legal obstacles.  The court specifically rejected those 
claims.  Pointing out that the FCC had risen above such challenges when it commissioned 





claim to collection of data problems were vague and unexplained.  Moreover, the reason 
for eschewing actual use data was unrealistic and inconsistent with the FCC’s overall 
approach to the DI.  
 The court also said that the agency should provide better notice on remand.  The 
opinion noted that the remand offered the agency an opportunity to cure its questionable 
notice of the DI and explained that the FCC was also obligated to provide notice of its 
underlying methodology and the reasoning from which it derived its proposed rules.  The 
court found that the FCC’s decision not to release this information was not without 
prejudice, especially given the numerous flaws represented in the DI. 
 
Local Television Triopoly Rule 
 In its Order, the FCC decided to allow triopolies in television markets with 18 or 
more stations, and to allow duopolies in markets with 17 or fewer stations if the merger 
was not with one of the four top-rated stations in a market (FCC, 2003i).  The court 
upheld the Commission’s determination that mergers between the four top-rated stations 
were inadvisable but remanded the FCC’s numerical limits so the Commissioners could 
rectify its inconsistencies and better support its assumptions (Prometheus Radio Project 
v. FCC, 2004).  In contrast to the deregulatory petitioners’ claim that limiting the number 
of commonly owned television stations in a market was duplicative of the DOJ’s antitrust 
guidelines, the justices said that the two guidelines aim to achieve different means.  The 
antitrust guidelines are designed to protect market prices, whereas the FCC’s goal is to 
protect the public interest.  When the Commission argued that media other than broadcast 
television could contribute to viewpoint diversity, the court did not disagree entirely.  





(2002).  The justices remanded this rule because the Commission did not adequately 
demonstrate that there was ample substitutability from other broadcast media.  The court 
rejected the citizen petitioners’ argument that the research used to determine if commonly 
owned stations provided more quality news broadcasts was flawed, saying that the 
studies were supported by evidence.  Contrary to the citizen petitioners’ claim that the 
FCC had not properly noticed its intention to allow triopolies in certain markets, the court 
ruled that the agency had provided adequate notice.  Citing the FCC’s announcement that 
it would be addressing the Local Television Ownership Rule and that it would take under 
consideration the remand from Sinclair v. FCC (2002) in its 2002 Biennial Review was 
sufficient notice according to the court. 
 When rejecting the FCC’s numerical limits on local television station ownership, 
the court took exception to the FCC’s construction of the DI and its equal market share 
approach.  The FCC asserted that there were too many fluctuations in television station 
ratings to provide reasonable data.  The court countered that the agency used an actual 
market share approach when it decided to ban mergers among the 4 top-rated stations in a 
market.  The judges concluded that the agency had not provided evidence that supported 
its claim that television rating varied so drastically that they could not be used as a source 
of reliable evidence.  Thus, the court ruled that the numerical limits assigned by the 
agency were inconsistent and patently unreasonable.  Even though the court affirmed that 
the FCC had the authority to modify its rules and methods, it considered the limits it 








Local Radio Ownership Rule 
 The court took issue with the FCC’s rationale for retaining its existing numerical 
limits on radio station ownership, although it did say that the Commissioners had 
provided justification for counting noncommercial stations in a market (Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  The court also conceded that the FCC was well within it 
rights to alter its methodology so it could measure markets geographically instead of by 
overlapping signal contours.  However, the Commission’s assumption that there needed 
to be five equal-sized competitors in a market for it to remain competitive lacked a 
reasoned analysis of why they chose this particular benchmark.   
 The Commission used game theory to support its five equal-sized competitors in a 
market standard (see Brenahan & Reiss, 1991; Phlips, 1995).  However, according to the 
court, the Commissioners did not show how existing numerical limits ensured five equal-
sized competitors.  There was no evidence that a market with five equal-sized 
competitors existed or had the potential to exist.  In fact, they said that it defied logic to 
assume that a combination of a top-ranked station is a competitive equal to a combination 
of low-ranked stations just because both entities own the same number of stations.  
Again, the court questioned why the FCC did not consider actual market share when 
deriving its numerical limits.  The citizen petitioners argued that the five equal-sized 
competitors approach contradicted the DOJ and FTC’s Merger Guidelines that 
determined that a market with five equal-sized competitors is highly concentrated.  The 
court agreed that this was an unacceptable contradiction in the FCC’s methodology, and 
the court ruled that the FCC’s evidence was suspect, not rationally derived, and was not 






 If Chairman Powell had not fully absorbed the political reality that the 
stakeholders in the FCC policy-making process were fully committed to advancing their 
competing values before the Commission voted to relax media ownership rules in June, 
this actuality must have inundated his consciousness in the months following the 
decision.  The clash between those who elevated the social values embedded in 
communications policy over the market considerations of the broadcast industry peaked 
during the year that followed.  Powell’s neglect of the political ramifications of the 
Commission’s decisions was a costly miscalculation. 
 Public opposition to the relaxation of media ownership rules not only failed to 
subside after the FCC completed the 2002 Biennial Review, but public antipathy toward 
the Commission’s decisions intensified.  As the media increased its coverage of the issue, 
citizens expressed their objections to the new rules with increased vigor, putting pressure 
on Congress to abate the most egregious measures contained in the Order.  Despite the 
many objections by powerful Republicans to passing any proposals modifying the new 
regulations, Congress eventually succumbed to political demands and attached a rider to 
an omnibus spending bill that lowered the national television ownership limit to 39%.  
 Although Powell repeatedly vowed that the Commission would create a 
defensible record of empirical evidence to support its determinations, the theory and 
execution of its rationale for adopting the DI were illogical and incongruous.  Media 
activists were able to exploit the contradictions contained in the Order to convince the 
court that the potential harm to citizen petitioners was substantial enough to issue a stay 





Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (2004), the court rendered its opinion in June.  The 
majority stated that the FCC’s assumptions when creating the DI were irrational and 
inconsistent.  The Administrative Procedures Act made it illegal for a federal agency to 
promulgate regulations that were arbitrary and capricious; therefore the court remanded 
the modified local television, local radio, and local cross-owned media rules back to the 
FCC for further consideration.  Powell’s FCC had elevated the competitive economic 
analysis of markets over the social values that were embedded in U.S. communications 
policy, and the Court rejected his definition of the public interest in broadcasting. 
 The FCC declined to appeal the court’s decision, and Powell submitted his 
resignation shortly thereafter.  President Bush nominated Kevin J. Martin to replace 
Powell.  Martin, Bush’s former campaign advisor and chad counter in Florida, was 















SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
This critical study has been an examination of the policy-making process during a 
time when shifting conceptions of the functions and purpose of broadcasting were widely 
contested.  After Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the legal regime 
that was grounded on a foundation of public service idealism evolved to one based on 
market forces pragmatism.  The contest over these competing regulatory goals came to a 
head during FCC Chairman Michael Powell’s attempt to loosen restrictions on media 
ownership policy during his tenure.  This chapter summarizes and evaluates the empirical 
evidence documented in previous chapters and offers conclusions based on those 
findings.  Additionally, this chapter answers the research questions that guided this study 




This narrative began by situating the communications policy environment in 
2001-2004 against the historical background of broadcast regulations.  Chapter 2 traced 
the origins of the public service requirements of broadcasters back to the earlier practice 
of permitting private corporations “affected with the public interest” to monopolize 
public right of ways in exchange pledging to help construct the nation’s transportation 





demonstrated how initial attempts to regulate the transportation and communications 
infrastructures informed the construction of the Radio Act of 1927 and later the Federal 
Communications Act of 1934.  Not only was the FCC responsible for maintaining the 
integrity of the electromagnetic spectrum, but it was also responsible for promoting the 
public interest, convenience, or necessity in broadcasting (Radio Act of 1927, §3).  As the 
first three chapters of this dissertation demonstrated, the FCC struggled to define the 
public service obligations of broadcasters in various ways over several decades.  
However, the idea that the public interest could be served by promoting localism, 
diversity, and competition was reoccurring and persistent (Kahn, 1984; NBC v. U.S., 
1943; Sterling & Kittross, 1990; 2 FRC Ann. Rep 166, 1928).  In most cases, the courts 
upheld the constitutionality of the agency’s decisions when the FCC limited media 
ownership in local and national markets, prohibited cross-ownership of media properties, 
and set policy designed to promote diversity of services by encouraging competition 
among providers. 
Chapters 2 and 3 explored how a deregulatory political climate influenced the 
FCC’s decisions to gradually relax broadcast ownership policies in the 1980s 
(Aufderheide, 1999; Horowitz, 1989; Keller, 2004).  When Congress had the opportunity 
to revamp the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, it chose to elevate market 
considerations over the consideration of public interest obligations of the industry.  This 
section of the dissertation analyzes the debates that lead up to the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, and it considers the political and economic rationale 
for forwarding this legislation.  Furthermore, this section analyzed the changing market 





continues to interrogate the positions of stakeholders in the policy-making process, and it 
traces the beginnings of a public backlash against media consolidation.  
When Congress adopted the mandate that requires the FCC to review its media 
ownership rules periodically, it set the stage for legal challenges to any remaining media 
ownership regulations (Telecommunications Act, 1996 §202 h).  Indeed, two influential 
cases heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit were described and 
analyzed in Chapters 4 and 6.  The opinions issued in Fox v. FCC (2002) and Sinclair v. 
FCC (2002) propelled Chairman Powell forward in his quest to provide the courts with 
irrefutable evidence that would support any subsequent changes in media ownership 
regulations. 
 As Powell prepared for the 2002 Biennial Review, he convened a panel of public 
experts to discuss how empirical research could be designed to support the Commission’s 
findings in the upcoming review (FCC, 2001e).  While the experts explored how various 
methodologies could be adapted to measure competition, most agreed that the public 
interest in media ownership could not be measured exclusively with quantitative 
methods.  Nonetheless, a week later, Powell announced that he was forming a Media 
Ownership Working Group (MOWG) to study issues related to market performance and 
media consolidation using economic data (FCC, 2001a).  Chapter 7 offers a critique of 
the studies. 
While MOWG was completing its research, public opposition to media 
consolidation grew.  Long established public interest organizations devoted to media 
issues saw an increase in the number of concerns expressed about media consolidation 





the Internet and the use of email, these groups began to coordinate their efforts.  New 
organizations were formed to educate the public about media policy, and other groups 
with broader-based missions were devoting resources to the explorations of media 
regulations. The last third of this study describes how opposition to further media 
consolidation grew as the June 2 deadline for the decision approached.  
 As the regulation of media ownership became a political problem for the FCC, 
Congress expressed its dissatisfaction with the way the review process was proceeding 
(Klinenburg, 2006; McChesney; 2004a).  They were hearing from many angry 
constituents who feared that further media consolidation would affect the quality of the 
democracy in the United States.  Several chapters of this dissertation document the 
arguments for and against further relaxation of the rules that were voiced by stakeholders 
in the decision-making process.  The procedures adopted by the Commission during its 
review process are also examined, including both official and unsanctioned hearings, 
testimony to Congress and industry groups, and public appearances by the 
Commissioners.   
Despite the negative input from Congress and the public, the Commission voted 
on June 2, 2003, to modify, repeal, and revise many of the media ownership restrictions 
that had been in place for several decades (FCC, 2003i).  The majority voted to approve 
raising the National Television Ownership Rule to 45%, up from 35%, and to maintain its 
50% discount on UHF stations.  They voted to retain the Dual Television Network Rule.  
Additionally, the Commission voted to repeal both the Television/Newspaper and 
Radio/Television Cross-Ownership prohibitions and replaced them with a single set of 





the Local Radio Ownership Rule.  The Third District Court of Appeals issued a stay of 
the new rules in September 2003 and remanded most of the rules back to the FCC in its 
final ruling (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004). 
 
Conclusions 
The first goal of this study was to contextualize the communications policy 
environment 2001-2004, within the historical background of broadcast regulations.  
Another objective of this study was to analyze the arguments forwarded by citizen groups 
and to compare and contrast them to the arguments presented by the FCC in order to 
provide a critical analysis of the FCC’s performance from 2001-2004.  Consequently, 
study was guided by the following research questions. 
 Research Question#1: How did the competing public interest definitions advanced 
by FCC Commissioners contribute to the formulation of broadcast ownership policy 
procedures and practices during this period? 
 
FCC Chairman Michael Powell made no secret of his belief that the market 
should dictate the structure of media ownership policy at the FCC or that he thought 
deregulation would best serve the public interest (Fallows, 2003; Hickey, 2003a).  
Commissioners Abernathy and Martin held similar views.  In contrast, both 
Commissioners Copps and Adelstein were equally forthright about their inclination to 
retain media ownership restrictions so consolidation would not inhibit the marketplace of 
ideas (FCC, 2002a; Hearn, 2001).  However, it would be a mistake to assume that the five 
Commissioners did not share certain conceptual agreements over the definition of what 
constitutes the public interest in broadcast ownership policy.  There was little debate over 
whether the Commission’s traditional policy objectives should be abolished.  The 2002 





rules could only be accomplished if they continued to promote diversity, competition, and 
localism.14
If the Commissioners agreed that promoting diversity, localism, and competition 
was imperative to the public interest, there was little consensus among them over how 
these goals should be achieved.  Powell believed that a competitive market across the 
spectrum of telecommunication service providers would result in consumer access to a 
wide array of sources (FCC, 2003i; Powell, 2000, 2001b, 2002a, 2003d).  If he was not 
overly concerned about competition between discrete categories of media, it was because 
he believed that the Internet and other content providers would fill in the gap if enough 
consumers supported them.  In Powell’s view, the public interest in media ownership was 
an economic problem.  As long as the FCC could structure its rules so that a certain 
number of firms could be maintained as relatively equal competitors in the market for 
audio and video delivery services, the dynamics of the market would ensure that localism 
and diversity would be protected as long as there was a demand for those services.  
Powell’s interpretation of the public interest was evident in the way that he structured 
many of the policies and procedures that he spearheaded during his tenure. 
  There is no evidence that any members of the Commission disagreed with 
these core values.  
One of the first procedures that Powell instigated as part of the 2002 Biennial 
Review was to convene a panel of seven “distinguished experts” to participate in the 
Media Ownership Roundtable Discussion (FCC, 2001a; FCC, 2001e).  Five out of seven 
                                                 
14 In its 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, the FCC defined five types of diversity: 
viewpoint, outlet, source, and female and minority ownership.  The agency defined 
localism as a broadcaster’s obligation to be responsive to the needs and interests of local 
communities and it defined competition as the most effective means of producing the 
marketplace results that best serve the public interest (Report and Order and Notice of 





of the panelists were classically trained economists, and the others had more than a 
passing acquaintance with using quantifiable methods in their research.  All but 1 of the 
12 studies produced by the MOWG used research designs dependent on content analysis 
or market data to evaluate the information that was compiled (FCC, 2002d).  When critics 
questioned the assumptions and research methods employed by the authors of these 
studies, Powell and his staff created the Diversity Index (“FCC Chairman Backs,” 2003).  
This variation of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index assigned numerical values to media 
outlets in each market in order to determine how much concentration in a market could 
be allowed before it would affect diversity, competition, or localism.  Since Powell and 
the other Republicans Commissioners were looking exclusively for economic data to 
support their initiatives, they discounted other ways of measuring the success or failure of 
their rules.  They largely ignored the social and political ramifications of the policy-
making process (Blevins & Brown, 2006).   
On the other hand, Commissioners Copps and Adelstein subscribed to the view 
that the primary method for assessing whether the Commission’s policies were a success 
was by soliciting public opinion (Adelstein, 2003a; Copps, 2003a: FCC, 2003b).  From 
the beginning of the review process, both Copps and Adelstein invited the public to 
participate in the policy-making process (McConnell, 2002a, 2002b).  Copps urged 
Powell to release the proprietary data sets that were used in the MOWG studies so 
academics and other members of the public could study the results.  Copps repeatedly 
requested that the deadline for public comment be extended.  When it appeared that 
Powell was reluctant to hold any public hearings to discuss media ownership policy, 





hearing allowed little time for the public to question the panelists or express their 
opinions about the FCC’s media ownership policy. 
After Powell refused to schedule any additional hearings, Copps and Adelstein 
sponsored town hall meetings across the country (Fallows, 2003; Klinenberg, 2007; 
McChesney, 2004a).  For the two Democratic Commissioners, public opinion about 
media ownership was the most important aspect of the process.  As the political pressure 
on Powell grew, he spoke publicly about his wish to avoid political or philosophical 
debates.  When Powell refused to release a draft of the 2002 Report and Order to the 
public or to Copps and Adelstein, before he was required to do so legally, he further 
alienated two important stakeholders in the policy-making process: Congress and the 
public.  Therefore, competing definitions of the public interest in broadcasting led to 
competing attempts to influence the procedures and practices of the Commission. 
 Research Question#2: How did the Telecommunications Act of 1996 reframe the 
communications environment? 
 
When legislators abandoned the spectrum scarcity rationale in favor of viewing 
the electromagnetic spectrum as one element in the telecommunications universe, the 
regulatory barriers that had kept discrete categories of the industry from competing 
against each other were dissolved (Aufderheide, 1999; McChesney, 1999; 
Telecommunications Act, 1996).  Telecommunications firms were then permitted to 
deliver video and audio content that had once been the exclusive terrain of broadcasters.  
Subsequently, broadcasters argued that competing with other video and audio providers 
would put them at a competitive disadvantage.  Therefore, Congress loosened or 
eliminated many media ownership restrictions so that broadcasters could consolidate their 





exchange for increased spectrum allocations, television broadcasters pledged to convert 
their analogue signals to digital.  
The creators of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 assumed that increased 
competition across the spectrum of telecommunications providers would lead to more 
innovation and lower costs to consumers (Aufderheide, 1999; Keller, 2004; Meyerson, 
1997).  In recasting the public interest as a consumer’s right to innovative services at 
competitive rates, the Telecommunications Act equated a deregulated, completive media 
environment with public interest in communication policy.    
However, the act resulted in less competition among broadcasters and led to a 
wave of consolidation that was most pronounced in radio.  The national cap on radio 
ownership was lifted entirely (Chester, 2007; Klinenberg, 2007; McChesney, 2004a, 
2004b).  Two years after the Telecommunications Act passed, almost half of all stations 
nationwide had changed hands, and the number of individual station owners had dropped 
precipitately.  The act permitted media corporations to own eight radio stations in large 
markets, and the production of local news on radio declined.  Radio programming 
became standardized and centralized, and the use of voice tracking became prevalent.  By 
2002, Clear Channel Communications owned more than 1200 stations nationwide, and 
many of those stations were airing nationally produced content.  
The Telecommunication Act also raised The National Television Station 
Ownership Limit to 35% of the national audience.  In the 50 largest markets, a single 
entity could own more than one television station or a radio and television station or a 
television station and cable system.  Additionally, one entity could own more than one 





The act also extended the time between license renewals for broadcasters and made it 
next to impossible for the FCC to render a licensee unfit for failing to serve the public 
interest.  The act also abandoned rate regulations for cable, except for basic service, and 
encouraged cross-platform competition from other telecommunication providers.   
When legislators required the FCC to review the remaining media ownership 
limits every 2 years, they placed a higher burden of proof on the agency to justify the 
retention of the rules.  Although the language in §202(h) was ambiguous, it created a new 
opening for challenges to the media ownership limits in court.  The provision for biennial 
reviews of the regulations also placed a higher administrative burden on the FCC. 
 Question #3: To what extent did the competing interpretations extant during this 
time period contribute to the specific procedures for generating public response to 
proposed rulemaking? 
 
As an administrative agency, the FCC is required to comply with the minimum 
standards for public participation in the decision-making process that are mandated by the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA, 1946).  According to the APA, the FCC is 
obligated to publicly disclose information related to the regulatory process, and the FCC 
must provide opportunities for the public to comment on any proposed regulatory actions.  
Therefore, many of the specific procedures for generating public response to the 
proposed rules were legally established and were not affected by competing 
interpretations of §202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.15
                                                 
15 The Commission shall review its rules adopted pursuant to this section and all of its 
ownership rules biennially as part of its regulatory reform review under section 11 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 and shall determine whether any of such rules are 
necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.  The Commission shall repeal 
or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest 
(Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 202 h). 
  The court ruled in 





noticing requirements of the APA, but it recommended on remand that the Commission 
provide better notice of its Cross-Media Limits. 
However, competing interpretations extant during this time period did contribute 
to the supplementary procedures for generating public response to the proposed rules.  As 
previously noted, Commissioner Copps repeatedly called for the public involvement in 
the process (Copps, 2002c, 2002d, 2003a; FCC, 2002a, 2002b).  After citizen’s 
responded to his call, the resulting political pressure forced Powell to agree to allow 
public access to the MOWG data sets, to schedule the Richmond hearing, and to extend 
the deadline for comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FCC, 2002a, 2002c, 
2002g, 2003c). 
As opposition to any further relaxation of the media ownership rules grew, Powell 
continued to insist that the regulatory process was not a political issue, and he attempted 
to ignore calls for more public accountability in the biennial review process (Blevins & 
Brown, 2006; McChesney, 2004a).  He derided what he called the angels of public 
interest and challenged those who believed in the angels to provide empirical evidence to 
support their theories (Powell, 1998, 2002a, 2002b).  By the time the filing window on 
the NPRM closed in February, the FCC had received more comments on media 
ownership than it had on any other issue in its history.  Most of them opposed the 
Commission’s proposed changes to the media ownership limits. 
When Powell agreed to appear at the Columbia Forum on Media Ownership, his 
opening statement warned the audience to dispense with emotional declarations and stick 
to the facts (Powell, 2003c).  The ensuing discussion was ardent and passionate with the 





left the forum shortly after reading his opening statement.  A week later, Powell wrote an 
editorial in USA Today condemning those who sought to make media ownership a 
political issue by substituting personal ideology and opinion for the facts  (2003e).  
Powell underestimated how strongly people felt about the issue, even while he denied the 
role of politics in the policy-making process.  This was not only naïve, but it also came 
off as arrogant and had the effect of inflaming his opponents (Hickey, 2003b). 
After Powell reluctantly agreed to hold the only public hearing on media 
ownership in Richmond Virginia, he was criticized for scheduling it as close to the 
beltway as was possible (McConnell, 2002b; “Onward to Richmond,” 2002) The 
panelists were mostly insiders, and there was little time allotted for public comments or 
questions.  Commissioners Copps and Adelstein urged Powell to hold more hearings, but 
Powell refused, saying that after reviewing over 15,000 comments made in response to 
the NPRM and after sitting through the hearing, he had heard enough from the public. 
 After the Richmond hearing, coverage of the issue intensified as the June 2 
deadline for the 2002 Report and Order approached (“News Media,” 2003; Strong 
Opposition,” 2003).  What was once primarily an inside the beltway issue was now 
becoming a matter of general public interest.  The more people heard about the 
possibility of increased media consolidation, the less they liked it.  Commissioners Copps 
and Adelstein proceeded to organize a serious of unsanctioned public forums across the 
country, and many of them were attended by standing-room only crowds (Chester, 2007; 
Klinenberg, 2007; McChesney, 2004a).  The FCC and Congress were flooded with letters 
and phone calls from their constituents who were opposed to relaxing media ownership 





of the public.  The momentum against the Commission’s proposal to modify the rules 
kept building, yet Powell refused to postpone the decision.  He also withheld the draft of 
the Report and Order from Copps and Adelstein until 3 weeks before the decision.  
 In the year leading up to the FCC’s decision, many members of Congress had 
been expressing their displeasure with the state of media consolidation and with how 
Powell was managing the biennial review process (Blevins & Brown, 2006; “Lawmakers 
Decry,” 2003; Lee, 2003; McChesney, 2004a).  Members of the Senate and House 
introduced bills that would repeal some of the FCC’s rules, they wrote letters to Powell 
calling him to task for not giving enough consideration to the public’s opposition to 
further relaxing the rules, and they expressed their concerns that relaxing the rules would 
be detrimental to a democratic society.  Although Powell was surely uncomfortable with 
their criticism, his intransigence backed him against the wall, and he refused to yield to 
the legislators’ concerns.  Although some members of Congress may have interpreted 
§202(h) of the Telecommunications Act very differently than did Powell, they had little 
influence on the specific procedures for generating public response that the FCC followed 
during this time period. 
 Question #4: To what extent did the range of public comments contribute to 
subsequent policy-making during these years? 
 
 There is little evidence to suggest that the range of public comments that were 
submitted to the FCC in response to the September 24 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
influenced the decisions made by the Commission’s majority when they voted to amend 
the FCC’s media ownership rules on June 2 (Blevins & Brown, 2006; Holman & 
McGregor, 2001; McGregor, 2006).  In fact, Chairman Powell told one reporter that 





the comments he had seen were too generalized and opinionated.  Therefore, he did not 
accept them as evidence.  However, legally the FCC is required to consider all public 
comments submitted before the filing window closes when making its decisions.  Yet, 
Powell described the letters as “a whole collection of anecdotes that were not responsive 
to the Court's question” (Mulkern, 2003a, K1).  
There are a number of reasons why the Commission might have chosen to ignore 
public comments (Holman & McGregor, 2001; McGregor, 2006).  First, the Republican 
majority on the Commission was predisposed to favoring its deregulatory agenda.  
Second, although the FCC stated that it received “more than 500,000 brief comments and 
form letters from individual citizens, most of which expressed opposition to changing the 
media ownership rules,” the vast majority of those comments were not received until 
after the filing window was closed (FCC, 2003i, p.5).  Therefore, only a few thousand 
comments received by individuals were legally eligible for consideration.  Additionally, 
since the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking asked for specific comments based on 
technical, legal, or economic analysis, many concerned citizens were unable to address 
the Commission’s criteria for commenting in a way that the Commission found 
persuasive.  Therefore, many of the comments submitted by individual citizens did not 
offer information about the specific policy questions that were sought by the 
Commission. 
 Even though public opinion may not have overtly influenced the Commission’s 
policy-making prior to the June 2 vote, there is no doubt that Congress did consider the 
range of public comments it received in opposition to media consolidation (McChesney, 





Television Station Limit by Congress can be attributed to voter opposition to the new 
rules.  Additionally, Congress listened to its constituents before the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking was issued.  Senators Hollings, Dorgan, and Inouye introduced a bill in 2001 
that would have revoked the FCC’s ability to lift media ownership rules (“No Title,” 
2001).  In a January 2003 meeting of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
Committee, the senators warned the Commissioners to proceed very carefully, and they 
were urged to hold public hearings (Competition Issues in the Telecommunications 
Industry, 2003).  Two weeks later, the same Committee held a hearing to discuss 
consolidation in the radio industry (Media Ownership, 2003).  The senators again were 
responding to complaints from citizens who pointed to the state of radio as an example of 
what could happen to the entire industry if media ownership rules were further relaxed.  
Four days before the field hearing in Richmond, two senators who were serving on the 
Antitrust Subcommittee in the House of Representatives sent a letter to the Commission 
deploring the state of diversity in broadcasting (Anselmo, 2003d; Kirkland & Struck, 
2003). 
 As media activists and organizations ramped up their public relations campaign, 
and as Commissioners Copps and Adelstein held their FCC town meetings, the press 
intensified its coverage of the issue (Chester, 2007; McChesney, 2004b).  Public 
opposition to the FCC’s proposed policy changes only increased and so did the political 
pressure on Congress.  In April, a majority of the members of Senate Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation Committee sent Powell a letter asking him to delay the June 
2 vote (Alpert, 2003; Pelofsky, 2003).  In May, both the House and Senate held more 





television ownership.  During this period, Congress was inundated with phone calls and 
letters from voters who were opposed to further consolidation in media (Mulkern, 2003a).  
 Shortly before the Commission voted on the 2002 Biennial Review Order and 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, more than 150 members of Congress from both parties 
asked the FCC to postpone the vote until they conducted more studies (Labaton, 2003a).  
After the Commission’s vote, public pressure on Congress to revoke the FCC’s decision 
snowballed.  Lobbyists from all sides of the issue descended on both houses (Chester, 
2007; Klinenberg, 2007; McChesney, 2004a).  A wide range of media activists and public 
interest groups pressed Congress to block the new rules from taking effect.  On a single 
afternoon, House members logged over 40,000 telephone calls about media ownership.  
Voter opposition to the new rules overwhelmed members of Congress when they traveled 
back to their districts.  By the end of July, the FCC received an additional 1.25 million 
letters opposing the new rules (Anselmo, 2003d).  In August, Powell announced a 
“Localism in Broadcasting Initiative” formed to create a task force to study how localism 
could be preserved and he was surely reacting to public pressure (FCC, 2003a).  After a 
series of complicated maneuvers, Congress eventually passed a law that reduced the new 
45% National Television Ownership Limit to 39%.  The law also changed the biennial 
review provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to a quadrennial process.  There 
is no doubt that public opinion opposed to media consolidation influenced Congress to 
act and thus contributed to the policy-making process. 
 It is reasonable to infer that the Third District Court in Philadelphia considered 
that public’s interest in media ownership limits when it decided the case.  When the 





the court agreed and cited the public’s interest in reaching a proper resolution of the case 
(Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  Additionally, the stay was issued in part 
because Congress was expected to pass a resolution rolling back the FCC’s new National 
Television Station Limit.  Allowing the new rules to go into effect would also harm the 
public interest in maintaining the existing rules.  While the legal system, in theory, is 
supposed to remain above the political fray, the issuance of the stay indicates that the 
justices were well aware of public opinion on the matter.  Other evidence that the court 
was not immune to the range of public comments on the issue includes passages in the 
opinion that acknowledge the nearly 2 million letters, postcards, emails, and petitions 
opposing further relaxation of the rules that the Commission received and noting the 
unofficial hearings that were held by Copps and Adelstein.  
 Question #5: What are the competing values embodied in the FCC’s rulemaking, 
the public response to that policy decision, and the court’s response to those decisions in 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC? 
 
 The competing values embodied in the FCC’s rulemaking can be traced directly 
to the bifurcated purpose of the agency itself.  As demonstrated in earlier chapters, the 
agency was formed not only to regulate the electromagnetic spectrum and the economic 
viability of the industries that it presided over, but it was also directed to uphold an 
idealized environment for social and political discourse.  This amalgamation of purpose 
provided the basis for contests over conflicting values throughout the history of U.S. 
communications policy.  This conflict became particularly acute during the 2002 biennial 
review process.  
 In the FCC’s 2002 Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the 





primary values that informed the decision-making process (FCC, 2003i).  Traditionally, 
the FCC embraced these ideals as the means by which a robust marketplace of diverse 
and antagonistic sources could be maintained (Aufderheide, 1999; McChesney,1999, 
2004b).  In the past, when the FCC evoked the primacy of localism, competition, and 
diversity, the Commission was articulating the means by which it sought to achieve a 
desirable social end.  However, after the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
maintaining a competitive market became an end in itself.  Consequently, the desired 
result of promulgating media ownership regulations was fundamentally realigned.  The 
meaning of the value of competition changed.  When Congress and the FCC adopted the 
mantra of economic efficiency in the market, they neglected to consider that promoting 
localism and diversity is not always economically efficient. 
 Additionally, when Congress allowed media owners to consolidate their holdings, 
they assumed that localism and diversity would be protected by increased video and 
audio delivery options (Aufderheide, 1999; McChesney, 1999; Price & Duffy, 1997).  
However, in 2002, the majority of the public received most of their local news and public 
affairs information from broadcasters (FCC, 2003i).  Media mergers in local and national 
markets meant that consumers had access to fewer independent sources of local news and 
public affairs programming. 
 The problem with trying to reconcile the conflicting goals of ensuring the 
economic viability of broadcasters with the social welfare of the public is evident in the 
convoluted rationale that the FCC offered for raising the cap on the Nation Television 
Station Ownership limit (FCC, 2003i).  When raising the limit to 45% of the aggregate 





owned stations responded better to community needs than did group-owned stations.  In 
another section of the report, the FCC stated that the only market relevant to diversity is 
local.  Accordingly, the FCC claimed that raising the national limit had no effect on 
diversity, but raising the limit was important because networks needed to increase their 
market share in order to compete with an abundance of national sources.  Nonetheless, 
the FCC also stated that it needed to retain a minimal limit so that local affiliates had 
some leverage with the networks when competing for independent programming and 
advertising dollars. 
 In other words, the FCC was arguing that it needed to raise the national television 
station ownership level in order to ensure than broadcasting would remain competitive on 
a national level with other video and audio providers (FCC, 2003i).  Therefore, the FCC 
needed to protect the economic welfare of national broadcasters since diversity did not 
matter in national markets.  However, the FCC chose to retain the Dual Network Rules 
because it said that this rule is necessary to maintain diversity, competition, and localism.  
Then when the FCC considered the Local Television Multiple Ownership Limit, it said 
that the existing rule was based on the flawed assumption that only local television 
stations contribute to viewpoint diversity in local markets.  These inconsistencies not 
only formed the basis for the subsequent remand in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 
but it also indicates that the FCC elevated the economic welfare of the industry it 
regulated over that of the public that it was mandated to serve.  When the FCC created 
the Diversity Index, it attempted to measure the value of diverse sources using methods 
that were similar to those used to assess market concentration in antitrust cases.  When 





competition in the marketplace of ideas, it ended up with truly absurd results that counted 
the New York Times as an equal competitor with the Duchess County Community 
College radio station.  Although there is not a lot of difference between screwdrivers 
made by different manufacturers, there is certainly a difference between the quality and 
reach of the New York Times and the quality and reach of a student radio station.  When 
the FCC attempted to apply economic measures to social policy, it tried to compare 
apples to oranges. 
 The public response to the FCC’s rules was remarkably consistent and coherent 
across the political spectrum.  Most people were worried about the effect of consolidation 
on localism and diversity (Chester, 2007; Klinenburg, 2006; McChesney, 2004a).  
Unions argued that group-owned stations tended to centralize their operations and cut 
news and other staff in order to boost profits, thereby depriving local communities of an 
important source of information.  A majority of the public responses to the FCC’s 
rulemaking complained that group station owners were less responsive to community 
needs, and less likely to respond to minority voices in the community.  Everyone from 
the National Rifle Association to the Catholic Conference of Bishops was afraid that the 
voices of their organizations would be marginalized in the race to attract the largest 
audience (Beckerman, 2003, Fallows, 2003).  The Parents Television Council complained 
that media corporations encouraged vulgar programming for the sake of high national 
ratings, whereas locally owned stations would be more responsive to the communities 
where they held their licenses.  Musicians argued that consolidation in radio made it next 
to impossible for local artists to get airplay and that radio formats had degenerated to the 





“Guild President, 2003”).  Activists complained that political advertisements on group-
owned stations were too expensive, even as corporate policy dictated that only 
uncontroversial ads would be aired.  All of these arguments reflected the public’s 
assumption that there was no viable substitute for broadcast services (McChesney, 
2004a).  Moreover, these arguments reflected the core belief that the FCC needed to 
maintain a thriving marketplace of ideas in broadcasting.   
When the Court of Appeals in Philadelphia handed down their decision in 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, its chief responsibility was to determine if the FCC 
had met the standard of review as required by the Administrative Procedures Act.  
According to the opinion, it is the court’s responsibility to ascertain if:  
The agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or 
is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise.  The reviewing court should not attempt itself to 
make up for such deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned basis for the 
agency’s action that the agency itself has not given. (Prometheus Radio Project v. 
FCC, 2004, p.30) 
 
While the court did have some leeway when it interpreted whether the 
Commission’s rules were Constitutional or whether they followed precedent, the 
parameters of the legal system limited their ability to look beyond the evidentiary record.  
Since the FCC presented its evidence in the form of economic and market research, the 
court was restricted to appraising the quality and consistency of the data it was offered.  
The court could not simply throw out a rule because it violated any of the normative 
principles of communication policy.  
However, the opinion did address the legitimacy of maintaining diversity, 





scarcity doctrine (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  The opinion stated that the 
Court had no intention, nor the power, to overturn the Supreme Court decision in NCCB 
(National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC, 1978).  In that case, the Supreme 
Court stated that there is a substantial and legitimate government interest in promoting 
diversified mass communications, and therefore limiting common ownership is a 
reasonable means of promoting the public interest.  The Court in Prometheus also stated 
that the abundance of nonbroadcast media had no effect on the limited physical properties 
of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
When the Court remanded the FCC’s local television, local radio, and Cross-
Media Limits, it did so because the Commission had failed to justify the numerical limits 
that it chose (Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  However, the court affirmed that 
the FCC had the power to impose some restrictions on Cross-Media Limits, stating that 
some restrictions were necessary in the public interest to guard against an elevated risk of 
harm to the range and breadth of viewpoints offered to the public.  Several sections of the 
opinion also established that promoting localism, competition, and diversity was a 
legitimate goal for the agency to pursue.  
Despite the restrictions imposed by the legal system, the Third District Court of 
Appeals allowed the seven normative principles of regulatory policy to influence their 
decision.16
                                                 
16 Napoli (2001) identified seven normative principles that play a role in the regulation of 
electronic media.  They are the First Amendment, the public interest, the marketplace of 
ideas, diversity, competition, universal service, and localism. 
  This can be inferred from the way the court interpreted section 202(h) of the 
Telecommunications Act.  The court stated that there was no deregulatory presumption in 





review its media ownership limits to determine if they were still useful in the public 
interest.  If not, then the FCC could modify, repeal, or strengthen the rules, but in order to 
serve the public interest, the Commission must support its decision with reasoned 
analysis.  This statutory interpretation, along with other passages in the opinion, 
confirmed that it is in the public interest to promote policies that protect localism, 
competition, diversity, and the marketplace of ideas.  The court also confirmed that it is 
not a violation of the First Amendment rights of media corporations to limit media 
ownership.  Additionally, one of the reasons why the court rejected the Diversity Index is 
because not all Americans had access to the Internet, and, therefore, universal access to 
broadcast services was a factor in the decision. 
 
Interpretive Communities and Conflicting Values 
 This study began with the theory that the stakeholders in the policy-making 
process belonged to different interpretive communities and, therefore, based their 
evaluation of the FCC’s policies and procedures during the tenure of Chairman Michael 
Powell on different sets of assumptions about the meaning of the public interest in media 
ownership policy (Fish, 1980; Napoli, 2001a; Streeter, 1996; Zelizer, 1994).  Each 
interpretive group was limited by the modes of thought that were available to them, 
restricted by the knowledge structures that defined them, and restrained by associations 
that bound them to each other.   
More than just a reaction to an extension of a deregulatory trend in media 
ownership policy that had been ongoing for several decades, the public’s response to the 
prospect of increased consolidation in the media was a protest against the corporate 





Congress abolished the national cap on radio stations and when corporations like Clear 
Channel and Citadel took control of multiple stations in local markets, the public felt the 
effects of these mergers immediately.  Listeners in communities across the nation heard 
the results of media consolidation every day on their way to work.  When corporate 
owners fired local announcers and hired consultants to create uniform play-lists piped in 
to local markets from central locations, many members of the public felt betrayed by the 
concomitant reduction in local news and the homogenization of local radio formats.  
When faced with the possibility that the same thing could happen to local television 
stations and newspapers, the public pushed back against what they saw as the hegemonic 
forces of the broadcast industry and corporate America.  When local stations were 
purchased by large national corporations, the public perception was that their choices 
were suddenly more limited and therefore the marketplace of ideas was more limited too.  
While the FCC presented the proposed rule changes as an economic problem that could 
be solved by employing the correct methodology, the public interpreted the problem as a 
social problem that could be solved politically.  Many members of the public were not 
willing to put their faith in the expertise of the agency, nor were they willing to rely on 
the promise of new technologies. 
 The public as a whole did not possess the expertise to comment specifically on the 
intricacies of market analysis that were presented by the FCC (Blevins & Brown, 2006; 
McGregor, 2006).  Most people who were concerned about media concentration were not 
knowledgeable about the fine points of statistical analysis or quantitative methodology, 
and fewer still had the time or inclination to wade through the thousands of pages of 





ownership policy.  Most people were not particularly equipped to parse the fine points of 
legal analysis, and they did not have the capability to produce the type of empirical 
evidence that the Commission sought.  That is not to say that the public was not well 
informed but rather that their knowledge was experiential and that fact limited the scope 
of their responses to the FCC’s proposed rules. 
 However, the public and their representatives did possess knowledge about our 
political system and democratic theory.  They understood that they had a right to exercise 
their power by participating in the policy-making process.  When public interest groups 
formed coalitions and urged individual citizens to write their representatives in Congress, 
they knew that the sheer number of comments opposing the FCC’s proposed rules would 
allow them to reconstruct the issue on their terms.  
Commissioners Copps and Adelstein, both having come to the FCC after serving 
as Congressional staffers, understood the political process as well.  When they planned 
their cross-country tour, they encouraged public participation in the policy-making 
process, and they must have hoped that if enough citizens showed up at these events to 
express their opposition to media consolidation that the other Commissioners would pay 
attention.  Copps was a trained historian, and Adelstein described himself as a life-long 
public servant who was dedicated to promoting the public interest (“Biography of 
Adelstein,” n.d; “Biography of Copps,” n.d.).  The professional background and 
philosophical orientation of both of these men were very different from that of the other 






Chairman Powell came from a military family, served in the Army and as a policy 
advisor to Richard Cheney in the Department of Defense (“Biography of Powell,” n.d.).  
After earning his law degree, Powell served as the chief of staff of the Antitrust Division 
at the Department of Justice.  At the Antitrust Division, Powell belonged to an 
interpretive group that used quantitative economic data to support policy decisions, and 
as an attorney, he belonged to a class of professionals that relied on empirical evidence 
when arguing cases in court.  Powell’s professional background induced him to construct 
policy in economic terms.  This habit of thought served to narrow his interpretation of 
what constituted acceptable evidence.  His political affiliation with the Bush 
administration, an administration that placed a high priority on media deregulation, must 
have certainly influenced the way he framed the policy goals of his agency.  While all of 
the Commissioners had contact with Congress, members of the public, and 
representatives from public interest groups, they talked much more frequently to industry 
insiders.  After the formal biennial review process began, the FCC “held seventy-one 
closed-door, off-the-record meetings with corporate media CEOs and their lobbyists, but 
only five such meetings with public interest groups” (McChesney, 2004a, p. 18).  Clearly, 
frequent interaction with industry officials who constructed media ownership policy as a 
roadblock that limited their ability to compete in a multichannel media environment, 
influenced and constrained the way the FCC interpreted the policy environment. 
 The broadcast industry was bound by its own interests.  Having long benefited by 
the corporate liberal organization of the regulatory structure of broadcasting, the largest 
broadcasters were not willing to concede that mergers and consolidation had an impact 





providers despite their proclamations espousing the glory of the unfettered marketplace.  
As a community united by common interests and interpretive strategies, broadcasters 
understood the boundaries of the Commission’s inquiry, and they followed the roadmap 
that was provided to them. 
Given that the business of broadcasting is highly dependent on market-driven 
research, the industry had the resources and motivation to respond to the FCC’s queries 
with the economic data that the agency sought.  Although broadcasters may have 
underestimated the level of public opposition to increased media consolidation, they 
correctly recognized that it was unlikely that Congress would undertake a major program 
to reform the structure of broadcasting.  Despite all of the anticonsolidation rhetoric on 
Capital Hill, Congress actually increased the National Television Station Limit to 39%, 
from the 35% that was required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Additionally, 
the Deregulatory Petitioners in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC were so confident of 
the validity of their construction of §202(h) that they construed the passage to mean that 
all media ownership limits should be eliminated.  Thus, the Deregulatory Petitioners were 
bound by the modes of thought that were available to them (Bunker, 2001; Fish, 1980; 
Streeter, 1996). 
 Opposition to the FCC’s proposed rules by members of Congress surged as press 
coverage of the issue increased (Beckerman, 2003; “Does Media”, 2003; Rosenstiel et al., 
2002).  As more representatives heard from more constituents, the politicians constructed 
their rhetoric to include ominous visions of democratic failure, a prophecy that was 
shared by many voters.  Because opposition to media consolidation emanated from all 





Commissioners and by appearing to stand up against corporate titans intent on destroying 
the marketplace of ideas.  If Congress was content to restrict its actions to passing a 
largely symbolic bill to check the national television ownership limit to 39%, well, as one 
scholar put it, “communication is a symbolic act whereby reality is produced, maintained, 
repaired and transformed” (Carey, 1988, p.23).  Moreover, the structure of corporate 
liberalism would not tolerate a more radical reformation of media ownership regulations 
(Streeter, 1996). 
 The justices that sat before the bench in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC also 
belonged to an interpretive community that is inherently conservative and theoretically 
rational.  Although the justices were bound by precedent and strict adherence to 
formalized practices and procedures, they also possessed a great deal of latitude when 
defining the meaning of §202(h) (Streeter, 1996).  When they decided that there was no 
deregulatory presumption that mandated the elimination of media ownership rules, they 
deconstructed the statutory requirements of the law to conform to their own interpretation 
of the public interest in broadcasting.  This was demonstrated by statements that 
supported the Commission’s right to regulate cross-media ownership, by the court’s 
reaffirmation of the spectrum scarcity rationale, and by its denial of the Deregulatory 
Petitioner’s claim that media ownership limits infringed on their First Amendment rights 
(Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2004).  All of these findings indicated that the 
justices elevated the value of past rulings over the argument put forth by the FCC and the 
Deregulatory Petitioners.  Likewise, the court’s insistence that the FCC’s evidence was 
based on unreasonable and inconsistent evidence was reflective of a pronounced trend 





policy decision-making (Napoli, 2007).  Thus, the conflict over the deregulation of media 
ownership during the Chairman Powell’s tenure can be ascribed to the differing 
interpretive strategies employed by dissimilar stakeholders in the policy-making process.   
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 Since many of the public comments received by the FCC during the 2002 biennial 
review process were received via electronic mail, it would be very productive if future 
research was aimed at addressing this phenomenon.  During the last review, FCC staffers 
created a rudimentary coding system that categorized public comments (Holman & 
McGregor, 2001; McGregor, 2006).  Therefore, it would be fruitful to explore whether a 
more systematic method of compiling the responses to policy initiatives taken by the 
Commission could be designed and applied to the record.  Creative approaches to the 
evaluation of such documentation could produce a comparative record that would be 
useful to study over time. 
 This study has demonstrated that propagation of media ownership regulations is, 
at least in part, a political problem (Blevins & Brown, 2006).  It may be somewhat easier, 
and more acceptable, to measure the economic effects of a policy decision on a defined 
market than it is to quantify the results of a policy decision on public opinion, but that 
does not negate the importance of attempting to do so.  The FCC should reach out to 
political scientists who have experience in conducting research that quantifies and 
categorizes public opinion in a manner that expands the empirical record.  There is no 
proscription that requires the courts or the FCC to rely exclusively on economic data 
when assessing the public interest in media policy.  Diversifying the scope of evidence 






 Lastly, this study has contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of the 
competing definitions of the public interest in media regulations by adapting the concept 
of interpretive communities to explore how different interest groups come to define the 
meaning of commonly used terms and the values that they extract from those concepts.  
Because meaning is never fixed, additional research exploring how stakeholders in the 
policy-making process emphasize different interpretive strategies when arriving at 
conclusions about the possible policy outcomes would contribute to our understanding of 
how groups achieve consensus. 
  
Policy Implications 
 The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 not only altered the way in 
which the communications industry could compete in the marketplace, but it also 
reformulated the meaning of the public interest in U.S. communications policy 
(Aufderheide, 1999; McChesney, 1999).  Unfortunately, when Congress neglected to 
elicit widespread public support for its fundamental revision of communications policy, it 
placed the FCC in the untenable position of having to address the gap between its avowed 
allegiance to the promotion of localism, diversity, and competition in its policy decisions 
and the regulatory reality created by the rules it promulgated.  While this has been an 
ongoing concern for the FCC, the stark contrast between the promotion of a corporate 
liberal agenda and the political and social goal of encouraging a diverse and antagonistic 
public sphere has never been as clear to the public as it was during the 2002 Biennial 
Review proceedings.   





a comprehensive rewrite of the Communications Act, it was inevitable that the wide-
ranging piece of legislation would include seemingly innocuous provisions without much 
debate (Mundy, 2003; Schwartzman, Feld, & Desai, 2006).  In fact, the inclusion of 
§202(h) was apparently the result of a compromise between Republican lawmakers and 
industry groups that wanted to eliminate media ownership caps completely and 
Democratic legislators that wanted to maintain the existing limits.  At the time, the 
National Television Station Ownership Limit was at 25%.  The House wanted the limit 
raised to 50% and GOP Senators wanted it eliminated altogether.  After much haggling, 
the lawmakers agreed to raise the limit to 35% in the spring of 1995.  Realizing that it 
was unlikely that the caps would be raised further, two Congressional lobbyists for 
Rupert Murdock’s NewsCorp, Peggy Binzel and Preston Padden, forwarded a plan to 
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) that would insert the language contained in §202(h) into 
the Act.  According to Mundy, (2003) several GOP Senators who sat on the Commerce 
Committee figured that if the FCC had to “repeal or modify any regulation that it 
determines to be no longer in the public interest” every 2 years, the FCC would fail to do 
the full justification required to fend off court challenges to any existing ownership rules 
(p. 5).  
On Christmas Eve 1995, Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD), Senator Fritz Hollings 
(D-S.C.), and Senator John Dingell (D-Mich.) signed off on §202(h).  There was no 
public discussion of the intent of the committee members who inserted this provision into 
the 1996 Telecommunications Act, nor was there any member of the committee who was 
willing to take credit for the drafting of the clause.  While it is likely that the original 





ramifications of §202(h), it is also reasonable to assume that a majority of the members of 
Congress had not given this section their full attention, considering that the full text of the 
act was 333 pages long.  The insertion of §202(h) was, as Schwartzman et al. (2006) 
called it, “a successful legislative ambush” by a special interest group that was allowed to 
essentially write what would prove to be a critical component of the omnibus rewriting of 
the Communications Act of 1934 (p.581).  Additionally, Congress ceded its statutory 
authority to the FCC when it ordered the agency to reconsider its media ownership rules 
every 2 years.  While the insertion of §202(h) in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
may have temporarily shielded Republican senators from the political ramifications of 
voting to eliminate media ownership limits altogether, it ended up intensifying the 
political pressure on the FCC and ultimately during the summer of 2003 on Congress 
itself. 
As previously documented in Chapter 3, the first Biennial Review under the 
direction of Chairman William Kennard took 2 years for the FCC to complete.  This 
meant that the FCC was required by statute to begin its second review only a few months 
after completing its first.  Although the FCC under Kennard voted to uphold most of the 
media ownership restrictions that were still in place after the passage of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, Kennard’s FCC modified cross-media restrictions with the new 
eight-voice rule.  However, even before the FCC had even issued its findings, in 2000 
NewsCorp had already hired attorneys to challenge the first review (Mundy, 2003; 
Schwartzman et al., 2006).  When the DC Court of Appeals found the FCC’s rationale for 
supporting the eight-voice rule and the national television ownership limit untenable, 






As the consequences of liberalizing media ownership restrictions after the 
Telecommunications Act became apparent to the public and to media advocacy 
organizations, members of Congress began paying attention to the provisions of §202(h).  
When it became evident that Powell planned to modify or eliminate the rules that had 
made it through the Communications Act rewrite, only then did lawmakers begin to 
speak out against media consolidation and FCC policy under Powell.  When public 
opposition to the 2002 Biennial Report and Order could no longer be ignored, Congress 
finally passed a compromise bill that raised the National Television Station Ownership 
Limit to 39%.  This symbolic gesture did not address the problem of media consolidation, 
it did not address the problem of ceding its statutory responsibility to an administrative 
agency, and it did not address the problem of defending FCC rules in court.  
Congressional failure to accept responsibility for the passage of §202(h) only ensured that 
court dockets would be filled with challenges to media ownership restrictions.  On the 
basis of this analysis, therefore, §202(h) should be repealed.  
While Congress certainly bears some amount of responsibility for the 2002 
Biennial Review debacle, this does not absolve Powell of his share of the blame.  Powell 
was so wedded to the ideology of the free market and his belief in the discourse of new 
technology that he let his own preconceived regulatory agenda dictate the entire review 
process.  When Powell kicked off the review procedures with the Roundtable Discussion 
on Media Ownership, he missed an opportunity to consider how differing perspectives on 
the issue might influence the ensuring debate.  Even though Powell chose to invite 





predilection towards his deregulatory policies, many of the panelists urged him to 
consider the issue from a wider perspective.  Most of the experts on the panel agreed that 
economic data should not be used exclusively to define the public interest.  These 
analysts asked Powell to enlarge his definition of competition from a strictly market-
based approach to one that also encompassed competition in the marketplace of ideas.  
Still, Powell ignored the advice of his own handpicked panel and neglected to consider 
the social ramifications of loosening media ownership regulations. 
Powell’s insistence that the Internet and other communication technologies 
offered consumers a diverse array of media choices ignored the reality that increased 
delivery options do not necessarily equal increased diversity of credible content, 
especially in regard to local news and public affairs.  While Powell’s interpretive 
community had access to increased communication options, the majority of American 
citizens in 2003 still relied on their local television network affiliates to deliver local 
news and information.  Although many consumers were accessing media content online, 
most of that content was not produced exclusively for the Internet; rather it replicated 
what was available through traditional media outlets.  Even though there was a multitude 
of information available on the Internet, not all sources are of equal importance, and the 
Diversity Index failed to take that into account.  The FCC under Powell’s leadership was 
so intent on devising a way to measure markets that it failed to remember why they were 
measuring markets in the first place.  Although it is fair to say that the type of research 
that the FCC engaged in was a legitimate way to approach the problem of media 
ownership in a rapidly changing communication environment, this research only 





responsibility to promulgate policy that allows the industry to remain economically 
healthy, it is also the agency’s responsibility to ensure that the public’s interest is served 
at the same time.  It is all well and good that consumers have access to multiple forms of 
entertainment, but it is imperative that citizens have access to the information they need 
to participate in a self-governing democracy.  Powell’s lack of attention to this aspect of 
the function of media in a democracy surely contributed to the court’s decision in 
Prometheus v. FCC (2004).  When Powell formulated his conception of the importance 
of competition in media markets, he neglected to take into consideration the value of 
competition in the marketplace of ideas. 
Additionally, Powell’s disregard for the political ramifications of media 
ownership policy was a blind spot that doomed his policy initiatives to failure.  It is 
understandable that Powell felt that it was his primary responsibility to provide empirical 
evidence to support his policies, but it was simply naïve of him to think that widespread 
public opposition to his proposals was not worthy of consideration.  Many 
communication scholars have theorized that regulatory capture has rendered the FCC as a 
failed agency, but even if this is the case, the FCC is required to at least acknowledge the 
pretense that the public has a voice in its decisions.  The FCC received more comments 
on this issue than on any other issue in its history; clearly, Powell’s choice to isolate 
himself from the politics of regulation was a consequential mistake. 
The courts should also shoulder some responsibility for the FCC’s failures.  When 
the DC Circuit consistently undermined the FCC’s ability to uphold media ownership 
limits based on a narrow interpretation of §202(h), it attenuated the agency’s authority to 





Congress had directed the FCC only to or modify its media ownership regulations would 
have stripped the FCC of its authority to affirm its existing rules even if they did further 
the public interest (Prometheus v. FCC, 2004).  As the Prometheus Court ruled, §202(h) 
contained no statutory presumption toward deregulation; rather it required the 
Commission “...to justify its decision to retain, repeal, or modify any of its rules with a 
reasoned analysis (Prometheus v. FCC, 2004, p. 42).  Furthermore, the Prometheus Court 
ruled that the Fox and Sinclair Court’s characterization of the deregulatory presumption 
of §202 (h) was a “crabbed reading” of the statute that would have curtailed the FCC’s 
traditional administrative law authority. 
 As the courts have demanded that the FCC and other policy-making agencies 
meet a greater standard of reasoned analysis in its decision-making process over the last 
several decades, the FCC and other regulatory agencies have come to rely more heavily 
on empirical research to support their policies in court (Albaek, 1995; Napoli, 2007).  It is 
indisputable that this type of research can be useful for measuring markets and other 
problems that can be quantified, however, critics have noted that excessive reliance on 
market analysis, and other economic data can marginalize the role of value judgments in 
the decision-making process.  It is certainly the case that Chairman Powell marginalized 
the importance of democratic and political values during the 2003 Biennial Review 
process, but the courts should also be held responsible for depending so heavily on 
empirical data.  The courts need to expand the scope of evidence that they will accept to 
support a reasoned analysis of policy, and the courts need to acknowledge that empirical 
analysis can be just as value laden as qualitative research.  The courts need to look at the 







 Powell was correct in his assessment that the competitive environment for 
broadcasters and other content providers had changed radically since the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act.  There are more media platforms and more ways of delivering 
audio and video content than ever before.  Shortly after taking office, current FCC Chair 
Julius Genachowski unveiled a proposal to develop a national broadband plan (“ FCC 
Sends,” 2010).  The plan would have attempted to guarantee near universal access to 
high-speed Internet connections, and it would have effectively usurped broadcaster's 
domination of the electromagnetic spectrum by asking them to voluntarily relinquish 
unused space so that it could be auctioned off to broadband service providers.  However, 
in April 2010, the DC Court of Appeals ruled in Comcast v. FCC (2010) that the FCC has 
no authority to regulate the Internet.  Genachowski later announced that the Commission 
would be seeking public comment on a new compromise approach to constructing a 
regulatory framework that would hold up in court (Genachowski, 2010).  A subsequent 
initiative by House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Henry Waxman (D-
Calif.) to codify net neutrality rules failed to make it out of committee (Chang, 2010). 
 It is also fair to say that the policy-making environment in which the FCC 
forwarded its proposed changes to its media ownership rules in 2003 has also changed 
since Michael Powell’s tenure.  When Congress rolled back the National Television 
Ownership Rule to 39% from 45% after the 2003 Biennial Review, it also amended 
§202(h).  Instead of requiring a biennial review of media ownership rules, the FCC now 
is required to conduct its review quadrennially. 





direction of FCC Chair Kevin Martin, loosened Newspaper/Broadcast Cross Ownership 
restrictions.  The FCC now allows cross-ownership between a daily newspaper and a 
broadcast station if the television station is not among the top four ranked stations in a 
market and if at least eight independent “major media voices” remain in the market 
(Report and Order, 2007).  
 In preparation for its 2010 Biennial Review, the FCC has been holding a series of 
Media Ownership Workshops across the country, and the Commission has gone to great 
lengths to solicit public participation in the decision-making process (FCC, 2009).  This 
is a laudatory development.  However, the Third District Court of Appeals recently 
announced in March 2010, that it would lift the stay on the FCC’s Newspaper/Cross-
Ownership Limits that has been in effect since Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 
perhaps due to the FCC’s inability to devise a new plan (McConnell, 2010).  While the 
regulatory climate may have changed since 2003, the failure to address many of the 
underlying assumptions, contradictions, and conflicts that are contained in the regulatory 
regime will continue to afflict the Commission and the courts in the future. 
 The discourse of technology is alive and thriving in regulatory quarters.  Once 
again, citizens are being asked to place their faith in the power of new delivery systems to 
provide us with a more perfect form of a participatory democracy.  It remains to be seens 
if Genachowski can create a broadband plan that will withstand the scrutiny of the courts.  
Given the current political climate as the midterm elections approach, it seem unlikely 
that Congress will pass a bill that authorizes the FCC to expand its authority over the 
Internet, and the prospect of passing a bill guaranteeing net neutrality in the near future 





 The tension between capitalism and the collective social welfare of our nation will 
continue to influence media ownership policy in the future.  There is no reason to believe 
that the corporate liberal organization of society will produce different results just 
because the advent of a new-age technology is upon us.  In fact, there is reason to suspect 
that the continuing decline in the size of mass media audiences will create more problems 
for democracy than broadband or cable or other delivery systems can solve.  For better or 
for worse, mass media have had an instrumental role in the development of a national 
culture.  As audiences become more fragmented, how they recreate any semblance of a 
national political discourse without having free over-the-air broadcasting to unite them?  
If citizens are moving toward a future where most media will be delivered via broadband, 
how will the FCC’s commitment to promoting localism be maintained?  John Armstrong 
(2002) demonstrated how difficult it was for the FCC to create policies that supported 
localism when regulating commercial television during its infancy.  It is equally 
important that policy-makers now ask how local communities that are currently defined 
by broadcast markets will be defined and served by broadband or other technologies.  If 
providing local news and public affairs programming becomes unprofitable for 
broadcasters, who will step in to fill the void?  There are no easy solutions to these 
problems and §202 (h) ensures that the issue of media ownership and the public service 
obligations of broadcasters will continue to generate controversy as long as the law 










Abernathy, K. (2001a).  Separate statement of Kathleen Abernathy. In re: Transfer of 
 control of broadcast licenses held by subsidiaries of Chris-Craft Industries Inc. to 
 Fox Television Stations Inc, File nos. BALCT-20000918ABB, et al.  Retrieved 
 from http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Abernathy/Statements/2001/stkqa102.html 
 
Abernathy, K. (2001b).  A perspective from FCC Commissioner Abernathy.  The United 
States International Telecommunications Union Association Newsletter.   
 Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Abernathy/Articles/2001/ 
 arkqa101.html 
 
Abernathy, K. (2002).  My view from the doorstep of FCC change.  Federal 
Communications Law Journal, 54, 199-122. 
 
Abernathy, K. (2003).  Written statement of Kathleen Abernathy on the 2002 Broadcast  
 Ownership Biennial Regulatory Review.  Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
 edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235127A2.pdf  
 
Adelstein, J. S. (2003a).  Big macs and big media: The decision to supersize.  Speech 
presented at the Media Institute, Arlington, VA.  Retrieved from 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-234736A1.pdf 
 
Adelstein, J. S. (2003b).  Statement of Commissioner Jonathon S. Adelstein dissenting: 
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Retrieved from 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235047A8.pdf 
 
Adelstein, J. S. (2003c).  Statement of FCC Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein,  
FCC Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein before the Senate Committee on  
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Hearing on FCC Oversight. Retrieved  
from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235162A2.pdf 
 
Administrative Procedure Act, Public Law No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
 
Aguilar, M. (1999).  Micro-radio: A small step in the return to localism, diversity, and 






Ahrens, F. (2003a, May 28).  FCC plan to alter media rules spurs growing debate.   
Washington Post, p. A1. 
 
Ahrens, F. (2003b, June 20).  Senate panel approves tougher media rules.  Washington  
          Post, p. E1. 
 
Ahrens, F. (2005, January 28).  FCC drops bid to relax media rules: Agency sought fewer  
 limits on ownership, Washington Post, p. A1. 
 
Airline Deregulation Act (1978).  Public Law No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705. 
 
Albiniak, P. (2000, February 21).  LPFM battle lines drawn.  Broadcasting & Cable,  
130(8) 7. 
 
Albiniak, P. (2003, April 14).  Mark your calendars for media rules.  Broadcasting &  
Cable, 133, 38-40. 
 
Alleven, M. (2001, April 16).  Powell's dream team.  Wireless Week, 7(16), 4. 
 
Alpert, B. (2003, April 9).  Debate heating up over deregulation of media ownership.  
Newhouse News Service, p. 1. 
 
Angevine, E. (1969, Winter).  The Consumer Federation of America.  Journal of  
 Consumer Affairs, 3(2), 152-156. 
 
Anselmo, J. (2003a, June 7).  FCC media ownership changes prompt plans for 
opposition, but House leaders not prepared to act.  CQ Weekly, 61,1394. 
 
Anselmo, J. (2003b, June 28).  Senate committee toughens media ownership restrictions  
in second swipe at FCC.  CQ Weekly, 61,1627. 
 
Anselmo, J. (2003c, July 12).  Focus on media ownership issue takes lawmakers by 
surprise.  CQ Weekly, 61, 1831. 
 
Anselmo, J. (2003d, July 26).  Lawmakers underestimate public concern about FCC 
media ownership rule.  CQ Weekly, 61, 1903-1905.  
 
Appropriation Act of 2004, P. L. No. 108-199, H.R. 2799, 108th Cong.1. (2004). 
 
Archer, G. L. (1938).  History of radio to 1926.  New York: American Historical Society,  
Inc. 
 








Armstrong, J. S. (2002).  Localism, community, and commercial television, 1948-1960: A       
value analysis. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Utah, Salt Lake 
 City. 
 
Armstrong, J. S. (2006).  Applying critical theory to electronic media history.  In D.G.  
Godfrey (Ed.), Methods of historical analysis in electronic media (pp. 145-166). 
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.1 (1945). 
 
Aufderheide, P. (1999).  Communications policy and the public interest: The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Austin, C. (1983, August 28).  After 30 years, this media watchdog is still viligent.  New 
York Times, p. A23. 
 
Avery, R. K. (Ed.)(1993).  Public service broadcasting in a multichannel environment:  
The history and survival of an ideal.  White Plains, NY: Longman. 
 
Avery, R. K. (2001, Summer).  Exploring the expanding domain of public  
telecommunications research.  Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media,  
45(3), 537-540. 
 
Avery, R. K. (2005).  Public service broadcasting and cultural context: Comparing the  
United States and European experience.  In G.F. Lowe & P. Jauert (Eds.), 
Cultural dilemmas in public service broadcasting (pp.199-209). Goteberg, 
Sweden: Nordicom. 
 
Avery, R. K. (2007).  The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967: Looking ahead by looking  
back.  Critical studies in Media Communication, 24(4), 358-364. 
  
Avery, R. K., & Pepper, R. (1976).  The evolution of the CPB-PBS relationship 1970- 
 1973.  Public Telecommunications Review, 7(2), 19-30. 
 
Avery, R. K., & Stavitsky, A. G. (2003).  The FCC and the public interest: A selective  
critique of U.S. telecommunications policymaking.  In M.P. McCauley, E. E. 
Peterson, B. L. Artz & D. Halleck (Eds.), Public broadcasting and the public 
interest (pp. 52-61).  
 
Bagdikian, B. H. (2000).  The media monopoly (6th ed.).  Boston: Beacon Press. 
 
Baker, D. (2002).  Democracy unhinged, more media concentration means  
less public discourse: A critique of the FCC studies on media ownership.   







Ahrens, F. (2003c, September 4).  Court blocks media ownership rules: Momentum  
grows to halt FCC change. Washington Post, p. 3A. 
 
Balough, M. (1996, April).  Showing that we care, no matter the story, the medium.   
 Quill, 84(3), 2. 
 
Barnouw, E. (1966).  A tower in Babel: A history of broadcasting in the United States:  
 Vol.1 to 1933.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Barnouw, E. (1968).  The golden web: A history of broadcasting in the United States:  
 Vol.2 to 1933-1953.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Barnouw, E. (1970).  The image empire: A history of broadcasting in the United States:  
 Vol.3 since 1953.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bateman, K. (2000, February 7).  Regulation/radio interference in DC. MediaWeek, 
10(3), 8B. 
 
Baughman, J. L. (1981).  Warriors in the wasteland: The Federal Communications  
Commission and American television, 1958-1967.  Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Columbia University, New York. 
  
Baxter, L. A.,  & Babbie, E. (2004).  The basics of communication research.  Belmont,  
CA: Thomson Wadsworth. 
 
Beckerman, G. (2003, November/December).  Tripping up big media.  Columbia 
 Journalism Review, 42(4), 15-20. 
 
Benjamin, L. (1998).  Working it out together: Radio policy from Hoover to the Radio  
 Act of 1927.  Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 42(2), 221-236. 
  
Benton Foundation. (n.d.).  About us.  Retrieved from http://www.benton.org/about 
 
Berry, S. T., & Waldfogel, J. (1999, February).  Public radio in the United States: Does it  
correct market failure or cannibalize commercial?  Journal of Public Economics,  
71(2), 189-212. 
 
Berry, S. T., & Waldfogel, J. (2001).  Do mergers increase product variety?  Evidence  
from radio broadcasting, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 1009-1025. 
 
Besen biography. (n. d.).  CRA International web site.  Retrieved from 
http://www.crai.com/ProfessionalStaff/listingdetails.aspx?id=1268 
 
Besen, S. (2001).  Statement of Stanley M. Besen.  Roundtable on FCC Ownership 






Blackly, R. J. (1979).  To serve the public interest: Educational broadcasting in the  
 United States.  Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. 
 
Blevins, J. L., & Brown, D.H. (2006).  Political issue or policy matter?  The U.S. Federal  
 Communications Commission's Third Biennial Review of broadcast ownership  
 rules.  Journal of Communication Inquiry, 30(1), 21-41. 
 
Bloom, D. (2003, April 8).  Diller disses dereg.  Daily Variety, p. 18. 
 
Biography of Jonathan S. Adelstein (n.d.). Retreived from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
 commissioners/previous/adelstein/biography.html 
 
Biography of Kathleen Q. Abernathy (n. d.).  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
 commissioners/previous/abernathy/biography.html 
 
Biography of Kevin J. Martin (n. d.).  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/ 
previous/martin/biography.html 
 
Biography of Michael J. Copps (n. d.).   
 Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/copps/biography.html 
 
Biography of Michael K. Powell (n. d.).  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
 commissioners/previous/powell/biography.html 
 
Biography of William E. Kennard (n.d.).  Retrieved from  
http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/previous/kennard/biography.html 
 
Bischoff, G. (2003, September 22).  Venue change could backfire on challengers of FCC  
order. Telephony, 244. 22-24. 
 
Bollinger, L. C. (1986).  The tolerant society: Freedom of speech and extremist speech  
 in America.  New York: The Oxford University Press. 
 
Bozell Biography, (n.d.).  Media Research Center.  Retrieved from http:// 
 www.mediaresearch.org/bios/lbb/welcome.asp 
 
Brady, S. (2003, January 20).  Media ownership forum draw Powell and co. Cable World, 
15(3), 6. 
 
Braman, S. (2003).  Policy as a research context.  In S. Bramen (Ed.), Communication  
 researchers and policy-making.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Brand, K. (2004).  The rebirth of low-power FM broadcasting in the U.S. Journal of  







 Brenahan, F., & Reiss, P. C. (1991).  Entry and competition in concentrated markets:  
Empirical industrial organization.  Journal of Political Economy, 99(5), 997-
1009. Brown, K. & Williams, G (2002).  Consolidation and advertising prices in 




Brown, L. (1971).  Television: The business behind the box.  New York: Harcourt Brace 
 Jovanovich. 
 
Bunker, M.D. (2001).  Critiquing free speech: First Amendment theory and the  
 challenge of interdisciplinary.  Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc 
 
Burr, R. (2003, April 1).  Statement of Congressman Richard Burr [Press release].  
Retrieved from LexisNexis. 
 
Bush, C. A. (2002).  On the substitutability of local newspaper, radio, and television 




Cable Communications Policy Act, P. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780 (1984). 
 
Cable Television and Consumer Protection Act, P. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460  
 (1992).  
 
Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 76.501(a) (1998). 
 
Campbell, K. (2003, May 30).  Are bigger voices better voices?  With FCC expected to 
relax ownership rules Monday, the media industry faces static from a public wary 
of consolidation.  Christian Science Monitor, p. 3. 
 
Carey, J. W. (1988).  Communication as culture: Essays on media and society.  
 New York: Routledge.   
 
Carlson, C. (2001, April 16).  Bush names insiders to FCC.  eweek, 18(15), 40. 
 
Carter, B. (2010, April 1).  Ratings fall on newscasts at two networks.  New York Times,  
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/business/media/ 
02tele.html?ref=todayspaper 
 
Carter, T. B., Dee, J. L., & Zuckman, H. L. (2000).  Mass communication law (5th 
ed.).  St. Paul: West Group. 
 
Caruso, D. (2003, September 10).  A win for pirate radio: Renegade broadcast group  





Chaffee, Z. (1919).  Freedom of speech during wartime.  Harvard Law Review 32(8) 932-
 973. Economics 16(1) 416 –460. 
 
Chandler, A. D. Jr., Bruchey, S., & Galambos, L. (Eds.).  (1968).  The changing 
 economic order: Readings in American business and economic history.  New 
 York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 
 
Chang, C. (2010, September 30). Mixed corporate reactions to next moves on net 
neutrality. Washington Post. fromhttp://voices.washingtonpost.com/ 
posttech/2010/09/mixed_corporate_reactions_to_n.html. 
 
Chester, J. (2004, January 21).  Michael Powell’s legacy: Weaker public interest, more  
powerful conglomerates, less competition, higher prices: His hubris has awakened 
public to dangers of consolidation.  Center for Digital Democracy.  Retrieved 
from http://www.democraticmedia.org/news/PowellFarewell.html. 
 
Chester, J. (2007).  Digital destiny: New media and the future of democracy.  New York: 
 The New Press. 
 
Clear Channel criticizes FCC decision President & COO Mark Mays says FCC 'chose  
 politics over the public interest' (2003). [Press release] Retrieved from  
 LexisNexis. 
  
Coalition for Networked Information. (n. d.).  Retrieved from http://www.cni.org/ 
 
Cochran, J., & Stevens, A. (2003, October 4).  Internet-based activist group puts powerful 
spin on politics.  CQ Weekly, 61, 2424-2425. 
 
Colten, R. D. (1993).  The regulation of rural electric cooperatives: The common law, 
consumer law and a cornucopia of customer protections. Washington, DC: 
National Consumer Law Center. 
 
Columbia Law School Kernochan Center for Law,  Media, and the Arts announces a  
forum on the FCC media ownership rules (2003, January 13) [Press release].  
Media Ownership Rules Forum.  Retrieved from http://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
media_inquiries/news_events/2003/January_2003/media_owner?#572 
 
Columbia media ownership rules forum (2003). [Webcast]  Retrieved from http:// 
 www.columbia.edu/acis/networks/advanced/kernochan-media-ownership 
 
Columbia's forum on media ownership: Convergence chaser special coverage. 
(2003, April 29).  Poynter Online.  Retrieved from http://www.poynter.org/ 
content/content_view.asp?id=17147 
 






Competition issues in the telecommunications industry: Hearing before the Committee  
on Science, Commerce, and Transportation,  Senate, 108th Cong. 1 (2003). 
 
Condit, C. M., & Lucaities, J. L. (1993).  Crafting equality: America’s Anglo-African  
 word.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Conrad, M. A. (1989).  The demise of the Fairness Doctrine: A blow for citizen  
 access.  Federal Communications Law Journal, 41(2)161-194. 
 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 2673, 108th Cong. 2, §629 (2004).  
 
Consumer Federation of America (n. d.).  About CFA.  Retrieved from http:// 
www.consumerfed.org/about.cfm 
 
Consumers Union.  (n. d.).  About Consumers Union.  Retrieved from http:// 
 www.consumersunion.org/about/ 
 
Cooper, M. N. (2001, October 29).  Statement of Dr. Mark N. Cooper.  Roundtable on  
FCC ownership policies.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/ 
roundtable_docs/cooper-stmt.pdf 
 
Cooper, M. N. (2003).  Media ownership and democracy in the digital information age: 
Promoting diversity with First Amendment principles and market structure 
analysis.  Stanford, CA: Center for Internet & Society. 
 
Cooper, M. N. (2007).  The case against media consolidation: Evidence on  
concentration, localism and diversity.  Stanford, CA: Creative Commons. 
 
Cooper, M. N. & Herold, S. (2004, January 29).  New media usage survey shows FCC  
based media ownership rules on faulty information: Newspapers twice as 
important source for local News than FCC found.  Retrieved from 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_telecom_and_utilities/000785.html 
 
Coopman, T. (1999).  FCC enforcement difficulties with unlicensed micro-radio. Journal  
of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 43, 582-602. 
 
Coopman, T. (2000a).  Dunifer v. the FCC: A case study of micro broadcasting.  Journal  
of Radio Studies, 7, 287–309. 
 
Coopman, T. (2000b).  Hardware handshake: Listserv forms backbone of national free 
radio network. Retrieved from 
http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol3/Iss3/articles/ted_coopman.htm#top 
 
Copple, R. F. (1991).  Cable television and the allocation of regulatory power: A study of  






Copps, M. J. (2001).  Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps 
Re: Applications for the assignment of Chris Craft Television Licenses to Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Copps/ 
Statements/2001/stmjc104.html 
 
Copps, M. J. (2002a).  Remarks by Commissioner Michael J. Copps.  Paper  
presented at the Everett Parker Ethics in Communications Lecture, Washington,  
DC Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Copps/2002/spmjc211.pdf 
 
Copps, M. J. (2002b).  In the matter of 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the 
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to 
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Concurring statement of 
Commissioner Michael J. Copps, MB Docket No. 02-xxx C.F.R. 
 
Copps, M. J. (2002c).  Remarks.  Paper presented at the United States  
Conference of Catholic Bishops, Washington, DC. Retrieved from http:// 
www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Copps/2002/spmjc201.html 
 
Copps, M. J. (2002d).  Commissioner Michael J. Copps expresses "alarm and  




Copps, M. J. (2003a).  Media concentration bench remarks.  Retrieved from  
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235047A5.pdf 
 
Copps, M. J. (2003b). Remarks Columbia Law School Forum on Media Ownership. 
Paper presented at the Columbia Law School Media Forum. Retrieved from 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-230398A1.pdf 
 
Copps, M.  J. (2003c) Statement of Michael J. Copps, Commissioner Federal  
Communications Commission before the Senate Committee on Commerce,  
Science, and Transportation. Retrieved fromhttp://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/ attachmatch/DOC-235127A3.pdf 
 
Copps, M. J. (2003d).  Statement of Michael Copps, dissenting: 2002 Biennial  
 Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules 
and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996.  Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
 DOC235047A9.pdf 
 
Corn-Revere biography. (n.d.).  Davis Wright Tremaine LLP.  Retrieved from  
http://www.dwt.com/people/RobertCornRevere 
 
Cox, J. (2003, April 1).  Executives, activists at university meeting speak out against 





 Crabtree, S. (2003a).  Pols move to push for reforms at FCC.  Daily Variety,  
p. 7. 
 
Crabtree, S. (2003b).  U.S. reps press for vote on rollback of FCC regs.  Daily Variety, 
281, 4-6. 
 
Creswell, J. W. (2003).  Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods  
approaches (2nd ed.).  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Cunningham, B. C., & Alexander, P. R. (2002).  A theory of broadcast media   
concentration and commercial advertising: Media ownership working group 
study #6.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/materials/already-
released/theory090002.pdf. 
 
Czitrom, D. J.  (1982) In the media and the American mind: From Morse to McLuhan.   
 Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Dale, M. D. (2004).  The structure of regulatory competition: corporations and public  
policies in a global economy.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Davidson, P. (2002, October 2).  FCC studies lean to deregulation.  USA Today, p. 3B. 
 
Davidson, P. (2003a, January 31).  Singers take on big radio; relaxed rules on ownership  
hurt industry, they say.  USA Today, p. B3. 
 
Davidson, P.  (2003b, February 24).  FCC member not afraid of dissent; Republican beat  
Chief Powell in game of savvy.  USA Today, p. B.07.  Retrieved June 27, 2009, 
from ProQuest Newsstand database.  (Document ID: 293697781) 
 
Davidson, P. (2003c, April 21).  FCC changes tack on media merger rules: Clear limits  
gain favor over case-by-case analysis.  USA Today, p. B1. 
 
Davidson, P. (2003d, June 3).  FCC ruling likely to generate appeals.  USA Today, p. B3. 
  
Davidson, P. (2003e, June 5).  Lawmakers question media rule changes.  USA Today,  
p. B2. 
 
Davidson, P. (2003f, September 17).  Senate votes no on new media rules.  USA Today,  
p.B3. 
 
Day, J. (1995).  The vanishing vision: The inside story of public television.  Berkeley,  
 CA: University of California Press. 
 
DeClerk, S. N. (2005).  Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC: Where will the media  






Dewey, J. (1991).  The public and its problems.  Athens, OH: Swallow Press. 
 
DiCola, P.,  & Thomson, K. (2002, November 18).  Radio deregulation: Has it served  
citizens and musicians?  Retrieved from http://futureofmusic.org/files 
/FMCradiostudy.pdf. 
 
Does ownership matter in local television news: A five-year study of ownership and  
quality (2003, April 29).  Washington, D.C.: Project in Excellence in Journalism.   
Retrieved from http://www.journalism.org/node/243 
 
Dominick, J. R., & Pearce, M. C. (1976).  Trends in network prime time programming  
1953-74.  Journal of Communication, 26, 70-80. 
 
Douglas, S. (1987).  Inventing American broadcasting: 1899-1922.  Baltimore: Johns  
Hopkins University Press 
 
Dreazen, Y. J. (2003a, June 4).  Democrats seize on FCC rule —Presidential hopefuls 
paint Bush as too close to corporations. Wall Street Journal, p. A4. 
 
Dreazen, Y. J. (2003b, September 4).  Leading the news: Judges stay new FCC media  
 rules; Appeals-Court order blocks ownership regulations from taking effect today.   
 Wall Street Journal, p. A4. 
 
Duopoly/Eight Voices Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.2555(b)(1998). 
 
Einstein, M. (2002, September).  Program diversity and the program selection process on 




Einstein, M. (2003, April 28).  Dereg?  We should talk re-reg. Broadcasting & Cable, 
 133, 50. 
 
Emord, J. W. (1989).  The First Amendment invalidity of FCC ownership regulations.   
Catholic University Law Review, 38, 401-469. 
  
Engelman, R. (1996).  Public radio and television in America: A political history.  
 Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
 
Enrich, D. (2003, May 27).  Copps, Adelstein host roundtable discussion against relaxed  
ownership rules.  States News Service.  Retrieved from LexisNexis. 
 
Fagerheim, B., & Amato, S. (1998).  The Benton Foundation.  College & Research  
Libraries News, 59(5), 371-373. 
 





FCC: Chairman backs index to measure media concentration (2003, April 9).  Chicago  
Tribune, p. 2. 
 
FCC commish endorses WGA push for hearings (2002, November 25).  Daily Variety,  
277, 2. 
 
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).  
 
FCC Media Ownership: Hearing before the Senate Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation Committee, Senate, 108th Cong., 1 (2003). 
 
FCC Oversight: Hearing before the Science, Commerce, and Transportation Committee,  
Senate, 108th Cong. 1 (2003). 
 
FCC sends national broadband plan to Congress: Plan details actions for connecting 
consumers, economy with 21st century networks. (2010, March 16).  Retrieved 
from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-296880A1.pdf. 
 
FCC takes first step to raise TV limits. (1992, May 18).  Broadcasting, 122 (21), 3. 
.  
Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151(1934). 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (1946). Public Service Responsibilities of  
 Broadcast Licensees (“Blue Book”).  Washington, DC: Federal Communications  
 Commission. 
 
Federal Communications Commission (1993).  Second Report and Order, No. 90-162, 47 
C.F.R. § 73.659 - 73.663 (1993). 
 
Federal Communications Commission (1998).  Notice of Inquiry in the Matter of 
Elimination of Experimental Broadcast Stations.  MM Docket No. 98-35. 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-01-99A1.pdfFederal 
Communications Commission. (1999a).  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: MM  
Docket No.99-25.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/ 
Miscellaneous/Filings/fl990827.doc 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (1999b).  Report and Order: Review of the  
Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, MM Docket No. 
91-221.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/mb/policy/own.html 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2000a).  Biennial Regulatory Review Staff  









Federal Communications Commission. (2000b).  Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other 
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
MM Docket No. 98-35.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/ 
 Mass_Media/Orders/2000/fcc00191.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2000c).  FCC Chairman responds to House vote  
to cut the number of community radio stations by 80% [Press release].  Retrieved  
from http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/2000/stwek033.html 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2000d). In the matter of the 2000 Biennial 
Regulatory Review Report, CC Docket No. 00-175. Retrieved from 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-00-456A1.pdf  
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2000e).  Low power FM radio service:  
Allegations and facts [Press release].  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
Bureaus/Mass_Media/Factsheets/lpfmfact032900.html 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2000f). LPFM reconsideration order.   
Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/News_Releases/ 
2000/nrmm0040.html 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2000g).  Low Power FM filing window.   
Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Public_Notices/ 
FM_Windows/da00167.html 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2000h).  Notice of acceptance of  
low power broadcast applications and notification of petitions to deny deadline.  
Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Public_Notices/ 
FM_Windows/pnmm0084.html 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2000i). Report and Order: In the Matter of Low  
Power Radio Service.  Report and Order, MM Docket No. 99-25, Retrieved from  
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5006113241 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2001a).  FCC Chairman Michael  
Powell announces creation of media ownership working group [Press release].  
Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/ 
News_Releases/2001/nrmc0124.html 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2001b). In the Matter of 
the Applications of (Assignors) and Fox Television Stations, Inc. : Memorandum 









Federal Communications Commission. (2001c).  FCC approves Fox/Chris-Craft  
merger with conditions [Press release].  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
Bureaus/Mass_Media/Orders/2001/fcc01209.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2001d).  Order and Notice of  
proposed rulemaking: In the matter of Cross-ownership of broadcast stations and 
newspapers and newspaper/radio cross-ownership waiver policy: MM Docket 
No. 01-235 and MM Docket No. 96-197. Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
Bureaus/Mass_Media/Orders/2001/fcc01262.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2001e).  Office of Plans and Policy  
announces roundtable discussion of media ownership.  Retrieved from http:// 
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/News_Releases/2001/nrmc0124.html 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2001f). Panelist biographies. Retrieved from 
 http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/biographies.html 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2001g).  Review of the radio industry 2000.   
Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/mb/policy/docs/radio00.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2001h).  Review of the Radio Industry 2001.   
Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/mb/policy/docs/radio01.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2001i).  Notice of proposed rulemaking and  
further notice of proposed rulemaking: In the matter of rules concerning multiple  
ownership of radio broadcast stations in local markets and definition of radio 
markets, MM Docket Nos. FCC 01-317, 01. Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
Bureaus/Mass_Media/Notices/2001/fcc01329.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2001j).  Roundtable discussion on media  
ownership [Podcast].  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/tr102901.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2002a). Commissioner Michael J.  
Copps welcomes first hearing on media concentration [Press release].  Retrieved 
from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-229233A1.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2002b).  FCC Commissioner  
Michael J. Copps calls for national discussion of ethics in government  
and consolidation in media; Seeks further action on the public interest obligations  











Federal Communications Commission. (2002c).  FCC's Media Bureau adopts  
procedures for public access to data underlying media ownership studies and 
 extends comment deadline for 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review of media 
 ownership rules [Press release].  Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-02-2980A1.pdf. 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2002d). FCC releases twelve studies on current  
media marketplace: Research represents critical first step in FCC’s fact-finding 
mission (2002) [Press release].  Retrieved from http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A1.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2002e). Federal Communications Commission  
initiates third biennial review of broadcast ownership rules: Cites goals of 
updating rules to reflect modern marketplace [Press release].  Retrieved from 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226188A1.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2002f).  Notice of proposed rulemaking, in the 
 matter of 2002 biennial regulatory review – review of the commission’s broadcast 
 ownership rules and other rules adopted pursuant to section 202 of the 
 Telecommunications Act of 1996, cross-ownership of broadcast stations and 
 newspapers, rules and policies concerning multiple ownership of radio broadcast 
 stations in local markets, definition of radio markets, FCC 02-249 (MB Docket 
 No. 02-277), Retrieved from http://www.sba.gov/advo/laws/comments/ 
 dfcc03_0408.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2002g).  Public notice: FCC seeks  
comment on ownership studies released by media ownership working group and  
establishes comment deadlines for 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review of  
Commission's Ownership Rules [Press release].  Retrieved from http:// 
www.fcc.gov/ownership/studies.html. 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2003a).  FCC chairman launches ‘localism in  
broadcasting’ initiative.  Retrieved from http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-238057A1.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2003b).  FCC Commissioners Adelstein and 




Federal Communications Commission. (2003c).  FCC Commissioners announce public 
hearing on media concentration: Field hearing set for Friday, March 7 in Seattle, 








Federal Communications Commission. (2003d).  FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps 
 announces two new media concentration hearings: Calls for protection for fearful 
 witnesses [Press release].  Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
 attachmatch/DOC-230981A1.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2003e).  FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps 
reacts to refusal to allow public airing of pending media concentration rules 
[Press release].  Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
 attachmatch/DOC-234590A1.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2003f).  Divided Commission votes to roll back 
media merger protections [Press Release].  Retrieved from http:// 
 hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235047A6.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2003g).  Field Hearing: Broadcast Ownership 
 en banc).  Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
 DOC-233205A1.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2003h).  Panels and agenda set for public 
 hearing in Richmond, VA on broadcast ownership rules [Press Release].  
 Retrieved from http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
DOC-231387A2.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2003i).  Report and Order and Notice of  
Proposed Rulemaking MB Docket 0227, MB Docket 01-235, MM Docket 01-
317, MM Docket 00-244, MB Docket 03-130 Retrieved from  
http://www.mediaaccess.org/programs/diversity/MOR&O.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission. (2003j).  Statement of Michael J. Copps,  
Commissioner Federal Communications Commission before the Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and the Internet of the House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce.  Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.go v
 /edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231559A1.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission (2004). Report to the Congress on  
the low power FM interference testing program, Public Law No. 106-553. 
 
Federal Communications Commission (2009). Media bureau announces workshops to 
begin the 2010 quadrennial review of the FCC's media ownership).  Retrieved 
from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-2139A1.pdf 
 
Federal Communications Commission (2010). FCC sends national broadband plan to  
Congress: Plan details actions for connecting consumers, economy with 21st 







Federal Communications Commission to hold public hearing on media concentration  
March 31 at Duke University (2003k).  Ascribe Newswire.  Retrieved from 
 LexisNexis. 
 
Federal court preserves stay of rules, calls FCC deregulation tendencies irrational and  
Inconsistent. (2004).  Prometheus Radio Group.  Retrieved from http:// 
www.prometheusradio.org 
 
Fight looms at FCC: Adelstein warns consumer backlash to come. (2003, May 21).   
Daily Variety. Retrieved from LexisNexis. 
 
Fish, S. (1980).  Is there a text in this class?  The authority of interpretive communities,  
 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Fisher, M. (2003, February 28).  FCC tests reception for lifting owner limits:  Roadshow 
gets lots of corporate static.  Washington Post, p. C1. 
 
Fowler, M., & Brenner, D. (1982).  A marketplace approach to broadcast regulation.   
Texas Law Review, 60, 207-257. 
 
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
Fratkin, B. C. (2002).  The National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting: A forgotten 
chapter of the media reform movement of the 1960s and 1970s.  University of 
Utah, Salt Lake City. 
 
Free Press. (n.d.). About us.  Retrieved from http://www.freepress.net/about_us 
 
Friendly, F. (1967).  Due to circumstances beyond our control....  New York: Times 
Books. 
 
Furchtgott-Ross, H. (2000).  Dissenting Statement of Harold Furchtgott-Ross: In the  
Matter of 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review of the Commission’s Broadcast  
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to §202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, FCC 00-191 C.F.R. Retrieved from 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-00-191A1.pdf 
 
Gatlin, G. (2003, January 17).  FCC gets opinions, few facts on owner rules.  Boston  
Herald, p. 27. 
 
Geewax, M. (2003, June 19).  Senate panel votes to reverse FCC rules on media  
 ownership.  Cox News Service. Retrieved from LexisNexis. 
 
Genachowski, J. (2010, May 6). The third way: A narrowly tailored broadband 






General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees.  Federal Register 50  
35,418, 35,453 (1985). 
 
General Order 40, 2 FRC Ann. Rep 166 (1928). 
 
Genesee Radio Corporation v. FCC 5, 183 (1938).  
 
Gentile, G. (2003, May 30).  Protesters challenge FCC plan: Regulators expected to  
loosen media ownership rules.  Advocate p. C3. 
 
George, L. M.,  & Waldfogel, J. (2003, August).  Who affects whom in daily newspaper  
markets?  Journal of Political Economy, 111(4), 765-784. 
 
Gomery, D. (2001, October 29).  Ownership policies, diversity, and localism.  
Roundtable on FCC ownership policies.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
 ownership/roundtable_docs/gomery-stmt.pdf 
 
Gomery, D. (n. d.).  Douglas Gomery Curriculum Vitae.  Retrieved from http:// 
 www.journalism.umd.edu/faculty/dgomery/cv.html 
 
Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FRC 37 F.2d 993 (1930). 
 
Groups urge veto of telco bill (1995, November 4).  Editor & Publisher, 128(44), p. 30. 
 
Grundfest, J. A. (1976).  Citizen participation in broadcast licensing before the FCC.  
Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. 
 
Guild President Victoria Riskin speaks at FCC en banc hearing (2003, February 28).  
Writers Guild of America.  Retrieved from http://www.wga.org/ 
 subpage_newsevents.aspx?id=370 
 
Gurwitt, R. (2004, March /April).  Broadcast buccaneer.  Mother Jones, 29(2), 24. 
 
Hakanen, E. A., & Bishop, R. (2002).  In the public interest?  The state of local television  
programming fifteen years after deregulation.  Journal of Communication 
Inquiry; 26(3), 261-277. 
 
Hall, S. (1993).  Encoding, decoding.  In S.  During (Ed.), The cultural studies reader, 
pp. 507-531. London: Routledge. 
 
Halonen, D. (2002, December 9).  FCC to hold media ownership hearing.  Electronic  
Media, 21, 3. 
 
Halonen, D. (2003a, February 3).  Senators prod FCC on ownership issue.  Electronic  






Halonen, D. (2003b, March 3).  FCC 'diversity index.' Electronic Media, 22, 6-8. 
 
Halonen, D. (2003c, June 9).  Landmark FCC vote comes under fire.  Television Week,  
13, 8-10. 
 
Hatfield, D. (2000, March 24).  Statement of Dale Hatfield, Chief, Office of Engineering  
and Technology, Concerning low power FM engineering issues. [Press release] 
Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/ 
News_Releases/2000/nret0005.html  
 
Hawley, E. W. (1974, June).  Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the vision  
of an associative State, 1921-1928.  Journal of American History, 61, 116-140. 
 
Hearn, T. (2000, June 5).  FCC to maintain cable and TV ownership ban.  Multichannel 
News, 21(23), 1-2. 
 
Hearn, T. (2001, October 22).  Copps defend FCC public interest test.  Multichannel 
News, 22(43), 20. 
 
Hearn, T. (2002, June 24).  Martin-Powel chronicles: Dissention in FCC ranks.   
Multichannel News, 23(25), 1-3. 
 
Hearn, T. (2003a, April 21).  New divider: 'Diversity index", 24, 2-4. 
 
Hearn, T. (2003b, September 8).  Powell's rules of order get whiplashed. Multichannel 
News, 24, 1, 46. 
 
Hearn, T. (2003c, September 22).  Court says keep media case in Philly. Multichannel 
News, 24, 30-31. 
 
Here, we would suggest, is a program for the FCC (1962, February 25).  Consumer 
Reports, 2, 93-95. 
 
Hickey, N. (2003a, March/April).  Power shift: As the FCC prepares to alter the media  
 map, battle lines are drawn.  Columbia Journalism Review, 26-28. 
 
Hickey, N. (2003b, July/August).  Ready, set, consolidate.  Columbia Journalism Review,  
37, 30-33. 
 
Ho, D. (2003a, April 17).  FCC Head's adamant on news rule outlet.  South Florida Sun –  
Sentinel, p. 3D. 
 
Ho, D. (2003b, May 9).  FCC Democrats frustrated on media review.  Associated Press.   







Ho, D. (2003c, June 4).  Senate questions FCC Commissioners on media ownership 
changes.  Associated Press. Retrieved from LexisNexis. 
  
Holland, B. (2003, March 15).  FCC plan concerns media watchers.  Billboard, 115(9), 7. 
 
Holman, J. M., & McGregor M.A. (2001).  Thank you for taking the time to read this:  
Public participation via new communication technologies at the FCC.  Journalism 
and Communication Monographs, 2(4, Winter), 159-202. 
 
Holson, L. M. (2002, June 21).  Common foe for musicians and labels.  New York Times,  
p. A1. 
 
Horowitz, R. B. (1989).  The irony of regulatory reform.  New York: Oxford  
University Press. 
 
Hoynes, W. (1994).  Public television for sale: Media, the market, and the public sphere.   
 Boulder, CO: Westview Press.  
 
Hundt, R. (1994).  Speech before the 1994 convention of American women in  
radio and television.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/ 
spreh415.txt 
 
Hundt, R. (1995).  Reading the First Amendment in favor of children: Implementing the  
Children's Television Act of 1990.  Speech to Brooklyn Law School.  Retrieved 
from http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh547.txt 
 
Hundt, R. (1997a).  Speech before the Federal Bar Association.  Retrieved from 
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh721.html 
 
Hundt, R. (1997b).  Thinking about why some communications mergers are  
unthinkable.  Brookings Institution Speech.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
Speeches/Hundt/spreh735.html 
 
Huntemann, N. B. (2004, April).  The diversity dilemma: The fallacies of format  
 differentiation as a measure of cultural value.  Paper presented at the annual  
 convention of the Broadcast Educators Association, Las Vegas, NV. 
 
In his own words: Michael Powell's changing FCC (2002, June 9).  Los Angeles Times,  
p. C4. 
 
Interstate Commerce Act.  Public Law 49-41(1887). 
 
Iosifides, P. (1999, Spring).  Diversity versus concentration in the deregulated mass  







James, F. (2003, February 27).  Major decisions approach for Federal Communications       
Commission.  Chicago Tribune, p. 1. 
 
Jessel, H. A. (1998, April 6).  Hall monitors.  Broadcasting & Cable, 128(14), 82. 
  
Jessell, H. A. (2003, January 20).  Voices and choices.  Broadcasting & Cable, 133, 71. 
 
Johnson, G. (2003, March 8).  Public hearing addresses media ownership issues.   
 
Associated Press State and Local Wire.  Retrieved from LexisNexis. 
 
Johnson, G. (2003, June 3).  Democrats: Decision hurts media diversity.  Boston Globe, 
p. D4. 
 
Johnson, N. (2003, May).  Forty years of wandering in the wasteland.  Federal  
 Communications Law Journal, 55 (3), 521-534. 
 
Johnson, P. (1998).  The United States.  In D. Goldberg, T. Prosser & S. Verhulst   
(Eds.), Regulating the changing media: A comparative study.  New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Jones, A. (2002, February).  Website review-FAIR.org.  Journalism Studies, 3(1), 137- 
138. 
 
Jonsson, P. (2003, February 10).  With Ted Turner's descent, end of an era?  Christian 
Science Monitor, p. 3. 
 
Kahn, F. J. (Ed.). (1984).  Documents of American Broadcasting (4th ed.).  Englewood  
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Kahn, F. J. (Ed.). (1968).  Documents of American Broadcasting.  New York: Meredith  
Corporation. 
 
Keller, M. (2004).  Damn the torpedoes!  Full speed ahead: The FCC’s decision to  
deregulate media ownership and the threat to viewpoint diversity.  Journal of Law  
and Policy, 12, 891-943. 
 
Kelliher, L. (2003, September/October).  Low power, high intensity.  Columbia  
Journalism Review, 42(3), 31-33. 
 
Kennard, W. E.  (1998).  Remarks by William E. Kennard Chairman Federal  
Communications Commission to NAB Radio convention, Seattle, Washington.  








Kennard, W. E. (1999a).  The unregulation of the internet: Laying a competitive course  
for the future.  Speech presented at the Federal Communications Bar Northern  
California Chapter, San Francisco. 
 
Kennard, W. E. (1999b).  Oral testimony of William E Kennard.  Retrieved from 
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/Statements/stwk933a.html 
 
Kennard, W. K. (2000).  Statement of William E. Kennard: In the Matter of 1998  
Biennial Regulatory Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and  
Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to §202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.   
Retrieved from http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-00- 
191A1.pdf  
 
Kerschbaumer, K. (2001).  Bigger than ever: Rankings show that 25 groups control 24% 
of radio stations.  Broadcasting & Cable.  Retrieved from 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/94566-Bigger_than_ever.php 
 
Kirkland, J. & Struck, M. (2003, June 4).  Snowe looks for answers as FCC parades 
 Commissioners before senate panel: States News Service.  Retrieved from 
 LexisNexis. 
 
Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2003, May 29).  Media deregulation foes make Murdoch their  
lightning rod.  New York Times, p. C6. 
 
Klinenberg, E. (2007).  Fighting for air: The battle to control America's media.  New 
York: Metropolitan Books. 
 
Knoll, A. (1996, Summer).  Any which way but loose: Nations regulate the Internet.  
Tulane Journal of International and Competitive Law, 4, 275-302. 
 
Konstantin, R. (1998, January/February).  In the shadow of giants.  Columbia Journalism  
Review, 36(5), 13. 
 
Korn, G. E. (1991).  Everett C. Parker and the citizen media reform movement: A 
 phenomenological life history.  Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of 
 Illinois at Carbondale. 
 
Krasnow, E. G., Longley, L. D.,  & Terry, H. A. (1982) The politics of broadcast 
regulation (3rd ed.).  New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 




Labaton, S. (2000, March 27).  F.C.C. heads for showdown with Congress over radio  





Labaton, S. (2001, February 6).  New FCC chief would curb agency reach. New York 
 Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/business/ 
 new-fcc-chief-would curbagencyreach.html?scp=1&sq=Labaton%202001 
 %20FCC&st=cse 
 
Labaton, S. (2002a, February 4).  Okay to grow.  New York Times, p. C2. 
 
 Labaton, S. (2002b, February 25).  Impatient court presses the F.C.C. to deregulate.   
New York Times, p. C2. 
 
Labaton, S.  (2002c, May 12).  FCC chief nears goal on media rules: But Powell is  
forced to alter ownership plan to gain majority.  International Herald Tribune, p. 
11. 
 
Labaton, S. (2002d, September 30).  A lone voice for regulation at the F.C.C.  New York  
Times, p. C1. 
 
Labaton, S. (2003a, June 2).  FCC votes to relax rules limiting media ownership.   
New York Times, p. A1. 
 
Labaton, S. (2003b, June 3).  Regulators ease rules governing media ownership.  
 New York Times, p. A1. 
 
Labaton, S. (2003c, June 20). Senate begins process to reverse new F.C.C. rules on 
media. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/20/ 
 business/media/20RULE.html?scp=6&sq=FCC%20Labaton%202003&st=cse. 
 
Labaton, S. (2003d, June 23). Senate votes to restore media limits.  New York Times, p. 1. 
 
Labaton, S. (2003e, September 22).  FCC Chief talks of frustration and surprise.  New 
York Times, C1. 
 
Labaton, S. (2004, February 12). Court is urged to change media ownership rules.  
New York Times, p. C14. 
 
Labaton, S. (2005, January 24).  FCC faces a new set of challenges after Powell,  
New York Times, C1, C8. 
 
Lawmakers decry FCC plans to issue ownership rules without review (2003, April 10).  
CongressDaily, 11-13. 
 
Layton, C. (2004, December/January).  News blackout.  American Journalism Review.  
Retrieved from http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=3500 
 
Layton, C., & Cirillo, M. (2004, December/January).  Tracking the coverage.  American  





Lazaroff, L. (2003, October 16).  Radio activists in Philadelphia take on FCC, media  
over ownership rules.  Chicago Tribune, p. 1. 
 
Ledbetter, J. (1997a).  Media anti-trust.  The Village Voice, 42(43), 28.  
 
Ledbetter, J. (1997b).  Made possible by…the death of public broadcasting in the United  
 States.  New York: Verso. 
 
Lee, J. (2003a, January 31).  Radio giant defends its size at Senate panel hearing.  New  
York Times, p. 8. 
 
Lee, J. (2003b, March 31).  On Minot, N.D., radio, a single corporate voice.  New York 
Times, p. C7. 
 
Legislative history of P.L. No. 104-104. 141 Cong. Rec. 104th Cong. S. 7881,1 (1995)  
   
Lemann, N. (2002, October 7).  The Chairman.  New Yorker, 87 (30) pp. 48-56. 
 
Levi, L. (2000).  Viacom-CBS merger: Reflections on the FCC's recent approach to 
structural regulation of the electronic mass media.  Federal Communications Law 
Journal, 52, 581.  
 
Levy, J., Ford-Livene, M. & Levine, A.  (2002).  Broadcast television:  
Survivor in a sea of competition: OPP working paper series, media ownership 
working group study #12.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/ 
materials/already-released/survivor090002.pdf. 
 
Lewis, H. (2003, April 1).  FCC gets an earful at hearing: Most oppose more deregulation 
of media ownership.  The Herald Sun, p. C1. 
 
Lieberman, D. (2003, June 9).  Joe, Jane Public left out of media debate.  USA Today, p.  
B9. 
 
Lin, S. F., & McDonald, D. G., (2004).  The effect of new networks on U.S. television 
diversity. Journal of Media Economics, 17(2), 105-122. 
 
Linder, L. R. (1999).  Public access television: America’s electronic soapbox.  Westport,  
CT: Praeger Publishers. 
 
Linder, C. (2003, May 27).  Odd bedfellows seek halt to FCC's media deregulation.   
States News Service.  Retrieved from LexisNexis. 
 
 
Lohr, S. (1996, April 21).  Wired life: The great unplugged masses confront the future.   






Lotozo, E. (n.d.).  Activists' mission: Bringing radio power to the people.  Philadelphia 
Inquirer, Retrieved from Newspaper Source database, EBSCO. 
 
Love, J. (1994).  Telecommunications policy roundtable list.  Distributed to TAP-INFO, 
a free Internet Distribution List.  Retrieved from http://www.interesting-
people.org/archives/interesting-people/199310/mg00096.html 
 
Lustig, R. J. (1982).  Corporate liberalism: The origins of modern American political  
theory, 1890-1920.  Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Mann-Elkins Act.  61st Congress, Ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910) 
 
Markels, A. (2000, June).  Radio active.  Wired, 8, 320-327.  
 
Martin, G. (2003, January 14).  Clear Channel's chief takes turn in hot seat.  San Antonio  
Express. Retrieved from Newspaper Source Database. 
 
Martin, K. (2002).  Separate statement of Kevin J. Martin approving in part, concurring 
in part.  Re: 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s 
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
 edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226188A3.pdf 
 
Martin, K. J. (2003a, January 16).  Opening statement of Kevin J. Martin Commissioner 
Federal Communications Commission.  Paper presented at the Media Ownership 
Forum, Columbia University. 
 
Martin, K. J. (2003b, June 2).  Statement of Commissioner Kevin J. Martin on Biennial 
Review of Broadcast Ownership Rules.  Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
 edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235047A7.pdf 
 
Martin, K. J .  (2003c, June 4).  Written statement of Kevin J. Martin before the 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States Senate 
FCC Oversight Hearing. Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ 
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235127A4.pdf 
 
Martinez, B. (1997, September 23).  Consumer groups to pressure FCC on cable-TV  
rates.  Wall Street Journal, B8. 
 
Mayer, R.N. (1989).  The consumer movement: Guardians of the marketplace.  Boston:  
Twayne Publishers. 
 
McChesney, R. W. (2006, January/February). A Cornerstone of the Media Reform  







McChesney, R. W. (1993).  Telecommunications, mass media, and democracy: The  
 battle for control of U.S. broadcasting 1928-1935.  New York: Oxford University 
 Press. 
 
McChesney, R. W. (1999).  Rich media, poor democracy: Communication politics in 
 dubious times.  Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
 
McChesney, R. W. (2004a).  Media policy goes to Main Street: The uprising of 2003.   
Communication Review, 7(3), 223-258.  
 
McChesney, R. W. (2004b).  The problem of the media: U.S. communication politics in  
the 21st century.  New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
McConnell, B. (2001a, June 4).  Two take seats.  Broadcasting & Cable, 131(24), 47-49. 
 
McConnell, B. (2001b, October 22).  Copps' lone voice.  Broadcasting & Cable, 131(44), 
30-32. 
 
McConnell, B. (2002a, November 25).  Media face grilling from Copps.  Broadcasting &  
Cable, 132, 10-12. 
 
McConnell, B. (2002b, December 9).  Powell grants dereg hearing in Richmond  
Broadcasting & Cable, 132, 8. 
 
McConnell, B. (2003a, March3).  Latest prime suspect in FCC coup: Powell.   
Broadcasting & Cable, 133(9), 1. 
 
McConnell, B. (2003b, June 9).  Congress won't undo FCC rules, but courts may.   
Broadcasting & Cable, 133, 22-24. 
 
McConnell, B. (2004a, February 16).  Quizzed on ownership, and the tone is hostile, 
Broadcasting & Cable, 134, 12. 
 
McConnell, B. (2004b, November 1).  The Common touch.  Broadcasting & Cable,  
134(44), 26.  
 
McConnell, B. (2010, March 24).  Court clears way for TV/newspaper deals, Daily Deal.  
Retrieved from Lexis/Nexis. 
 
McConnell, B., & Albiniak, P. (1998, December 12).  Bigwigs weigh in on ownership.   
Broadcasting and Cable, 128, 23. 
 
McConnell, C. (1996, Feb 12) Ownership spotlight moves to FCC.  Broadcasting &  







McConnell, C. (1998a, March 9).  FCC considers low-power radio.  Broadcasting &  
Cable, 128(10), 19.  
 
McConnell, C. (1998b, May 4).  Low-power radio brings high-intensity response.  
Broadcasting & Cable, 128, 22-24. 
 
McCraw, T. K.  (1980). Regulatory Agencies.  In G. Porter (Ed.), Encyclopedia of  
American Economic History (11).  New York: Scribners. 
pp. 778-807.   
McGregor, M. A.  (2006). When the ‘public interest’ is not what interests the public.  
Communication Law and Policy, 11(2), 207-224. 
 
Media Access Project (n.d.).  About Media Access Project.  Retrieved from http:// 
 www.mediaaccess.org/about/ 
 
Media Access Project (2003, September 4). A message from the staff at Media Access  
 Project on yesterday's victory in court [Press release].  Retrieved from  
 http://www.mediaaccess.org/MAPVictoryStatement.pdf 
 
Media Access Project's report on oral argument in media ownership Court challenge in  
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC (2004, February 11). [Press release]    
Washington, DC: Media Access Project. 
 
Media-rule thrill ride still rolling (2003, June 14).  Billboard, 115, 1-3. 
 
Media Concentration: Hearing before Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and  
Transportation, Senate, 107th Cong. 2nd 1(2001). 
 
Media Ownership: Hearing before Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and  
Transportation, Senate, 108th Cong.1 (2003). 
 
Meiklejohn, A. (1948) Free speech and its relation to self-government. New York: 
 Harper & Brothers.  
 
Menendez, B. (2003, June 2).  Menendez: FCC decision undermines nation's ideals  
[Press release].  Retrieved from Congressional Press Releases: LexisNexis. 
 
A message from the staff at Media Access Project on yesterday's victory in court (2003).   
 [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.mediaaccess.org/press-room/a- 
 message-from-the-staff-of-media-access-project-on-yesterdays-victory-in-court  
 
Meyerson, M. I. (1997, February).  Ideas of the marketplace: A guide to the 1996  
Telecommunications Act.  Federal Communications Law Journal, (49)2, 251-
288. 
 





Miller, V. B., Ensley, C.H., Young, T.B. (2003, January).  Television industry summit 
 2002: Leveling the playing field, the case for deregulation.  Bear Sterns. 
 
Minnow, N. W. (1965).  Equal time: The private broadcaster and the public interest.  
New York: Atheneum. 
 
Monsma, D. (2006).  The academic equivalence of science and law: Normative legal 
scholarship in the quantitative domain of social science.  T. M. Cooley L. Review, 
23, 157-203. 
 
MoveOn.  (n.d.).  About MoveOn family of organizations.  Retrieved from http:// 
www.moveon.org/about.html 
 
Moyers, B. (2002, April 26).  NOW with Bill Moyers [Television Show]: PBS.   
Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/now/thisweek/index_042602.html 
 
Moyers, B. (2003, April 25a).  NOW with Bill Moyers [Television Show]: PBS.   
Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/now/thisweek/index_042503.html 
 
Mulkern, A. C. (2003a, May 14).  Senators blast plan to loosen media-ownership rules:  
Some say FCC proposal will limit access, choice.  Denver Post, p. K1. 
 
Mulkern, A. C. (2003b, January 15).  Senators wary of changes in media ownership rules.  
Denver Post, p. C1.  
 
Mundy, A.  (1996) Telecom Act liberates, further regulates video.  MediaWeek, (9)4.   
Retrieved from LexisNexis. 
 
Mundy, A. (1998, February 9).  The new trustbusters.  MediaWeek, 8(6). 24-26. 
 
Mundy, A. (2001, June 4).  FCC noms hold the phone.  MediaWeek, 11(23). 12. 
 
Mundy, A. (2003a, March/April).  Q & A FCC Commissioner Michael Copps: We're 
 heading into the unknown.  Columbia Journalism Review, 41, 30-31. 
 
Mundy, A. (2003b, September 22).  Senate aims resolution at consolidation, strikes 
Powell.  Cable World, 15, 25-26. 
 
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
 
Munroe, N. (2001, July 23).  FCC.  National Journal, 33(25), 2011-2003. 
 
Murray, A.  (2003, February 24).  FCC `palace coup' creates more work for the  
lobbyists.  Wall Street Journal  (Eastern Edition), p. A 4.  Retrieved from Wall 






NAHJ and NABJ call on FCC to delay issuing new broadcast ownership rules.  
(2003, May 27).  PR Press Wire.  Retrieved from LexisNexis. 
 
Napoli, P. M. (2001a).  Foundations of communications policy: Principles and process in  
 the regulation of electronic media.  Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, Inc. 
 
Napoli, P. M. (2001b).  Diversity and localism: A policy analysis perspective.   
Roundtable on FCC Ownership Policies.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
ownership/roundtable_docs/napoli-stmt.pdf 
 
Napoli, P. M. (2004).  Curriculum Vitae.  Retrieved from http://www.bnet.fordham.edu/ 
public/comm/pnapoli/home.htm 
 
Napoli, P. M., & Seaton, M. (2007).  Necessary knowledge for communications policy:  
Information asymmetries and commercial data access and usage in the 
policymaking process.  Federal Communications Law Journal, 59, 295-326. 
 
National Broadcasting Company Incorporated v. United States et al., 319 U.S.190  
(1943). 
 
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. United States et al., 436 U.S.  
775 (1978). 
 
National Information Infrastructure Act of 1993: Report to accompany H.R. 1757.  103rd  
Congress 1st Session, H.R., Rep. No. 103-225 (1993). 
 
National Television Station Ownership Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.2555(3). 
 
Nielsen Media Research (2002).  Consumer survey on media usage: Media working 
group study #8.  Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
 attachmatch/DOC-226838A17.pdf. 
 
Ness, S. (2000). Statement of Susan Ness: In the matter of 1998 biennial regulatory 
review of the commission’s broadcast ownership rules and other rules adopted 
pursuant to §202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Retrieved from 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-00-191A1.pdf 
 
New coalition unveils public interest blueprint for America's 21st century  
telecommunications highway.  (1993, October 26).  Retrieved from http:// 
www.cni.org/Hforums/roundtable/about.html 
 
News media gets good grades for Iraq coverage (2003, February 25).  Washington, DC:  
The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. 
 






Notice of proposed rulemaking, FCC 02-249, 47 C.F.R. (2002).  
 
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F. 2d 543 (1969). 
 
Office of the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (2004). 
Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/briefs/03-3388_013004.pdf 
 
Onward to Richmond (2002, December 8).  Broadcasting & Cable, 132(50). p.40. 
 
Orol, R., & Lauria, P. (2003, April 8).  Diller decries media deregulation.  The Deal.  
Retrieved from LexisNexis. 
 Ownership re faces murky outcome (2003, September 22).  Broadcasting & Cable, 
 133, 3. 
 
Pelofsky, J. (2003, April 11).  Some Senators seek more hearings: FCC to vote in June on  
media.  South Florida Sun-Sentinel, p. 2D. 
 
Pelosi, N. (2003, June 2).  Pelosi: FCC decision jeopardizes goals of diversity,  
competition, and local control [Press release].  Retrieved from Congressional  
Press Releases: LexisNexis. 
 
Petros, I. (1999, Spring).  Diversity versus concentration in the deregulated mass media  
 domain.  Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 76(1), 152-163. 
 
Phlips, L. (1995).  Competition policy: A game theory perspective.  Cambridge, MA: 
 Cambridge University Press. 
 
The politics of big media (2003,September 19).  Economist, (368) 8341, 55-57. 
Pollitt, K. (1997, November 11).  Subject to debate.  Nation, 265, 9. 
Postman, N. (1999).  Building a bridge to the 18th century: How the past can improve 
 our future.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 
Powell, M. K. (1998, April 5).  The public interest standard: A new regulator's search for 
enlightenment.  Speech presented at the American Bar Association 17th Annual 
Legal Forum on Communications Law, Las Vegas.  Retrieved from http:// 
 www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/spmkp806.html 
 
Powell, M. K. (2000) Dissenting statement of Michael Powell: In the matter of 1998  
Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership  
rules and other rules adopted pursuant to section 202 of the  
  Telecommunications Act of 1996. Retrieved from http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ 







Powell, M. K. (2001a).  Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell: Re:  
Disposition of applications for the transfer of control of certain radio licenses.   
Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/Statements/ 
2001/stmkp109.html 
 
Powell, M.K. (2001b).  Transcript of conversation between Michael K. Powell and Sam 
 Donaldson. Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/ 
 spmkp102.pdf 
 
Powell, M. K. (2001c).  Transcript of remarks of Chairman Michael K. Powel    
before Cellular Telecommunications Internet Association.  Speech presented at  
the CTIA convention, Las Vegas.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/ 
Powell/2001/spmkp101.html 
Powell, M. K. (2002a).  Remarks of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal 
 Communications Commission: Dialogue with Sam Donaldson. Interview 
 presented at the National Association of Broadcasters, Orlando, Florida.  
 Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2002/spmkp207.html 
 
Powell, M. K. (2002b).  Remarks of Michael K. Powell. Transcript of discussion at the 
 Goldman Sachs Communicopia XI Conference, New York.  Retrieved from 
 http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226929A1.pdf 
 
Powell, M. (2002c, May 8).  Remarks of Michael K. Powell: Dialogue with Brian Lamb. 
Paper presented at the National Cable & Telecommunications Association 
(NCTA), New Orleans, LA. 
 
Powell, M. K. (2003a).  Chairman Michael K. Powell responds to members regarding  
upcoming Biennial Review of media ownership [Press release].  Retrieved from 
http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/letters/media-ownership/ 
 
Powell, M. K. (2003b). Oral statement of Michael K. Powell, Chairman Federal  
Communications Commission, on Broadcast Ownership Biennial Review before  
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate.   
Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC- 
235110A1.pdf 
 
Powell, M. K. (2003c).  Opening statement of Michael K. Powell, Chairman Federal  




Powell, M. K. (2003d).  Press statement of Michael Powell: In the matter of the 2002 
Biennial Regulatory Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and 
Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 






Powell, M. K. (2003e).  Should limits on broadcast ownership change?  USA  
Today, p. A11.  
 
Powell, M.K. (2005) Statement of FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell on leaving the  
Commission [Press release]. Retrieved from http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/ 
attachmatch/DOC-256206A1.pdf 
 
Preservation of Localism, Program Diversity, and Competition in Television Broadcast  
Services Act of 2003, H. R., 108th Cong. 1 (2003). 
 
Price, M. E., & Duffy, J. F. (1997).  Technological change and doctrinal persistence:  
Telecommunication reform in Congress and the Court.  Columbia Law Journal, 
97(4), 976-1015. 
 
Pritchard, D. (2002, September).  Viewpoint diversity in cross-owned newspapers and  
television stations: A study of news coverage in the 2000 Presidential Campaign:   
Media ownership working group study #2.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
 ownership/studies.html 
 
Prometheus Radio Project. (n. d.).  About us.  Retrieved from http://prometheusradio.org/ 
 about_us/ 
 
Prometheus Radio Project. (n. d.).  Your dial was made for revolution.  Retrieved from  
 http://prometheusradio.org/content/view/20/154/ 
 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC 3rd Circuit No. 03-3388 (2004). 
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 47 U.S.C. §396 (1967). 
 
Pulley, B. (2002, April 29).  Commander of the airwaves.  Forbes, 169(11), 78-82. 
 
Radio Act of 1927 69th Cong., 2d, Public Law No. 632 (1927). 
 
Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000, H.R. 3439, 106th Cong, 2 Session (2000). 
 
Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000. S. 2068, 106th Cong. 2d Session (2000). 
 
Ranly, D. P. (1976).  The challengers: Social pressure on the press 1965-1975.   
 Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Missouri, Columbia. 
 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 336 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 






Report on the Fairness Doctrine, 102 F.C.C.2d 145 (1985). 
 
Roberts, S., Frenette, J., & Stearns, D. (2002).  A comparison of media outlets  
and owners for ten selected markets, 1960, 1980, 2000:  Media ownership 
working group study #1.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/ 
materials/already-released/comparison090002.pdf 
 
Rosenstiel, T., Chinni, D., & Avila, T. (2003, February 27).  New federal rules for media  
ownership: How much does the public know?  Washington, DC: Pew Research  
Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism. Retrieved from  
http://www.journalism.org/node/3047 
 
Rowland, W. D. (1982).  The illusion of fulfillment: The broadcast reform movement. 
Journalism Monographs, 79. Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency 
Standard Broadcast Stations, 47 C.F.R.  
§ 73.3555 (d) (1940). 
 
Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, Multiple Ownership  
of Standard Broadcast Stations, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a) (1943). 
 
Russo, M. (2001, October 29).  FCC Chairman Michael Powell announces creation of 
Media Ownership Working Group [News release]. Retrieved from http:// 
 www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/News_Releases/2001/nrmc0124.pdf 
 
S. Rep. No. 104-230 (1996). 
 
S. 2518, 106th Cong. 2d Session (2000). 
 
Safire, W. (2002, May 22).  The great media gulp. New York Times, p. A.33. 
 
Safire, W. (2003a, January 20).  On media giganticism.  New York Times, p. A19. 
 
Safire, W. (2002b, May 22).  The great media gulp.  New York Times, p. A33. 
 
Safire, W. (2003c, June 16).  Regulate the FCC.  New York Times, p. A19. 
 
Safire, W. (2003d, June 26).  Big media's silence.  New York Times, p. A33. 
 
Safire, W. (2003e, July 24).  Bush's four horsemen.  New York times, p. A19. 
 
Safire, W. (2003f, July 17).  Localism's last stand.  New York Times, p. A27. 
 








Sanders, E.  (2002, October 2).  Results of FCC's media studies are released; Regulations: 
The agency is expected to use the findings to provide justification for future rules 
on ownership. Los Angeles Times, p. C2.  
 
Sanders, E., & Hofmeister, S. (2002, June 9).  Bringing regulations up to speed: As the  
communications industry changes at a dizzying pace, Michael Powell of the 
Federal Communications Commission is facing criticism for his deliberate pace.  
Los Angeles Times.  p. C1. 
 
Sarno, E. F. (1969).  The National Radio Conferences.  Journal of Broadcasting 13(2),  
189-202. 
 
Saxe, F. (2001, June 9).  Broadcasters may face more regulation due to recent Senate  
shake-up.  Billboard, 113 (23), 82-84. 
 
 Schatz, J. (2003, November 1).  Congress weighs pros, cons of 'Omnibus’ approach.  
 Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 61, 2688-2693. 
 
Schiesel, S. (2002, April 3).  FCC rules on ownership under review.  New York Times.   
p. C1. 
 
Schlesinger, A. M. (1951).  The rise of modern America: 1865-1951.  New York: The  
Macmillan Company. 
 
Schwartzman, A. J., Leanza, C. A., Campbell, A.J., Bachtelll, J.A,.& Henein, K, (2004,  
January 26).  Prometheus Radio Project, et al. v. FCC and United States No. 03-
3388, Rule 28(j), FRAP.  Retrieved from http://www.mediaaccess.org/programs/ 
diversity/CitizenPet28JLetter.pdf 
 
Schwartzman, A. J., &  Feld, H, Desai, P. (2006). Section 202(h) of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Beware of intended consequences. Federal 
Communications Law Journal, 51, 581. 
 
Scott, A. (2003, March 8).  Move to ease media-ownership rules given a cool reception in 
Seattle.  Seattle Times, p. 1. 
 
Senate Commerce hears debate on media ownership. (2004, Sept. 28).  FreePress.   
 Retrieved from http://www.freepress.net/washington/update.php?id=62] 
 
Setzer, F. & Levy, J. (1991, June).  Broadcast television in a multichannel marketplace,  
 OPP working paper series: Media ownership working group study #12.   
Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp26.pdf 
 
Shadid, A. (2001, March 8).  Powell: Market should guide telecom changes FCC  chief 






Shales, T. (2003, June 6).  Senate panel cuts big media down to size.  Washington  
Post, p. C1. 
 
Shields, T. (2002a, July 29). The FCC's gatekeeper. Mediaweek, 12(28), 22-26. 
 
Shields, T.  (2002b, October 7).  FCC: Just the facts.  Mediaweek, 12(36), 6-8. 
 
Shields, T. (2003a, March 17).  Good Copps, Bad Copps.  Mediaweek, 13, 28-31. 
 
Shields, T. (2003b, March 3).  Voices from the field.  Mediaweek, 13, 6. 
 
Shields, T. (2003c, June 9).  FCC ownership vote comes under fire.  Adweek, 44, 10.  
 
Shields, T. & Bachman, K. (2003, May 19).  Dereg gains momentum.  Mediaweek,  
13, 6-8. 
 
Shriver, J.  (2002, February 29).  Court rejects FCC's limits on TV ownership, Media: An  
appeals panel says agency's cap on how many U.S. households a firm can reach is 
 contrary to law.’  More mergers may result.  Los Angeles Times, p. A1. 
 
Silk, A. J., Klein, L. R. & Berndt, E. R. (2002, June 4).  Intermedia substitutability and  
market demand by national advertisers.  Review of Industrial Organization, 20, 
323-348. 
 
Sillars, M. O. (1991).  Messages, meanings, and culture: Approaches to communication  
 criticism.  New York: HarperCollins. 
 
Sillars, M. O., & Gronbeck, B. E. (2001).  Communication criticism; Rhetoric, social  
codes, and cultural studies.  Prospect Heights: Waveland Press. 
 
Sinclair Broadcasting Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
 
Singleton, L. A. (2003, Fall).  Silent voices: Analyzing the FCC "Media Voices" criteria.   
 Communication Law & Policy, 8(4), 385-404. 
 
Slocum, C. B. (2003,).  Joint comments of Writers Guild of America, West,  
Producers Guild of America, Shukovsky English Productions, Bungalow 78 
Entertainment, Oh Shoot Productions, Gideon Productions and UBU 
Productions.  Retrieved from http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/ 
news_and_events/press_release/fcc/WGAwEtAlComments.pdf 
 
Smith, L. K. (2003, April).  In whose best interest?  FCC deregulation and local news:  
How cross-ownership, national caps and duopolies are addressed in three 







Smith, M. Y. (1982).  The method of history.  In G.H. Stemple & B.H. Westly  
(Eds.), Research methods in mass communication (pp 305-320).  Englewood  
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc. 
 
Soley, L. (1999).  Free radio: Electronic civil disobedience.  Boulder, CO: Westview.  
 
Spavins, T. C., Denison, L, Frenette, L., & Roberts, S. (2002, September).  The  
measurement of local television news and public affairs programs: Media 
ownership working group study #7.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ 
ownership/materials/already-released/measurement090002.pdf. 
 
Starr, J. (2000).  Air wars: The fight to reclaim public broadcasting.  Boston: MA.   
 Beacon Press. 
 
Stavitsky, A. G. (1995).  Guys in suits with charts: Audience research in public radio.   
 Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 39(2), 177-189. 
 
 Stavitsky, A. G. & Avery, R. K. (2003).  U.S. public broadcasting and the business of  
public service.  In G.F. Lowe & T. Hujanen (Eds.), (pp.137-146). Broadcasting 
and convergence: New articulations of public service remit. Goteburg, Sweden: 
Nordicom.  
 
Stavitsky, A. G., & Avery, R. K., & Vanhala, H. (2001).  From Class D to LPFM: The  
 high-powered politics of low-power radio.  Journalism & Mass Communication  
 Quarterly, 78(2), 340-354. 
 
Steiner, G.A. (1963).  The people look at television: A study of audience 
attitudes.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 
Sterling, C. H.  (1984).  Electronic media: A guide to trends in broadcasting and 
newer technologies 1920-1983.  New York: Praeger. 
 
Sterling, C. H., & Kittross, J. M. (1990). Stay tuned: A concise history of American 
broadcasting (2nd ed.). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
 
Stern, C. (2001, March 13).  Blocked radio deals approved; Chairman of FCC uses  
administrative powers.  Washington Post, p. E3. 
 
Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). 
 
Streeter, T.  (1987).  The cable fable revisited: Discourse, policy, politics, and the making 
of cable television.  Critical Studies in Mass Communication 4(2), 174-200. 
 
Streeter, T. (1990).  Beyond freedom of speech and public interest: The relevance of  






Streeter, T. (1996).  Selling the air: A critique of the policy of commercial broadcasting  
in the United States.  Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
 
Strong opposition to media cross-ownership emerges. (2003, July 13).  Washington, DC:  




Student note: Paying attention to justice: The FCC and the failure to regulate. (2002, 
 Fall). Media Law & Policy, 62-83. 
 
Sunstein, C. R. (1995).  Democracy and the problem of free speech.  New York: The Free 
 Press. 
 
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 
Tedlow, R. S. (1985).  The antitrust movement: Symbolic politics and industrial  
organization economics.  In A. D. T. Chandler, & S. Richard (Eds.), The coming 
 of managerial capitalism: A casebook on the history of American economic  
institutions (pp. 551-578).  Homewood IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 
 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Conference Report.  Congressional Record, S 686  
 142(14).  
 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  P. L. No. 104, 110 Stat. 56.  (1996). 
 
Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995.  S. 652, 104th  
Congress (1995). 
 
Telecommunications Competition and Deregulatory Act 141 Cong. Rec. S. 7881 (1995) 
 
Time Warner Entm't. Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 162 (D.C. Circuit 2001) 
 
Trigoboff, D. (2003, June 9).  Copps: Dereg foes will be back.  Broadcasting & Cable,  
133(23) 26. 
 
Tristani, G. (2001a).  Dissenting statement of Commissioner Gloria Tristani 
Re: Transfer of control of broadcast licenses held by subsidiaries of Chris-Craft 
Industries, Inc., to Fox Television Stations, Inc.  Retrieved from 
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Tristani/Statements/2001/stgt149.html 
 









Tuckel, P., & O'Neill, H. (2002, September/October).  The vanishing respondent in  
telephone surveys.  Journal of Advertising Research, 42(5), 26-48. 
 
Turner Broadcasting Company Inc., v. FCC 512 U.S 662 (1994). 
 
Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc. v. FCC 520 U.S.180 (1997). 
  
Turner, T. (2003).  Monopoly or democracy?  Washington Post, p. A23. 
 
2 FRC Ann. Rep 166 (1928). 
 
United Church of Christ.  (n.d.).  About us.  Retrieved from http://www.ucc.org/about-us/ 
 
United States v. Clear Channel Communications Civil Action No.: 1:00CV02063, 
 (2001, September 6) pp.1-10. 
 
United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation et al. 12 F. 2d 614 (1926). 
 
Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557(1886). 
 
Waldfogel, J. (2001).  Consolidation and localism.  Roundtable on FCC Ownership 
Policies.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/roundtable_docs/ 
 waldfogel-stmt.pdf 
 
Waldfogel, J. (2002).  Consumer substitution among media: Media ownership working 
group study #3.  Retrieved from http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/materials/already-
released/consumer090002.pdf 
 
Waldfogel, J. (n.d.).  Curriculum Vita.  Retrieved fromhttp://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
 ~waldfogj/cv.pdf 
 
Wallace, N. (2004, March 4).  Technology.  Chronicle of Philanthropy, 16(10), 3. 
 
Wertheimer, F. (1995, Spring).  Common Cause and the new political era.  Common 
Cause Magazine, 21(1), 30. 
 
Wetlaufer, G. B. (1999).  Systems of belief in modern American law: A view from 
century’s end.  American University Law Review, 49(1), 1-79. 
 
What you don’t know can hurt: Television’s vast wasteland. (1961, January).  Consumer 
Reports, 26, 424-427. 
 








Whitney, D. (2002, October 14).  Most powerful women in television.  Electronic Media,  
21, 8-18. 
 
Wiebe, R. H. (1967).  The search for order: 1877-1920.  New York: Hill and Wang. 
 
Wieck, P. (1973, June 2).  The John Gardner Brigade.  New Republic, 168(22), 21-23.  
Wigfield, M. (2003, April 9).  Deals & dealmakers: Index relaxing media ownership still  
engenders fear in industry. Wall Street Journal, p. C5. 
 
Williams, G., Brown, K., & Alexander, P. (2002).  Radio market structure  
and music diversity: Media ownership working group study #9.  Retrieved from 
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/materials/already-released/radiomarket090002.pdf. 
 
Williams, G., & Roberts, S. (2002).  Radio industry review 2002: Trends in  




Williams, R. (1998).  From Marxism and literature.  In D. H. Richter (Ed.), Critical  
tradition: Classic texts and contemporary trends.  Boston: St. Martin's Press. 
 
Witherspoon, J., Kovitz, R., Avery, R. K., & Stavitsky, A. G. (2000).  A history of public  
 broadcasting.  Washington, DC: Current Publishing. 
  
Yang, C. (2003, June 16).  Mad as hell at the FCC.  Business Week, 3837, 37. 
 
Yochi, D. (2003, September 5).  No-frills fighter stuns the FCC, media goliaths.  Wall  
Street Journal, p. B1. 
 
Zelizer, B. (1993).  Journalists as interpretive communities.  Critical Studies in Mass  
 Communications 3(10), 219-237. 
 
Zinn, H. (1985).  A people's history of the United States: 1492-Present.  New York:  
HarperPerennial. 
